nfa. 


•  J>* 

ji 


THE 


VEIL    REMOVED; 


REFLECTIONS 


DAVID  HUMPHREYS'  ESSAY  ON  THE  LIFE 


ISRAEL    PUTNAM. 

ALSO, 

NOTICES  OF  OLIVER  W.  B.  PEABODY's  LIFE  OF  THE  SAME, 

s.  SWETT'S  SKETCH  OF  BUNKER  HILL  BATTLE, 

ETC.   ETC. 


BY  JOHN 'FELLOWS.' 


"  History  has  been  styled,  '  The  evidence  of  time — the  depository  of  events.'  It  should 
oblige  all  who  have  performed  any  distinguished  part  on  the  theater  of  the  world  to  appear 
before  us  in  their  proper  character ;  and  to  render  the  account  of  their  actions  at  the  tri 
bunal  of  posterity,  as  models  which  ought  to  be  followed,  or  as  examples  to  be  censured 
and  avoided." — Gordon,  Hist.  Am.  Rev. 


NEW    YORK: 
JAMES   D.    LOCKWOOD, 

5  JOHN-STREET. 

1843. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1843, 

BY  JOHN  FELLOWS, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  Southern  District  of 
New  York. 


Stereotyped  by 

RICHARD  C.  VALENTINE, 
45  Gold-street,  New  York. 

Printed  by 
GEORGE  W.  WOOD  &  CO., 

45  Gold  Street. 


PREFACE. 


"  Is  the  time  never  to  arrive  when  an  honest  man 
can  tell  the  truth  as  to  the  events  of  the  revolution  ? 
Are  facts,  in  regard  to  the  character  and  conduct  of 
Gen.  Putnam,  to  be  refuted  by  idle  denials,  and  tales  to 
be  deemed  veracious  because  they  have  been  often  re 
peated  ?  I  trust  not,  but  that  the  time  will  come  when 
the  candid  and  impartial  historian  will  do  full  justice  to 
the  men  who  were  distinguished  in  the  war  for  national 
independence." 

The  above  is  an  extract  of  a  letter  in  reference  to 
the  work  I  had  commenced.  The  prophecy  of  the 
writer  is,  I  believe,  already  fulfilled.  The  fullness  of 
time,  in  respect  to  this  matter,  has  at  length  arrived. 

Judge  Marshall  has  done  much  to  dissipate  the  mist 
that  enveloped  a  portion  of  our  revolutionary  history, 
and  other  lights  have  appeared  since  his  publication, 
that  clear  the  way  for  Mr.  Bancroft  to  complete  the 
work. 

Objections  are  made  to  my  undertaking ;  that  it  is 
too  late  to  correct  erroneous  statements  of  occurrences 
which  happened  so  long  ago  as  our  revolutionary  war; 
that  the  sacred  ashes  of  the  dead  should  not  be  disturb 
ed,  de  mortuis  nil  nisi  bonum,  etc.  As  though  the  truth 
should  not  be  told,  for  the  benefit  of  the  living,  from  fear 
of  injuring  the  deceased,  who  are  beyond  the  reach  of 
harm.  This  principle  acted  upon  would  render  history 
as  worthless  as  romance. 

Many  even  say,  if  they  suspected  they  had  been 

4.11452 


'4 

cheated  in  respect  to  the  history  of  Putnam,  they  would 
not  wish  to  be  undeceived ;  showing  thereby  the  tena 
city  with  which  the  generality  of  mankind  cling  to  pre 
conceived  opinions.  With  such,  all  argument  would  be 
vain  and  useless. 

It  is,  moreover,  said  that  the  feelings  of  the  descend 
ants  of  Gen.  Putnam  would  be  wounded  by  any  remarks 
tending  to  depreciate  the  military  fame  of  their  ancestor. 
To  this  I  answer,  that  in  the  United  States  every  per 
son  is  estimated  by  his  individual  merits,  and  the  de 
scendants  of  Gen.  Putnam  may  be  entitled  to  the  highest 
respect,  without  claiming  one  of  the  greatest  military 
heroes  in  the  world  for  their  ancestor. 

If  the  history  of  our  glorious  revolution  has  been  per 
verted  by  awarding  undue  honor  to  some,  to  the  neglect 
of  those  more  deserving  ;  if  the  stories  promulgated  to 
the  world  by  Col.  Humphreys  and  others  of  the  won 
derful  prowess  and  achievements  of  Israel  Putnam  are 
not  true,  and  the  credit  bestowed  upon  them  disreputa 
ble  to  an  intelligent,  free  people,  I  can  see  no  reason 
why  they  should  not  be  shown  to  be  at  variance  with 
fact.  This  is  the  object  I  have  in  view,  without  any 
ill-will  towards  Gen.  Putnam,  or  any  of  his  family,  none 
of  whom  have  I  ever  known. 

I  have  not  written  without  book ;  but  if  any  errors, 
in  matter  of  fact,  should  be  pointed  out,  that  have  crept 
into  the  work,  they  will  be  acknowledged  with  pleasure, 
and  corrected.  Vituperative  abuse  will  be  suffered  to 
pass  unheeded. 

NEW  FORK,  Feb.,  1843. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PUTNAM'S  Birth  and  Education — Singular  Adventure  in  Killing 
a  Wolf,  p.  32. — Engages  in  the  French  War — Expedition  in 
quest  of  a  Prisoner,  38. — Putnam  and  Durkee  tumble  into  a 
Clay-pit,  40. — A  Singular  Race,  46. — P.  goes  on  a  Scout  in 
open  daylight,  48. — Chivalrous  Adventure,  52. — P.'s  remarka 
ble  Courage  in  extinguishing  a  Fire  which  had  taken  place 
in  the  Barracks  at  Fort  Edward,  55. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Expedition  against  Ticonderoga,  57. — Perilous  descent  of  the 
Rapids,  near  Fort  Miller,  66. — Scout  to  South  Bay — Putnam 
made  prisoner,  and  taken  to  Montreal,  67. — Col.  Peter  Schuy- 
ler  and  Mrs.  Jemima  Howe,  77. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Expedition  against  Montreal,  86. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Putnam  offered  a  Bribe  by  Gen.  Gage  to  support  the  Royal 
cause,  97. — Gen.  Charles  Lee — Skirmish  on  Hog  and  Noddle 
Islands,  103. — Letter  from  Roger  Sherman  to  Gen.  Wooster 
on  the  appointment  of  a  Major-general  by  Congress,  from 
Connecticut,  106. — Letter  from  Gen.  Washington  to  the  Presi^ 
dent  of  Congress  on  the  appointment  of  general  officers,  107. — 
1* 


6 

Trumbull's  Painting  of  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  109.— Ex 
tracts  from  the  Histories  of  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill  by  various 
authors,  with  the  testimony  of  persons  in  the  action,  116. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Sketch  of  Bunker  Hill  Battle,  by  S.  Swett,  141. — George  E.  Ellis's 
Oration,  in  commemoration  of  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  155. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Battle  of  Long  Island,  165.— Letter  of  Gen.  Sullivan  to  the  Pre 
sident  of  Congress,  171. — Letter  of  Gen.  Washington  to  Gen. 
Sullivan,  172. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

Putnam's  command  on  the  North  River.  Forts  Montgomery 
and  Clinton  taken,  174. — Col.  Hamilton's  Letters  to  Gen. 
Washington  respecting  Gen.  Putnam's  neglect  to  obey  his 
orders  to  forward  reinforcements  to  him  in  the  vicinity  of 
Philadelphia,  193. — Washington's  Letter  Jo  Putnam  requiring 
him  in  the  most  peremptory  manner  to  forward  the  troops,  be 
fore  ordered,  immediately,  199. — Chancellor  Livingston's  Let 
ter  to  Gen.  Washington,  complaining  of  Gen.  Putnam's  "  im 
prudent  lenity  to  the  disaffected,  and  too  great  intercourse  with 
the  enemy,"  211. — Horse  Neck  Expedition,  213.— Gen.  Put 
nam's  command  of  fifty  men,  stationed  at  Princeton — Capt. 
McPherson,  219. — Mrs.  Coghlan,  221.— Military  conduct  of 
Col.  Burr  and  Gen.  Putnam  contrasted,  225. — Putnam's  death 
— Reflections. 


INTRODUCTION. 

I  SHALL  have  frequent  occasion  to  refer  to  the  journal 
of  Major  Robert  Rogers,  who  commanded  a  corps  of 
provincial  troops  denominated  Rangers,  during  the 
French  or  Seven  Years'  War,  so  called.  The  journal 
was  published  at  London,  in  1765.  And  as  the  work 
is  probably  little  known  in  America,  it  will  doubt 
less  be  satisfactory  to  the  reader  to  be  made  acquainted 
with  the  character  and  standing  of  the  author.  For 
this  purpose,  I  will  in  the  first  place  give  an  abstract 
of  the  introduction  to  the  work  ;  followed  by  official 
documents,  establishing  the  reputation  Major  Rogers 
acquired  with  the  respective  commanders  ;  likewise 
examples  of  his  hazardous  enterprises. 

"  I  claim,"  says  the  author,  "the  merit  of  impartially 
relating  matters  of  fact  without  disguise  or  equivocation. 
Most  of  those  which  relate  to  myself  can  at  present  be 
attested  by  living  witnesses." 

As  an  apology  for  defects  in  the  style  of  his  journal, 
he  says :  "  It  is  the  soldier,  not  the  scholar,  who  writes  ; 
that  many  things  here  were  written  in  deserts,  on  rocks 
and  mountains,  amidst  the  hurries,  disorders,  and  noise 
of  war.  This  was  my  situation  when  the  following 
journals  were  transmitted  to  the  generals  and  com 
manders  I  acted  under ;  which  I  am  not  now  at  liberty 
to  correct,  except  in  some  very  gross  and  palpable 
errors." 

Major  Rogers  was  a  native  of  a  frontier  town  in  the 


8  INTRODUCTION. 

then  province  of  New  Hampshire,  where,  he  says,  "  I 
could  hardly  avoid  obtaining  some  knowledge  of  the 
manners,  customs,  and  language  of  the  Indians ;  and 
my  manner  of  life  was  such  as  led  me  to  a  general  ac 
quaintance  with  the  British  and  French  settlements. 

"At  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  in  1755,  troops 
were  levied  in  the  several  provinces  of  New  England, 
New  York,  and  New  Jersey.  The  general  rendezvous 
was  appointed  at  Albany,  in  the  province  of  New 
York,  and  the  troops  put  under  the  command  of  Major- 
general  (since  Sir  William)  Johnson.  I  had  the  honor 
of  commanding  a  company  in  the  troops  furnished  by 
New  Hampshire ;  and  was  recommended  to  the  gen 
eral  as  a  person  well  acquainted  with  the  haunts  and 
passes  of  the  enemy,  and  the  Indian  method  of  fighting." 

"The  24th  of  September,  [1755,]  I  received  an  order 
from  the  general  to  proceed  with  four  men  to  Crown 
Point,  and,  if  practicable,  bring  a  prisoner  from  thence  ; 
and  with  an  account  of  the  manner  in  which  I  executed 
this  order,  I  shall  begin  my  journals." 

The  major  then  proceeds  to  detail  his  various  expe 
ditions  and  rencounters  with  the  enemy ;  of  which  I 
shall  presently  give  an  account  of  two,  that  proved 
very  disastrous  to  the  rangers.  Reference  to  others 
will  also  occur,  in  the  course  of  this  work. — I  now  pass 
to  the  official  documents  alluded  to  above. 

"  In  January,  1758,"  says  the  author,  "  Lord  Loudoun 
informed  me  of  his  intention  to  levy  five  additional  com 
panies  of  rangers,  desiring  me  to  name  the  persons 
whom  I  thought  fit  for  officers,  and  such  as  might  be 
depended  upon  to  levy  the  men,  giving  me  the  follow 
ing  instructions :  *  Whereas,  I  have  thought  proper  to 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

augment  the  rangers  with  five  additional  companies, 
that  is,  four  New  England  and  one  Indian  company ; 
and  whereas  I  have  an  entire  confidence  in  your  skill 
and  knowledge  of  the  men  most  fit  for  that  service ;  I 
do,  therefore,  by  these  presents,  appoint  you  to  raise 
such  a  number  of  non-commissioned  officers  and  pri 
vate  men  as  will  be  necessary  to  complete  the  said  five 
companies,  upon  the  following  establishments,'  &c. — 
*  You  will  not  fail  to  instruct  the  officers  appointed  to 
this  service  that  they  are  not  to  enlist  any  man  for  a 
less  term  than  one  year,  nor  any  but  what  are  able- 
bodied,  well  acquainted  with  the  woods,  used  to  hunt 
ing,  and  every  way  qualified  for  the  ranging  service. 
You  are  also  to  observe  that  the  men  are  all  to  be  at 
Fort  Edward  on  or  before  the  15th  of  March  next  en 
suing.' 

"In  pursuance  of  the  above  instructions,  I  immediately 
sent  officers  to  the  New  England  provinces,  where,  by 
the  assistance  of  my  friends,  the  requested  augmenta 
tion  of  rangers  was  quickly  completed,  the  whole  five 
companies  being  ready  for  service  by  the  fourth  day 
of  March." 

On  the  6th  of  April,  1758,  Capt.  Rogers  was  promo 
ted  to  a  majority,  by  Gen.  Abercrombie,  who  had  suc 
ceeded  Lord  Loudoun,  on  the  latter's  returning  to  Eng 
land.  The  commission  says :  "  Having  the  greatest 
confidence  in  your  loyalty,  courage  and  skill  in  this 
kind  of  service,  [that  of  the  rangers,]  I  do,  by  virtue  of 
the  power  and  authority  to  me  given  by  his  majesty, 
hereby  constitute  and  appoint  you  to  be  major  of  the 
rangers  in  his  majesty's  service,  and  likewise  captain 
of  a  company  of  said  rangers,"  &c. 


10  INTRODUCTION. 

At  the  close  of  the  French  war  in  America,  in  1760, 
Major  Rogers  was  commissioned,  by  Gen.  Amherst, 
then  commander-in-chief,  to  receive  the  surrender  of 
Detroit  and  other  western  posts,  then  in  possession  of 
the  French.  The  commission  is  addressed  to  Major 
Rogers,  commanding  his  majesty's  independent  compa 
nies  of  rangers.  It  is  dated  at  the  head-quarters  in 
the  camp  of  Montreal,  12th  of  September,  1760. 

Major  Rogers  gives  a  particular  account  of  the  man 
ner  in  which  he  executed  this  service,  including  his  cor 
respondence  with  the  French  commander  at  Detroit, 
and  a  journal  of  his  whole  tour,  which  terminated  at 
New  York,  February  the  14th,  1761.  And  with  this 
he  closes  his  book,  an  octavo  volume  of  two  hundred 
and  forty-eight  pages. 

Thus  it  appears  that  Major  Rogers,  by  his  fidelity, 
courage,  and  skill,  obtained  the  fullest  confidence 
and  approbation  of  the  several  general  officers  under 
whom  he  served  from  the  commencement  to  the  end 
of  the  war.  And  as  his  journals,  although  not  formally 
addressed  to  the  commanders-in-chief,  were  constantly 
submitted  to  their  inspection  ;  and,  moreover,  as  his 
work  was  published  soon  after  the  close  of  the  war, 
while  living  witnesses  of  the  transactions  therein  re 
corded  might  contradict  his  statements,  if  incorrect,  we 
may  safely  place  the  utmost  faith  in  the  truth  of  the 
record. 

The  author  subjoins  to  the  work  the  following  ad 
vertisement  : — "  It  is  proposed  to  continue  this  journal 
in  a  second  volume,  containing  an  account  of  my  travels 
into  the  country  of  the  Cherokees  and  of  the  southern 
Indians ;  also  of  my  second  tour  into  the  interior  coun- 


INTRODUCTION.  11 

try  upon  the  great  lakes,  and  of  the  Indian  wars  in 
America  since  the  year  1760,  with  correct  plans  of  all 
the  British  forts  upon  the  American  continent." 

I  take  the  following  notice  of  Major  Rogers  and  the 
rangers  from  Mr.  Edward  Everett's  Life  of  John  Stark, 
which  is  incorporated  in  Professor  Sparks'  "  Library  of 
American  Biography." 

"  A  corps  of  rangers  was  enlisted  in  New  Hampshire, 
by  Robert  Rogers,  who  acquired  great  reputation  as  a 
partisan  officer  in  the  progress  of  the  war.  Stark's  ex 
perience  on  scouting  parties  obviously  fitted  him  for 
the  service ;  and  his  character  was  already  so  well  es 
tablished,  that  he  received  a  commission  as  a  lieutenant. 

"  The  journal  of  his  service  with  these  rangers  was 
published  by  Major  Rogers  in  1765,  at  London,  and 
presents  an  exceedingly  interesting  view  of  their  severe 
and  perilous  warfare.  Their  duty  was  to  reconnoitre 
the  hostile  posts  and  armies,  to  surprise  straggling  par 
ties,  and  obtain  prisoners,  to  effect  diversions  by  false 
attacks,  to  serve  as  guides  and  couriers.  They  acted 
in  a  corps  independent  of  the  line  of  the  army,  under 
their  own  officers,  and  with  their  own  regulations,  as 
prescribed  by  their  gallant  leader,  and  still  preserved 
in  his  journal  alluded  to."* 

"  Early  in  January,  1757,  a  party  of  the  rangers  was 
detached  on  an  expedition  down  the  lake,  which  ended 
in  an  engagement  of  great  severity,  in  which  we  behold 
clear  indications  of  the  future  hero  of  Bennington." 

*  These  companies  were  kept,  during  the  war,  in  the  pay  of  the 
crown ;  and  after  the  peace,  the  officers  were  allowed  half-pay 
in  the  British  establishment. — Belknap's  Hist,  of  New  Hamp 
shire. — EDIT. 


12  INTRODUCTION. 

Here  Mr.  Everett  gives  a  detail  of  this  expedition, 
from  Rogers'  journal,  in  an  improved  style,  with  some 
additional  information  from  other  sources. 

"  The  action,  which  began  at  two  o'clock  in  the  af 
ternoon,  was  kept  up  till  sunset,  when  Major  Rogers 
received  a  wound  through  his  wrist,  which  prevented 
him  from  holding  his  gun. 

"  The  enemy  used  every  artifice  to  induce  the  ran 
gers  to  submit.  He  assured  them,  at  one  time,  that 
large  reinforcements  were  at  hand,  by  whom  they 
would  be  cut  to  pieces  without  mercy,  and  that  if  they 
surrendered  they  should  be  treated  with  kindness.  He 
called  on  Rogers  by  name,  and  assured  him  of  his  es 
teem  and  friendship,  and  expressed  his  regret  that  his 
brave  companions  in  arms  should  persist  in  maintaining 
the  contest,  at  the  hazard  of  certain  death.  But  these 
blandishments  were  as  unavailing  as  the  superior  phy 
sical  power  of  the  enemy ;  and  after  Major  Rogers's 
second  wound  had  disabled  him,  the  contest  was  kept 
up  by  Lieutenant  Stark  with  equal  bravery  and  con 
duct,  till  at  the  approach  of  night  the  fire  of  the  enemy 
ceased,  and  the  rangers  were  able  to  take  up  their  re 
treat  in  safety. 

"  The  rangers  were  much  weakened  by  the  loss  of 
men  killed,  and  they  had  a  great  number  too  severely 
wounded  to  travel  without  extreme  difficulty  and  the 
assistance  of  their  comrades.  Still,  however,  they  were 
so  near  the  French  fort,  that  it  was  deemed  absolutely 
necessary  to  make  the  best  of  their  way  during  the 
night.  Perceiving  a  large  fire  in  the  woods,  which 
they  supposed  to  be  that  of  a  hostile  party,  they  made 
a  long  circuit  in  the  night,  and  found  themselves  in  the 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

morning  six  miles  south  of  the  advanced  guard  of  the 
French,  on  Lake  George.  The  wounded  were  unable 
to  advance  further  on  foot,  and  they  were  still  forty 
miles  from  Fort  William  Henry. 

"  In  this  distressing  state  of  affairs,  Lieutenant  Stark 
volunteered,  with  two  of  his  men,  to  proceed  to  the  fort 
and  return  with  sleighs  for  the  wounded.  The  snow 
was  four  feet  deep  on  a  level,  and  could  be  traversed 
only  in  snow-shoes.  Notwithstanding  their  efforts  and 
exhaustion  the  preceding  day  and  night,  Stark  and  his 
companions  reached  the  fort,  at  a  distance  of  forty 
miles,  by  evening.  They  got  back  to  their  companions 
with  a  sleigh  and  a  small  reinforcing  party  by  the  next 
morning.  The  party,  reduced  to  forty-eight  effective 
and  six  wounded  men,  with  the  prisoners  they  had  ta 
ken  from  the  convoy,  reached  the  fort  in  safety,  the 
same  evening. 

"  In  this  severe  affair,  the  rangers,  out  of  seventy- 
eight  men,  had  fourteen  killed,  six  wounded,  and  six 
taken  prisoners.  The  force  of  the  enemy  engaged 
amounted  to  two  hundred  and  fifty,  of  which,  accord 
ing  to  a  statement  subsequently  made  by  the  enemy  to 
Major  Rogers,  one  hundred  and  sixteen  were  killed  or 
mortally  wounded.  A  large  share  of  the  honor  of  the 
day  unquestionably  belongs  to  Stark.  After  the  first 
partial  success  against  the  convoy,  it  was  recommend 
ed  by  the  council  of  officers  to  retreat,  by  a  different 
route  from  that  by  which  they  came  ;  a  settled  practice 
of  warfare  borrowed  by  the  rangers  from  the  Indians. 
Had  they  pursued  this  prudent  course,  they  would  have 
escaped  the  battle.  Rogers  however,  rendered  confi 
dent  by  a  long  series  of  successful  adventures,  and 

2 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

relying  on  the  terrors  with  which  his  rangers  had 
inspired  the  enemy,  declared  that  they  would  not  dare 
pursue  him,  and  took  the  same  route  back. 

"After  Captain  Spikeman  was  killed  and  Rogers  was 
disabled  by  his  wounds,  Stark's  fortitude  and  persever 
ance  prevented  the  party  from  throwing  away  their 
lives,  in  a  panic  flight  before  a  victorious  enemy. 

"  On  the  reorganization  of  the  corps,  Stark  received 
the  justly  merited  promotion  to  the  rank  of  captain,  in 
the  place  of  Spikeman  who  was  killed.  The  whole 
party  were  honorably  noticed  by  the  commander-in- 
chief." 

The  statement  respecting  Rogers'  determination  to 
return  by  the  same  route  in  which  they  came,  is  taken 
from  a  note  by  the  editor  of  the  Concord,  N.  H.,  edition 
of  Rogers'  journal,  on  the  authority  of  a  Mr.  Shute, 
who  was  in  the  action. — That  Stark  returned  to  the 
party,  as  above  stated,  I  presume,  is  a  mistake.  It  is 
not  unlikely  that  he  volunteered  to  proceed  to  the  fort, 
although  Rogers,  very  properly  in  an  official  report, 
says,  "  From  Lake  George  I  despatched  Lieut.  Stark 
with  two  men  to  Fort  William  Henry,  to  procure  con 
veyance  for  our  wounded  men  thither ;  and  the  next 
morning  we  were  met  by  a  party  of  fifteen  men  with 
a  sled,  under  the  command  of  Lieut.  Buckley,  of 
Hobb's  company  of  rangers,  at  the  first  narrows  at 
Lake  George." 

The  following  is  an  abstract  from  the  journal : 

"  Having  laid  my  return,  says  Rogers,  of  the  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,  in  the  above  action,  before  Maj. 
Sparks,  commanding  officer  at  Fort  Edward,  he  trans 
mitted  it  to  the  general.  And  the  30th  of  January  fol- 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

lowing,  I  wrote  to  Capt.  James  Abercrombie,  then  at 
Albany,  recommending  such  officers  as  I  thought  most 
deserving  to  fill  the  vacancies  occasioned  by  the  late 
action ;  and  I  received  the  following  answer : 

'Albany,  Feb.  6,  1757. 
*  DEAR  SIR  : 

'  The  general  received  your  report  by  Maj.  Sparks, 
and  returns  you  and  your  men  thanks  for  your  good 
behavior.  On  receiving  the  account  of  your  skirmish, 
we  sent  an  express  to  Boston,  and  expect  his  return  in 
a  few  days.  Please  to  send  me  the  names  of  the  offi 
cers  you  would  recommend  for  your  own  company, 
and  also  to  fill  the  vacancies  in  the  others. — I  yesterday 
received  yours  of  the  30th  of  January.  You  cannot 
imagine  how  all  ranks  of  people  here  are  pleased  with 
your  conduct,  and  that  of  your  men  ;  for  my  own  part, 
it  is  no  more  than  I  expected.  *  *  *  As  soon 

as  Gen.  Abercrombie  receives  Lord  Loudoun's  instruc 
tions  in  regard  to  the  rangers,  I  shall  send  you  notice 
of  it ;  in  the  interim,  I  hope  you  will  get  the  better  of 
your  wound.  If  I  can  be  of  any  service  to  you  or  your 
men,  as  long  as  they  continue  to  behave  so  well,  you 
may  command  your  most  humble  servant, 

4  JAMES  ABERCROMBIE,  aid-de-camp. 

*  To  Capt.  ROBERT  ROGERS.'  " 

The  Concord  editor,  above  mentioned,  says  of  Ro 
gers  :  "  He  was  a  man  of  great  presence  of  mind,  in 
trepidity,  and  perseverance  in  the  accomplishment  of 
his  plans.  He  was  six  feet  in  height,  well-proportioned, 
and  one  of  the  most  active  and  athletic  men  of  his  time. 


16  INTRODUCTION. 

The  Indians  entertained  a  great  dread  of  him,  and  with 
very  good  reason. — The  late  Gen.  Stark,  who  had  been 
for  years  the  companion  and  friend  of  Rogers,  gave  him 
full  credit  for  his  courage." 

I  will  give  here  another  specimen  of  the  severe  and 
hazardous  duties  imposed  upon  Maj.  Rogers  and  the 
rangers,  and  of  their  courage  and  perseverance  in  the 
performance  of  them  :  in  which  it  is  also  shown  that 
Capt.  Putnam  had  no  connection  with  this  corps. 

"  On  the  28th  of  February,  1758,  Col.  Haviland,  who 
then  commanded  at  Fort  Edward,  ordered  out  a  scout 
under  the  direction  of  one  Putnam,  who  commanded  a 
company  of  Connecticut  provincials,  with  some  of  my 
men,  giving  out  publicly  at  the  same  time,  that,  upon 
Putnam's  return,  I  should  be  sent  to  the  French  forts 
with  a  strong  party  of  four  hundred  rangers.  This 
was  known  not  only  to  the  officers,  but  soldiers  also, 
before  Putnam's  departure. 

"  While  this  party  was  out,  a  man  in  the  service  of 
Mr.  Best,  a  sutler,  was  captured  by  a  party  from  Ti- 
conderoga,  and  one  of  Putnam's  men  deserted  to  the 
enemy.  Upon  Capt.  Putnam's  return,  we  were  inform 
ed,  he  had  ventured  within  eight  miles  of  the  French  fort 
at  Ticonderoga,  and  that  a  party  he  had  sent  to  make 
discoveries  reported  to  him,  that  there  were  nearly  six 
hundred  Indians  not  far  from  the  enemy's  quarters. 

"March  10th.-  Soon  after  the  said  Capt.  Putnam's 
return,  in  consequence  of  positive  orders  from  Col.  Hav 
iland,  I  this  day  began  a  march  for  the  neighborhood 
of  Carillon,  [the  French  name  of  Ticonderoga,]  not  with 
a  party  of  four  hundred  men,  as  first  given  out,  but  of 
one  hundred  and  eighty  men  only,  officers  included.  I 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

acknowledge  I  entered  upon  this  service,  and  viewed 
this  small  detachment  of  brave  men  march  out,  with 
no  little  concern  and  uneasiness  of  mind ;  for  as  there 
was  the  greatest  reason  to  expect  that  the  enemy  were, 
by  the  prisoner  and  deserter  above  mentioned,  fully 
informed  of  the  design  of  sending  me  out  upon  Put 
nam's  return,  what  could  I  think,  to  see  my  party,  in 
stead  of  being  augmented,  reduced  to  less  than  half  the 
number  originally  proposed  ?  I  must  confess  it  appear 
ed  to  me,  ignorant  and  unskilful  as  I  then  was  in  poli 
tics  and  the  arts  of  war,  incomprehensible  ;  but  my 
commander  doubtless  had  his  reasons,  and  is  able  to 
vindicate  his  own  conduct.  [The  foregoing  clause  is 
italicized  by  the  author ;  who  doubtless  had  his  suspi 
cions  that  Col.  Haviland  had  been  influenced  by  im 
proper  motives  in  this  case.  And  I  am  inclined  to 
believe  he  was  moved  by  jealousy  at  the  fame  of  the 
American  partisan  officer,  Rogers,  and  his  rangers, 
and  intended  they  should  be  massacred.  There  are 
such  wretches  in  all  armies.  America  has  not  been 
free  .from  them.]  We  marched  to  the  half-way  brook, 
and  there  encamped  the  first  night." — Journal,  p.  79.) 

Here  the  author  gives  a  minute  detail  of  his  scout, 
and  of  his  bloody,  disastrous  conflict  with  the  enemy ; 
which  occupies  ten  octavo  pages.  This  detail  would 
afford  but  little  interest  to  the  reader,  at  the  present  day. 
I,  therefore,  pass  to  the  author's  concluding  remarks : 

"  The  enemy  pushed  us  so  close  in  front,  that  the 
parties  were  not  more  than  twenty  yards  asunder  in 
general,  and  sometimes  intermixed  with  each  other. 
The  fire  continued  almost  constant  for  an  hour  and  a 
half,  from  the  beginning  of  the  attack,  in  which  we  lost 

2* 


18  INTRODUCTION. 

eight  officers,  and  more  than  one  hundred  privates  kill 
ed  upon  the  spot.  We  were  at  last  obliged  to  break, 
and  I  with  about  twenty  men  ran  up  the  hill  to  Crafton, 
where  we  stopped  and  fired  on  the  Indians,  who  were 
eagerly  pursuing  us  with  numbers  we  could  not  with 
stand.  Lieut.  Phillips,  being  surrounded  by  three  hun 
dred  Indians,  was  at  this  time  capitulating  for  himself 
and  party,  on  the  other  part  of  the  hill.  He  spoke  to 
me,  and  said  if  the  enemy  would  give  them  good  quar 
ters,  he  thought  it  best  to  surrender,  otherwise  that  he 
would  fight  while  he  had  one  man  left  to  fire  a  gun.* 

"  I  now  retreated  with  the  remainder  of  my  party, 
in  the  best  manner  possible  ;  several  who  were  wound 
ed  and  fatigued,  were  taken  by  the  Indians.  We 
reached  Lake  George  in  the  evening,  where  we  found 
several  wounded  men,  whom  we  took  with  us  to  the 
place  where  we  had  left  our  sleds.  From  this  place  I 
sent  an  express  to  Fort  Edward,  desiring  Mr.  Haviland 
to  send  a  party  to  assist  in  bringing  in  the  wounded. 
We  passed  the  night  here  without  fire,  or  blankets 
which  had  fallen  into  the  enemy's  hands.  In  the 
morning  we  proceeded  up  the  lake,  and,  at  Hoop  is 
land,  met  Capt.  John  Stark  coming  to  our  relief,  with 
provisions,  blankets,  and  sleighs.  We  encamped  there 
that  night,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  next  day,  March 
15th,  arrived  at  Fort  Edward. 

"  The  number*  of  the  enemy  who  attacked  us  was 
about  seven  hundred,  of  whom  six  hundred  were  In- 

*  This  unfortunate  officer  and  his  party,  upon  the  strongest  as 
surances  of  good  treatment,  after  they  surrendered,  were  tied  to 
trees,  and  hewed  to  pieces  in  the  most  barbarous  and  shocking 
manner. 


INTRODUCTION.  19 

dians.  We  afterwards  learned  that  we  killed  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  of  them,  and  wounded  as  many  more.  I 
will  not  pretend  to  say  what  would  have  been  the  re 
sult  of  this  unfortunate  expedition  had  our  numbers  been 
four  hundred  strong,  as  was  contemplated  ;  but  it  is  due 
to  those  brave  officers  and  men  who  accompanied  me, 
most  of  whom  are  now  no  more,  to  declare,  that  every 
man,  in  his  respective  station,  behaved  with  uncommon 
resolution  and  courage ;  nor  do  I  know  an  instance 
during  the  action  in  which  the  prudence  or  good  con 
duct  of  one  of  them  could  be  questioned."  (Journal,  p.  87.) 
In  making  the  above  abstract  from  Rogers'  journal,  I 
have  in  some  parts  adopted  the  language  of  the  Con 
cord,  N.  H.,  edition  of  that  work.  The  editor  of  this 
edition,  by  the  way,  has  taken  unbounded  liberty  with 
the  original,  adding  to,  and  deducting  from  it,  ad  libi 
tum ;  as  well  as  occasionally  changing  its  phraseology. 
To  this  perhaps  there  would  be  no  objection,  provided 
the  reader  were  informed  of  the  course  taken.  The 
diction,  where  the  editor  appears  to  take  any  pains 
about  it,  is  improved ;  and  the  additions  are  probably 
correct,  particularly  the  information  derived  from  Gen. 
Stark,  whose  Life  is  included  in  the  same  volume,  which 
was  the  principal  object  of  the  publication.  The  jour 
nal,  moreover,  would  well  admit  of  great  curtailment 
in  its  details,  judiciously  made.  The  editor,  however, 
did  not,  I  think,  take  sufficient  time  to  prepare  the  work 
so  well  as  he  might  have  done. 

REVIEW  OF  ROGERS'  JOURNAL. 

The  following  is  the  only  English  notice  of  the  work, 
that  has  fallen  under  my  observation  : 


20  INTRODUCTION. 

"  *  Journals  of  Major  Robert  Rogers  ;  containing  an 
account  of  the  several  excursions  he  made,  under  the 
generals  who  commanded  on  the  continent  of  America, 
during  the  late  war.  From  which  may  be  collected 
the  most  material  circumstances  of  every  campaign  on 
that  continent,  from  the  commencement  to  the  conclu 
sion  of  the  war.'  From  the  specimen  of  the  work  now 
before  us,  it  appears  that  the  accounts  of  Major  Rogers 
may  be  depended  upon  by  the  public;  they  are  un 
doubtedly  as  authentic  as  they  are  important  and  ne 
cessary  to  those  who  would  acquire  a  thorough  under 
standing  of  the  nature  and  progress  of  the  late  military 
operations  in  North  America. 

"  The  author  writes  like  an  honest,  a  sensible,  and  a 
modest  man ;  and  has  given,  throughout  his  whole  ac 
count,  undoubted  proofs  that  he  is  a  brave  and  skilful 
officer.  He  headed,  with  much  reputation,  the  provin 
cial  troops  called  rangers,  during  the  whole  course  of 
what  were  called  the  French  wars  in  America." — Bibli- 
otheca  Americana  Nova,  or  catalogue  of  books  relating 
to  America,  printed  from  1700  to  1800.  By  O.  Rich. 
London,  1832. 

That  no  doubt  may  rest  on  the  mind  of  the  reader 
in  regard  to  the  authenticity  of  the  statements  of  facts 
by  Maj.  Rogers,  in  his  journal,  the  following  testimony 
of  his  title  to  credibility  has  been  obtained  from  the  dis 
tinguished  gentlemen  therein  named,  citizens  of  his  na 
tive  state,  where  his  character  would  doubtless  be  duly 
estimated : 


INTRODUCTION.  21 

"  Concord,  July  16,  1842. 
"  DEAR  SIR — 

"  I  have  made  some  inquiry  respecting  Major  R. 
Rogers,  and  among  our  oldest  inhabitants  I  find  but 
one  opinion  respecting  his  character,  and  that  is  fully 
expressed  in  the  note -enclosed  to  me,  and  transmitted 
herewith  to  you,  from  Gov.  Hill. 

"  Mr.  Hill  has  perhaps  a  better  knowledge  of  Major 
Rogers'  character,  as  an  officer,  than  any  other  person 
here :  he  has  been  prompted  by  reasons  which  could 
not  have  operated  on  others. 

"  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  ROBERT  DAVIS. 
"Mr.  CHARLES  COFFIN,  New  York  city." 

"  Concord,  July  2,  1842. 
"  GEN.  ROBERT  DAVIS  : 

"  MY    DKAK   SiK 

"  I  have  this  moment  read  Mr.  Coffin's  letter  address 
ed  to  you,  requesting  information  in  relation  to  the  char 
acter  of  the  late  Maj.  Robert  Rogers.  Having  recently 
had  occasion  to  make  inquiries  relative  to  his  early  his 
tory,  I  find  nothing  in  the  region  of  his  birth  that  goes 
at  all  to  discredit  him.  One  of  the  last  of  his  blood  re 
lations  in  this  vicinity  who  personally  remembered  him, 
a  lady,  died  about  one  year  ago.  From  her  mouth, 
through  Mark  Burnham,  Esq.,  a  native  of  the  same 
town  with  Rogers,  I  derived  the  information  that  all 
the  family  were  proud  of  his  name,  and  were  reluctant 
to  associate  it  with  a  reputation  that  was  not  entirely 
unsullied.  Maj.  Rogers  never  resided  in  this  state  per 
manently  after  the  commencement  of  the  Revolutionary 
War :  he  was  in  the  British  service  in  Canada  after  the 


22  INTRODUCTION. 

close  of  the  old  French  War,  partly  in  a  military,  and 
partly  in  a  civil  capacity.  The  only  child  bearing  his 
name  was  several  years  under  my  care  as  guardian : 
this  circumstance,  among  others,  has  led  me  more  par 
ticularly  to  mark  the  character  of  the  celebrated  war 
rior.  I  consider  him  to  have  been  one  of  the  most 
talented  men  of  the  country — perhaps  the  best  partisan 
officer  this  country  ever  produced.  I  believe  him  to 
have  been  the  author  of  that  perfect  mode  of  attack  and 
defence  which  enabled  a  hundred  of  the  rangers  to  do 
more  service  than  thousands  of  the  British  regulars,  es 
pecially  in  the  winter  service  of  the  old  war  of  1756. 
Such  safety  to  troops  on  fatigue  amid  the  severest  sea 
sons  of  a  severe  climate  was  never  secured — such  cer 
tainty  in  the  results,  either  on  the  advance  or  retreat, 
perhaps,  was  never  realized  by  any  other  force  than 
the  rangers,  under  the  perfect  arrangement  and  disci 
pline  invented  by  Rogers.  I  consider  him  to  have  been 
as  great  a  man  in  his  peculiar  sphere  as  Napoleon  Bo 
naparte,  and  of  moral  courage  and  honesty  coming 
nearly  if  not  quite  up  to  the  mark  of  Andrew  Jackson. 
"  I  am,  respectfully,  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

ISAAC  HILL." 


In  the  course  of  this  volume,  frequent  reference  will 
be  made  to  the  following  work : 

*'  History  of  the  late  war  in  North  America  and  the 
Islands  of  the  West  Indies  ;  including  the  campaigns 
of  1763  and  1764,  against  his  majesty's  Indian  ene 
mies.  By  Thomas  Mante,  Major  of  a  brigade  in  the 
campaign  of  1764.  London,  1772." 


INTRODUCTION.  23 

A  quarto  volume  of  542  pages,  with  a  volume  con 
taining  maps  and  plans. 

The  Bibliotheca,  Americana  Nova  speaks  thus  of  the 
work:  "Mr.  Mante  explains  the  cause  of  the  com 
mencement  of  hostilities  with  the  French  in  North 
America  in  a  satisfactory  manner,  and  leads  the  reader 
through  a  circumstantial  and  entertaining  detail  of  the 
military  operations,  both  there  and  in  the  West  Indies, 
to  the  end  of  the  war ;  together  with  two  subsequent 
campaigns  against  the  Indians." 

The  Critical  Review,  or  Annals  of  Literature,  Lon 
don,  1773,  in  a  brief  notice  of  the  work,  says  :  "  The 
history  presents  us  with  no  new  information  ;  but  we 
believe  the  facts  are  in  general  authenticated,  and 
such  readers  as  are  desirous  of  perusing  a  detail  of 
the  war  in  America,  may  find  it  fully  related  in  this 
work." 

There  might  be  nothing  in  the  history  new  to  this 
critic,  who  had  consulted  other  writers  on  the  subject ; 
his  acknowledgment,  therefore,  of  its  authenticity,  is  the 
more  valuable. 

Maj.  Mante  often  alludes  to  the  services  of  Rogers, 
and  always  with  the  highest  approbation.  For  instance, 
he  says  :  "  Capt.  Robert  Rogers,  of  the  New  Hampshire 
regiment,  a  person  well  acquainted  with  the  woods  of 
North  America,  and  with  the  Indians  in  the  interest  of 
the  English,  having  by  this  time  [Sept.  1755]  joined 
Gen.  Johnson,  he  was  ordered  on  different  scouts  to 
discover  the  number  of  the  enemy,  and  how  they  were 
employed." 

The  author  concludes  the  work  as  follows : 

"  Thus  have  we  brought  down  to  the  time  proposed 


24  INTRODUCTION. 

the  history  which  we  engaged  to  give  the  public.  But 
we  cannot  take  leave  of  the  generous  encouragers  of 
this  undertaking,  without  expressing  our  grateful  ac 
knowledgments  for  the  journals  and  plans  communica 
ted  to  us  by  many  general  and  other  respectable  offi 
cers,  employed  on  the  different  services  which  we  have 
related.  The  only  merit  we  pretend  to  in  this  compila 
tion,  is  our  having  strictly  adhered  to  that  impartiality 
which  ought  to  be  the  first  consideration  of  every 
historian." 

I  will  here  take  a  passing  notice  of  the  "  Life  of  Is 
rael  Putnam,"  by  Oliver  W.  B.  Peabody,  published  at 
New  York,  in  1839.  This  work  is  no  more  than  a 
varnished  copy  of  that  of  Col.  Humphreys.  The  au 
thor  says :  "  His  [Putnam's]  biography  has  been  al 
ready  written  by  a  friend  and  fellow-soldier,  who 
gathered  from  his  own  lips  a  portion  of  his  history ; 
and  we  shall  freely  avail  ourselves  of  the  materials 
which  have  been  thus  collected,  in  connection  with 
such  as  have  been  gained  from  other  sources."  The 
whole  story,  however,  had  been  fully  told.  Humphreys 
had  gleaned  from  the  general  all  that  his  fertile  memory 
could  furnish ;  and  there  alone  his  history  was  to  be 
found.  The  annals  of  the  French  war,  as  well  as  those 
of  the  American  revolution,  were  extremely  deficient 
in  respect  to  the  achievements  of  Putnam  ;  insomuch, 
that  the  work  of  Humphreys  was  undertaken  avowedly 
to  "  rescue  from  oblivion  the  actions  of  that  distinguish 
ed  veteran." 

The  work  of  Mr.  Peabody,  however,  is  written  in 
far  better  style  than  its  prototype ;  it  is  the  gilded  pill, 
which  lessens  somewhat  the  aversion  to  the  medicine. 


INTRODUCTION.  25 

And  the  biography  of  Putnam,  in  the  dress  it  now  has, 
and  in  the  company  with  which  it  is  associated,  has  a 
fair  chance  to  descend  down  to  the  latest  posterity.  It 
is  stereotyped,  and  incorporated  with  the  lives  of  the 
most  eminent  American  worthies,  in  Professor  Sparks' 
"  Library  of  American  Biography,"  being  written,  it  is 
believed,  expressly  for  that  work  ;  and  of  which  a  Lon 
don  edition  is  issued  simultaneously  with  that  of  the 
American. — The  publication  is  justly  held  in  the  highest 
estimation,  being  conducted  by  a  gentleman  of  first-rate 
abilities  ;  but  that  the  military  character  of  Gen.  Put 
nam,  which  is  the  only  claim  that  can  be  urged  in  his 
favor,  entitled  his  name  to  a  place  in  it,  is,  in  the  opinion 
of  some  persons,  a  little  problematical. 

That  discrepancies  in  histories  of  the  same  events  by 
different  authors  should  occur,  is  not  surprising  when 
we  consider  how  difficult  it  is  even  in  courts  of  justice 
to  elicit  the  truth  :  the  conflicting  testimony  adduced 
arising  from  the  same  transactions  striking  witnesses 
differently,  or  from  prejudice  in  favor  of  or  against  one 
of  the  parties  in  contention.  So  with  the  writers  of 
history,  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  a  true  statement  of 
facts,  originating  from  the  same  causes,  added  to  the 
national  or  party  prejudices  of  the  authors  themselves, 
will  naturally  lead  to  representations  variant  and  con 
tradictory. 

Besides,  many  historians  are  in  the  habit  of  interlard 
ing  their  narrations  with  their  own  conceptions  of  what 
might,  or  ought,  in  their  opinion,  to  have  taken  place  ; 
which  they  give  as  actual  occurrences.  Thus  in  ancient 
history  we  are  entertained  with  long  harangues  of  gen 
erals  to  their  armies,  before  the  means  of  transmitting 

3 


26  INTRODUCTION. 

them  to  posterity  were  known.  I  admire  the  frankness 
of  Mr.  Botta  on  this  head.  In  a  note  to  the  reader, 
prefixed  to  his  "  History  of  the  American  war  of  Inde 
pendence,"  he  says  :  "  There  will  be  found,  in  the  course 
of  this  history,  several  discourses  of  a  certain  length. 
Those  I  have  put  in  the  mouth  of  the  different  speakers 
have  really  been  pronounced  by  them,  and  upon  those 
very  occasions  which  are  treated  of  in  the  work.  I 
should,  however,  mention  that  I  have  sometimes  made 
a  single  orator  say  what  has  been  said  in  substance  by 
others  of  the  same  party.  Sometimes,  also,  but  rarely, 
using  the  liberty,  granted  in  all  times  to  historians,  I 
have  ventured  to  add  a  small  number  of  phrases,  which 
appeared  to  me  to  coincide  perfectly  with  the  sense  of 
the  orator,  and  proper  to  enforce  his  opinion." 

In  accordance  with  the  principle  here  avowed,  Mr. 
Botta,  in  treating  of  the  Bunker  Hill  battle,  observes : 
"  It  was  during  the  retreat  that  Dr.  Warren  received 
his  death.  Finding  the  corps  he  commanded  hotly 
pursued  by  the  enemy,  despising  all  danger,  he  stood 
alone  before  the  ranks,  endeavoring  to  rally  his  troops, 
and  to  encourage  them  by  his  own  example.  He  re 
minded  them  of  the  mottoes  inscribed  on  their  ensigns  ; 
on  the  one  side  of  which  were  these  words,  *  An  appeal 
to  Heaven;9  and  on  the  other,  *  Qid  transtulit,  sustinet? 
meaning,  that  the  same  providence  which  brought  their 
ancestors,  through  so  many  perils,  to  a  place  of  refuge, 
would  also  deign  to  support  their  descendants."* 

*  Col.  Humphreys  speaks  of  a  standard  containing  the  above 
armorial  bearings,  which,  he  says,  had  been  sent  from  Connecticut, 
for  the  use  of  the  troops  from  that  province  ;  and  from  him  doubt 
less  Mr.  Botta  obtained  his  information. 


INTRODUCTION.  27 

Now  this  is  a  sheer  fiction  of  the  historian  ;  nothing 
of  the  kind  occurred.  Dr.  Warren  had  no  command 
on  the  occasion,  and  it  is  most  probable  fell  within  the 
redoubt.  At  any  rate,  after  the  Americans  had  ex 
pended  all  their  ammunition,  and  of  course  were  under 
the  necessity  of  quitting  the  fortifications,  it  would  have 
been  madness,  by  descanting  upon  the  mottoes  inscribed 
on  their  banners,  to  attempt  to  rally  them  to  breast  the 
balls  and  bayonets  of  the  enemy  in  the  open  field. 
Sauve  qui  peut,  "  Save  himself  who  can,"  was  the  only 
command,  or  exhortation  to  be  given  at  this  time. 

.  Mr.  Botta  had  before  said  :  "  The  provincials,  desti 
tute  of  bayonets,  defended  themselves  valiantly  with 
the  but-end  of  their  muskets.  But  the  redoubt  being 
already  full  of  enemies,  the  American  general  [Col. 
Prescott]  gave  the  signal  of  retreat,  and  drew  off  his 
men." 

How  far  Col.  Humphreys,  in  his  Life  of  Gen.  Putnam, 
has  indulged  his  own  fancy  in  the  narration,  is  for  the 
reader  to  judge. 


THE    VEIL    REMOVED,   ETC. 


CHAPTER  I. 

COL.  HUMPHREYS  addressed  his  essay,  in  manuscript, 
to  the  State  Society  of  the  Cincinnati  in  Connecticut, 
covered  in  a  letter  to  the  president  thereof,  dated  June 
4,  1788;  and  arrangements  were  doubtless  made  at  the 
approaching  anniversary  of  the  society,  July  4th,  for 
its  publication. 

It  is  not  proposed  to  give  a  regular  review  of  the 
work,  but  to  select  the  most  striking  and  important 
passages  thereof,  and  make  such  strictures  on  them  as 
may  be  deemed  appropriate.  The  first  extract  taken 
commences  at  page  twelve  of  the  Boston  edition  of 
1818. 

The  numerous  errors  and  falsehoods  relative  to  the  birth 
and  achievements  of  Major-general  Putnam,  which  have  (at 
a  former  period)  been  circulated  with  assiduity  oh  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic,  and  the  uncertainty  which  appeared  to  prevail 
with  respect  to  his  real  character,  first  produced  the  resolution 
of  writing  this  essay  on  his  life,  and  induced  the  editor  to 
obtain*  materials  from  that  hero  himself.  If  communications 
of  such  authenticity,  if  personal  intimacy  as  an  aid-de-camp 
to  that  general,  or  if  subsequent  military  employments,  which 
afforded  access  to  sources^  of  intelligence  not  open  to  others, 

*  The  editor  seizes  with  eagerness  an  opportunity  of  acknowledging  his 
obligations  to  Dr.  Albigence  Waldo,  who  .was  so  obliging  as  to  commit  to 
writing  many  anecdotes,  communicated  to  him  by  Gen.  Putnam  in  the 
course  of  the  present  year,  [1788.] 

f  A  multitude  of  proofs  might  be  produced  to  demonstrate  that  military 
facts  cannot  always  be  accurately  known  but  by  the  cornmander-in-chiei 
and  his  confidential  officers. 

3* 


30 

give  the  writer  any  advantages,  the  unbiassed  mind  will  de 
cide  how  far  they  exculpate  him  from  the  imputations  of  that 
officiousness,  ignorance,  and  presumption,  which,  in  others, 
have  been  reprehended  with  severity.  He  only  wishes  that 
a  premature  and  unfavorable  construction  may  not  be  formed 
of  his  motive  or  object.  Should  this  essay  have  any  influ 
ence  in  correcting  mistakes,  or  rescuing  from  oblivi&n  the  ac 
tions  of  that  distinguished  veteran  ;  should  it  create  an 
emulation  to  copy  his  domestic,  manly,  and  heroic  virtues  ; 
or  should  it  prompt  some  more  skilful  hand  to  portray  the 
illustrious  group  of  patriots,  sages,  and  heroes,  who  have 
guided  our  councils,  fought  our  battles,  and  adorned  the 
memorable  epocha  of  independence,  it  will  be  an  ample  com 
pensation  for  the  trouble,  and  excite  a  consolatory  reflection 
through  every  vicissitude  of  life. 

In  regard  to  what  the  author  says  respecting  milita 
ry  facts  not  being  always  known  but  by  the  command- 
er-in-chief,  I  will  observe,  that  the  acts  of  principal 
officers  engaged  in  military  transactions,  must  be  suffi 
ciently  notorious  to  establish  the  degree  of  merit  to 
which  they  are  entitled.  The  acts  of  a  major-general 
especially  must  become  so  well  known  to  the  intelligent 
part  of  the  public,  as  to  enable  it  to  form  a  due  estimate 
of  his  claims  to  approbation ;  and  these  will  be  recorded 
in  history. 

There  is,  however,  an  apology  for  the  author's  at 
tempt  to  rescue  from  oblivion  the  actions  of  Putnam,  in 
the  early  part  of  his  military  career,  \vhen  serving  in 
the  French,  or  Seven  Years'  War.  For,  in  fact,  no 
history,  including  the  transactions  of  that  war,  that  I 
have  consulted,  alludes,  in  any  manner  whatever,  to  his 
exploits,  nor  even  mentions  his  name,  the  journal  of 
Major  Rogers  alone  excepted  ;*'  and  Rogers,  as  Mr. 
Peabody  justly  observes,  "rarely  notices  him,  and  never 
with  any  comment  indicating  that  the  least  importance 


*  Since  writing  the  above,  I  find  that  Mante  states  the  fact  of  Putnam's 
being  made  a  prisoner,  without  the  least  allusion,  however,  to  his  prowess 
on  that  occasion. 


31 

was  attached  by  the  author  to  his  services."  It  is 
evident  then,  that,  had  it  not  been  for  his  biographer, 
Gen.  Putnam  would  have  acquired  no  distinction  for 
his  achievements,  whatever  they  may  have  been,  dur 
ing  that  warfare. 

Israel  Putnam,  who,  through  a  regular  gradation  of  pro 
motion,  became  the  senior  major-general  in  the  army  of  the 
United  States,  was  born  at  Salem,  in  the  province  (now  state) 
of  Massachusetts,  on  the  7th  day  of  January,  1718.  His  fa 
ther,  Capt.  Joseph  Putnam,  was  the  son  of  Mr.  John  Putnam, 
who,  with  two  brothers,  came  from  the  south  of  England,  and 
were  among  the  first  settlers  of  Salem. 

To  compensate  partially  for  the  deficiency  of  education 
(though  nothing  can  remove  or  counterbalance  the  incon- 
veniencies  experienced  from  it  in  public  life)  he  derived  from 
his  parents  the  source  of  innumerable  advantages  in  the 
stamina  of  a  vigorous  constitution.  Nature,  liberal  in  be 
stowing  on  him  bodily  strength,  hardiness,  and  activity,  was 
by  no  means  parsimonious  in  mental  endowments.  While 
we  leave  the  qualities  of  the  understanding  to  be  developed 
in  the  process  of  life,  it  may  not  be  improper,  in  this  place, 
to  designate  some  of  the  circumstances  which  were  calculated 
to  distinguish  him  afterwards  as  a  partisan  officer. 

Courage,  enterprise,  activity,  and  perseverance  were  the 
first  characteristics  of  his  mind. 

His  disposition  was  as  frank  and  generous  as  his  mind  was 
fearless  and  independent.  He  disguised  nothing  ;  indeed  he 
seemed  incapable  of  disguise.  Perhaps  in  the  intercourse 
he  was  ultimately  obliged  to  have  with  an  artful  world,  his 
sincerity,  on  some  occasions,  outwent  his  discretion.  Al 
though  he  had  too  much  suavity  in  his  nature  to  commence 
a  quarrel,  he  had  too  much  sensibility  not  to  feel,  and  too 
much  honor  not  to  resent  an  intended  insult.  The  first  time 
he  went  to  Boston  he  was  insulted  for  his  rusticity  by  a  boy 
of  twice  his  size  and  age ;  after  bearing  the  sarcasms  until 
his  patience  was  worn  out,  he  challenged,  engaged,  and 
vanquished  his  unmannerly  antagonist,  to  the  great  diversion 
of  a  crowd  of  spectators.  While  a  stripling,  his  ambition 
was  to  perform  the  labor  of  a  man,  and  to  excel  in  athletic 
diversions.  In  that  rude,  but  masculine  age,  whenever  the 


32 

village-youth  assembled  on  their  usual  occasions  of  festivity, 
pitching  the  bar,  running,  leaping,  and  wrestling  were  fa 
vorite  amusements.  At  such  gymnastic  exercises  (in  which, 
during  the  heroic  times  of  ancient  Greece  and  Rome,  con 
quest  was  considered  as  the  promise  of  future  military  fame) 
he  bore  the  palm  from  almost  every  ring. 

In  the  year  1739  he  removed  from  Salem  to  Pomfret,  an 
inland  fertile  town  in  Connecticut,  forty  miles  east  of  Hart 
ford  :  having  here  purchased  a  considerable  tract  of  land  he 
applied  himself  successfully  to  agriculture. 

The  first  years,  on  a  new  farm,  are  not  however  exempt 
from  disasters  and  disappointments,  which  can  only  be  re 
medied  by  stubborn  and  patient  industry.  Our  farmer,  suffi 
ciently  occupied  in  building  a  house  and  barn,  felling  woods, 
making  fences,  sowing  grain,  planting  orchards,  and  taking 
care  of  his  stock,  had  to  encounter,  in  turn,  the  calamities 
occasioned  by  drought  in  summer,  blast  in  harvest,  loss  of 
cattle  in  winter,  and  the  desolation  of  his  sheep-fold  by  wolves. 
In  one  night  he  had  seventy  fine  sheep  and  goats  killed,  be 
sides  many  lambs  and  kids  wounded.  This  havoc  was  com 
mitted  by  a  she- wolf,  which,  with  her  annual  whelps,  had 
for  several  years  infested  the  vicinity.  The  young  were 
commonly  destroyed  by  the  vigilance  of  the  hunters,  but  the 
old  one  was  too  sagacious  to  come  within  reach  of  gunshot : 
upon  being  closely  pursued  she  would  generally  fly  to  the 
western  woods,  and  return  the  next  winter  with  another  lit 
ter  of  whelps. 

It  is  objected,  that  a  single  wolf  could  not  possibly 
catch  and  kill  seventy  sheep  and  goats,  and  wound 
many  lambs  and  kids  besides,  in  one  night ;  and,  more 
over,  that  this  number  of  sheep,  for  they  must  have 
composed  the  principal  part  of  the  flock,  goats  being 
rarely  raised  in  Connecticut,  was,  at  least,  double  the 
number  usually  kept,  at  the  time  alluded  to,  on  the  old 
est  farms ;  whereas  Mr.  Putnam  had  just  commenced 
to  cultivate  a  new  one.  There  is,  therefore,  probably 
some  mistake  in  the  account  here  given ;  which  might 
have  arisen  from  Putnam's  impediment  of  speech,  seven 
teen  being  taken  for  seventy. 


33 

This  wolf  at  length  became  such  an  intolerable  nuisance, 
that  Mr.  Putnam  entered  into  a  combination  with  five  of  his 
neighbors  to  hunt  alternately  until  they  could  destroy  her. 
Two,  by  rotation,  were  to  be  constantly  in  pursuit.  It  was 
known,  that,  having  lost  the  toes  from  one  foot,  by  a  steel 
trap,  she  made  one  track  shorter  than  the  other.  By  this 
vestige,  the  pursuers  recognized,  in  a  light  snow,  the  route 
of  this  pernicious  animal.  Having  followed  her  to  Connec 
ticut  river  and  found  she  had  turned  back  in  a  direct  course  to 
wards  Pomfret,  they  immediately  returned,  and  by  ten  o'clock 
the  next  morning  the  bloodhounds  had  driven  her  into  a  den, 
about  three  miles  distant  from  the  house  of  Mr.  Putnam.  [The 
next  morning,  that  is,  of  the  day  after  the  chase  was  com 
menced  ;  in  which  the  hunters  made  a  tour  of  eighty  miles^ 
to  and  from  the  river,  in  a  little  more  than  one  day  and  night.] 
The  people  soon  collected  with  dogs,  guns,  straw,  fire  and 
sulphur  to  attack  the  common  enemy.  With  this  apparatus 
several  unsuccessful  efforts  were  made  to  force  her  from  the 
den.  The  hounds  came  back  badly  wounded  and  refused 
to  return.  The  smoke  of  blazing  straw  had  no  effect.  Nor 
did  the  fumes  of  burnt  brimstone,  with  which  the  cavern  was 
filled,  compel  her  to  quit  the  retirement.  Wearied  with 
such  fruitless  attempts  (which  had  brought  the  time  to  ten 
o'clock  at  night,)  Mr.  Putnam  tried  once  more  to  make  his 
dog  enter,  but  in  vain ;  he  proposed  to  his  negro  man  to  go 
down  into  the  cavern  and  shoot  the  wolf:  the  negro  declined 
the  hazardous  service.  Then  it  was  that  the  master,  angry 
at  the  disappointment,  and  declaring  that  he  was  ashamed 
to  have  a  coward  in  his  family,  resolved  himself  to  destroy 
the  ferocious  beast,  lest  she  should  escape  through  some  un 
known  fissure  of  the  rock.*  His  neighbors  strongly  remon 
strated  against  the  perilous  enterprize  :  but  he,  knowing  that 
wild  animals  were  intimidated  ~by  fire,  and  having  provided 
several  strips  of  birch-bark,  the  only  combustible  material 
which  he  could  obtain,  that  would  afford  light  in  this  deep 

*  After  appropriating  the  labor  of  this  negro  to  his  own  benefit,  it  was 
ungenerous  in  Putnam  to  wish  him  to  hazard  his  life  also  in  an  affair  that 
could  not  be  of  the  least  possible  advantage  to  himself.  Mr.  Putnam  ought 
to  have  offered  this  poor  fellow  freedom,  on  condition  of  his  killing  the 
wolf;  for  in  the  way  the  latter  was  going  on,  she  would  soon  destroy  more 
than  the  amount  of  his  value. 


34 

and  darksome  cave,  prepared  for  his  descent.  Having,  ac 
cordingly,  divested  himself  of  his  coat  and  waistcoat,  and 
having  a  long  rope  fastened  round  his  legs,  by  which  he 
might  be  pulled  back,  at  a  concerted  signal,  he  entered  head 
foremost,  with  the  blazing  torch  in  his  hand. 

The  aperture  of  the  den,  on  the  east  side  of  a  very  high 
ledge  of  rocks,  is  about  two  feet  square  ;  from  thence  it  de 
scends  obliquely  fifteen  feet,  then  running  horizontally  about 
ten  more,  it  ascends  gradually  sixteen  feet  towards  its  termi 
nation.  The  sides  of  this  subterraneous  cavity  are  composed 
of  smooth  and  solid  rocks,  which  seem  to  have  been  divided 
from  each  other  by  some  former  earthquake.  The  top  and 
bottom  are  also  of  stone,  and  the  entrance,  in  winter,  being 
covered  with  ice,  is  exceedingly  slippery.  It  is  in  no  place 
high  enough  for  a  man  to  raise  himself  upright,  nor  in  any 
part  more  than  three  feet  in  width. 

Having  groped  his  passage  to  the  horizontal  part  of  the 
den,  the  most  terrifying  darkness  appeared  in  front  of  the 
dim  circle  of  lighj;  afforded  by  his  torch.  It  was  silent  as 
the  house  of  death.  None  but  monsters  of  the  desert  had 
ever  before  explored  this  solitary  mansion  of  horror.  He, 
cautiously  proceeding  onward,  came  to  the  ascent ;  which 
he  slowly  mounted  on  his  hands  and  knees  until  he  discover 
ed  the  glaring  eyeballs  of  the  wolf,  who  was  sitting  at  the 
extremity  of  the  cavern.  Started  at  the  sight  of  fire,  she 
gnashed  her  teeth,  and  gave  a  sullen  growl.  As  soon  as  he 
had  made  the  necessary  discovery,  he  kicked  the  rope  as  a 
signal  for  pulling  him  out.  The  people,  at  the  mouth  of  the 
den,  who  had  listened  with  painful  anxiety,  hearing  the 
growling  of  the  wolf,  and  supposing  their  friend  to  be  in  the 
most  imminent  danger,  drew  him  forth  with  such  celerity  that 
his  shirt  was  stripped  over  -his  head  and  his  skin  severely 
lacerated.  After  he  had  adjusted  his  clothes,  and  loaded 
his  gun  with  nine*  buck-shot,  holding  a  torch  in  one  hand 
and  the  musket  in  the  other,  he  descended  the  second  time. 
When  he  drew  nearer  than  before,  the  wolf,  assuming  a  still 
more  fierce  and  terrible  appearance,  howling,  rolling  her 
eyes,  snapping  her  teeth,  and  dropping  her  head  between 

*  Nine  is  a  cabalistic,  sacred  number,  and  it  was  doubtless  believed,  that 
a  musket  thus  charged  would  be  sure  to  take  effect. 


35 

her  legs,  was  evidently  in  the  attitude,  and  on  the  point  of 
springing  at  him.  At  the  critical  instant  he  levelled  and 
fired  at  her  head.  Stunned  with  the  shock,  and  suffocated 
with  the  smoke,  he  immediately  found  himself  drawn  out  of 
the  cave.  But  having  refreshed  himself,  and  permitted  the 
smoke  to  dissipate,  he  went  down  the  third  time.  Once  more 
he  came  within  sight  of  the  wolf,  who  appearing  very  pas 
sive,  he  applied  the  torch  to  her  nose,  and  perceiving  her 
dead,  he  took  hold  of  her  ears,  and  then  kicking  the  rope 
(still  tied  round  his  legs)  the  people  above  with  no  small  ex 
ultation  dragged  them  both  out  together. 

I  have  offered  these  facts  in  greater  detail,  because  they 
contain  a  display  of  character ;  and  because  they  have  been 
erroneously  related  in  several  European  publications,  and 
very  much  mutilated  in  the  History  of  Connecticut,  a  work 
as  replete  with  falsehood  as  destitute  of  genius,  lately  print 
ed  in  London. 

The  work,  here  alluded  to,  was  written  by  the  Rev. 
Mr.  Peters,  a  clergyman  of  the  English  church,  and  a 
tory  refugee,  in  the  time  of  the  American  revolution. 
After  his  arrival  in  England,  with  the  view  of  serving 
his  majesty  in  the  best  way  he  could,  he  published  a 
caricature  of  the  people,  among  whom  he  had  officiated 
as  their  spiritual  guide,  which  he  denominated  a  history 
of  Connecticut. 

As  to  the  wonderful  feat  of  Putnam,  detailed  above, 
more  has  probably  been  made  of  it  than  it  is  entitled 
to.  The  description  of  the  den,  in  which  the  wolf  took 
refuge,  is  said  to  be  incorrect ;  that  it  is  by  no  means 
so  extensive  as  represented.  It  is  thought,  also,  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  drag  a  man  out  from  such  a 
zigzag  course  by  a  rope  tied  to  his  legs,  with  the  addi 
tional  weight  of  a  large  wolf  attached  to  him. 

As  this  cavern  has  never  been  subjected  to  measure 
ment,  its  supposed  dimensions  depending  entirely  upon 
the  estimate  made  of  it  by  Putnam ;  and  as,  in  the  pe 
culiar  circumstances  in  which  he  was  placed,  he  would 
be  very  apt  to  form  an  erroneous  opinion  respecting  it ; 
and,  moreover,  when  the  penchant  which  some  people 


36 

have  for  the  marvelous,  and  desire  to  enhance  the  dan 
gers  they  have  undergone,  are  taken  into  consideration, 
it  is  probable  the  objections  are  well  founded. 

After  all,  there  was,  perhaps,  more  cunning  than 
courage  exercised  in  this  matter.  Putnam  knew  that 
wild  animals  were  intimidated  by  fire ;  and  was  there 
fore  sensible  that  he  did  not  run  so  great  a  hazard  as 
his  neighbors,  ignorant  of  that  fact,  supposed.  Upon 
the  whole,  I  think  it  to  be  regretted  that  this  wolf-story 
ever  obtained  publicity ;  particularly  as  it  tends  to  as 
similate  the  character  of  Putnam  to  that  of  the  fabulous 
heroes  of  antiquity,  whose  career  commenced  with  the 
destruction  of  ferocious  beasts  and  chimerical  monsters. 
Besides,  there  could  have  been  no  necessity  for  such  a 
procedure,  as  the  rope  might  be  tied  to  the  wolf  and 
she  dragged  out  by  herself,  while  Putnam  could  crawl 
back  in  the  same  manner  he  entered. 

As  an  apology,  however,  for  the  biographer,  a  wri 
ter  observes,  that — "  Some  European  statement  repre 
sented  Putnam  as  having  strangled  the  wolf  in  his  arms, 
after  having  wounded  him  ;  (see  Biographical  Diction 
ary  by  John  Gorton:  London:  article  Putnam.)  Show 
ing  the  necessity  of  an  accurate  account  of  that  affair." 
The  same  writer  says :  "  Putnam  was  known  in  the 
French  war,  to  the  British  officers,  by  the  soubriquet 
of  '  old  wolf.'" 

After  writing  the  above,  I  accidentally,  a  few  days 
since,  met  with  an  intelligent  gentleman,  of  about  sixty 
years  of  age,  a  native  of  Pomfret,  and  of  course  con 
versant  with  the  Putnam  wolf-story ;  which  he  said 
was  a  real  fact ;  that  Putnam  did  actually  kill  the  wolf 
in  manner  and  form  as  stated.  The  cave,  he  said,  was 
situated  on  the  side  of  a  hill,  about  fifteen  feet  in  extent, 
somewhat  large  at  the  opening,  then  more  narrow  for 
a  short  distance,  when  it  forms  an  area  in  which  a  man 
can  stand  erect.  Here  the  wolf  had  taken  up  her  do- 
micil.  He  had  frequent  conversations  with  Putnam's 
negro,  Dick,  who  was  present  at  this  famous  affair,  and 


37 

acknowledged  that  Putnam  requested  him  to  enter  the 
cave,  which  he  declined. 

I  asked  the  gentleman  if  he  had  ever  read  Col.  Hum 
phrey's  account  of  this  matter.  He  replied,  that  he 
did  not  recollect  having  done  so ;  and  when  I  detailed 
to  him  the  statement  of  Col.  Humphreys  he  was  as 
tonished,  and  pronounced  it  untrue. 

Prosperity,  at  length,  began  to  attend  the  agricultural  af 
fairs  of  Mr.  Putnam.  He  was  acknowledged  to  be  a  skilful 
and  indefatigable  manager. 

But  the  time  had  now  arrived  which  was  to  turn  the  in 
struments  of  husbandry  into  weapons  of  hostility,  and  to 
exchange  the  hunting  of  wolves,  who  had  ravaged  the  sheep- 
folds,  for  the  pursuit  after  savages,  who  had  desolated  the 
frontiers.  Mr.  Putnam  was  about  thirty-seven  years  old, 
when  the  war  between  England  and  France,  which  preceded 
the  last,  broke  out  in  America.  His  reputation  must  have 
been  favorably  known  to  the  government,  since  among  the 
first  troops  that  were  levied  by  Connecticut,  in  1755,  he  was 
appointed  to  the  command  of  a  company  in  Lyman's  regi 
ment  of  provincials.  I  have  mentioned  his  age  at  this  period 
expressly  to  obviate  a  prevalent  opinion,  that  he  was  far  ad 
vanced  in  life  when  he  commenced  his  military  service. 

As  he  was  extremely  popular,  he  found  no  difficulty  in 
enlisting  his  complement  of  recruits  from  the  most  hardy, 
enterprising,  and  respectable  young  men  of  bis  neighborhood. 
The  regiment  joined  the  army,  at  the  opening  of  the  cam 
paign,  not  far  distant  from  Crown  Point.  Soon  after  his  arrival 
at  camp,  he  became  intimately  acquainted  with  the  famous 
partisan  captain,  afterwards  Major  Rogers,  with  whom  he 
was  frequently  [twice]  associated  in  traversing  the  wilder 
ness,  reconnoitering  the  enemy's  lines,  gaining  intelligence, 
and  taking  straggling  prisoners,  as  well  as  in  beating  up  the 
quarters  and  surprising  the  advanced  pickets  of  their  army. 
For  these  operations  a  corps  of  rangers  was  formed  from 
the  irregulars. 

This  is  a  mistake.  No  corps  of  rangers  was  formed 
from  the  irregular  or  provincial  troops :  they  were  en 
listed,  chiefly  in  New  Hampshire,  for  the  express  ser- 

4 


38 

vice  to  which  they  were  assigned.  Putnam  never  be 
longed  to  this  corps  ;  although,  upon  a  few  occasions, 
he  with  provincial  troops,  as  also  regular  English  sol 
diers,  were  detached  to  accompany  it,  when  too  weak 
in  numbers  for  the  service  required.  In  the  summer 
of  1757,  in  consequence  of  the  mortality  among  the 
rangers  by  small-pox,  fifty-two  volunteers  from  the 
regular  troops,  as  before  observed,  were  directed  by 
Lord  Loudoun  to  be  trained  by  Major  Rogers  for 
the  ranging  service.  But  there  is  not  a  single  instance, 
mentioned  by  Rogers  in  his  journal,  of  irregular  or 
provincial  troops  being  enlisted  into  the  corps  of  ran 
gers. 

The  first  time  Rogers  and  Putnam  were  detached  with  a 
party  of  these  light  troops,  it  was  the  fortune  of  the  latter 
to  preserve,  with  his  own  hand,  the  life  of  the  former. 

The  object  of  this  expedition  was  to  obtain  an  accurate 
knowledge  of  the  position  and  state  of  the  works  at  Crown 
Point.  It  was  impracticable  to  approach  with  their  party 
near  enough  for  this  purpose,  without  being  discovered. 
Alone,  the  undertaking  was  sufficiently  hazardous,  on  ac 
count  of  the  swarms  of  hostile  Indians  who  infested  the 
woods.  Our  two  partisans,  however,  left  all  their  men  at 
a  convenient  distance,  with  strict  orders  to  continue  con 
cealed  until  their  return.  Having  thus  cautiously  taken 
their  arrangements,  they  advanced  with  the  profoundcst  si 
lence  in  the  evening ;  and  lay,  during  the  night/contiguous 
to  the  fortress.  Early  in  the  morning  they  approached  so 
close  as  to  be  able  to  give  satisfactory  information  to  the 
general  who  had  sent  them,  on  the  several  points  to  which 
their  attention  had  been  directed  ;  but  Captain  Rogers,  be 
ing  at  a  little  distance  from  Captain  Putnam,  fortuitously 
met  a  stout  Frenchman,  who  instantly  seized  his  fusee  with 
one  hand,  and  with  the  other  attempted  to  stab  him,  while 
he  called  to  an  adjacent  guard  for  assistance.  The  guard 
answered.  Putnam,  perceiving  the  imminent  danger  of  his 
friend,  and  that  no  time  was  to  be  lost,  or  further  alarm 
given  by  firing,  ran  rapidly  to  them,  while  they  were  yet 
struggling,  and  with  the  but-end  of  his  piece  laid  the  French- 


39 

man  dead  at  his  feet.  The  partisans,  to  elude  pursuit,  pre 
cipitated  their  flight,  joined  the  party,  and  returned  without 
loss  to  the  encampment. 

This  is  a  plain  story,  which  from  its  brevity  could 
hardly  admit  of  erors  in  the  detail.  If  Colonel  Hum 
phreys  had  the  relation  from  Gen.  Putnam,  it  ought  to 
be  true  to  the  letter  ;  yet  Mr.  Peabody,  as  though  it 
were  a  part  of  a  romance,  that  might  be  suited  to  the 
taste  of  the  writer,  makes  variations  as  to  matters  of 
fact ;  non-essential,  to  be  sure,  any  further  than  tend 
ing  to  cast  a  doubt  on  the  validity  of  Col.  Humphreys' 
original  statement.  He  says  : — "  They  [Rogers  and  Put 
nam]  left  their  men  concealed  behind  a  willow  thicket, 
and  went  themselves  sufficiently  near  the  works  to  pro 
cure  the  information  they  desired.  It  was  now  about 
the  hour  of  sunrise,  when  the  soldiers  began  to  issue 
in  such  numbers  from  the  fort,  that  the  partisans  found 
no  opportunity  to  rejoin  their  men  without  detection. 
In  the  course  of  an  hour  or  two,  a  soldier  came  di 
rectly  to  the  spot  where  Rogers  lay  concealed  at  a  lit 
tle  distance  from  Putnam,"  &c.,  p.  116.  Mr.  Peabody, 
it  appears,  had  perused  the  journal  of  Maj.  Rogers, 
and,  h  would  seem,  has  borrowed  some  of  the  circum 
stances  detailed  in  his  official  report  of  this  affair, 
which  is  as  follows : 

"  October  21, 1755. — I  had  orders  from  Gen.  Johnson 
of  this  date,  to  embark  for  Crown  Point,  with  a  party 
of  four  men,  in  quest  of  a  prisoner.  At  night  we 
landed  on  the  west  side  of  Lake  George,  twenty-five 
miles  from  the  English  camp.  The  remainder  of  the 
way  we  marched  by  land,  and  the  26th  we  came  in 
sight  of  the  fort.  In  the  evening  we  approached 
nearer,  and  next  morning  found  ourselves  within  about 
300  yards  of  it.  My  men  lay  concealed  in  a  thicket 
of  willows,  while  I  crept  somewhat  nearer,  to  a  large 
pine  log,  where  I  concealed  myself  by  holding  bushes 
in  my  hand.  Soon  after  sunrise  the  soldiers  issued  out 
in  such  numbers,  that  my  men  and  I  could  not  possi- 


40 

bly  join  each  other  without  a  discovery.  About  10 
o'clock  a  single  man  marched  out  directly  towards  our 
ambush.  When  I  perceived  him  within  ten  yards  of 
me,  I  sprung  over  the  log,  and  met  him  and  offered 
him  quarters,  which  he  refused,  and  made  a  pass  at 
me  with  a  dirk,  which  I  avoided,  and  presented  my 
fusee  to  his  breast ;  but  notwithstanding,  he  still  pushed 
on  with  resolution,  and  obliged  me  to  despatch  him. 
This  gave  an  alarm,  and  made  it  necessary  for  us  to 
hasten  to  the  mountain.  I  arrived  safe  at  our  camp 
the  30th,  with  all  my  party." 

I  leave  it  to  Mr.  Peabody  to  reconcile  the  disagree 
ment  in  the  two  statements.  I  confess,  I  can  make  no 
comment  that  would  throw  the  least  light  upon  the 
subject.  If  Rogers'  account  is  entitled  to  credit,  which, 
I  believe,  will  not  be  disputed,  Col.  Humphreys  must 
have  wofully  misunderstood  the  communication  made 
to  him  of  this  transaction. 

The  time  for  which  the  colonial  troops  engaged  to  serve 
terminated  with  the  campaign.  Putnam  was  reappointed, 
and  again  took  the  field  in  1756. 

Few  are  so  ignorant  of  war  as  not  to  know,  that  military 
adventures,  in  the  night,  are  always  extremely  liable"  to  ac 
cidents.  Captain  Putnam,  having  been  commanded  to  re- 
connoiter  the  enemy's  camp  at  the  Ovens  near  Ticonderoga, 
took  the  brave  Lieut.  Robert  Durkee  as  his  companion.  In 
attempting  to  execute  these  orders,  he  narrowly  missed  be 
ing  taken  himself  in  the  first  instance,  and  killing  his  friend 
in  the  second.  It  was  customary  for  the  British  and  provin 
cial  troops  to  place  their  fires  round  their  camp,  which  fre 
quently  exposed  them  to  the  enemy's  scouts  and  patroles.  A 
contrary  practice,  then  unknown  in  the  English  army,  pre 
vailed  among  the  French  and  Indians.  The  plan  was  much 
more  rational ;  they  kept  their  fires  in  the  center,  lodged 
their  men  circularly  at  a  distance,  and  posted  their  sentinels 
in  the  surrounding  darkness.  Our  partisans  approached 
'  the  camp,  and  supposing  the  sentries  were  within  the  circle  of 
fires,  crept  upon  their  hands  and  knees  with  the  greatest 
possible  caution,  until,  to  their  utter  astonishment,  they  found 


41 

themselves  in  the  thickest  of  the  enemy.  The  sentinels, 
discovering  them,  fired  and  slightly  wounded  Durkee  in  the" 
thigh.  He  and  Putnam  had  no  alternative.  They  fled.  The 
latter,  being  foremost,  and  scarcely  able  to  see  his  hand  be 
fore  him,  soon  plunged  into  a  clay  pit.  Durkee,  almost  at 
the  identical  moment,  came  tumbling  after.  Putnam  by  no 
means  pleased  at  finding  a  companion,  and  believing  him  to 
be  one  of  the  enemy,  lifted  his  tomahawk  to  give  the  deadly 
blow,  when  Durkee  (who  had  followed  so  closely  as  to 
know  him)  inquired,  whether  he  had  escaped  unhurt.  Cap 
tain  Putnam  instantly  recognizing  his  voice,  dropped  his 
weapon :  and  both,  springing  from  the  pit,  made  good  their 
retreat  to  the  neighboring  ledges,  amidst  a  shower  of  random 
shot.  There  they  betook  themselves  to  a  large  log,  by  the 
side  of  which  they  lodged  the  remainder  of  the  night.  Be 
fore  they  lay  down,  Captain  Putnam  said  he  had  a  little  rum 
in  his  canteen,  which  could  never  be  more  acceptable  or  ne 
cessary  ;  but  on  examining  the  canteen,  which  hung  under 
his  arm,  he  found  the  enemy  had  pierced  it  with  their  balls, 
and  that  there  was  not  a  drop  of  liquor  left.  The  next  day 
he  found  fourteen  bullet  holes  in  his  blanket. 

It  is  a  little  singular,  that  Capt.  Putnam,  while  he  and 
Lieut.  Durkee  started  together  in  their  flight,  and  both 
fell  into  a  pit  nearly  at  the  same  time,  should  have 
taken  his  companion  for  an  enemy ;  the  agitated  state 
of  his  mind  may,  however,  account  for  the  mistake. 
The  reader,  at  the  first  view  of  this  statement,  would 
be  apt  to  conclude  that  the  escape  of  Putnam  unharm 
ed  upon  this  occasion,  bordered  somewhat  upon  the 
miraculous,  supposing  that  fourteen  separate  balls  had 
pierced  his  blanket,  and  one  or  more  his  canteen  ;  but 
when  it  is  considered,  that  his  blanket  was  of  course 
rolled  up  and  slung  upon  his  back,  and  therefore  that 
one  ball  might  have  perforated  it  in  as  many  places  as 
stated,  and  at  the  same  time  passed  through  his  can 
teen,  the  wonderment  ceases ;  as  it  is  not  uncommon 
for  the  clothes  of  persons  engaged  in  warfare  to  meet 
with  the  like  accident  without  injury  to  the  wearer. 

In  the  same  summer  [1756]  a  body  of  the  enemy,  con- 
4* 


42 

sisting  of  600  men,  attacked  the  baggage  and  provision  wag 
ons  at  a  place  called  the  Half- way- brook  ;  it  being  equidis 
tant  from  Fort  Edward,  and  the  south  end  of  Lake  George, 
Having  killed  the  oxen  and  plundered  the  wagons,  they  re 
treated  with  their  booty  without  having  met  with  such  re 
sistance  as  might  have  been  expected  from  the  strength  of 
the  escort.  General  Webb,  upon  receiving  intelligence  of 
this  disaster,  ordered  the  Captains  Putnam  and  Rogers  "  to 
take  100  volunteers  in  boats,  with  two  wall-pieces  and  two 
blunderbusses,  and  to  proceed  down  Lake  George  to  a  cer 
tain  point ;  there  to  leave  the  batteaux  under  a  proper  guard, 
and  thence  to  cross  by  land,  so  as  to  harass,  and,  if  practi 
cable,  intercept  the  retreating  enemy  at  the  narrows.'7 
These  orders  were  executed  with  so  much  punctuality,  that 
the  party  arrived  at  the  destined  place  half  an  hour  before 
the  hostile  boats  came  in  view.  Here  they  waited,  under 
cover,  until  the  enemy  (ignorant  of  these  proceedings)  en 
tered  the  narrows  with  their  batteaux  loaded  with  plunder. 
Then  the  volunteers  poured  upon  them  volley  after  volley, 
killed  many  of  the  oarsmen,  sunk  a  number  of  their  batteaux, 
and  would  soon  have  destroyed  the  whole  body  of  the  ene 
my,  had  not  the  unusual  precipitancy  of  their  passage  (fa 
vored  by  the  wind)  carried  them  through  the  narrows  into 
the  wide  part  of  South  Bay,  where  they  were  out  of  the 
reach  of  musket-shot.  The  shattered  remnant  of  the  little 
fleet  soon  arrived  at  Ticonderoga,  and  gave  information  that 
Putnam  and  Rogers  were  at  the  narrows.  A  fresh  party 
was  instantly  detached  to  cut  them  in  pieces,  on  their  return 
to  Fort  Edward.  Our  partisans,  sensible  of  the  probability 
of  such  an  attempt,  and  being  full  twenty  miles  from  their 
boats,  strained  every  nerve  to  reach  them  as  soon  as  possi 
ble  ;  which  they  effected  the  same  night.  Next  day,  when 
they  had  returned  as  far  as  Sabbath-Day  Point,  they  discov 
ered,  on  shore,  the  before-mentioned  detachment  of  300  men, 
who  had  passed  them  in  the  night,  and  who  now,  on  per 
ceiving  our  party,  took  to  their  boats  with  the  greatest  alac 
rity,  and  rowed  out  to  give  battle.  They  advanced  in  line, 
maintaining  a  good  mien,  and  felicitating  themselves  upon 
the  prospect  of  an  easy  conquest,  from  the  great  superiority 
of  their  numbers.  Flushed  with  these  expectations,  they 


43 

were  permitted  to  come  within  pistol-shot  before  a  gun  was 
fired.  At  once,  the  wall-pieces  and  blunderbusses,  which 
had  been  brought  to  rake  them  in  the  most  vulnerable  point, 
were  discharged.  As  no  such  reception  had  been  foreseen, 
the  assailants  were  thrown  into  the  utmost  disorder.  Their 
terror  and  confusion  were  greatly  increased  by  a  well-di 
rected  and  most  destructive  fire  of  the  small-arms.  The 
larger  pieces  being  reloaded,  without  annoyance,  continued 
alternately  with  the  musketry  to  make  dreadful  havoc,  until 
the  rout  was  completed,  and  the  enemy  driven  back  to  Ti- 
conderoga.  In  this  action,  one  of  the  bark  canoes  contained 
twenty  Indians,  of  whom  fifteen  were  killed.  Great  num 
bers,  from  other  boats,  both  of  French  and  Indians,  were 
seen  to  fall  overboard ;  but  the  account  of  their  total  loss 
could  never  be  ascertained.  Rogers  and  Putnam  had  but 
one  man  killed,  and  two  slightly  wounded.  They  now  land 
ed  on  the  point,  and  having  refreshed  their  men  at  leisure, 
returned  in  good  order  to  the  British  camp. 

There  seems  to  be  no  end  to  the  blunders  in  this 
book  of  Col.  Humphreys.  In  this  case,  the  object  of 
the  expedition  alluded  to,  the  number  of  men  compos 
ing  it,  and  the  name  of  the  commanding  general,  by 
whose  order  it  was  undertaken,  are  misstated ;  and, 
moreover,  the  detail  of  nearly  all  the  circumstances 
attending  it,  is  incorrect  in  point  of  fact. 

The  author,  it  is  seen,  previously  to  giving  the  fore 
going  account,  says  : — "  The  time  for  which  the  colo 
nial  troops  engaged  to  serve  terminated  with  the  cam 
paign.  Putnam  was  reappointed,  and  again  took  the 
field  in  1756."  And  then  follows  the  above  statement 
of  an  affair  which  took  place  in  November,  1755. 
This  shows  that  Putnam  kept  no  minutes  of  transac 
tions  that  fell  under  his  cognizance,  or  of  which  he  had 
obtained  imperfect  accounts  ;  and  that,  in  this  instance, 
he  had  forgotten  even  the  year  in  which  they  occur 
red.  Can  a  true  history  be  expected  from  such  a 
source  ? 

The  following  is  the  official  report  of  this  affair  by 
Major  Rogers,  who  'commanded  the  expedition,  riot 


44 

Putnam  and  Rogers.  The  small  party  first  sent  out 
upon  this  occasion,  was  probably  composed  entirely 
of  rangers ;  and  of  course  Putnam  was  not  among 
them,  but  was  attached  to  the  reinforcement  sent  to 
their  aid. 

I  will  in  the  first  place  introduce  a  short  previous 
report,  as  tending  to  explain  particularly  the  object  of 
the  expedition. 

"  October  15, 1755. — Agreeably  to  orders  of  this  date 
from  Gen.  Johnson,  I  embarked  with  forty  men  in  five 
boats.  Our  design  was  to  discover  the  strength  of  the 
enemy's  advance  guard,  and,  if  possible,  to  decoy  the 
wrhole  or  part  of  them  into  an  ambush  ;  but  though 
we  were  indefatigable  in  our  endeavors  for  several 
days,  yet  all  our  attempts  proved  abortive ;  and,  as  an 
account  of  our  several  movements  during  this  scout 
would  little  gratify  the  reader,  I  shall  omit  giving  a 
particular  detail  of  them.  We  returned  safe  to  our 
encampment  at  Lake  George  on  the  19th. 

"November  4th,  1755. — Agreeably  to  orders  from 
Gen.  Johnson  this  day,  I  embarked  for  the  enemy's  ad 
vance  guard,  before-mentioned,  with  a  party  of  30  men,  in 
four  batteaux,  mounted  with  two  wall-pieces  each.  The 
next  morning,  a  little  before  daylight,  we  arrived  with 
in  half  a  mile  of  them,  where  we  landed,  and  concealed 
our  boats.  I  then  sent  out  four  men  as  spies,  who  re 
turned  the  next  evening,  and  informed  me,  that  the 
enemy  had  no  works  round  them,  but  lay  entirely 
open  to  an  assault ;  which  advice  I  despatched  imme 
diately  to  the  general,  desiring  a  sufficient  force  to  at 
tack  them ;  which,  notwithstanding  the  general's  ear 
nestness  and  activity  in  the  affair,  did  not  arrive  till 
we  were  obliged  to  retreat.  On  our  return,  however, 
we  were  met  by  a  reinforcement,  sent  by  the  general, 
whereupon  I  returned  towards  the  enemy,  and  the  next 
evening  sent  two  men  to  see  if  their  sentries  were 
alert,  who  approached  so  near  as  to  be  discovered  and 
fired  at  by  them,  and  were  so  closely  pursued  in  their 


45 

retreat,  that  unhappily  our  whole  party  was  discovered. 
The  first  notice  I  had  of  this  being  the  case,  was  from 
two  canoes  with  thirty  men  in  them,  which  I  conclud 
ed  came  out  with  another  party  by  land,  in  order  to 
force  us  between  two  fires ;  to  prevent  which,  I  with 
Lieut.  McCurdy  and  fourteen  men,  embarked  in  two 
boats,  leaving  the  remainder  of  the  party  on  shore,  un 
der  the  command  of  Capt.  Putnam.  In  order  to  de 
coy  the  enemy  within  the  reach  of  our  wall-pieces,  we 
steered  as  if  we  intended  to  pass  by  them,  which  luck 
ily  answered  our  expectations  ;  for  they  boldly  headed 
us  till  within  about  an  hundred  yards,  when  we  dis 
charged  the  before- mentioned  pieces,  which  killed  sev 
eral  of  them,  and  put  the  rest  to  flight.  We  drove 
them  near  where  our  land  party  lay,  and  they  were 
galled  also  by  them.  At  this  time  I  discovered  their 
party  by  land,  and  gave  our  people  notice  of  it,  who 
thereupon  embarked,  without  receiving  any  considera 
ble  injury  from  the  enemy's  fire,  notwithstanding  it 
was  for  some  time  very  brisk  upon  them.  We  warm 
ly  pursued  the  enemy,  and  again  got  an  opportunity  to 
discharge  our  wall-pieces  upon  them.  We  continued 
the  pursuit  down  the  lake  to  their  landing,  where 
they  were  received  and  covered  by  100  men,  upon 
whom  we  discharged  our  wall-pieces,  and  obliged  them 
to  retire.  But  finding  their  number  vastly  superior  to 
ours,  we  judged  it  most  prudent  to  return  to  our  encamp 
ment,  at  Lake  George,  where  we  safely  arrived  on  the 
8th  of  November." 

The  affair  at  the  Half-way-brook,  mentioned  by  Col. 
Humphreys  above,  happened  nearly  three  years  after 
the  period  at  which  he  has  placed  it.  Major  Mante 
thus  notices  the  Occurrence  : 

"  Whilst  the  intrenchments  of  Gen.  Abercrombie 
enclosed  him  in  security,  M.  de  Montcalm  exerted  his 
usual  activity  in  harassing  the  frontiers,  and  in  de 
taching  parties  to  attack  the  convoys  of  the  English. 
On  the  17th  of  July,  1758,  one  of  these  parties  de- 


46 

stroyed  three  provincial  officers  and  upwards  of  twen 
ty  men,  at  Half -way -brook  ;  and  the  27th  of  the  same 
month,  one  hundred  and  sixteen  wagoners  and  sixteen 
rangers  met  with  the  same  fate,  between  that  place 
and  Fort  Edward.  Major  Rogers  was  then  detached 
with  a  party  of  seven  hundred  men,  in  quest  of  the 
enemy ;  but  they  had  the  good  fortune  to  escape  him. 
On  his  return,  he  met  an  express  from  the  general, 
with  orders  to  proceed  to  South  and  East  Bay,  and  re 
turn  by  Fort  Edward.  Whilst  the  major  was  pursu 
ing  the  route  prescribed  him  by  these  orders,  he  was 
attacked,  on  the  8th  of  August,  near  the  spot  where 
Fort  St.  Anne  stood,  by  about  500  of  the  enemy,  his 
own  number  being  reduced  to  530  men.  But  both  he 
and  his  men  behaved  with  so  much  spirit,  that  in  an 
hour  they  broke  the  assailants,  and  obliged  them  to  re 
treat.  In  this  action  there  fell  190  of  the  French ;  and 
the  English  lost  about  40,  the  missing  included.  Maj. 
Putnam  and  two  lieutenants  were  made  prisoners." 
(Page  158.) 

Major  Rogers  gives  a  particular  description  of  this 
expedition,  in  his  journal,  which  will  appear  hereafter 
in  .its  proper  place.  He  and  Mante  fully  agree  in  their 
statements;  and,  according  to  them,  there  is  no  propri 
ety  in  the  reflections  cast  upon  the  escort  of  the  wag 
oners  by  Col.  Humphreys.  It  is  a  little  singular,  that 
Gen.  Putnam  should  have  forgotten  the  cause  of  the 
expedition  in  which  he  was  made  a  prisoner,  and  trans 
ferred  it  to  an  object  entirely  different,  which  happen 
ed  long  before. 

THE    RACE. 

Soon  after  these  rencounters,  a  singular  kind  of  race  was 
run  by  our  nimble-footed  provincial  and  an  active  young 
Frenchman.  The  liberty  of  each  was  by  turns  at  stake. 
Gen.  Webb,  wanting  a  prisoner  for  the  sake  of  intelligence, 
sent  Captain  Putnam  with  five  men  to  procure  one.  The 
captain  concealed  himself  near  the  road  which  leads  from 
Ticonderoga  to  the  Ovens.  His  men  seemed  fond  of  show. 


47 

ing  themselves,  which  unsoldierlike  conduct  he  prohibited 
with  the  severest  reprehension.  This  rebuke  they  imputed 
to  unnecessary  fear.  They  had  not  lain  long,  in  the  high 
grass,  before  a  Frenchman  and  an  Indian  passed — the  In 
dian  was  considerably  in  advance.  As  soon  as  the  former 
had  gone  by,  Putnam,  relying  on  the  fidelity  of  his  men, 
sprang  up,  ran,  and  ordered  them  to  follow.  After  running 
about  thirty  rods,  he  seized  the  Frenchman  by  the  shoul 
ders,  and  forced  him  to  surrender.  But  his  prisoner,  looking 
round,  perceiving  no  other  enemy,  and  knowing  the  Indian 
would  be  ready  in  a  moment  to  assist  him,  began  to  make 
an  obstinate  resistance.  .  Putnam,  finding  himself  betrayed 
by  his  men  into  a  perilous  dilemma,  let  go  his  hold,  stepped 
back  and  snapped  his  piece,  which  was  leveled  at  the 
Frenchman's  breast.  It  missed  fire.  Upon  this  he  thought 
it  most  prudent  to  retreat.  The  Frenchman,  in  turn,  chased 
him  back  to  his  men,  who,  at  last,  raised  themselves  from 
the  grass  ;  which  his  pursuer  espying  in  good  time  for  him 
self,  made  his  escape.  Putnam,  mortified  that  these  men 
had  frustrated  his  success,  dismissed  them  with  disgrace ; 
and  not  long  after  accomplished  his  object. 

Captain  Putnam,  upon  this  occasion,  as  the  story  is 
told,  caught  a  real  Tartar ;  who,  not  only  unwilling  to 
follow  his  captor,  was  inclined  that  the  latter  should 
accompany  him  ;  and  Putnam,  it  seems,  adopted  the 
sage  advice  of  Dogberry  to  his  watch.  But  there  must 
be  some  mistake  in  this  matter.  It  is  hardly  possible 
to  conceive,  that  General  Putnam  would  give  a  narra 
tive  so  discreditable  to  himself.  The  athletic,  the 
brave  Putnam,  in  the  very  prime  and  gristle  of  man 
hood,  (thirty-eight  years  of  a^e,)  and  who,  if  he  had 
lived  in  Greece,  in  the  time  of  Pythagoras,  might  with 
confidence  have  entered  the  lists  at,  the  Olympic  games, 
is  here  made  to  truckle  to  a  stripling,  whom  he  had  in 
his  clutches,  and  might,  one  would  think,  have  carried 
off  upon  his  shoulders.  But  on  his  making  resistance, 
Putnam  endeavors  to  shoot  him,  and  thereby  deprive 
himself  of  the  very  object  he  had  in  view,  that  of  ma- 


48 

king  a  prisoner.  Failing  in  this  attempt,  he  takes  to 
his  heels,  and  the  youngster  after  him. 

The  Indian,  spoken  of,  was  considerably  in  advance, 
and,  it  does  not  appear,  knew  any  thing  of  what  was 
going  on.  The  Frenchman  made  no  call  upon  him, 
which  is  a  sufficient  indication  that  they  were  not  trav 
eling  together,  nor  knew  of  their  proximity  to  each 
other.  This  story  ought  to  be  expunged  from  the 
book — it  cannot  be  true. 

Mr.  Peabody  has  changed  the  phrase  "  considerably 
in  advance,"  to  "  at  a  little  distance,"  thereby  rendering 
it  more  probable  that  the  Indian  would  hear  the  bustle 
of  the  combatants,  and  turn  back,  to  ascertain  the  cause. 
But  he  has  no  justification  for  taking  this  liberty  with 
the  original  text. 

The  active  services  of  Captain  Putnam  on  every  occasion 
attracted  the  admiration  of  the  public,  and  induced  the  Le 
gislature  of  Connecticut  to  promote  him  to  a  majority  in 
1757. 

As  no  official  document  appears,  showing  any  ex 
traordinary  active  services  of  Captain  Putnam,  his  pro 
motion  was  probably  in  accordance  with  the  usual  cus 
tom  of  advancement  in  military  rank,  according  to  se 
niority  of  commission.  Its  immediate  cause,  in  this 
case,  was  likely  to  have  originated  in  a  demand  of  an 
increase  of  provincial  troops  from  Connecticut. 

A  few  days  before  the  siege,  [of  Fort  William  Henry,] 
Major  Putnam,  with  two  hundred  men,  escorted  Gen.  Webb 
from  Fort  Edward  to  Fort  William  Henry.  The  object  was 
to  examine  the  state  of  this  fortification,  which  stood  at  the 
southern  extremity  of  Lake  George.  Several  abortive  at 
tempts  having  been  made  by  Major  Rogers  and  others  in  the 
night  season,  Major  Putnam  proposed  to  go  down  the  lake  in 
open  daylight,  land  at  Northwest  Bay,  and  tarry  on  shore 
until  he  could  make  satisfactory  discovery  of  the  enemy's 
actual  situation  at  Ticonderoga  and  the  adjacent  posts.  The 
plan  (which  he  suggested)  of  landing  with  only  five  men, 
and  sending  back  the  boats,  to  prevent  detection,  was  deem- 


49 

ed  too  hazardous  by  the  general.  At  length,  however,  he 
was  permitted  to  proceed  with  eighteen  volunteers  in  three 
whale  boats  ;  but  before  he  arrived  at  Northwest  Bay,  he 
discovered  a  body  of  men  on  an  island.  Immediately  upon 
this,  he  left  two  boats  to  fish  at  a  distance,  that  they  might 
not  occasion  an  alarm,  and  returned  himself  with  the  infor 
mation.  The  general,  seeing  him  rowing  back  with  great 
velocity,  in  a  single  boat,  concluded  the  others  were  captur 
ed,  and  sent  a  skiff,  with  orders  for  him  alone  to  come  on 
shore.  After  advising  the  general  of  the  circumstances,  he 
urged  the  expediency  of  returning  to  make  further  discove 
ries,  and  bring  off  the  boats.  Leave  was  reluctantly  given. 
He  found  his  people,  and,  passing  still  onward,  discovered 
(by  the  aid  of  a  good  perspective  glass)  a  large  army  in  mo 
tion.  By  this  time  several  of  the  advanced  canoes  had 
nearly  surrounded  him,  but  by  the  swiftness  of  his  whale 
boats,  he  escaped  through  the  midst  of  them.  On  his  return 
he  informed  the  general  minutely  of  all  he  had  seen,  and 
intimated  his  conviction  that  the  expedition  must  obviously 
be  destined  against  Fort  William  Henry.  That  commander, 
strictly  enjoining  silence  on  the  subject,  directed  him  to  put 
his  men  under  an  oath  of  secrecy,  and  to  prepare,  without 
loss  of  time,  to  return  to  the  head-quarters  of  the  army. 
Major  Putnam  observed,  "  he  hoped  his  excellency  did  not 
intend  to  neglect  so  fair  an  opportunity  of  giving  battle, 
should  the  enemy  presume  to  land."  "  What  do  you  think 
we  should  do  here  ?"  replied  the  general.  Accordingly 
the  next  day  he  returned,  and  the  day  after  Colonel  Monroe 
was  ordered  from  Fort  Edward,  with  his  regiment,  to  rein 
force  the  garrison.  That  officer  took  with  him  all  his  rich 
baggage  and  camp  equipage,  notwithstanding  Maj.  Putnam's 
advice  to  the  contrary.  The  day  following  his  arrival,  the 
enemy  landed  and  besieged  the  place. 

The  Marquis  de  Montcalm,  provided  with  a  good  train  of 
artillery,  meeting  with  no  annoyance  from  the  British  army, 
and  but  inconsiderable  interruption  from  the  garrison,  ac 
celerated  his  approaches  so  rapidly,  as  to  obtain  possession 
of  the  fort  in  a  short  time  after  completing  the  investiture. 

A  very  important  affair  is  here  attempted  to  be  made 
up  out  of  very  small  materials.  Of  what  use  was  the 


50 

discovery  of  a  few  men  upon  an  island  ?  No  advan 
tage  was  taken  of  it,  notwithstanding  Major  Putnam's 
great  haste  to  come  back  with  the  news.  The  report  he 
gave  of  the  dangerous  situation  in  which  he  had-  im 
prudently  left  two  of  his  boats,  caused  the  general  re 
luctantly  to  grant  him  liberty  to  return  for  them.  Put 
nam,  however,  with  his  usual  good  fortune,  escaped 
through  the  midst  of  the  enemy's  canoes. 

The  assertion  that  Major  Rogers  made  abortive  at 
tempts  to  gain  information  of  the  condition  of  the  ene 
my,  at  their  different  stations,  by  reason  of  making  his 
excursions  in  the  night  season  ;  and  that  it  was  reserv 
ed  for  the  brave  and  sagacious  Putnam  to  undertake  an 
expedition  for  that  purpose,  in  open  daylight,  is  too  ri 
diculous  for  comment.  It  would  require  the  eyes  of  an 
owl,  to  take  surveys  of  the  enemy's  positions  and  forti 
fications  in  the  night.  Rogers,  with  his  rangers,  in  his 
fatiguing  scouts,  traveled  day  and  night,  in  all  seasons 
of  the  year,  and  made  reasonable,  and,  no  doubt,  cor 
rect  reports  to  the  commanding  generals  of  his  discov 
eries. 

There  is  such  a  resemblance  in  several  circumstances 
contained  in  the  foregoing  statement  of  Colonel  Hum 
phreys,  to  those  in  the  following  official  reports  oi  Ma 
jor  Rogers,  that  I  am  induced  to  insert  them.  The  ex 
pedition,  according  to  Rogers,  it  will  be  perceived,  took 
place  nearly  two  years  before  the  time  allotted  to  it  by 
Humphreys,  Fort  William  Henry  not  being  taken  till 
August,  1757.  It  will  be  recollected  that  Rogers  pub 
lished  his  journal  in  1765,  and  that  Humphreys'  Life  of 
Putnam  did  not  appear  till  1788. 

"  November  10,  1755.  Pursuant  to  orders  I  received 
this  day  from  Gen.  Johnson,  in  order  to  discover  the 
enemy's  strength  and  situation  at  Ticonderoga,  I  pro 
ceeded  on  the  scout  with  a  party  of  ten  men  on  the  12th 
instant;  and  on  the  14th  I  arrived  within  view  of  the 
fort  at  that  place,  and  found  they  had  erected  three 
new  barracks  and  four  storehouses  in  the  fort ;  between 


51 

which  and  the  water  they  had  eighty  batteaux  hauled 
upon  the  beach,  and  about  fifty  tents  near  the  fort. 
They  appeared  to  be  very  busy  at  work.  Having  by 
these  discoveries  answered  the  design  of  our  march, 
we  returned,  arriving  at  our  encampment  the  19th. 

"December  19, 1755.  Having  had  a  month's  repose, 
I  proceeded,  agreeably  to  orders  from  Gen.  Johnson, 
with  two  men,  once  more  to  reconnoiter  the  French  at 
Ticonderoga.  [Eighteen  volunteers,  on  account  of  the 
great  hazard  to  be  encountered,  were  deemed  requisite 
by  the  general  for  a  like  scout  under  Putnam.]  In  our 
way  we  discovered  a  fire  upon  an  island,  adjacent  to 
the  route  we  took,  which,  as  we  supposed,  had  been 
kindled  by  some  of  the  enemy  who  were  there.  [Rogers 
did  not  return  back  to  inform  the  general  of  this  mighty 
discovery.]  This  obliged  us  to  lie  by,  and  act  like  fish 
ermen,  in  order  to  deceive  them  till  night  came  on,  when 
we  retired  to  the  west  side  of  the  lake,  fifteen  miles 
north  of  our  fort.  Here  concealing  our  boat,  the  20th 
we  pursued  our  march  by  land,  and  on  the  21st,  at 
noon,  [open  daylight]  were  in  sight  of  the  French  fort; 
where  we  found  their  people  still  deeply  engaged  at 
work,  and  discovered  four  pieces  of  cannon  mounted 
on  the  southeast  bastion  ;  two  at  the  northwest  to 
wards  the  woods,  and  two  on  the  south.  By  what  I 
judged,  the  number  of  their  troops  was  about  five  hun 
dred.  I  made  several  attempts  to  take  a  prisoner,  by 
waylaying  their  paths  ;  but  they  always  passed  in  num 
bers  vastly  superior  to  mine,  and  thereby  disappointed 
me.  We  approached  very  near  their  fort  by  night,  and 
were  driven  by  the  cold,  which  was  now  very  severe, 
to  take  shelter  in  one  of  their  evacuated  huts.  Before 
defy  there  was  a  fall  of  snow,  which  obliged  us  with  all 
possible  speed  to  march  homeward,  lest  the  enemy 
should  perceive  our  tracks  and  pursue  us. 

"  We  found  our  boat  in  safety,  and  had  the  good  for 
tune,  after  being  almost  exhausted  with  hunger,  cold, 
and  fatigue,  to  kill  two  deer,  with  which  being  refresh- 


52 

ed,  dn  the  24th,  we  returned  to  Fort  William  Henry, 
a  fortress  erected  in  this  year's  campaign,  at  the  south 
end  of  Lake  George." 

Major  Rogers'  reports  are  modest,  plain  narratives 
of  facts,  without  any  ostentatious  displays  of  extraordi 
nary  courage  or  hair-breadth  escapes. 

Not  long  after  this  misfortune,  [capture  of  Fort  William 
Henry,]  Gen.  Lyman  succeeded  to  the  command  of  Fort  Ed 
ward.  He  resolved  to  strengthen  it.  For  this  purpose  one 
hundred  and  fifty  men  were  employed  in  cutting  timber.  To 
cover  them,  Capt.  Little  was  posted  (with  fifty  British  regu 
lars)  at  the  head  of  a  thick  swamp  about  one  hundred  rods 
eastward  of  the  fort — to  which  his  communication  lay  over 
a  tongue  of  land,  formed  on  the  one  side  by  the  swamp,  and 
by  a  creek  on  the  other. 

One  morning,  at  daybreak,  a  sentinel  saw  indistinctly 
several  birds,  as  he  conceived,  come  from  the  swamp  and 
fly  over  him  with  incredible  swiftness.  While  he  was  rumi 
nating  on  these  wonderful  birds,  and  endeavoring  to  form 
some  idea  of  their  color,  shapes  and  size,  an  arrow  buried  it 
self  in  the  limb  of  a  tree  just  above  his  head.  He  now  dis 
covered  the  quality  and  design  of  these  winged  messengers 
of  fate,  and  gave  the  alarm.  Instantly  the  working  party 
began  to  retreat  along  the  defile.  A  large  body  of  savages 
had  concealed  themselves  in  the  morass  before  the  guard  was 
posted,  and  were  attempting  in  this  way  to  kill  the  sentinel 
without  noise,  with  the  design  to  surprise  the  whole  party. 
Finding  the  alarm  given,  they  rushed  from  the  covert,  shot 
and  tomahawked  those  who  were  nearest  at  hand,  and  press 
ed  hard  on  the  remainder  of  the  unarmed  fugitives.  Capt. 
Little  flew  to  their  relief,  and,  by  pouring  on  the  Indians  a 
well-timed  fire,  checked  the  pursuit,  and  enabled  such  of  the 
fatigue-men  as  did  not  fall  in  the  first  onset,  to  retire  to  the 
fort.  Thither  he  sent  for  assistance,  his  little  party  being 
almost  overpowered  by  numbers.  But  the  commandant,  Im 
agining  that  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  were  approaching 
for  a  general  assault,  called  in  his  out-posts  and  shut  the 
gates. 

Maj.  Putnam  lay,  with  his  rangers,  on  an  island  adjacent 
to  the  fort.  Having  heard  the  musquetry,  and  learned  that 


53 

his  friend  Capt.  Little  was  in  the  utmost  peril,  he  plunged 
into  the  river  at  the  head  of  his  corps,  and  waded  through  the 
water  towards  the  place  of  engagement.  This  brought  him 
so  near  to -the  fort,  that  Gen.  Lyman,  apprized  of  his  design, 
and  unwilling  that  the  lives  of  a  few  more  brave  men  should 
be  exposed  to  what  he  deemed  inevitable  destruction,  mount 
ed  the  parapet  and  ordered  him  to  proceed  no  further.  The 
major  only  took  time  to  make  the  best  short  apology  he  could, 
and  marched  on.  This  is  the  only  instance  in  the  whole  course 
of  his  military  service  wherein  he  did  not  pay  the  strictest  obe 
dience  to  orders  ;  and  in  this  instance  his  motive  was  highly 
commendable.  But  when  such  conduct,  even  if  sanctified 
by  success,  is  passed  over  with  impunity,  it  demonstrates 
that  all  is  not  right  in  the  military  system.  In  a  disciplined 
army,  such  as  that  of  the  United  States  became  under  Gen. 
Washington,  an  officer  guilty  of  a  slighter  violation  of  orders, 
however  elevated  in  rank  or  meritorious  in  service,  would 
have  been  brought  before  the  bar  of  a  court  martial.  Were 
it  not  for  the  seductive  tendency  of  a  brave  man's  example, 
I  might  have  been  spared  the  mortification  of  making  these 
remarks  on  the  conduct  of  an  officer,  whose  distinguishing 
characteristics  were  promptitude  for  duty  and  love  of  subordi 
nation,  as  well  as  cheerfulness  to  encounter  every  species  of 
difficulty  and  danger. 

The  rangers  of  Putnam  soon  opened  their  way  for  a  junc 
tion  with  the  little  handful  of  regulars,  who  still  obstinately 
maintained  their  ground.  By  his  advice  the  whole  rushed 
impetuously  with  shouts  and  huzzas  into  the  swamp.  The 
savages  fled  on  every  side,  and  were  chased,  with  no  incon 
siderable  loss  on  their  part,  as  long  as  the  daylight  lasted. 
On  ours  only  one  man  was  killed  in  the  pursuit.  His  death 
was  immediately  revenged  by  that  of  the  Indian  who  shot 
him.  This  Indian  was  one  of  the  runners — a  chosen  body 
of  active  young  men,  who  are  made  use  of  not  only  to  pro 
cure  intelligence  and  convey  tidings,  but  also  to  guard  the 
rear  on  a  retreat.  . 

The  foregoing  is  a  private  anecdote,  no  historian 
taking  the  least  notice  of  it.  The  absolute  misstate- 
ments,  known  to  be  contained  in  it,  naturally  lead  to 
the  conjecture  that  others  may  have  occurred.  These 


54 

misstatements  are,  in  the  first  place,  the  connecting  of 
Putnam  with  the  corps  of  rangers,  of  which  he  was  no 
more  a  member  than  his  biographer.  Secondly,  the 
assertion,  that  this,  if  it  actually  happened,  was  the  only 
instance  in  which  Putnam  disobeyed  the  orders  of  a 
superior  officer.  He  neglected  to  obey  the  orders  of 
Gen.  Washington  more  than  once,  and  upon  one  occa 
sion  absolutely  refused,  as  will  appear  hereafter  ;  which 
caused  Washington  to  write  to  him  as  follows  :  "  That 
you  may  not  hesitate  about  complying  with  this  order, 
you  are  to  consider  it  as  peremptory,  and  not  to  be  dis 
pensed  with.  *  *  *  I  could  wish  that  in  future  my 
orders  may  be  immediately  complied  with,  without  ar 
guing  upon  the  propriety  of  them.  If  any  accident 
ensues  from  obeying  them,  the  fault  will  be  upon  me 
and  not  upon  you" 

The  daring  of  Putnam,  according  to  his  biographer, 
seems  to  have  frightened  all  the  generals  out  of  their 
senses,  for  fear  his  chivalrous  adventures  should  cause 
the  sacrifice  of  half  the  army.  It  is  a  fact,  however, 
that  very  few  men  were  ever  lost  under  his  immediate 
command.  But  that  Gen.  Lyman  should  be  so  weak 
as  to  suppose  a  scout  of  Indians,  sent  ahead  of  an  army 
to  examine  the  condition  of  an  enemy's  post,  should  at 
tack  a  few  fatigue-men,  adjacent  to-  a  fortification  in 
tended  to  be  assaulted,  is  not  credible.  Scouts  upon 
such  occasions  are  ordered  to  reconnoiter  an  enemy's 
works  with  the  utmost  caution,  to  prevent  being  dis 
covered,  and  then  to  return  to  the  army  and  make  their 
report. 

It  is  likely,  in  this  case,  that  Maj.  Putnam  was  not  in 
fair  hailing  distance  of  the  fort  when  he  passed  it,  and 
in  the  confusion  mistook  the  orders  of  the  general,  which 
doubtless  were  for  him  to  hasten  on  to  the  support  of 
Little  as  fast  as  possible. 

The  attempt  here  made  to  elevate  a  subaltern  officer 
at  the  expense  of  his  superior,  does  not  appear  to  be 
supported  by  the  least  probability  of  truth.  Gen.  Ly- 


55 

man's  character  as  a  general  officer  stands  ummpeach- 
ed.  "In  1755  he  was  appointed  cominander-in-chief 
of  the  Connecticut  forces,  and  held  this  post  with  much 
distinction  till  the  conclusion  of  the  Canadian  war." 
(Davenport,  Biog.) 

In  the  winter  of  1757,  when  Col.  Haviland  was  command 
ant  at  Fort  Edward,  the  barracks  adjoining  to  the  northwest, 
bastion  took  fire.  They  extended  within  twelve  feet  of  the 
magazine,  which  contained  three  hundred  barrels  of  powder, 
On  its  first  discovery,  the  fire  raged  with  great  violence. 
The  commandant  endeavored,  in  vain,  by  discharging  some 
pieces  of  heavy  artillery  against  the  supporters  of  this  flight 
of  barracks,  to  level  them  with  the  ground.  Putnam  arrived 
from  the  island  where  he  was  stationed  at  the  moment  when 
the  blaze  approached  that  end  which  was  contiguous  to  the 
magazine.  Instantly  a  vigorous  attempt  was  made  to  extin 
guish  the  conflagration.  A  way  was  opened  by  a  postern 
gate  to  the  river,  and  the  soldiers  were  employed  in  bringing 
water ;  which  he,  having  mounted  on  a  ladder  to  the  eaves  of 
the  building,  received  and  threw  upon  the  flame.  It  contin 
ued,  notwithstanding  their  utmost  efforts,  to  gain  upon  them. 
He  stood,  enveloped  in  smoke,  so  near  the  sheet  of  fire,  that 
a  pair  of  thick  blanket  mittens  were  burnt  entirely  from  his 
hands ;  he  was  supplied  with  another  pair  dipt  in  water. 
Col.  Haviland,  fearing  that  he  would  perish  in  the  flames, 
called  to  him  to  come  down.  But  he  entreated  that  he  might 
be  suffered  to  remain,  since  destruction  must  inevitably  ensue 
if  their  exertions  should  be  remitted.  The  gallant  command 
ant,  not  less  astonished  than  charmed  at  the  boldness  of  his 
conduct,  forbade  any  more  effects  to  be  carried  out  of  the 
fort,  animated  the  men  to  redoubled  diligence,  and  exclaim 
ed,  "  If  we  must  be  blown  up,  we  will  go  all  together.7'  At 
last,  when  the  barracks  were  seen  to  be  tumbling,  Putnam 
descended,  placed  himself  at  the  interval,  and  continued  from 
an  incessant  rotation  of  replenished  buckets  to  pour  water 
upon  the  magazine.  The  outside  planks  were  already  con 
sumed  by  the  proximity  of  the  fire,  and  as  only  one  thickness 
of  timber  intervened,  the  trepidation  now  became  general 
and  extreme.  Putnam,  still  undaunted,  covered  with  a  cloud 
of  cinders,  and  scorched  with  the  intensity  of  the  heat,  main- 


56 

tained  his  position  until  the  fire  subsided,  and  the  danger  was 
wholly  over.  He  had  contended  for  one  hour  and  a  half 
with  that  terrible  element.  His  legs,  his  thighs,  his  arms, 
and  his  face  were  blistered  ;  and  when  he  pulled  off  his 
second  pair  of  mittens,  the  skin  from  his  hands  and  fingers 
followed  them.  It  was  a  month  before  he  recovered.  The 
commandant,  to  whom  his  merits  had  before  endeared  him, 
could  not  stifle  the  emotions  of  gratitude,  due  to  the  man 
who  had  been  so  instrumental  in  preserving  the  magazine, 
the  fort,  and  the  garrison. 

It  is  somewhat  singular  that  none  of  the  historians 
who  have  treated  of  this  war,  should  have  taken  a 
passing  notice  of  so  notable  a  circumstance  as  is  here 
related.  It  would  have  been  a  terrible  misfortune,  had 
the  magazine  of  this  important  post  been  blown  up  ; 
which,  it  seems,  by  this  account,  was  saved  by  the  su 
perior  prowess  and  untiring  perseverance  of  one  man. 
History,  however,  is  silent  on  the  subject,  and,  perhaps, 
it  would  have  been  as  well  if  Col.  Humphreys  had  fol 
lowed  the  example ;  or,  at  least,  given  the  description 
of  the  affair  in  a  less  romantic  style.  When  historical 
facts  are  mixed  up  with  the  wonderful,  it  leads  to  a 
suspicion  that  the  whole  is  a  fabrication. 


57 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  repulse  before  Ticonderoga  took  place  in  1758.  Gen. 
Abercrombie,  the  British  commander-in-chief  in  America, 
conducted  the  expedition.  His  army,  which  amounted  to 
nearly  sixteen  thousand  regulars  and  provincials,  was  amply 
supplied  with  artillery  and  military  stores.  This  well-ap 
pointed  corps  passed -over  Lake  George,  and  landed,  without 
opposition,  at  the  point  ofMestination.  The  troops  advanced 
in  columns.  Lord  Howe,  having  Maj.  Putnam  with  him,  was 
in  front  of  the  center.  A  body  of  about  Jive  hundred  men, 
(the  advance  or  pickets  of  the  French  army,)  which  had  fled 
at  first,  began  to  skirmish  with  our  left.  "  Putnam,"  said 
Lord  Howe,  "  what  means  that  firing  ?"  "  I  know  not,  but 
with  your  lordship's  leave  will  see,"  replied  the  former. 
"  I  will  accompany  you,"  rejoined  the  gallant  young  noble 
man.  In  vain  did  Maj.  Putnam  attempt  to  dissuade  him  by 
saying — "  My  lord,  if  I  am  killed,  the  loss  of  my  life  will  be 
of  little  consequence,  but  the  preservation  of  yours  is  of  in 
finite  importance  to  this  army."  The  only  answer  was — 
"  Putnam,  your  life  is  as  dear  to  you  as  mine  is  to  me ;  I 
am  determined  to  go."  One  hundred  of  the  van,  under  Maj. 
Putnam,  filed  off  with  Lord  Howe.  They  soon  met  the  left 
flank  of  the  enemy's  advance,  by  whose  first  fire  his  lordship 
fell. — It  was  a  loss  indeed  ;  and  particularly  felt  in  the  ope 
rations  which  occurred  three  days  afterwards.  His  manners 
and  his  virtues  had  made  him  the  idol  of  the  army.  Nothing 
could  be  more  calculated  to  inspire  men  with  the  rash  ani 
mation  of  rage,  or  to  temper  it  with  the  cool  perseverance  of 
revenge,  than  the  sight  of  such  a  hero,  so  beloved,  fallen  in 
his  country's  cause.  It  had  the  effect.  Putnam's  party, 
having  cut  their  way  obliquely  through  the  enemy's  ranks,  and 
having  been  joined  by  Capt.  D'Ell,  with  twenty  men,  together 
with  some  other  small  parties,  charged  them  so  furiously  in 


58 

rear,  that  nearly  three  hundred  were  killed  on  the  spot,  and 
one  hundred  and  forty-eight  made  prisoners.  In  the  mean 
time,  from  the  uhskilfulness  of  the  guides,  some  of  our  col 
umns  were  bewildered.  The  left  wing,  seeing  Putnam's 
party  in  their  front,  advancing  over  the  dead  bodies  towards 
them,  commenced  a  brisk  and  heavy  fire,  which  killed  a 
Serjeant  and  several  privates.  Nor  could  they,  by  sounds 
or  signs,  be  convinced  of  their  mistake,  until  Maj.  Putnam, 
preferring  (if  hea-ven  had  thus  ordained  it)  the  loss  of  his  own 
life  to  the  loss  of  the  lives  of  his  brave  associates,  ran  through 
the  midst  of  the  flying  lolls,  and  prevented  the  impending 
catastrophe. 

I  will  here,  in  this  stage  of  the  history,  give  abstracts 
from  the  accounts  of  Mante  and  Marshall  of  this  expe 
dition. 

An  abstract  of  Major  Mante's  account  of  the  expedi 
tion  against  Ticonderoga,  in  1758: 

"  The  army  being  formed  into  four  columns,  and  or 
dered  to  march,  they  soon  came  to  an  encampment  that 
had  been.occupied  by  the  advanced  guard  of  the  ene 
my,  consisting  of  three  pickets  of  the  regiment  of 
Guienne,  and  deserted  by  them  on  the  approach  of  the 
English  ;  but  not  till  they  had  destroyed  their  ammuni 
tion  and  provisions,  and  set  fire  to  their  camp. 

"  The  woods  being  very  thick,  and  impassable,  with 
any  regularity,  to  such  a  body  of  men,  and  the  guides 
unskilful,  the  troops  were  bewildered,  and  the  columns 
broke,  falling  in  one  upon  another.  During  this  disor 
der,  Lord  Howe,  at  the  head  of  the  right  center  column, 
supported  by  the  light  infantry,  fell  in  with  about  Jive 
hundred  French,  who  had  likewise  lost  themselves  in 
the  woods." 

The  author  here  gives  an  account  of  the  skirmish, 
and  the  loss  sustained  by  the  enemy,  and  adds :  "  But 
this  advantage  was  too  inconsiderable  to  counterbalance 
the  loss  of  Lord  Howe,  who,  almost  at  the  beginning 
of  the  action,  received  a  musket  ball  in  the  breast,  of 
which  he  instantly  expired.  The  want  of  guides  in  a 


59 

country  so  circumstanced  as  to  render  the  regular  mo 
tion  even  of  a  small  party  extremely  difficult,  must 
greatly  embarrass  that  of  a  large  army.  Accordingly, 
the  total  ignorance  of  the  ground  on  which  this  skirmish 
happened,  together  with  the  early  death  of  Lord  Howe, 
caused  such  confusion  amongst  the  English,  that  the 
whole  benefit  of  this  little  success  was  confined  to  that  of 
occupying  the  ground  upon  which  it  was  obtained,  the 
night  after" 

From  Marshall's  introduction  to  his  Life  of  Wash 
ington,  vol.  1.,  p.  432: 

"  The  expedition  against  Ticonderoga  and  Crown 
Point  was  conducted  by  Gen.  Abercrombie  in  person. 
Having  assembled  his  forces  in  the  neighborhood,  he 
embarked  them  at  Lake  George  on  board  one  hundred 
and  twenty-five  whale  boats  and  nine  hundred  batteaux. 
His  army  consisted  of  near  sixteen  thousand  effectives, 
of  whom  about  nine  thousand  were  provincials.  It 
was  attended  by  a  very  formidable  train  of  artillery, 
and  every  requisite  for  the  success  of  the  enterprise. 
The  pieces  designed  to  cover  their  landing  were  mount 
ed  on  rafts. 

"  Early  the  next  morning  they  reached  the  landing 
place,  which  was  in  a  cove  on  the  west  side  of  the  lake 
leading  to  the  advanced  guard  of  the  enemy,  composed 
of  one  battalion,  posted  in  a  logged  camp,  when  a  de 
barkation  was  effected  without  opposition.  The  troops 
were  immediately  formed  into  four  columns,  the  British 
in  the  center,  and  the  provincials  on  the  flanks,  in  which 
order  they  marched  towards  the  advanced  guard  of 
the  French.  On  their  approach,  the  enemy,  who  were 
not  in  force  to  oppose  them,  destroyed  whatever  was 
in  their  power,  and  deserting  their  camp  made  a  pre 
cipitate  retreat. 

"  Abercrombie  continued  his  march  towards  Ticon 
deroga  with  the  intention  of  investing  the  place  ;  but 
the  woods  being  very  thick,  and  the  guides  unskilful, 
the  columns  were  thrown  into  confusion,  and  in  some 


60 

measure  entangled  with  each  other.  In  this  situation, 
Lord  Howe,  at  the  head  of  the  right  center  column,  fell 
in  with  a  part  of  the  advanced  guard  of  the  enemy, 
which,  in  retreating  from  Lake  George,  was  likewise 
lost  in  the  woods.  He  immediately  attacked  and  dis 
persed  them  ;  killing  several,  and  taking  one  hundred 
and  forty-eight  prisoners,  among  whom  were  five  offi 
cers  and  three  cadets. 

"  This  small  advantage  was  purchased  at  a  very  dear 
rate  ;  though  only  two  officers  on  the  side  of  the  British 
were  killed  :  one  of  these  was  Lord  Howe  himself,  who 
fell  on  the  first  fire.  This  gallant  young  nobleman  had 
endeared  himself  to  the  whole  army,  and  was  univer 
sally  bewailed." 

Mante  says  the  troops  were  formed  into  four  col 
umns,  the  British  in  the  center,  and  the  provincials  on 
the  flanks.  And  Marshall  says  Lord  Howe  was  at  the 
head  of  the  right  cent&r  column,  supported  by  the  light 
infantry.  As  Major  Putnam  belonged  to  the  provin 
cials,  his  station,  of  course,  was  on  the  flanks,  and  not 
with  Lord  Howe  and  the  British  troops,  in  the  center. 
We  find,  also,  by  these  documents,  that  the  confusion 
which  occurred  by  the  columns  falling  in  one  upon 
another,  happened  before  the  English  army  met  with 
the  French  picket, — not  afterwards,  as  Humphreys 
states ;  and,  indeed,  when  no  enemy  could  reasonably 
have  been  expected  to  be  encountered ;  and  it  being  broad 
daylight,  it  was  hardly  possible  they  could  mistake  each 
other  for  enemies.  The  different  costumes  of  the  Eng 
lish  and  French  troops  were  a  sufficient  safeguard 
against  such  an  accident,  at  least,  in  the  daytime.  The 
sergeant  and  several  privates,  said  to  have  been  killed  in 
consequence  of  making  such  a  mistake,  must  have  been 
slain  by  the  balls  of  the  enemy ;  otherwise  the  histo 
ries  of  the  war  would  certainly  contain  a  notice  of 
such  an  untoward  event. 

Was  it  necessary  for  the  British  army,  consisting  of 
16,000  men,  to  lose  a  favorite  general  officer,  in  order 


61 

to  become  sufficiently  excited,  resolutely  to  attack  and 
defeat  an  advanced  guard  of  the  French,  consisting  of 
500  men  ?  And,  after  all,  it  would  seem,  by  the  biog 
rapher's  account,  that  the  issue  of  the  contest  was 
doubtful,  till  Putnam's  party  cut  their  way  obliquely 
through  the  enemy's  ranks. 

The  tender  feelings  which  Maj.  Putnam  possessed  taught 
him  to  respect  an  unfortunate  foe,  and  to  strive,  by  every 
lenient  art  in  his  power,  to  alleviate  the"  miseries  of  war. 
For  this  purpose  he  remained  on  the  field  until  it  began  to 
grow  dark,  employed  in  collecting  such  of  the  enemy  as 
were  left  wounded,  to  one  place ;  he  gave  them  all  the 
liquor  and  little  refreshments  which  he  could  procure  ;  he 
furnished  to  each  of  them  a  blanket ;  he  put  three  blankets 
under  a  French  sergeant  who  was  badly  wounded  through 
the  body,  and  placed  him  in  an  easy  posture  by  the  side  of  a 
tree  :  the  poor  fellow  could  only  squeeze  his  hand  with  an 
expressive  grasp.  "Ah,"' said  Major  Putnam,  "depend 
upon  it,  my  brave  soldier,  you  shall  be  brought  to  the  camp 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  the  same  care  shall  be  taken  of  you 
as  if  you  were  my  brother."  The  next  morning  Major 
Rogers  was  sent  to  reconnoiter  the  field,  and  to  bring  off  the 
wounded  prisoners  ;  but  finding  the  wounded  unable  to  help 
themselves,  in  order  to  save  trouble,  he  despatched  every 
one  of  them  to  the  world  of  spirits.  Putnam's  was  not  the 
only  heart  that  bled.  The  provincial  and  British  officers, 
who  became  acquainted  with  the  fact,  were  struck  with  in 
expressible  horror. 

If  Putnam  was  the  author  of  this  base  slander,  his 
boasted  humanity  was  a  consummate  sham  ;  for  while 
he  was  pharisaically  proclaiming  his  own  good  deeds, 
he  was,  at  the  same  time,  endeavoring  to  stab  the  repu 
tation  of  a  brave,  honorable  fellow-soldier.  The  In 
dian  auxiliaries  of  both  the  French  and  English  weje 
frequently  guilty  of  the  most  revolting  cruelties  to  pris 
oners,  whether  wounded  or  not,  and  the  commanding 
officers  always  endeavored  to  screen  themselves  from 
the  responsibility  by  a  pretence,  at  least,  that  it  was 
not  in  their  power  to  restrain  them.  But  to  suppose, 

6 


62 

that  a  regularly  t commissioned  officer,  European  or 
American,  would 'be  tolerated  in  such  an  act  as  here  re 
lated,  when  no  plausible  excuse  could  be  given  for  its 
prevention,  is  supremely  ridiculous.  It  would  lead  to 
retaliation,  on  the  first  opportunity. 

It  appears,  however,  that  the  English  army  encamp 
ed  on  the  battle  ground  the  night  succeeding  the  skir 
mish  ;  and  that  Rogers,  instead  of  being  sent  on  to  it, 
was  sent  off  from  it,  early  the  next  morning.  Maj. 
Mante,  as  stated  above,  says — "  That  the  whole  benefit 
of  this  little  success  was  confined  to  that  of  occupying 
the  ground  upon  which  *it  was  obtained,  the  night 
after."  Maj.  Putnam,  therefore,  might  have  remained 
with  the  sergeant  mentioned,  and  others  of  the  wound 
ed  enemy,  all  night,  had  he  so  chosen. 

The  assailants,  after  having  been  for  more  than  four  hours 
exposed  to  a  most  fatal  fire,  without  making  any  impression 
by  their  reiterated  and  obstinate  proofs  of, valor,  were  or 
dered  to  retreat.  Maj.  Putnam,  who  had  acted  as  an  aid  in 
bringing  the  provincial  regiments  successively  into  action,  as 
sisted  in  preserving  order.  The  loss  on  our  side  was  upwards 
of  two  thousand  killed  and  wounded.  Twenty-five  hundred 
stands  of  arms  were  taken  by  the  French.  Our  army,  after 
sustaining  this  havoc,  retreated  with  such  extraordinary 
precipitation,  that  they  regained  their  camp  at  the  southward 
of  Lake  George  the  evening  after  the  action. 

Ubiquity,  it  seems,  is  one  of  the  qualities  attributed 
to  Putnam ;  for  while  he  was  with  the  English  regu 
lars,  at  the  head  of  the  right  center  column,  cutting  his 
way  obliquely  through  the  enemy 's  ranks,  he  was,  at  the 
same  time,  acting  as  an  aid  in  bringing  the  provincial 
regiments  successively  to  action.  Why  really,  it  does 
appear  that  too  much  capital,  on  the  score  of  merit,  is 
attempted  to  be  made  out  of  this  trifling  affair,  a  mere 
skirmish,  unworthy  the  name  of  battle.  Whereas,  one 
would  think,  in  reading  Humphreys'  account  of  it,  that 
two  large  armies,  of  fifteen  or  twenty  thousand  men 
each,  had  come  in  contact,  and  engaged  in  a  tremen- 


63 

dous  conflict.  We  have  seen  that  the  French  picket 
of  five  hundred  men,  when  they  discovered  the  force 
coming  against  them,  precipitately  abandoned  their 
fortification,  and  were  making  all  the  speed  possible  to 
arrive  at  Ticonderoga.  But  unfortunately  missing  their 
way,  were  overtaken  by  the  English  army,  and,  at 
once,  "  hemmed  in  on  every  side"  It  is  probable  they 
discharged  their  muskets  once  only,  and  then  endeav 
ored  to  make  their  escape.  Their  being  surrounded, 
accounts  for  the  large  number,  in  proportion  to  their 
force,  that  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  English  army. 
Several  also,  says  Marshall,  were  killed.  It  being  a 
momentary  affair,  precludes  the  possibility  of  the  pro 
vincials  being  brought  successively  into  action.  The 
contest  was  too  soon  over  to  admit  of  a  succession  or 
regular  series  of  tactics. 

If  Maj.  Putnam  acted  so  conspicuous  a  part  in  this 
enterprise,  as  here  stated,  it  is  singular  that  no  histo 
rian,  not  even  Rogers,  should  mention  his  name  in  con 
nection  with  it.  His  biographer,  however,  has  atoned 
for  the  neglect,  and  done  him,  perhaps,  more  than  am 
ple  justice.  He  belonged  to  the  provincials,  where 
there  was  opportunity  enough  for  the  attainment  of 
fame  without  endeavoring  to  foist  him  into  corps  with 
which  he  had  no  concern. 

I  will  now  give  an  abstract  of  Maj.  Rogers'  account 
of  this  expedition,  as  recorded  in  his  journal. 

"On  the  22d  June,  1758,  Lord  Howe  encamped  at 
Lake  George,  where  formerly  stood  Fort  William  Hen 
ry,  with  a  part  of  the  troops  destined  to  the  attack  of 
Ticonderoga ;  and  on  the  28th,  Maj.  Gen.  Abercrom- 
bie  arrived  at  the  same  place  with  the  remainder  of 
the  army,  where  he  tarried  till  the  morning  of  the  5th 
of  July  ;  and  then  the  whole  army,  consisting  of  nearly 
16,000,  embarked  in  batteaux  for  Ticonderoga. 

"  The  order  of  march  was  a  most  agreeable  sight. 
The  regular  troops  in  the  center,  provincials  on  each 
wing,  the  light  infantry  on  the  right  of  the  advance 


64 

guard,  the  rangers  on  the  left,  with  Col.  Broadstreef  s 
batteaux-men  in  the  center.  In  this  manner  we  proceed 
ed  till  dusk,  down  Lake  George,  to  Sabbath-day  Point, 
where  the  army  halted  and  refreshed.  About  ten 
o'clock  the  army  moved  again,  and  at  twelve  the  whole 
landed.  I  immediately  sent  an  officer  to  wait  upon  the 
general  for  his  orders,  and  received  directions  from 
Capt.  Abercrombie,  one  of  his  aids,  to  gain  the  top  of 
a  mountain  that  bore  north  about  a  mile  from  the  land 
ing  place  ;  and  from  thence  to  proceed  east  to  the  river 
that  runs  into  the  falls  betwixt  the  landing  and  the 
saw-mill  ;  to  take  possession  of  some  rising  ground  on 
the  enemy's  side,  and  there  wait  the  army's  coming.  I 
immediately  marched  to  the  place  to  which  I  was  or 
dered,  where  I  arrived  in  about  an  hour,  and  posted 
my  men  to  as  good  advantage  as  I  could. 

"  About  two  o'clock  Cols.  Lyman  and  Fitch  came  to 
my  rear,  and  soon  after  a  sharp  fire  began  in  the  rear 
of  Col.  Lyman's  regiment ;  on  which  he  said  he  would 
make  his  front  immediately,  and  desired  me  to  fall  on 
their  left  flank,  which  I  accordingly  did.  By  this  time, 
Lord  Howe,  with  a  detachment  from  his  front,  had 
broke  the  enemy,  and  hemmed  them  in  on  every  side ; 
but  advancing  himself  with  great  eagerness  and  intre 
pidity  upon  them,  was  unfortunately  shot,  and  died  im 
mediately. 

"  There  were  taken  prisoners  of  the  enemy  in  this  ac 
tion,  five  officers,  two  volunteers,  and  160  men,  who 
were  sent  to  the  landing  place.  Nothing  more  mate 
rial  was  done  this  day.  The  next  morning,  at  six 
o'clock,  I  was  ordered  to  march  with  400  rangers,  to  the 
river  that  runs  into  the  falls,  the  place  where  I  was  the 
day  before,  and  there  to  halt,  on  the  west  side,  till  fur 
ther  orders  ;  while  Capt.  Stark,  with  the  remainder  of 
the  rangers,  marched  with  Capt.  Abercrombie  and 
Mr.  Clerk,  the  engineer,  to  observe  the  position  of  the 
enemy  at  the  fort,  from  whence  they  returned  that  eve 
ning." 


65 

Thus  it  appears  that  Maj.  Rogers,  so  far  from  be 
ing  on  the  ground  the  day  after  the  battle,  murdering 
the  wounded  prisoners,  was  at  a  great  remove  from  it. 
Mr.  Peabody  seems  a  little  shocked  at  this  relation ; 
arid,  after  quoting  it  from  Humphreys,  he  says  :  "  We 
have  no  means  of  contradicting  or  confirming  a  story, 
which  every  reader  would  be  glad  to  believe  unfound 
ed."  Mr.  Peabody  is  familiar  with  Rogers'  journal, 
referring  to  it  on  several  occasions,  and  therefore,  one 
would  think,  had  sufficient  means  for  contradicting  a 
statement  so  evidently  false. 

"  The  whole  army  lay  the  ensuing  night  under  arms. 
By  sunrise  next  morning,  Sir  William  Johnson  joined 
the  army,  with  four  hundred  and  forty  Indians.  At 
seven  o'clock  I  received  orders  to  march  with  my  ran 
gers.  A  lieutenant  of  Capt.  Stark's  led  the  advance 
guard.  I  was  within  about  three  hundred  yards  of  the 
breast- work,  .when  my  advance  guard  was  ambushed 
and  fired  upon  by  about  two  hundred  Frenchmen.  I 
immediately  formed  a  front,  and  marched  up  to  the 
advance  guard,  who  maintained  their  ground,  and  the 
enemy  immediately  retreated.  The  batteaux-men  now 
formed  on  my  left,  and  light  infantry  on  my  right. 
Soon  after,  three  regiments  of  provincials  came  up  and 
formed  in  my  rear,  at  two  hundred  yards  distance. 
About  half  an  hour  past  ten,  the  greatest  part  of  the 
army  being  drawn  up,  a  fire  began  on  the  left  wing, 
where  Col.  De  Lancey's  (the  New  Yorkers)  and  the 
boatmen  were  posted  ;  upon  which  I  was  ordered  for 
ward  to  endeavor  to  drive  the  enemy  within  the  breast 
work,  and  then  to  fall  back,  that  the  pickets  and  grena 
diers  might  march  through.  The  enemy  soon  retired 
within  their  works,  and  Maj.  Proby  marched  through 
with  his  pickets,  within  a  few  yards  of  the  breast-work, 
where  he  unhappily  fell  ;  and  the  enemy  keeping  up  a 
heavy  fire,  the  soldiers  hastened  to  the  right-about, 
when  Col.  Haldiman  came  up  with  the  grenadiers  to 
support  them,  being  followed  by  the  battalions  in  bri- 

6* 


66 

gades.  Some  of  the  provincials  with  the  Mohawks 
came  up  also.  Col..Haldiman  advanced  very  near  the 
breast-work,  which  was  at  least  eight  feet  high. 

"  We  toiled  with  repeated  attacks  for  four  hours,  being 
greatly  embarrassed  by  trees  that  were  felled  by  the 
enemy  without  their  breast-work,  when  the  general 
thought  proper  to  order  a  retreat,  directing  me  to  bring 
up  the  rear,  which  I  did  in  the  dusk  of  the  evening. 
On  the  ninth  we  arrived  at  our  encampment  at  the 
south  end  of  Lake  George ;  where  the  army  received 
the  thanks  of  the  general  for  their  good  behavior,  and 
were  ordered  to  intrench  themselves.  The  wounded 
were  sent  to  Fort  Edward  and  Albany.  Our  loss,  both 
in  the  regufer  and  provincial  troops,  was  somewhat 
considerable.  The  enemy's  loss  was  about  five  hun 
dred,  besides  those  who  were  taken  prisoners." 

As  one  day  Maj.  Putnam  chanced  to  lie  with  a  batteau 
and  five  men,  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Hudson,  near  the 
Rapids,  contiguous  to  which  Fort  Miller  stood,  his  men  on 
the  opposite  bank  had  given  him  to  understand  that  a  large 
body  of  savages  were  in  his  rear,  and  would  be  upon  him  in 
a  moment.  To  stay  and  be  sacrificed, — to  attempt  crossing 
and  be  shot,  or  to  go  down  the  falls,  with  an  almost  abso 
lute  certainty  of  being  drowned,  were  the  sole  alternatives 
that  presented  themselves  to  his  choice.  So  instantaneously 
was  the  latter  adopted,  that  one  man  who  had  rambled  a  lit 
tle  from  the  party,  was,  of  necessity,  left,  and  fell  a  misera 
ble  victim  to  savage  barbarity.  The  Indians  arrived  on  the 
shore  soon  enough  to  fire  many  balls  on  the  batteau  before 
it  could  be  got  under  way.  No  sooner  had  our  batteau-men 
escaped,  by  favor  of  the  rapidity  of  the  current,  beyond  the 
reach  of  musket-shot,  than  death  seemed  only  to  have  been 
avoided  in  one  form  to  be  encountered  in  another  not  less 
terrible.  Prominent  rocks,  latent  shelves,  absorbing  eddies, 
and  abrupt  descents,  for  a  quarter  of  a  mile,  afforded  scarcely 
the  smallest  chance  of  escaping  without  a  miracle.  Putnam, 
trusting  himself  to  a  good  providence,  whose  kindness  he  had 
often  experienced,  rather  than  to  men,  whose  tenderest  mer 
cies  are  cruelty,  was  now  seen  to  place  himself  sedately  at 


67 

the  helm,  and  afford  an  astonishing  spectacle  of  serenity. 
His  companions,  with  a  mixture  of  terror,  admiration,  and 
wonder,  saw  him  incessantly  changing  the  course,  to  avoid 
the  jaws  of  ruin,  that  seemed  expanded  to  swallow  the  whirl 
ing  boat.  Twice  he  turned  it  fairly  round  to  shun  the  rifts 
of  rocks.  Amidst  these  eddies,  in  which  there  was  the 
greatest  danger  of  its  foundering,  at  one  moment  the  sides 
were  exposed  to  the  fury  of  the  waves ;  then  the  stern,  and 
next  the  bow  glanced  obliquely  onward,  with  inconceivable 
velocity.  With  not  less  amazement  the  savages  beheld  him 
sometimes  mounting  the  billows,  then  plunging  abruptly 
down,  at  other  times  skilfully  veering  from  the  rocks,  and 
shooting  through  the  only  narrow  passage  ;  until,  at  last, 
they  viewed  the  boat  safely  gliding  on  the  smooth  surface  of 
the  stream  below.  At  this  sight,  it  is  asserted,  that  these 
rude  sons  of  nature  were  affected  with  the  same  kind  of  su 
perstitious  veneration  which  the  Europeans,  in  the  dark  ages, 
entertained  for  some  of  their  most  valorous  champions.  They 
deemed  the  man  invulnerable,  whom  their  balls,  on  his  push 
ing  from  shore,  could  not  touch ;  and  whom  they  had  seen 
steering  in  safety  down  the  rapids  that  had  never  before  been 
passed.  They  conceived  it  would  be  an  affront  against  the 
Great  Spirit  to  attempt  to  kill  "this  favored  mortal  with  pow 
der  and  ball,  if  they  should  ever  see  and  know  him  again. 

If  the  Indians  looked  upon  Putnam  as  invulnerable 
by  means  of  powder  and  ball,  it  seems,  they  had 
a  different  opinion  of  the  instrumentality  of  the  toma 
hawk  ;  to  which,  it  will  be  seen,  he  soon  after  this  af 
fair  submitted. 

The  author,  in  the  foregoing  description,  has  shown 
that  he  possessed  more  poetical  talents,  than  qualifica 
tions  for  an  historian.  The  account  is  too  inflated  for 
a  true  narrative  of  facts.  A  poet,  on  his  first  passing 
through  Hell-Gate,  on  the  east  river,  or  hearing  it  de 
scribed,  would  be  apt  to  depict  the  awful  dangers  it 
presents  in  equally  glowing  terms.  Yet  this  passage 
is  daily  navigated  without  fear,  as  probably  now  are  the 
rapids  in  question. 

In  the  month  of  August,  [1758]  five  hundred  men  were 


68 

employed,  under  the  orders  of  Majs.  Rogers  and  Putnam,  to 
watch  the  motions  of  the  enemy  near  Ticonderoga.  At 
South  Bay  they  separated  the  party  into  two  equal  divisions, 
and  Rogers  took  a  position  on  Wood  Creek,  twelve  miles 
distant  from  Putnam. 

Upon  being,  some  time  afterwards,  discovered,  they  form 
ed  a  reunion,  and  concerted  measures  for  returning  to  Fort 
Edward.  Their  march  through  the  woods  was  in  three  di 
visions  by  FILES  :  the  right  commanded  by  Rogers,  the  left 
by  Putnam,  and  the  center  by  Capt.  D'Ell.  The  first  night 
they  encamped  on  the  banks  of  Clear  River,  about  a  mile 
from  old  Fort  Ann,  which  had  been  formerly  built  by  Gen. 
Nicholson.  Next  morning  Maj.  Rogers,  and  a  British  offi 
cer  named  Irwin,  incautiously  suffered  themselves,  from  a 
spirit  of  false  emulation,  to  be  engaged  in  firing  at  a  mark. 
Nothing  could  have  been  more  repugnant  to  the  military 
principles  of  Putnam  than  such  conduct,  or  reprobated  by 
him  in  more  pointed  terms.  As  soon  as  the  heavy  dew 
which  had  fallen  the  preceding  night  would  permit,  the  de 
tachment  moved  in  one  body,  Putnam  being  in  front,  D'Ell 
in  center,  and  Rogers  in  the  rear.  The  impervious  growth 
of  shrubs  and  underbrush  that  had  sprung  up,  where  the 
land  had  been  partially  cleared  some  years  before,  occasion 
ed  this  change  in  the  order  of  march.  At  the  moment  of 
moving,  the  famous  French  partisan  Molang,  who  had  been 
sent  with  five  hundred  men  to  intercept  our  party,  was  not 
more  than  one  mile  and  a  half  distant  from  them.*  Having 
heard  the  firing,  he  hastened  to  lay  an  ambuscade  precisely 
in  that  part  of  the  wood  most  favorable  to  his  project.  Maj. 
Putnam  was  just  emerging  from  the  thicket,  into  the  com 
mon  forest,  when  the  enemy  rose,  and  with  discordant  yells 
and  whoops,  commenced  an  attack  upon  the  right  of  his  di 
vision.  Surprised,  but  undismayed,  Putnam  halted,  returned 
the  fire,  and  passed  the  word  for  the  other  divisions  to  ad 
vance  for  his  support.  D'Ell  came.  The  action,  though 
widely  scattered,  and  principally  fought  between  man  and 
man,  soon  grew  general  and  intensely  warm.  It  would  be 
as  difficult  as  useless  to  describe  this  irregular  and  ferocious 

*Here  the  "  one  mile  and  a  half"  is  reduced  by  Mr.  Peabody  to  "  scarce 
a  mile,"  for  fear,  it  may  be  supposed,  the  firing  would  not  be  heard  at  a  mile 
and  a  lialf  distance. 


69 

he 

mode  of  fighting.  Rogers  came  not  up  ;  but,  as  he  declareu 
afterwards,  formed  a  circular  file  between  our  party  and 
Wood  Creek,  to  prevent  their  being  taken  in  rear  or  enfila 
ded.*  Successful  as  he  commonly  was,  his  conduct  did  not 
always  pass  without  unfavorable  imputation.  It  was  a  cur- 
rent  saying  in  the  camp,  "  that  Rogers  always  sent,  but 
Putnam  led  his  men  to  action  ;"  yet,  in  justice,  it  ought  to 
be  remarked  here,  that  the  latter  has  never  been  known,  in 
relating  the  story  of  this  day's  disaster,  to  affix  any  stigma 
upon  the  conduct  of  the  former. 

This  is  to  knock  a  man  down,  then  beg  pardon, 
and  allege  that  no  offence  was  intended.  The  saddle 
is  here  evidently  put  upon  the  wrong  horse.  "  That 
Rogers  always  sent,  but  Putnam  led  his  men  to  action," 
is  so  contrary  to  all  the  historical  records  of  the  war 
in  question,  that  it  is  astonishing  it  should  have  become 
a  current  saying  in  the  camp.  At  any  rate,  the  saying 
will  not  now  pass  current  with  those  conversant  with 
the  history. 

Gen.  Putnam  had  doubtless  read  Rogers'  journal, 
and  had  not  forgotten  his  report  of  a  scout  under  the 
command  of  Putnam,  in  which  he  says :  — "  Upon 
Capt.  Putnam's  return,  we  were  informed,  he  had  ven 
tured  within  eight  miles  of  the  French  fort  at  Ticonde- 
roga,  and  that  a  party,  he  had  sent  to  make  discoveries, 
reported  to  him,"  &c.  (See  Introduction.) 

This  small. party  might  as  well  have  been  sent  from 
the  fort  in  the  first  place ;  as  a  larger  body  of  men,  at  the 
distance  of  eight  miles,  could  render  it  no  support  in 
case  of  an  attack. 

"Maj.  Putnam,   perceiving  it  would  be  impracticable  to 

*  Mr.  Peabody  has  taken  the  liberty  to  make  the  insinuation  of  cowardice 
on  the  part  of  Rogers  upon  this  occasion  somewhat  more  pointed  than  the 
foregoing.  He  says  : — "  The  assault,  however  unexpected,  was  sustained 
with  gallantry  and  coolness  ;  Putnam  ordered  his  men  to  halt,  returned  the 
fire,  and  called  upon  Dalzell  and  Rogers  to  support  him.  Dalzell  came  im 
mediately  up  ;  but  Rogers,  instead  of  advancing  to  the  aid  of  his  associates, 
stationed  his  men  between  the  combatants  and  Wood  Creek,  in  order,  as  he 
affirmed,  to  guard  against  an  attack  in  the  rear ;  or,  as  was  suspected  by 
others,  to  relieve  himself  from  the  necessity  of  making  one  in  an  opposite 
direction." 


70 

cross  the  creek,  determined  to  maintain  his  ground.  In 
spired  by  his  example,  the  officers  and  men  behaved  with 
great  bravery ;  sometimes  they  fought  aggregately  in  open 
view,  and  sometimes  individually  under  cover ;  taking  aim 
from  behind  the  bodies  of  trees,  and  acting  in  a  manner  in 
dependent  of  each  other.  For  himself,  having  discharged 
his  fusee  several  times,  at  length  it  missed  fire,  while  the 
muzzle  was  pressed  against  the  breast  of  a  large  and  well- 
proportioned  savage.  This  warrior,  availing  himself  of  the 
indefensible  attitude  of  his  adversary,  with  a  tremendous  war- 
whoop,  sprang  forward  with  his  lifted  hatchet,  and  compelled 
him  to  surrender  ;  and  having  disarmed  and  bound  him  fast 
to  a  tree,  returned  to  the  battle. 

The  intrepid  Capts.  D'Ell  and  Harman,  who  now  com 
manded,  were  forced  to  give  ground  for  a  little  distance  :  the 
savages,  conceiving  this  to  be  the  certain  harbinger  of  vic 
tory,  rushed  impetuously  on,  with  dreadful  and  redoubled 
cries.  But  our  two  partisans,  collecting  a  handful  of  brave 
men,  gave  the  pursuers  so  warm  a  reception  as  to  oblige 
them,  in  turn,  to  retreat  a  little  beyond  the  spot  at  which  the 
action  had  commenced.  Here  they  made  a  stand.  This 
change  of  ground  occasioned  the  tree  to  which  Putnam  was 
tied  to  be  directly  between  the  fire  of  the  two  parties.  Hu 
man  imagination  can  hardly  figure  to  itself  a  more  deplora 
ble  situation.  The  balls  flew  incessantly  from  either  side, 
many  struck  the  tree,  while  some  passed  through  the  sleeves 
and  skirts  of  his  coat.  In  this  state  of  jeopardy,  unable  to 
move  his  body,  to  stir  his  limbs,  or  even  to  incline  his  head, 
he  remained  more  than  an  hour.  So  equally  balanced,  and 
so  obstinate  was  the  fight !  At  one  moment,  while  the  bat 
tle  swerved  in  favor  of  the  enemy,  a  young  savage  chose  an 
odd  way  of  discovering  his  humor.  He  found  Putnam 
bound.  He  might  have  dispatched  him  at  a  blow.  But  he 
loved  better  to  excite  the  terrors  of  the  prisoner,  by  hurling 
a  tomahawk  at  his  head  ;  or  rather  it  should  seem  his  object 
was  to  see  how  near  he  could  throw  it  without  touching  him 
• — the  weapon  struck  in  the  tree  a  number  of  times  at  a 
hair's-breadth  distance  from  the  mark. 

Not  only  the  hair-breadth  escapes  of  Putnam  border 
on  the  miraculous,  but  it  is  also  most  wonderful,  that  a 
savage  warrior,  in  the  heat  of  a  doubtful  battle,  should 


71 

have  left  the  field  of  action,  to  amuse  himself  in  the 
manner  here  stated ;  thus,  however,  the  book  has  it, 
and  the  reader  is  left  to  form  his  own  conjectures  in 
regard  to  the  accuracy  in  the  narration  of  such  strange 
occurrences. 

The  author  proceeds  to  detail  the  cruel  treatment' 
Putnam  received  from  the  Indians.  Among  the  rest, 
awful  preparations  were  made  for  burning  him  alive  ; 
but  just  before  its  intended  consummation,  he  was  for 
tunately  rescued  by  a  French  officer.  The  Indian  to 
whom  he  surrendered,  however,  was  not  privy  to  this 
transaction ;  who  is  reported  as  treating  him  kindly. 
But  determined  not  to  lose  his  captive,  he  had  recourse 
to  the  following  singular  expedient,  says  the  author,  to 
prevent  it. 

He  took  the  moccasins  from  his  feet,  and  tied  them  to  one 
of  his  wrists  ;  then  directing  him  to  lie  down  on  his  back 
upon  the  bare  ground,  he  stretched  one  arm  to  its  full  length, 
and  bound  it  fast  to  a  young  tree ;  the  other  arm  was  ex 
tended  and  bound  in  the  same  manner — his  legs  were 
stretched  apart  and  fastened  to  two  saplings.  Then  a  num. 
ber  of  tall,  but  slender  poles  were  cut  down,  which,  with 
some  long  bushes,  were  laid  across  his  body  from  head  to 
foot :  on  each  side  lay  as  many  Indians  as  could  convenient 
ly  find  lodging,  in  order  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  his  es 
cape.  In  this  disagreeable  and  painful  posture  he  remained 
until  morning. 

The  next  night  the  party  arrived  at  Ticonderoga. 
From  whence  Putnam  was  conducted  to  Montreal  by 
a  French  officer. 

The  cruelty  of  the  American  Indians  in  war  to  their 
prisoners,  is  well  known,  and  the  relation  of  instances 
of  it  cause  no  surprise  ;  but  such  unusual  and  unneces 
sary  precautions,  as  here  recited,  for  the  safe  keeping 
of  a  single  prisoner,  excite  our  utmost  wonder.  Every 
thing,  however,  relating  to  Putnam,  seems  sui  generis, 
peculiar  to  himself  alone,  nothing  of  the  kind  having- 
ever  happened  to  any  other  individual.  The  Indians 
must,  indeed,  have  looked  upon  him  as  more  than  mortal. 


72 

If  we  can  place  any  confidence  in  the  official  reports 
of  Maj.  Rogers,  the  whole  of  the  foregoing  statement, 
so  far  as  respects  the  action,  and  the  purpose  of  the  ex 
pedition,  is  erroneous  in  every  particular. 

It  is  not  usual,  nor  would  it  be  safe,  in  military  expe 
ditions,  to  make  a  copartnership  in  the  command,  lest 
the  parties  should  disagree,  and  thereby  render  abor 
tive  the  object  intended  to  be  effected.  Rogers  had 
the  entire  command  in  this  case.  He  received  an  or 
der,  on  the  28th  of  July,  1758,  to  embark  with  700 
men,  with  a  view  of  intercepting  a  party  of  the  enemy, 
who  had,  the  day  before,  attacked  a  convoy  of  wagon 
ers,  near  Half-way-brook,  and  killed  one  hundred  and 
sixty  men.  Maj.  Putnam,  it  seems,  with  a  party  of 
provincials,  as  well  as  some  companies  of  regular 
English  troops,  was  detached  to  join  his  command, 
there  not  being  a  sufficiency  of  rangers  for  the  service 
required.  Col.  Humphreys,  having  used  up  the  cause 
of  .this  expedition  for  another,  undertaken  for  a  differ 
ent  purpose,  in  November,  1755,  (see  p.  41,)  states  this 
to  be  "  to  watch  the  motions  of  the  enemy  near  Ticon- 
deroga."  Whereas,  five  men,  instead  of  five  hundred, 
would  have  been  sufficient  for  this  object.  There  was 
no  separation  of  the  party,  nor  was  their  being  dis 
covered  the  cause  of  the  conclusion  to  return  to  their 
station  ;  but  in  consequence  of  the  enemy's  having  es 
caped  them,  which  rendered  needless  their  longer  re 
maining. 

I  will  give  Maj.  Rogers'  report  of  this  affair,  in  con 
firmation  of  what  I  assert.  And  let  me  impress  upon 
the  reader  the  i*act,  that  Rogers  kept  a  journal  of  his 
transactions,  noting  each  day's  occurrence,  and  making 
regular  reports  thereof  to  the  commanding  generals. 
It  is  not  pretended  that  Gen.  Putnam  did  any  such 
thing,  depending  entirely  upon  memory  to  detail  to  his 
biographer  events  in  which  he  had  concern,  that  hap 
pened  twenty  years  and  upwards  before.  Without 
doubting  his  veracity,  therefore,  we  may  account  for 


73 

the  numerous  errors  which  appear  in  his  Life,  to  for- 
getfulness.  Add  to  this  the  liability  of  misconceiving 
oral  communications. 

The  attempt  here  made  to  bring  in  doubt  the  brave 
ry  of  Rogers  is  as  vain  as  unjust  and  disingenuous. 
He  was  brave  to  a  fault — to  rashness  ;  and  probably 
fought  more  desperate  battles,  in  this  war,  than  any 
two  officers  engaged  in  it,  on  either  side.  His  wounds 
were  honorable  testimonials  of  his  personal  exposure  ; 
while  some  others,  who  served  in  that  war,  could  not 
show  a  scratch  received  from  the  enemy  in  battle. 

Rogers,  having  justly  acquired  great  fame  for  his 
useful  services,  was  doubtless  envied  by  many,  who, 
not  willing  to  run  the  same  hazards  as  he  had  done, 
hoped,  by  depreciating  his  merits,  to  render  themselves 
nearer  on  a  par  with  him.  And  it  must  be  confessed, 
for  the  fact  is  too  palpable  to  admit  of  disguise,  that 
Maj.  Putnam  was  one  of  the  number. 

It  will  be  seen  presently  that  Putnam,  in  the  affair 
in  question,  surrendered  on  the  first  onset,-  before  the 
detachment  was  formed  for  action,  and  being,  of  course, 
removed  from  the  battle  ground,  could  have  no  per 
sonal  knowledge  of  what  passed  afterwards.  His 
communications,  therefore,  to  his  biographer  of  the  oc 
currences  which  took  place  in  the  engagement,  must 
have  been  obtained  from  hearsay  reports,  utterly  des 
titute  of  truth.  In  conformity  to  these  ridiculous  ru 
mors,  Col.  Humphreys  modestly  cashiers  Rogers,  and 
gives  the  command  to  the  firm  of  Capts.  D'Ell  and 
Harman  ;  while  Mr.  Peabody  confines  it  to  Capt.  Dal- 
zell,  as  he  calls  Humphreys'  D'Ell.  This  is  really  a 
summary  way  of  suiting  historical  facts  to  a  particular 
purpose.  Mr.  Peabody  had  read  Rogers'  journal,  and, 
I  must  think,  has  sinned  against  light. 

Here  follows  Rogers'  official  report  of  the  scout  in 
question : 

"July  8, 1758.  By  order  of  the  general  [Abcrcrom- 
bie]  I  this  day  began  a  scout  to  South  Bay,  from  which 

7 


74 

I  returned  the  16th,  having  effected  nothing  considera 
ble,  except  discovering  a  large  party  of  the  enemy, 
supposed  to  be  nearly  a  thousand,  on  the  east  side  of 
the  lake.  This  party  the  next  day  fell  upon  a  detach 
ment  of  Col.  Nicholl's  regiment,  at  the  Half-way- 
brook,  killed  three  captains  and  upwards  of  twenty 
privates. 

"  The  27th,  another  party  of  the  enemy  fell  upon  a 
convoy  of  wagoners,  between  Fort  Edward  and 
Half-way-brook,  and  killed  one  hundred  and  sixteen 
men,  sixteen  of  whom  were  rangers.  In  pursuit  of  this 
party,  with  a  design  to  intercept  their  retreat,  I  was 
ordered  to  embark,  the  28th,  with  seven  hundred  men  ; 
the  enemy,  however,  escaped  me,  and  in  my  return 
home,  on  the  31st,  I  was  met  by  an  express  from  the 
general,  with  orders  to  march  to  South  and  East  Bay, 
and  return  by  way  of  Fort  Edward.  In  the  prosecu 
tion  of  which  orders,  nothing  very  material  happened 
till  the  8th  of  August.  Early  in  the  morning  of  that 
day  we  decamped  from  the  place  where  Fort  Anne 
stood,  and  began  our  march  ;  Maj.  Putnam  with  a  par 
ty  of  provincials  marching  in  front ;  my  rangers  in  the 
rear ;  Capt.  Dalyell  [Humphreys'  D'Ell]  with  the  regu 
lars  in  the  center ;  the  other  officers  suitably  disposed 
among  the  men,  being  in  number  five  hundred  and 
thirty,  exclusive  of  officers  ;  a  number  having  by  leave 
returned  home  the  day  before.  After  marching  about 
three  quarters  of  a  mile,  a  fire  began  with  five  hundred 
of  the  enemy  in  the  front.  I  brought  my  people  into 
as  good  order  as  possible ;  Capt.  Dalyell  in  the  center, 
and  the  rangers  on  the  right  with  Capt.  Partridge's 
light  infantry :  on  the  left  was  Capt.  Giddings,  with  the 
Boston  troops  ;  and  Maj.  Putnam,  being  in  the  front  of 
his  men  when  the  fire  began,  the  enemy  rushed  in,  took 
him,  one  lieutenant,  and  two  privates,  prisoners,  and 
considerably  disordered  others  of  the  party  ;  who  after 
wards  rallied  and  did  good  service,  particularly  Lieut. 
Durkee,  who,  notwithstanding  two  wounds,  one  in  his 


75 

thigh,  the  other  in  his  wrist,  kept  in  the  action  the  whole 
time,  encouraging  his  men  with  great  earnestness  and 
resolution.  Capt.  Dalyell  with  Gage's  light  infantry, 
and  Lieut.  Eyer's  of  the  44th  regiment,  behaved  with 
great  bravery,  they  being  in  the  center,  where  at  first 
was  the  hottest  fire ;  which  afterwards  fell  to  the  right, 
where  the  rangers  were,  and  where  the  enemy  made 
four  different  attacks.  In  short,  officers  and  soldiers, 
throughout  the  detachment,  behaved  with  such  vigor 
and  resolution  as  in  one  hour's  time  broke  the  enemy, 
and, obliged  them  to  retreat;  but  this  they  did  with 
such  caution,  in  small  scattering  parties,  as  gave  us  no 

freat  opportunity  to  harass  them  by  a  pursuit.     We 
ept  the  field,  and  buried  our  dead. 

"  When  the  action  was  over,  we  had  missing  fifty- 
four  men,  twenty-one  of  whom  came  in,  being  separated 
from  us  while  the  action  continued.  The  enemy's  loss 
was  one  hundred  and  ninety-nine  kilted  on  the  spot, 
some  of  whom  were  Indians.  We  arrived  at  Fort  Ed 
ward  on  the  9th,  being  met,  at  some  distance  from  it, 
by  Col.  Provost,  with  a  party  of  three  hundred,  and 
refreshments  for  the  wounded,  which  I  had  desired  by 
an  express  sent  before."  (Journal,  p.  116.) 

I  will  here  notice  a  mistake  of  some  little  importance, 
which  Mr.  Everett,  in  his  Life  of  Stark,  has,  it  must  be 
supposed,  fallen  into  through  inadvertence.  Speaking 
of  the  scout,  treated  of  above,  he  says :  "  In  the  pro 
gress  of  this  action  Maj.  Israel  Putnam,  commanding  a 
company  of  rangers,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
He  was  tied  to  a  tree  by  the  Indians,  and  for  a  long 
time  was  within  the  fire  of  both  parties,  and  otherwise 
exposed  to  peril  and  outrage  from  the  savage  foe." 
(p.  44.)  Now,  Mr.  Everett  professedly  takes  his  infor 
mation  of  the  early  career  of  Gen.  Stark  from  the  New 
Hampshire  abstract  of  Rogers'  journal,  which  contains 
a  particular  account  of  the  battle  here  alluded  to.  This 
statement,  therefore,  would  appear  to  be  sanctioned  by 
that  work ;  whereas,  on  the  very  page  in  which  Put- 


76 

nam's  capture  is  mentioned,  it  is  stated,  in  giving  the 
order  in  which  the  party  proceeded,  that  "  Maj.  Put 
nam  with  a  party  of  provincials  marched  in  front ;" 
the  same  as  above  stated  from  the  London  edition  of 
the  journal.  Maj.  Putnam,  therefore,  did  not  command 
a  company  of  rangers,  upon  this  occasion.  He  was 
never  commissioned  as  an  officer  of  the  rangers ;  and 
no  attempt  to  smuggle  him  into  that  corps  can  admit 
of  justification.  The  notice  of  the  cruel  treatment 
received  by  Putnam  from  the  Indians,  I  'perceive,  is 
copied  from  a  note  of  the  N.  H.  editor.  Rogers  makes 
no  mention  of  it  in  his  journal,  he  probably  being  un 
acquainted  with  the  fact.  I  will  give,  from  Maj.  Mante's 
History,  a  short  account  of  this  affair  ;  which  accords 
with  the  statement  of  Rogers,  bating  a  few  trifling  dis 
crepancies,  as  follows : 

"  Whilst  the  intrenchments  of  Gen.  Abercrombie  en 
closed  him  in  Security,  M.  De  Montcalm  exerted  his 
usual  activity  in  harassing  the  frontiers,  and  in  detach 
ing  parties  to  attack  the  convoys  of  the  English.  On 
the  17th  of  July,  one  of  these  parties  destroyed  three 
provincial  officers  and  upwards  of  twenty  men,  at 
Half-way-brook;  on  the  27th  of  the  same  month,  one 
hundred  and  sixteen  wagoners  and  sixteen  rangers 
met  with  the  same  fate  between  that  place  and  Fort 
Edward.  Maj.  Rogers  was  then  detached  with  a  party 
of  seven  hundred  men  in  quest  of  the  enemy;  but  they 
had  the  good  fortune  to  escape  him.  On  his  return  he 
met  an  express  from  the  general,  with  orders  to  proceed 
to  South  and  East  Bay,  and  return  by  Fort  Edward. 
Whilst  the  major  was  pursuing  the  route  prescribed  him 
by  these  orders,  he  was  attacked,  on  the  8th  of  August, 
near  the  spot  where  Fort  Anne  stood,  by  about  five 
hundred  of  the  enemy,  his  own  number  being  reduced 
to  five  hundred  and  thirty  men.  But  both  he  and  his 
men  behaved  with  so  much  spirit  that  in  an  hour  they 
broke  the  assailants,  and  obliged  them  to  retreat,  though, 
such  was  the  enemy's  caution,  without  any  prospect  of 


77 

being  able  to  harass  them  by  a  pursuit.  In  this  action 
there  fell  one  hundred  and  ninety  of  the  French,  and 
the  English  lost  about  forty,  the  missing  included. 
Maj.  Putnam  and  two  lieutenants  were  made  prison 
ers."  (p.  158.) 

There  is  here  no  mention  of  any  copartnership  in  the 
command.  The  orders  were  given  to  Rogers  only  ; 
and  Putnam  evidently  did  not  know  the  object  of  the 
expedition. 

We  left  Maj.  Putnam  at  Montreal.  At  this  place 
were  several  prisoners,  and  among  them  Col.  Peter 
Schuyler;  who  generously  furnished  Maj.  Putnam  with 
clothing  and  money.  An  exchange  of  prisoners  was 
about  to  be  made.  Col.  Schuyler  was  comprehended 
in  the  cartel,  and,  by  his  management,  Putnam  was 
also  included.  Apprehensive  if  it  should  be  known  that 
Putnam  was  a  distinguished  partisan,  his  liberation 
might  be  retarded  ;  and  knowing  that  there  were  offi 
cers,  who,  from  the  length  of  their  captivity,  had  a 
claim  of  priority  to  exchange,  Schuyler  made  use  of  the 
following  artifice : 

There  is,  said  he  to  the  governor,  an  old  man  here,  who 
is  a  provincial  major,  and  wishes  to  be  at  home  with  his  wife 
and  children  ;  he  can  do  no  good  here  or  anywhere  else  ;  I 
believe  your  excellency  had  better  keep  some  of  the  young 
men,  who  have  no  wife  or  children  to  care  for,  and  let  the 
old  fellow  go  home  with  me."  This  justifiable  finesse  had 
the  desired  effect. 

It  was  certainly  good  policy  to  pass  Maj.  Putnam, 
upon  this  occasion,  under  his  true  title,  provincial  major, 
instead  of  that  assumed  for  him  by  his  biographer,  as 
an  officer  of  the  rangers.  The  rangers  had  done  the 
enemy  much  harm,  and  it  might  be  expected  v/ould  do 
them  still  more.  If,  therefore,  Putnam  had  been  sup 
posed  to  belong  to  this  corps,  it  is  not  probable  he 
would  have  received  the  special  favor  of  being  ex 
changed,  in  preference  to  others  having  superior  claims 
in  consequence  of  longer  detention  as  prisoners.  But 

7* 


78 

it  would,  indeed,  have  been  strange,  had  Putnam  actu 
ally  been  attached  to  the  rangers,  and  performed  such 
feats  of  valor,  as  recorded  by  Col.  Humphreys,  that  his 
name  should  not  have  been  known  in  Canada.  It  does 
not,  however,  appear  that  he  had  ever  been  heard  of 
in  that  quarter. 

At  the  house  of  Col.  Schuyler,  Maj.  Putnam  became  ac 
quainted  with  Mrs.  Howe,  a  fair  captive,  whose  history 
would  not  be  read  without  emotion,  if  it  could  be  written  in 
the  same  affecting  manner  in  which  I  have  often  heard  it 
told.  She  was  still  young  and  handsome  herself,  though 
she  had  two  daughters  of  marriageable  age.  [The  eldest, 
however,  was  but  eleven  years  old.] 

Distress,  which  had  taken  somewhat  from  the  original  re 
dundancy  of  her  bloom,  and  added  a  softening  paleness  to 
her  cheeks,  rendered  her  appearance  the  more  engaging. 
Her  face,  that  seemed  to  have  been  formed  for  the  assemblage 
of  dimples  and  smiles,  was  clouded  with  care.  The  natural 
sweetness  was  not,  however,  soured  by  despondency  and  pet- 
ulauce,  but  chastened  by  humility  and  resignation.  This 
mild  daughter  of  sorrow  looked  as  if  she  had  known  the  day 
of  prosperity,  when  serenity  and  gladness  of  soul  were  the 
inmates  of  her  bosom.  That  day  was  past,  and  the  once 
lively  features  now  assumed  a  tender  melancholy,  which 
witnessed  her  irreparable  loss.  She  needed  not  the  custom 
ary  weeds  of  mourning,  or  the  fallacious  pageantry  of  wo, 
to  prove  her  widowed  state.  She  was  in  that  stage  of  afflic 
tion  when  the  excess  is  so  far  abated  as  to  permit  the  subject 
to  be  drawn  into  conversation,  without  opening  the  wound 
afresh.  It  is  then  rather  a  source  of  pleasure  than  pain  to 
dwell  upon  the  circumstances  in  narration.  Every  thing 
conspired  to  make  her  story  interesting.  Her  first  husband 
had  been  killed  and  scalped  by  the  Indians  some  years  be 
fore.  By  an  unexpected  assault,  in  1756,  upon  Fort  Durn- 
mer,  where  she  then  happened  to  be  present  with  Mr.  Howe, 
her  second  husband,  the  savages  carried  the  fort,  murdered 
the  greater  part  of  the  garrison,  mangled  in  death  her  hus 
band,  and  led  her  away  with  seven  children  into  captivity  ? 
She  was  for  some  months  kept  with  them ;  and  during  their 
rambles  she  was  frequently  on  the  point  of  perishing  with 


79 

hunger,  and  as  often  subjected  to  hardships  seemingly  intol 
erable  to  one  of  so  delicate  a  frame.  Some  time  after  the 
career  of  her  miseries  began,  the  Indians  selected  a  couple 
of  their  young  men  to  marry  her  daughters.  The  fright 
and  disgust  which  the  intelligence  of  this  intention  occasion 
ed  to  these  poor  young  creatures,  added  infinitely  to  the  sor 
rows  and  perplexities  of  their  frantic  mother.  To  prevent 
the  hated  connection,  all  the  activity  of  female  resource  was 
called  into  exertion.  She  found  an  opportunity  of  conveying 
to  the  governor  a  petition,  that  her  daughters  might  be  re 
ceived  into  a  convent  for  the  sake  of  securing  the  salvation 
of  their  souls.  Happily  the  pious  fraud  succeeded. 

About  the  same  time  the  savages  separated,  and  carried 
off  her  other  five  children  into  different  tribes.  She  was 
ransomed  by  an  elderly  French  officer  for  four  hundred 
livres.  Though  all  the  world  was  no  better  than  a  desert, 
and  all  its  inhabitants  were  then  indifferent  to  her,  yet  the 
loveliness  of  her  appearance  in  sorrow  had  awakened  affec 
tions,  which,  in  the  aggravation  of  her  troubles,  were  to  be 
come  a  new  source  of  afflictions. 

The  officer  who  bought  her  of  the  Indians  had  a  son  who 
also  held  a  commission,  and  resided  with  his  father.  During 
her  continuance  in  the  same  house,  at  St.  John's,  the  double 
attachment  of  the  father  and  the  son  rendered  her  situation 
extremely  distressing.  It  is  true,  the  calmness  of  age  de 
lighted  to  gaze  respectfully  on  her  beauty  ;  but  the  impetu 
osity  of  youth  was  fired  to  madness  by  the  sight  of  her 
charms.  [This  woman  must  have  been  another  Ninon  de 
Lenclos.] 

The  affair  soon  reached  the  governor's  ears,  and  the  young 
officer  was,  shortly  afterwards,  sent  on  a  tour  of  duty  to  De 
troit. 

This  gave  her  a  short  respite  ;  but  she  dreaded  his  return, 
and  the  humiliating  insults  for  which  she  might  be  reserved. 
Col.  Schuyler  became  her  protector,  and  endeavored  to  pro 
cure  her  liberty.  The  person  who  purchased  her  from  the 
savages,  unwilling  to  part  with  so  fair  a  purchase,  demanded 
a  thousand  livres  as  her  ransom.  But  Col.  Schuyler  ob 
tained  from  the  governor  an  order,  in  consequence  of  which 
Mrs.  Howe  was  given  up  to  him  for  four  hundred  livres ; 


80 

nor  did  his  active  goodness  rest  until  every  one  of  her  five 
sons  was  restored  to  her. 

Business  having  made  it  necessary  that  Col.  Schuyler 
should  precede  the*  prisoners  who  were  exchanged,  he  recom 
mended  the  fair  captive  to  the  protection  of  his  friend  Put 
nam.  She  had  just  recovered  from  the  measles  when  the 
party  was  preparing  to  set  off  for  New  England.  By  this 
time  the  young  French  officer  had  returned,  with  his  passion 
rather  increased  than  abated  by  absence.  He  pursued  her 
wheresoever  she  went,  and,  although  he  could  make  no  ad 
vances  in  her  affection,  he  seemed  resolved,  by  perseverance, 
to  carry  his  point.  Mrs.  Howe,  terrified  by  his  treatment, 
was  obliged  to  keep  constantly  near  Maj.  Putnam,  who  in 
formed  the  young  officer  that  he  should  protect  that  lady  at 
the  risk  of  his  life. 

In  the  long  march  from  captivity,  through  an  inhospitable 
wilderness,  encumbered  with  five  small  children,  she  suffer 
ed  incredible  hardships.  Though  endowed  with  masculine 
fortitude,  she  was  truly  feminine  in  strength,  and  must  have 
fainted  by  the  way,  had  it  not  been  for  the  assistance  of  Maj. 
Putnam.  There  were  a  thousand  good  offices  which  the 
helplessness  of  her  condition  demanded,  and  which  the  gen 
tleness  of  his  nature  delighted  to  perform.  He  assisted  in 
leading  her  little  ones,  and  in  carrying  them  over  the  swampy 
grounds  and  runs  of  water,  with  which  their  course  was  fre 
quently  intersected.  He  mingled  his  own  mess  with  that 
of  the  widow  and  fatherless,  and  assisted  them  in  supplying 
and  preparing  their  provisions.  Upon  arriving  within  the 
settlements,  they  experienced  a  reciprocal  regret  at  separa 
tion,  and  were  only  consoled  by  the  expectation  of  soon 
mingling  in  the  embraces  of  their  former  acquaintances  and 
dearest  connections. 

After  the  conquest  of  Canada,  in  1760,  she  made  a  jour 
ney  to  Quebec,  in  order  to  bring  back  her  two  daughters, 
whom  she'  had  left  in  a  convent.  She  found  one  of  them 
married  to  a  French  officer.  The  other  having  contracted 
a  great  fondness  for  the  religious  sisterhood,  with  reluctance 
consented  to  leave  them  and  return. 

The  editor  of  the  Boston  edition  of  this  work,  pub 
lished  in  1818,  makes  the  following  note:  "Two  or 


81 

three  incidents  respecting  Mrs.  Howe,  which  were  re 
ceived  by  the  author  from  Gen.  Putnam,  and  inserted 
in  the  former  editions,  are  omitted  in  this,  as  they  ap 
peared,  on  further  information,  to  be  mistakes" 

Now,  if  Gen.  Putnam  has  made  two  or  three  mistakes 
in  the  story  of  Mrs.  Howe,  is  it  not  probable  he  has 
made  others  in  the  extraordinary  and,  in  a  measure,  in 
credible  incidents  of  his  life,  as  related  by  his  biogra 
pher  ?  Not  having  read  any  former  edition  of  the 
work,  I  am  not  aware  of  the  mistakes  to  winch  allu 
sion  is  here  made. 

Some  time  after  I  had  made  the  foregoing  remarks, 
and  passed  on  to  other  matters,  I  accidentally  met  with 
the  story  of  Mrs.  Howe's  captivity,  as  related  by  her 
self;  and  recorded  in  an  appendix  to  the  third  volume 
of  Belknap's  History  of  New  Hampshire.  By  which  it 
appears,  that  the  whole  account  of  Col.  Humphreys, 
so  far  as  relates  to  the  part  assigned  to  Maj.  Putnam,  is 
a  sheer  mistake.  The  article  is  entitled — "  A  PARTICU 
LAR  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  CAPTIVITY  OF  MRS.  JEMIMA  HoWE  I 

by  the  Rev.  Bunker  Gay,  of  Hinsdale,  in  a  letter  to  the 
author;" — of  which  the  following  is  an  abstract: 

"On  the  27th  of  July,  1755,  Caleb  Howe,  Hilkiah 
Grout,  and  Benjamin  Gaffield,  were  ambushed  by  a 
party  of  Indians,  as  they  were  returning  from  their  la 
bor  in  the  field  to  a  place  called  Bridgman's  Fort. 
Howe  was  killed  ;  Gaffield  was  drowned  in  attempting 
to  cross  the  river,  and  Grout  made  his  escape.  The 
Indians  went  directly  to  Bridgman's  Fort,  where  the 
families  of  these  unfortunate  men  resided.  There  was 
no  man  in  it,  and  only  three  women,  the  wives  of  the 
above-mentioned  men,  and  their  children,  consisting  of 
eleven,  seven  of  whom  were  Mrs.  Howe's.  They  had 
heard  the  report  of  guns,  and  were  impatient  to  learn 
the  cause.  By  the  noise  without,  they  concluded  their 
friends  had  returned,  and  too  hastily  opened  the  gate 
to  receive  them  ;  when  to  their  inexpressible  surprise 
they  admitted  the  savages,  and  these  three  families 


82 

were  made  captives.  The  eldest  of  Mrs.  Howe's  chil 
dren  was  eleven  years  old,  and  the  youngest  but  six 
months.  The  two  eldest  were  daughters,  which  she 
had  by  her  first  husband,  Mr.  William  Phipps,  who  was 
also  slain  by  the  Indians.  It  was  from  the  mouth  of 
this  woman  that  I  lately  received,  I  doubt  not  a  true, 
though,  to  be  sure,  a  very  brief  and  imperfect  history 
of  her  captivity,  which  I  transmit  for  your  perusal.  It 
may  perhaps  afford  you  some  amusement,  if  you  should 
not  think  it,  or  an  abbreviation  of  it,  worthy  to  be  pre 
served  among  the  records  you  are  about  to  publish." 

Here  follows  a  detail  of  Mrs.  Howe's  sufferings, 
which  is  very  similar  to  all  cases  of  the  kind  with  In 
dian  captives,  and  is  not  sufficiently  interesting  for  in 
sertion  here,  if,  indeed,  I  had  room  to  spare  for  the  pur 
pose.  Mrs.  Howe  had  the  good  fortune,  as  stated  by 
Col.  Humphreys,  to  procure  her  two  daughters  to  be 
placed  in  a  nunnery.  "  At  the  close  of  the  war,"  she 
says,  "the  governor  returned  to  France, taking  my  eldest 
daughter  with  him,  whom  he  married  to  a  French  gen 
tleman  by  the  name  of  Cron  Louis.  My  other  daughter 
still  remaining  in  the  nunnery,  I  made  a  journey  to 
Canada,  resolving  to  use  my  best  endeavors  not  to  re 
turn  without  her.  But  I  found  it  extremely  difficult  to 
prevail  with  her  to  quit  the  nunnery.  Indeed,  she  ab 
solutely  refused,  and  all  the  persuasions  and  arguments 
I  could  use  had  no  effect,  until  I  obtained  a  letter  from 
the  governor  to  the  superintendent  of  the  nuns,  in  which 
he  threatened,  if  my  daughter  should  not  immediately 
be  delivered  into  my  hands,  or  could  not  be  prevailed 
with  to  submit  to  my  parental  authority,  he  would  send 
a  band  of  soldiers  to  assist  me  in  bringing  her  away. 
Upon  hearing  this  she  made  no  further  resistance.  But 
so  extremely  bigoted  was  she  to  the  customs  and  reli 
gion  of  the  place,  that  she  left  it  with  the  greatest  re 
luctance,  and  the  most  bitter  lamentations,  which  she 
continued  as  we  passed  in  the  streets,  and  refused  to 
be  comforted.  My  good  friend,  Maj.  Small,  whom  we 
met  with  on  the  way,  tried  all  he  could  to  console  her, 


83 

and  was  so  kind  as  to  bear  us  company,  and  carry  my 
daughter  behind  him  on  horseback. 

"But  I  have  run  on  a  little  before  my  story,  for  I  have 
not  yet  informed  you  of  the  means  and  manner  of  my 
own  redemption;  to  the  accomplishing  of  which  sev 
eral  gentlemen  contributed.  To  whose  goodness,  there 
fore,  I  am  greatly  indebted,  and  hope  I  shall  never  be 
so  ungrateful  as  to  forget.  Col.  Schuyler  in  particular 
was  so  very  kind  and  generous  as  to  advance  two 
thousand  seven  hundred  livres  to  procure  a  ransom  for 
myself  and  three  of  my  children.  He  accompanied  and 
conducted  us  from  Montreal  to  Albany,  and  entertained 
us  in  the  most  friendly  and  hospitable  manner  a  con 
siderable  time,  at  his  own  house,  and  I  believe  entirely 
at  his  own  expense." 

"  I  have  spun  out  the  above  narrative,"  says  Mr.  Gay, 
"  to  a  much  greater  length  than  I  at  first  intended,  and 
shall  conclude  it  with  referring  you,  for  a  more  ample 
and  brilliant  account  of  the  captive  heroine  who  is  the 
subject  of  it,  to  Col.  Humphreys'  History  of  the  Life 
of  Gen.  Israel  Putnam,  with  some  remarks  upon  a  few 
clauses  of  it.  I  never  indeed  had  the  pleasure  of  pe 
rusing  the  whole  of  that  history,  but  remember  to  have 
seen,  some  time  ago.  an  extract  from  it  in  one  of  the 
Boston  newspapers,  in  which  the  colonel  has  extolled 
the  beauty,  good  sense,  and  rare  accomplishments  of 
Mrs.  Howe,  in  a  style  that  may  appear,  to  those  who 
are  acquainted  with  her,  at  this  day  romantic  and  ex 
travagant.  And  the  colonel  must  have  been  misin 
formed  with  respect  to  some  particulars  that  he  has 
mentioned  in  her  story.  Indeed,  when  I  read  the  ex 
tract  from  his  history  to  Mrs.  Tate,  which  name  she 
has  derived  from  a  third  husband,  whose  widow  she 
now  remains,  she  seemed  to  be  well  pleased,  and  said 
at  first  it  was  all  true,  but  soon  after  contradicted  the 
circumstance  of  her  lover's  being  so  bereft  of  his 
senses  when  he  saw  her  moving  off  in  a  boat  at  some 
distance  from  the  shwe,  as  to  plunge  into  the  water  af 
ter  her,  in  consequence  of  which  he  was  seen  no  more. 


84 

It  is  true,  she  said,  that  as  she  was  returning  from  Mon 
treal  to  Albany,  she  met  with  young  Saccapee  on  the 
way.  That  she  was  in  the  boat  with  Col.  Schuyler, 
that  the  French  officer  came  on  board  the  boat,  made 
her  some  handsome  presents,  took  his  final  leave  of 
her,  and  departed,  to  all  appearance,  in  tolerable  good 
humor. 

"  She  moreover  says,  that  when  she  went  to  Canada 
for  her  daughter,  she  met  with  him  again ;  that  he 
showed  her  a  lock  of  her  hair,  and  her  name  likewise 
printed  with  vermilion  on  his  arm.  As  to  her  being 
chosen  agent  to  go  to  Europe,  in  behalf  of  the  people 
of  Hinsdale,  when  Col.  Howard  obtained  from  the 
government  of  ffew  York  a  patent  for  their  lands  on 
the  west  side  of  "Connecticut  river,  it  was  never  once 
thought  of  by  the  Hinsdale  people,  until  the  above  men 
tioned  extract  arrived  among  them  ;  in  which  the  au 
thor  asserts  it  as  an  undoubted  fact"  This  statement 
of  Mrs.  Howe's  being  chosen  by  the  people  of  Hins 
dale  their  embassadress  on  a  foreign  mission,  and  that 
of  Saccapee's  plunging  into  the  water  after  her,  and  in 
consequence  was  no  more  seen,  are  among  the  two  or 
three  mistakes  mentioned  by  the  Boston  editor  as  being 
omitted. 

The  discrepancies  in  the  story  of  Mrs.  Howe,  as 
given  by  Col.  Humphreys  and  herself,  are  astonishing. 
In  the  first  place,  there  is  a  variance  in  the  name  of 
the  fort  in  which  she  was  made  a  prisoner  ;  but  ad 
mitting  it  may  have  been  known  under  two  different 
denominations,  what  explanation  can  be  made  for  Col. 
Humphreys'  saying — "  The  savages  carried  the  fort, 
and  murdered  the  greater  part  of  the  garrison  ;"  when, 
according  to  Mrs.  Howe,  "  there  was  no  man  in  it, 
and  only  three  women  and  their  children,"  none  of 
whom  were  murdered. 

The  love  affair  of  the  young  French  officer,  Sacca 
pee,  with  the  fair  captive,  as  related  by  Col.  Hum 
phreys,  turns  out  to  be  a  real  romance,  founded  on  fact, 
to  be  sure,  but  ornamented  with  fictitious  amplifica- 


85 

tions,  usual  and  expected  in  such  compositions,  but  of 
fensive  and  inadmissible  in  historical  narrative. 

But  what  is  most  astounding  and  unaccountable  is, 
that  Col.  H.  should  say — "  Business  having  made  it 
necessary  that  Col.  Schuyler  should  precede  the  pris 
oners  who  were  exchanged,  he  recomrnanded  the  fair 
captive  to  the  protection  of  his  friend  Putnam."  He 
then  gives  a  minute  account  of  the  gallant  manner  in 
which  Maj.  Putnam  executed  his  trust,  in  acts  of  kind 
ness  and  civility  to  the  widow  and  her  children,  in  tra 
versing  "  the  swampy  grounds  and  runs  of  water,  with 
which  their  course  was  frequently  intersected.  And 
upon  their  arrival  within  the  settlements,  they  expe 
rienced  a  reciprocal  regret  at  separation."  Whereas, 
by  Mrs.  Howe's  statement,  no  business  required  Col. 
Schuyler  to  precede  her  in  the  journey,  whatever  may 
have  been  the  case  in  respect  to  the  other  exchanged 
prisoners.  She,  it  may  be  presumed,  wanted  no  time 
to  prepare  for  her  return  ;  and  she  says  positively,  that 
Col.  Schuyler  conducted  her  from  Montreal  to  Albany. 
They  came  by  water  to  the  head  of  the  lake,  and  then 
doubtless  in  some  vehicle  to  Albany. 

Putnam,  it  is  said,  separated  from  his  charge  "  upon 
their  arrival  within  the  settlements."  This  is  very 
vague ;  why  not  name  the  place  at  which  the  separa 
tion  took  place  ?  And  why  should  they  discontinue 
their  route  together  immediately  on  coming  to  a  set 
tlement  ?  This  is  not  accounted  for.  If,  moreover,  Maj. 
Putnam  had  shown  the  civilities  to  Mrs.  Howe,  as  stated, 
is  it  probable  that  she  would  have  been  so  unthankful 
as  not  even  to  mention  his  name  ;  when  she  gratefully 
acknowledges  the  favors  of  others,  particularly  those 
of  Col.  Schuyler,  who,  by  Humphreys'  account,  was 
not  much  more  entitled  to  her  thanks  than  Putnam  1 

There  appear  to  be  shocking  mistakes  in  this  whole 
matter  ;  and  it  will  no  doubt  be  conceded,  that  implicit 
confidence  cannot  be  placed  in  the  entire  Essay  of 
Col.  Humphreys  on  the  Life  of  Gen.  Putnam. 

8 


86 


CHAPTER  III. 

WE  now  arrive  at  the  period  when  the  prowess  of  Britain, 
victorious  alike  by  sea  and  by  land,  in  the  new  and  in  the 
old  world,  had  elevated  that  name  to  the  zenith  of  national 
glory.  The  conquest  of  Quebec  opened  the  way  for  the 
total  reduction  of  Canada.  On  the  side  of  the  lakes,  Am- 
herst  having  captured  the  posts  of  Ticonderoga  and  Crown 
Point,  applied  himself  to  strengthen  the  latter.  Putnam, 
who  had  been  raised  to  the  rank  of  lieut.  colonel,  and  pres 
ent  at  these  operations,  was  employed  the  remainder  of  this 
and  some  part  of  the  succeeding  season,  in  superintending 
the  parties  which  were  detached  to  procure  timber  and  other 
materials  for  the  fortification. 

In  1760,  Gen.  Amherst,  a  sagacious,  humane,  and  expe 
rienced  commander,  planned  the  termination  of  the  war  in 
Canada,  by  a  bloodless  conquest.  For  this  purpose,  three 
armies  were  destined  to  co-operate,  by  different  routes, 
against  Montreal,  the  only  remaining  place  of  strength  the 
enemy  held  in  that  country.  The  corps  formerly  command 
ed  by  Gen.  Wolfe,  now  by  Gen.  Murray,  was  ordered  to 
ascend  the  river  St.  Lawrence;  another,  under  Col.  Havi- 
land,  to  penetrate  by  the  Isle  Aux  Noix  ;  and  the  third,  con 
sisting  of  about  ten  thousand  men,  commanded  by  the  gene 
ral  himself,  after  passing  up  the  Mohawk  river,  and  taking 
its  course  by  the  lake  Ontario,  was  to  form  a  junction  by 
falling  down  the  St.  Lawrence.  In  this  progress,  more  than 
one  occasion  presented  itself  to  manifest  the  intrepidity  and 
soldiership  of  Lieut.  Col.  Putnam.  Two  armed  vessels  ob 
structed  the  passage,  and  prevented  the  attack  on  Oswe- 
gatchie.  Putnam,  with  one  thousand  men,  in  fifty  batteaux, 
undertook  to  board  them.  This  dauntless  officer,  ever  spar 
ing  of  the  Uood  of  others,  as  prodigal  of  his  own,  to  accom- 


87 

plish  it  with  the  less  loss,  put  himself,  with  a  chosen  crew, 
a  beetle  and  wedges,  in  the  van,  with  a  design  to  wedge  the 
rudders,  so  that  the  vessels  should  not  be  able  to  turn  their 
broadsides,  or  perform  any  other  manoeuvre.  All  the  men 
in  his  little  fleet  were  ordered  to  strip  to  their  waistcoats, 
and  advance  at  the  same  time.  He  promised,  if  he  lived,  to 
join  and  show  them  the  way  up  the  sides.  Animated  by  so 
daring  an  example,  [promised  to  be  given,]  they  moved  swift 
ly,  in  profound  stillness,  as  to  certain  victory  or  death.  The 
people  on  board  the  ships,  beholding  the  good  countenance 
with  which  they  approached,  ran  one  of  the  vessels  onshore, 
and  struck  the  colors  of  the  other.  Had  it  not  been  for  the 
dastardly  conduct  of  the  ship's  company  in  the  latter,  who 
compelled  the  captain  to  haul  down  his  ensign,  he  would 
have  given  the  assailants  a  bloody  reception  :  for  the  ves 
sels  were  well  provided  with  spars,  nettings,  and  every  cus 
tomary  instrument  of  annoyance  as  well  as  defence. 

It  now  remained  to  attack  the  fortress,  which  stood  on  an 
island,  and  seemed  to  have  been  rendered  inaccessible  by 
a  high  abattis  of  Hack  ash,  that  everywhere  projected  over 
the  water.  Lieut.  Col.  Putnam  proposed  a  mode  of  attack, 
and  offered  his  services  to  carry  it  into  effect.  The  general 
approved  the  proposal.  Our  partisan,  accordingly,  caused  a 
sufficient  number  of  boats  to  be  fitted  for  the  enterprise. 
The  sides  of  each  boat  were  surrounded  with  fascines,  mus 
ket  proof,  which  covered  the  men  completely.  A  wide 
plank,  twenty  feet  in  length,  was  then  fitted  to  every  boat  in 
such  manner,  by  having  an  angular  piece  sawed  from  one 
extremity,  that,  when  fastened  by  ropes  on  both  sides  of  the 
bow,  it  might  be  raised  or  lowered  at  pleasure.  The  design 
was,  that  the  plank  should  be  held  erect  while  the  oarsmen 
forced  the  bow  with  the  utmost  exertion  against  the  abattis ; 
and  that  afterwards,  being  dropped  on  the  pointed  brush,  it 
should  serve  as  a  kind  of  bridge  to  assist  the  men  in  passing 
over  them.  Lieut.  Col.  Putnam  having  made  his  disposi 
tions  to  attempt  the  escalade  in  many  places  at  the  same 
moment,  advanced  with  his  boats  in  admirable  order.  The 
garrison  perceiving  these  extraordinary  and  unexpected  ma 
chines,  waited  not  the  assault,  but  capitulated.  Lieut.  Col. 
Putnam  was  particularly  honored  by  Gen.  Amherst,  for  his 


88 

ingenuity  in  this  invention,  and  promptitude  in  its  execution. 
The  three  armies  arrived  at  Montreal  within  two  days  of 
each  other ;  and  the  conquest  of  Canada  became  complete 
without  the  loss  of  a  single  drop  of  blood. 

Some  of  the  speculations  recorded  in  the  biography 
of  Gen.  Putnam  are  actually  too  outre  and  absurd  to 
admit  of  serious  consideration.  Such  are  the  projects 
for  capturing  armed  vessels,  by  first  rendering  their 
rudders  useless  by  means  of  beetle  and  wedges ;  and 
of  scaling  an  abattis  by  boards  fastened  to  the  bow  of 
row  boats.  The  first  could  certainly  not  be  effected, 
unless  the  crews  of  the  vessels,  including  the  sentinel, 
were  asleep  ;  and  as  to  the  latter,  an  abattis  erected  on 
the  bank  of  a  river,  for  the  protection  of  a  fortifica 
tion,  would  necessarily  be  some  twelve  or  fifteen  feet, 
at  the  top,  above  the  boat  on  the  river,  and  the  troops 
to  ascend  it,  would,  therefore,  have  to  walk  the  plank 
at  an  elevation  probably  of  90  degrees,  no  very  easy 
task. 

Gen.  Putnam  seems  to  have  been  much  addicted  to 
waggery ;  and  his  ignorant  neighbors  had  swallowed 
with  eagerness  the  relations  of  the  marvelous  incidents  of 
his  life  ;  and  finding,  also,  that  his  young  aid-de-carnp 
was  equally  credulous,  he  thought  proper  to  entertain 
him  in  the  same  manner.  It  is  not  likely,  however, 
that  he  expected  the  narratives  would  ever  meet  the 
public  eye,  in  print.  But  after  they  were  presented  to 
the  public  and  well  received,  he  probably  thought  it 
would  be  as  well  to  let  them  pass  uncontradicted. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  I  am  prepared  to  show,  that  the 
whole  account  of  Gen.  Amherst's  expedition,  here  giv 
en,  is  erroneous  in  every  particular  ;  that  no  such  pro 
jects,  as  spoken  of,  were  attempted,  or  contemplated  to 
be  put  in  execution  ;  that  one  of  the  French  vessels  in 
question,  had  accidentally  ran  aground  in  the  river  St. 
Lawrence,  before  the  British  entered  it ;  and  that  the 
other  fought  about  four  hours  before  surrendering,  hav 
ing  twelve  men  killed,  or  wounded. 


89 

In  ordinary  cases,  a  passing  remark  only  would  be 
required,  to  expose  the  absurdity  of  the  foregoing  state 
ments.  But  when  a  large  portion  of  the  public,  which 
is  always  fond  of  the  marvelous,  appears  disposed  to 
believe  whatever  has,  or  may  be  said,  of  the  prowess 
and  extraordinary  achievements  of  Gen.  Putnam,  it 
becomes  necessary  to  set  forth  more  particularly  the 
fallacy  upon  which  the  pretensions  are  founded.  I 
shall,  therefore,  quote,  at  considerable  length,  the  ac 
counts  of  the  transactions  in  question,  by  two  historians 
of  the  first  respectability,  the  one  American,  the  other 
English.  The  latter  gives  a  minute  detail  of  the  cir 
cumstances  attending  the  capture  of  the  French  ves 
sel,  and  of  the  investment  of  the  fort  at  Isle  Royal,  and 
of  its  fingl  surrender  by  capitulation. 

The  first  authority  I  shall  cite  is  "  THE  HISTORY  OF 
CONNECTICUT,  FROM  1630  to  1764.  BY  BENJAMIN  TRUM- 
BULL,  D.  D." 

"  In  June  [1760,]  the  general  [Amherst]  commenced 
his  march  from  Schenectady,  with  the  main  army,  and 
proceeded  by  the  Mohawk  and  Oneida  rivers  to  Os- 
wego. 

"  After  a  detachment  had  been  sent  foward  to  re 
move  obstructions  in  the  river  St.  Lawrence,  and  to 
find  the  best  place-  for  the  passage  of  the  boats  and 
vessels,  the  army  embarked  and  passed  the  lake  [On 
tario]  without  any  misfortune.  The  general  receiving 
intelligence  that  one  of  the  enemy's  vessels  was  aground 
and  disabled,  and  that  another  lay  off  La  Gallette,  de 
termined,  with  the  utmost  dispatch^  to  go  down  the 
river  and  attack  Oswegatchie  and  Isle  Royal. 

"  On  the  17th  of  August,  the  row-galleys  fell  in  with 
the  French  sloop  commanded  by  M.  de  la  Broquerie, 
who,  after  a  smart  engagement,  surrendered  to  the 
English  galleys.  The  enemy  retired  with  great  pre 
cipitation  before  the  army,  until  it  arrived  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Isle  Royal.  This  was  immediately  so  com 
pletely  invested,  that  the  garrison  had  no  means  of  es- 

8* 


90 

caping.  By  the  23d,  two  batteries  were  opened  against 
the  fort,  and  it  was  cannonaded  by  these,  in  concert 
with  the  row-galleys  in  the  river.  Dispositions  having 
been  made  for  a  general  attack,  M.  Pouchant,  the  com 
mander,  beat  a  parley,  and  surrendered  the  fort  on 
terms  of  capitulation. 

"  When  the  necessary  preparations  had  been  made, 
Gen.  Amherst  proceeded  down  the  river."  Vol.  2,  p.  423. 

AN     ABSTRACT     OF    MAJ.     MANTELS   ACCOUNT  OF  THE    EX 
PEDITION  AGAINST  MONTREAL. 

"  The  necessary  preparations  having  been  made  to 
bring  the  whole  power  of  the  British  forces  in  North 
America  against  Montreal,  in  order  to  finish  by  its  re 
duction  the  war  in  that  part  of  the  world,  and  the  sea 
son  being  sufficiently  advanced  to  enable  Sir  Jeffery 
Amherst,  the  commander-in-chief,  to  commence  his  part 
of  the  operations,  he  embarked  at  New  York  on  the 
2d  of  May,  1760.  and  proceeded  to  Schenectady. 
From  thence,  with  part  of  his  army,  he  pursued  his 
route  to  Oswego,  where  he  encamped  on  the  9th  of  Ju 
ly.  The  remainder  he  ordered  to  follow  with  the 
greatest  diligence,  under  the  command  of  Brigadier 
Gage.  On  the  14th,  two  vessels  hove  in  sight  on  Lake 
Ontario,  which  proved  to  be  those  that  had  been  fitted 
out  at  Niagara,  under  the  command  of  Capt.  Loring. 
Boats  were  immediately  dispatched  to  him  with  orders 
to. look  out  for,  and  attack  the  French  vessels  cruising 
on  the  lake.  On  the  20th,  two  other  vessels  appeared, 
and  proved  to  be  the  French  vessels  which  had  esca 
ped  Capt.  Loring's  vigilance.  On  the  22d,  Brigadier 
Gage  arrived  with  the  rear  of  the  army  ;  as  did  Sir 
William  Johnson,  on  the  23d,  with  a  party  of  Indians. 
On  the  24th,  the  general  received  intelligence,  that  the 
French  vessels  had  escaped  into  the  river  St.  Law 
rence,  and  that  Capt.  Loring  was  returning  with  the 
Onondaga  of  sixteen,  and  the  Mohawk  of  eighteen  six- 
pounders.  • 


91 

"  On  the  5th  of  August,  the  general  ordered  the  army 
to  be  in  readiness  to  embark.  It  amounted  to  10,142 
effective  men,  officers  included.  The  Indians  under 
Sir  William  Johnson  were  706. 

"  On  the  7th,  Capt.  Loring  sailed  with  his  two  ves 
sels  ;  but  having  mistaken  the  channel  from  the  lake  to 
the  river  St.  Lawrence,  the  army  passed  him,  while  he 
was  endeavoring  to  extricate  himself.  On  the  13th, 
the  whole  army  gained  the  Point  de  Barril,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  post  called  La  Gallette,  which  Brig 
adier  Gage  was  ordered  to  destroy  the  preceding  year. 
Here  the  enemy  had  a  very  good  dock,  in  which  they 
built  their  vessels.  The  grenadiers  and  light  infantry, 
with  the  row-galleys,  took  post  that  day  without  halt 
ing,  at  Oswegatchie,  a  few  miles  below  the  Point  de 
Barril. 

"  All  this  while,  one  of  the  enemy's  vessels  kept  hov 
ering  about  the  army ;  and,  as  Capt.  Loring  had  not 
yet  got  into  the  right  channel,  it  became  necessary  for 
the  safety  of  the  army,  either  to  compel  this  vessel  to 
retire,  or  to  take  her.  [But  one  of  the  two  vessels  ap 
pearing,  is  a  confirmation  of  Dr.  Trumbull's  report,  that 
one  was  aground  and  disabled.]  The  general  was, 
therefore,  obliged  to  order  Col.  Williamson,  with  the 
row-galleys,  well  manned,  to  do  one  or  the  other.  On 
the  17th,  the  galleys  advanced  with  the  utmost  intre 
pidity,  under  a  very  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy ;  but 
it  did  not  in  the  least  damp  the  ardor  of  the  assailants  ; 
their  fire  was  returned  with  such  resolution  and  brave 
ry,  that,  after  a  severe  contest  of  about  four  hours,  the 
French  vessel  struck  her  colors.  She  mounted  ten 
twelve-pounders  ;  and  had  on  board  one  hundred  men, 
twelve  of  whom  were  killed  or  wounded.  Two  of 
Col.  Williamson's  detachment  were  killed,  and  three 
wounded.  The  genera]  immediately  named  the  vessel 
the  Williamson,  in  honor  of  the  colonel,  and  to  perpet 
uate  the  memory  of  so  gallant  an  action.  The  same 
day  the  army  ^proceeded  to  Oswegatchie,  from  whence 
4* 


92 

it  was  necessary  to  reconnoiter  Isle  Royal,  so  that  it 
was  noon  the  next  day  before  the  army  could  pro 
ceed. 

"  Fort  Levi  stood  upon  this  island,  which  was  other 
wise  strongly  fortified.  Though  the  reduction  of  Fort 
Levi  could  be  of  little  service,  merely  as  a  fort,  yet  it 
was  certainly  of  too  much  consequence  to  be  left  in 
the  rear  of  an  army  ;  besides,  the  number  of  pilots,  per 
fectly  acquainted  with  the  intricate  navigation  of  the 
river  St.  Lawrence,  which  the  taking  of  the  garrison 
prisoners  would  afford,  was  alone  a  sufficient  motive  for 
attacking  it.  It  was,  therefore,  invested  that  very  eve 
ning.  Whilst  the  English  were  passing  the  point,  the 
French  kept  up  a  very  smart  cannonade  on  them,  and 
destroyed  one  of  the  row-galleys,  and  a  few  boats,  and 
killed  two  or  three  men ;  but  notwithstanding  this  fire, 
and  an  uninterrupted  continuance  of  it,  the  fort  was  so 
completely  invested  by  the  20th,  by  the  masterly  dis 
position  of  the  troops,  as  to  make  it  impossible  for  the 
garrison  to  escape. 

"  Capt.  Loring  had  arrived  the  day  before  with  his 
two  vessels,  and  the  Williamson  brig  ;  and  the  batte 
ries  being  now  ready,  the  general,  on  the  23d,  deter 
mined  to  assault  the  fort,  that  as  little  time  as  possible 
might  be  wasted  on  it.  He,  therefore,  ordered  the  ves 
sels  to  fall  down  the  stream,  post  themselves  as  close 
to  the  fort  as  possible,  and  man  their  tops  well,  in  or 
der  to  fire  upon  the  enemy,  and  prevent  their  making 
use  of  their  guns  ;  whilst  the  grenadiers  rowed  in  with 
their  broadswords  and  tomahawks,  fascines  and  scal 
ing-ladders,  [not  a  wide  plank,  twenty  feet  in  length,] 
under  cover  of  three  hundred  of  the  light  infantry,  who 
were  to  fire  into  the  embrasures.  The  grenadiers  re 
ceived  their  orders  with  a  cheerfulness  that  might  be 
regarded  as  a  sure  omen  of  success ;  and,  with  their 
usual  alacrity,  prepared  for  the  attack,  waiting  in  their 
shirts  till  the  ships  could  take  their  proper  stations. 
This  the  Williamson  brig,  commanded  by  Lieut.  Sin- 


93 

clair,  and  the  Mohawk  by  Lieut.  Phipps,  soon  did.  But 
the  Onondaga,  in  which  was  Capt.  Loring,  by  some 
extraordinary  blunder,  ran  aground.  The  enemy  dis 
covering  her  distress,  plied  her  with  such  unceasing 
showers  of  great  and  small  arms,  that  Capt.  Loring 
thought  proper  to  strike  his  colors,  and  sent  Thornton, 
his  master,  on  shore  to  the  enemy,  who  endeavored  to 
take  possession  of  the  vessel ;  but  by  Col.  Williamson's 
observing  it,  he  turned  upon  them  a  battery,  which 
obliged  them  to  desist  from  the  undertaking.  The 
general  then  ordered  Lieut.  Sinclair,  from  the  William 
son  brig,  and  Lieut.  Pennington,  with  two  detachments 
of  grenadiers  under  their  command,  to  take  possession 
of  the  Onondaga ;  and  they  obeyed  their  orders  with 
such  undaunted  resolution,  that  the  English  colors  were 
again  hoisted  on  board  her.  But  the  vessel,  after  all, 
could  not  be  got  off;  and  was,  therefore,  abandoned 
about  midnight.  The  English  batteries,  however,  put 
a  stop  to  any  future  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  board 
her.  Capt.  Loring  being  wounded,  was  in  the  mean 
time  sent  ashore.  This  accident  of  the  Onondaga's 
running  aground,  obliged  the  general  to  defer  his  plan 
of  assault;  but  this  delay  proved  rather  a  fortunate 
event,  as  it  saved  a  good  deal  of  blood  ;  for  on  the 
25th,  M.  Pouchot,  the  commandant,  beat  a  parley,  de 
manding  what  terms  he  might  expect ;  to  which  no 
other  answer  was  returned,  than  that  the  fort  must  be 
immediately  given  up,  and  the  garrison  surrendered 
prisoners  of  war  ;  and  but  ten  minutes  were  given  for  a 
reply.  These  terms  were  received  within  the  ten  min 
utes  ;  and  Lieut.  Col.  Massey,  with  the  grenadiers,  im 
mediately  took  possession  of  the  place.  The  loss  of 
the  English  before  it,  was  twenty-one  men  killed,  and 
nineteen  wounded.  The  first  shot  from  the  English 
battery  killed  the  French  officer  of  artillery.  Eleven 
more  were  killed  afterwards,  and  about  forty  wounded. 
The  garrison,  all  but  the  pilots,  for  the  sake  of  whom 
chiefly  the  place  had  been  attacked,  were  sent  to  New 


94 

York ;  and  the  general  named  the  fort,  Fort  William 
Augustus. 

"  Till  the  30th,  the  army  was  employed  in  levelling 
the  batteries,  and  repairing  boats  and  rafts  for  the  ar 
tillery,  which  was  now  embarked  with  the  necessary 
stores ;  and,  on  the  31st,  the  general,  with  the  first  di 
vision  of  the  army,  embarked,  and  in  the  evening 
reached  the  Me  Aux-Chats,  having  passed  the  first 
rapids.  *  *  * 

"  On  the  4th  of  September,  about  noon,  the  van  of 
the  army  entered  the  Cedar-falls  ;  and,  for  want  of 
sufficient  precaution,  twenty-nine  boats  belonging  to 
regiments,  seventeen  whaleboats,  and  one  row  galley, 
were  dashed  to  pieces,  with  the  loss  of  eighty-eight 
men.  *  *  On  the  6th,  the  army  embarked  at 

La  Chine,  on  the  island  of  Montreal,  about  nine  miles 
from  the  city  ;  which  the  general  immediately  marched 
to,  and  that  night  invested  ;  the  French  army  having 
retired  into  it.  The  next  day,  the  following  letters 
[omitted]  passed  between  the  two  generals,  and  ended 
in  a  capitulation,  which  was  signed  on  the  8th  of  Sep 
tember,  1760." 

See  also  Marshall's  Life  of  Washington,  and  Ma- 
cauley's  History  of  the  State  of  New  York ;  which 
concur  with  the  foregoing.  In  none  of  these  authorities 
do  we  hear  any  thing  of  Lieut.  Col.  Putnam,  with  his 
beetle  and  wedges,  and  wide  plank,  twenty  feet  in  length; 
which  shows,  that  the  story,  as  related  by  Humphreys, 
is  a  complete  sham.  Mr.  Peabody  follows  him,  giving 
full  credit  to  the  relation. 

Beetle  and  wedges,  to  be  sure,  might  easily  be  manu 
factured,  but  where  were  the  planks  to  come  from  ? 
Surely  the  expedition  was  not  incumbered  with  this 
material  in  anticipation  of  Col.  Putnam's  project.  The 
whole  affair  appears  to  be  a  complete  hoax ;  and  must 
have  been  intended  by  Putnam  (if  indeed  he  made  to 
his  biographer  the  communication  as  above  stated) 
merely  to  test  the  extent  of  human  credulity. 


95 

Although  a  general  peace  among  the  European  powers 
was  ratified  in  1763,  yet  the  savages  on  our  western  frontiers 
still  continued  their  hostilities.  After  they  had  taken  several 
posts,  Gen.  Bradstreet  was  sent,  in  1764,  with  an  army, 
against  them.  Col.  Putnam,  then,  for  the  first  time,  Ap 
pointed  to  the  command  of  a  regiment,  was  on  the  expedition. 

Upon  the  arrival  of  Gen.  Bradstreet,  the  savages  saw  that 
all  further  efforts,  in  arms,  would  be  vain,  and  accordingly, 
after  many  fallacious  proposals  for  a  peace,  and  frequent 
tergiversations  in  the  negotiation,  they  concluded  a  treaty, 
which  ended  the  war  in  America. 

Col.  Putnam,  at  the  expiration  of  ten  years  from  his  first 
receiving  a  commission,  after  having  seen  as  much  service, 
endured  as  many  hardships,  encountered  as  many  dangers, 
and  acquired  as  many  laurels  as  any  officer  of  his  rank,  with 
<*reat  satisfaction  laid  aside  his  uniform,  and  returned  to  his 

t5 

plough. 


96 


CHAPTER    IV. 

THE  author,  after  bringing  the  career  of  Putnam  in 
the  Canadian  war  to  a  close,  gives  a  brief  history  of  the 
causes  which  produced  the  American  revolution ;  and 
observes  : 

As  Putnam  happened  to  be  often  at  Boston,  he  held  many 
conversations,  on  these  subjects,  with  Gen.  Gage,  the  British 
commander-in-chief,  Lord  Percy,  Col.  Sheriff,  Col.  Small, 
and  many  officers  with  whom  he  had  formerly  served,  who 
were  now  at  the  head-quarters.  Being  often  questioned, 
"  In  case  the  dispute  should  proceed  to  hostilities,  what  part 
he  would  really  take  ?"  he  always  answered,  "  With  his 
country ;  and  that,  let  whatever  might  happen,  he  was  pre 
pared  to  abide  the  consequence." 

At  length  the  fatal  day  arrived,  when  hostilities  com 
menced.  Gen.  Gage,  in  the  evening  of  the  18th  of  April, 
1775,  detached  from  Boston  the  grenadiers  and  light  infan 
try  of  the  army,  commanded  by  Lieut.  Col.  Smith,  to  destroy 
some  military  and  other  stores  deposited  by  the  province  at 
Concord. 

After  giving  a  concise  account  of  this  affair,  the  au 
thor  proceeds : 

Nothing  could  exceed  the  celerity  with  which  the  intelli 
gence  flew  everywhere,  that  blood  had  been  shed  by  the 
British  troops.  The  country,  in  motion,  exhibited  but  one 
scene  of  hurry,  preparation,  and  revenge.  Putnam,  who  was 
ploughing  when  he  heard  the  news,  left  his  plough  in  the 
middle  of  the  field,  unyoked  his  team,  and  without  waiting  to 
change  his  clothes,  set  off  for  the  theatre  of  action.*  But 

*  Col.  Swett  says :  "  On  the  first  news  of  the  battle  of  Lexington,  Put 
nam  mounted  his  horse,  rode  in  a  single  day  one  hundred  miles,  arrived  at 


97 

finding  the  British  retreated  to  Boston,  and  invested  by  a 
sufficient  force  to  watch  their  movements,  he  came  back  to 
Connecticut,  levied  a  regiment,  under  authority  of  the  legis 
lature,  and  speedily  returned  to  Cambridge.  He  was  now 
promoted  to  be  a  major-general  on  the  provincial  staff,  by 
his  colony  ;  and,  in  a  little  time,  confirmed  by  congress,  in 
the  same  rank  on  the  continental  establishment.  Gen.  Ward, 
of  Massachusetts,  by  common  consent,  commanded  the  whole ; 
and  the  celebrated  Dr.  Warren  was  made  a  major-general. 
Not  long  after  this  period,  the  British  commander-in-chief 
found  the  means  to  convey  a  proposal,  privately,  to  Gen. 
Putnam,  that  if  he  would  relinquish  the  rebel  party,  he  might 
rely  upon  being  made  a  major-general  on  the  British  estab 
lishment,  and  receiving  a  great  pecuniary  compensation  for 
his  services.  Gen.  Putnam  spurned  at  the  offer ;  which, 
however,  he  thought  prudent  at  that  time  to  conceal  from 
public  notice. 

According  to  Mr.  Peabody,  Putnam  "  received  from 
the  assembly  of  Connecticut  a  commission  as  brigadier- 
general." — In  a  "History  of  Massachusetts,  from  1704 
to  July,  1775,"  by  Alden  Bradford,  secretary  of  the 
commonwealth,  (Boston,  1822,)  in  treating  of  the  bat 
tle  of  Bunker  Hill,  the  author  says :  "  Col.  Israel  Put 
nam,  of  Connecticut,  afterwards  a  major-general  in  the 
continental  army,  was  on  the  field  of  action,  towards 
the  close  of  the  engagement,  but  had  no  specific  com 
mand.  The  whole  expedition  was  one  of  sudden  un 
dertaking  ;  and  the  only  regular  and  distinct  designation 
was  that  of  Prescott,  who  had  command  of  the  troops 
which  took  possession  of  the  ground  on  the  evening  of 
the  16th.  His  activity  and  courage  would  have  done 
honor  to  the  most  celebrated  veteran  in  the  British 
army."  (p.  386.) 

Mr.  Bradford,  from  his  situation,  had  the  means  of 


Cambridge,  and  attended  a  council  of  war  on  the  21st  of  April,  when  the 
parole  was  Putnam." — (Orderly  book.) 

Professor  Sparks,  however,  in  his  Lectures  on  History,  says  that  Put 
nam,  before  leaving  home,  put  on  his  military  coat.  But  this,  1  believe,  re 
mains  a  mooted  question. 

9 


98 

acquiring  the  most  accurate  information  of  this  matter ; 
and,  in  fact,  all  the  circumstances  related  by  the  various 
writers  on  the  subject  lead  to  the  conclusion  to  which 
he  arrives.  Mr.  Peabody,  however,  endeavors  to  palm 
Gen.  Putnam  upon  the  public  as  the  chief  in  this  glori 
ous  action,  so  honorable  to  the  man  who  actually  com 
manded,  and  his  brave  associates  who  fought  the  battle. 
He  says ;  "  We  have  thus  far  refrained  from  saying 
any  thing  of  the  particular  command  allotted  to  Putnam 
on  this  occasion.  In  the  work  to  which  we  have  just 
referred,  [Col.  Swett's  Sketch  of  the  battle  of  Bunker 
Hill.]  he  is  mentioned  as  having  the  general  control  and 
superintendence  of  the  expedition  ;  and  this  opinion  is 
supported  by  the  following  considerations.  He  was 
the  only  general  officer  who  was  present  at  the  battle  ; 
and  it  is  very  improbable  that  the  various  detachments 
should  have  been  left  without  a  commander  of  the 
whole.  He  appears  to  have  acted,  throughout  the 
battle  and  the  previous  arrangements  for  it,  in  this  ca 
pacity.  Such  was  the  purport  of  his  own  constant  de 
clarations"  Does  his  quitting  the  seat  of  action  in 
the  heat  of  battle,  and  making  repeated  visits  to  Cam 
bridge,  as  asserted  by  Mr.  Swett,  to  drum  up  reinforce 
ments,  accord  with  the  duties  of  a  commander?  Would 
he  not  depute  another  officer  for  such  service,  for  fear 
the  battle  might  be  lost  for  want  of  his  presence.  The 
absurdity  of  foisting  him  into  the  command  is  too  glar 
ing  for  argument.  Gen?  Putnam  insinuated  nothing  of 
the  kind  to  his  biographer,  Humphreys.  All  that  is 
pretended,  according  to  him,  is  that — "  In  this  battle, 
the  presence  and  example  of  Gen.  Putnam,  who  arrived 
with  the  reinforcement,  were  not  less  conspicuous  than 
useful"  After  the  death  of  the  general,  his  friends 
have  undertaken  to  embellish  his  acts  with  facts  that 
never  occurred.  Besides,  he  was  not  "  the  only  gene 
ral  officer  present  at  the  battle."  Gen.  Warren  was 
also  present,  and  fought  bravely  ;  but  neither  of  them 
had  received  orders  to  repair  to  the  field  of  action  ; 


99 

they  were  both  volunteers,  and  consequently  had  no 
command.  I  find,  however,  after  writing  the  above, 
that  Mr.  Bradford  is  mistaken  in  regard  to  the  rank 
Putnam  held  at  the  time  as  a  provincial  officer.  He 
had  been  recently  appointed  second  brigadier-general ; 
but  being  soon  after  made  a  major-general  in  the  con 
tinental  army,  his  title  of  brigadier  was  merged  in  that 
of  major,  and  his  occupancy  of  the  former  was  proba 
bly  little  known. 

The  following  document  settles  this  question  : 

OFFICE  OF  SECRETARY  OF  STATE,  ) 
Hartford,  Ct.,  Sept.  16,  1842.  J 

DEAR  SIR: — Your  letter  of  the  21st  ult.,  requesting 
information  in  relation  to  the  rank  held  by  Gen.  Put 
nam,  at  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  was  duly 
received,  and  I  regret  that  absence  and  other  circum 
stances  have  hitherto  prevented  my  earlier  attention 
to  the  subject. 

From  a  careful  and  thorough  examination  of  the  rec 
ords  of  this  (then)  colony,  as  well  as  the  records  of  the 
"Council  of  Safety"  and  of  the  "Pay-Table  Office,"  I 
am  enabled  to'  say  that  the  following  statement  com 
prises  all  the  material  facts  appearing  on  these  records 
in  relation  to  this  inquiry. 

Previous  to  April,  1775,  Gen.  Putnam  held  the  rank 
of  lieutenant-colonel  of  a  regiment  of  militia,  to  which 
office  he  was  appointed  in  October,  1774. 

At  a  special  session  of  the  General  Assembly,  held 
in  the  month  of  April,  1775,  a  public  act  was  passed, 
directing  that  six  regiments  "  be  forthwith  raised  by 
enlistment,  to  continue  in  service  for  a  term  not  ex 
ceeding  seven  months,"  and  to  be  commanded  by  "one 
major-general,  assisted  by  two  brigadier  generals, — 
each  of  which  general  officers  shall  take  the  command 
of  a  regiment  as  colonel."  The  regiments  consisted  of 
ten  companies  of  one  hundred  men  each. 

At  the  same  session,  to  wit,  April,  1775,  appoint- 


100 

merits  were  made  of  all  the  officers  of  this  corps,  among 
which  are  the  following  : 

"  This  Assembly  do  appoint  David  Wooster,  Esq.,  to  be  major- 
general. 

"  This  Assembly  do  appoint  Joseph  Spencer,  Esq.,  to  be  brig 
adier-general. 

"  This  Assembly  do  appoint  Israel  Putnam,  Esq.,  to  be  second 
brigadier-general." 

"3d  REGIMENT. 

This  Assembly  do  appoint  Israel  Putnam,  Esq.,  to  be^l 

colonel  of  the  3d  regiment,  and  captain      ...         Of  the  1st 
Jonathan  Kingsley,  1st  lieutenant    ...      I  comp'y, 
Thomas  Grosvenor,  2d  lieutenant  ...         3d  reg't." 
Elijah  Loomis,  ensign ) 

Each  of  the  other  general  officers  received  a  similar 
appointment  to  command  a  regiment  and  company. 
Probably  this  was  the  general  practice  in  this  state  at 
that  time. 

I  have  been  thus  particular,  that  you  might  readily 
see  the  probable  cause  of  the  different  statements  made 
concerning  the  military  rank  of  Gen.  Putnam,  at  the 
engagement  on  Bunker  Hill.  He  was  a  brigadier-gen 
eral  at  the  time  ;  but  as  he  also  commanded  the  3d 
regiment,  which  he  is  supposed  to  have  led  into  the  en 
gagement,  it  has  erroneously  been  supposed  by  some 
persons  that  his  rank  was  only  that  of  a  colonel. 

I  might  add,  that  Gen.  Putnam  never  had  from  this 
state   the  appointment  of  major-general :  that  rank  he 
had  from   the  continental  congress,  as  you  are  doubt 
less  aware,  soon  after  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill. 
I  am,  &c., 

NOAH  A.  PHELPS, 

Secretary  of  State. 
To  JOHN  FELLOWS,  ESQ.,  New  York. 

Putnam  was  appointed  a  major-general  by  the  con 
gress  before  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  but  had  no  no 
tice  of  it  till  the  2d  of  July,  when  he  received  the  com 
mission.  The  supposition  that  "  Putnam  led  his  regi- 


ment  into  the  engagement"  is  erroneous.  One  hundred 
and  twenty  of  his  regiment,  says  Col.  Swett,  were  de 
tached  for  this  service,  and  put  under  the  command  of 
Col.  Prescott. 

It  is  seen  by  the  foregoing  that  Putnam,  a  second 
brigadier-general  in  the  Connecticut  establishment,  is 
advanced,  by  the  continental  congress,  over  the  heads 
of  two  generals  of  superior  rank  in  the  same  province. 
And  it  will  appear  hereafter,  that  this  arose  from  the 
supposed  heroic  conduct  of  the  former  in  a  skirmish  at 
Hog  and  Noddle  islands,  in  which  he  took  no  part,  not 
being  on  either  of  these  islands  at  the  time  of  its  occur 
rence,  but  on  the  main,  probably  over  a  mile  from  the 
scene  of  action. 

In  regard  to  the  attempt  made  by  the  British  com 
mander  to  detach  Gen.  Putnam  from  the  American 
cause,  Col.  Swett,  upon  what  authority  he  does  not  in 
form  us,  states  it  to  have  taken  place  after  the  battle  of 
Bunker  Hill,  and  the  proposal  to  come  from  Sir  Wil 
liam  Howe  ;  whereas,  according  to  Col.  Humphreys, 
who  had  the  best  means  of  obtaining  correct  information, 
it  occurred  during  the  command  of  Gen.  Gage,  the  old 
acquaintance  of  Putnam.  Sir  William  Howe  did  not 
arrive  at  Boston  till  September. 

But  will  it  be  credited,  that  either  of  those  generals 
would  have  presumed  to  recommend  to  their  govern 
ment  the  appointment  of  Putnam  to  the  rank  of  major- 
general  over  their  own  generals,  so  much  his  superior 
in  education  and  talents  ?  That  a  pecuniary  reward 
was  offered  for  his  treachery,  cannot  be  doubted.  But 
why  was  it  thought  proper  to  keep  this  matter  a  secret 
at  the  tirne ;  the  sure  means,  when  known,  to  create  a 
suspicion  of  an  understanding  between  the  parties  ?  A 
similar  attempt  was  made  to  tamper  with  Gen.  Charles 
Lee ;  and  the  following  statement  shows  the  prudent 
course  he  adopted  upon  the  occasion. 

Gen.  Burgoyne  and  Gen.  Lee  had  served  together 
in  Portugal,  and  an  intimate  friendship  of  long  standing 

9* 


subsisted  between  them.  When  the  former  arrived  at 
Boston,  Gen.  Lee  wrote  a  letter  to  his  friend,  filled  with 
invective  against  the  British  court  and  cabinet,  setting 
forth  the  injustice  of  their  proceedings  in  regard  to  the 
colonies.  This  letter  was  received  in  good  part,  and 
answered  by  Gen-  Burgoyne  in  terms  of  courtesy,  on 
the  8th  of  July,  after  it  was  known  to  him  that  Gen. 
Lee  had  joined  the  American  camp.  In  closing  his 
letter,  he  proposed  an  interview  with  his  friend  at 
Brown's  house,  on  Boston  Neck,  a  little  within  the 
British  advanced  sentries,  pledging  his  parole  of  honor 
for  the  safe  return  of  Gen.  Lee,  and  soliciting  the  same 
for  himself.  This  invitation  Gen.  Lee  was  inclined  to 
accept ;  but,  not  choosing  to  do  it  without  the  sanction 
of  the  civil  authority,  he  laid  the  matter  before  the  pro 
vincial  congress  of  Massachusetts,  saying :  "  If  they 
approve  it,  he  must  request  that  they  will  depute  some 
one  gentleman  of  their  body  to  accompany  him,  and 
be  witness  to  the  conversation."  To  which  the  con 
gress  answered : 

"  SIR, — The  congress  have  perused  the  letter  from 
Gen.  Burgoyne,  which  you  were  kind  enough  to  sub 
mit  to  their  inspection.  They  can  have  no  objection 
to  the  proposed  interview,  from  any  want  of  the  high 
est  confidence  in  the  wisdom,  discretion,  and  integrity 
of  Gen.  Lee ;  but,  as  the  confidence  of  the  people  in 
their  generals  is  so  essentially  necessary  to  the  well- 
conducting  of  the  enterprise  in  which  we  are  engaged, 
and  as  a  people  contending  for  their  liberties  are  natu 
rally  disposed  to  jealousy,  and  not  inclined  to  make  the 
most  favorable  construction  of  the  motives  of  conduct, 
which  they  are  not  fully  acquainted  with,  they  beg 
leave  to  suggest  whether  such  an  interview  might 
not  have  a  tendency  to  lessen  the  influence,  which  the 
congress  would  wish  to  extend  to  the  utmost  of  their 
power  to  facilitate  the  operations  of  war.  The  con 
gress,  agreeably  to  your  request,  and  to  prevent  as  far 
as  we  are  able  any  disagreeable  consequences,  which 


103 

may  arise  from  the  jealousy  of  the  people  on  such  an 
occasion,  have  appointed  Mr.  El  bridge  Gerry  to  attend 
you  at  the  proposed  interview,  if  you  shall  think  proper 
to  proceed  in  it ;  and,  as  they  do  not  think  themselves 
authorized  to  counteract  the  general's  inclination,  they 
would  submit  it  to  his  opinion  whether  the  advice  of  a 
council  of  war  might  not  be  taken  in  a  matter  of  such 
apparent  delicacy."  (MS.  Journal,  July  10th.) 

These  hints  had  their  effect  on  the  mind  of  Gen.  Lee, 
and  he  wrote  a  complimentary  note  to  Gen.  Burgoync, 
the  next  day,  declining  the  interview.  (Sparks'  Wash 
ington,  vol.  3,  p.  498.) 

The  first  attention  had  been  prudently  directed  towards 
forming  some  little  redoubts  and  intrenchments  ;  for  it  was 
well  known  that  lines,  however  slight  or  untenable,  were 
calculated  to  inspire  raw  soldiers  with  a  confidence  in  them 
selves.  The  next  care  was  to  bring  the  live-stock  from  the 
islands  in  Boston  bay,  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  (al 
ready  surrounded  by  land)  from  making  use  of  them  for 
fresh  provisions.  In  the  latter  end  of  May,  between  two 
and  three  hundred  men  were  sent  to  drive  off  the  stock  from 
Hog  and  Noddle  islands,  which  are  situated  on  the  north 
east  side  of  Boston  harbor.  Advantage  having  been  taken 
of  the  ebb-tide,  when  the  water  is  fordable  between  the  main 
and  Hog  island,  as  it  is  between  that  and  Noddle  island,  the 
design  was  effected.  But  a  skirmish  ensued,  in  which  some 
of  the  marines,  who  had  been  stationed  to  guard  them,  were 
killed:  and  as  the  firing  continued  between  the  British 
water-craft  and  our  party,  a  reinforcement  of  three  hundred 
men,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery,  was  ordered  to  join  the 
latter.  Gen.  Putnam  took  the  command,  and  having  himself 
gone  down  on  the  Beach,  within  conversing  distance,  and  in 
effectually  ordered  the  people  on  board  an  armed  schooner  to 
strike,  he  plied  her  with  shot  so  furiously  that  the  crew 
made  their  escape,  and  the  vessel  was  burnt.  An  armed 
sloop  was  likewise  so  much  disabled  as  to  be  towed  off  by 
the  boats  of  the  fleet.  Thus  ended  this  affair,  in  which 
several  hundred  sheep  and  some  cattle  were  removed  from 
under  the  muzzles  of  the  enemy's  cannon,  and  our  men,  ac- 


104 

customed  to  stand  fire,  by  being  for  many  hours  exposed  to  it, 
without  meeting  with  any  loss. 

Here  we  have  a  like  bungling  story,  a  fac-simile  of 
that  related  above  respecting  the  two  French  vessels 
on  the  river  St.  Lawrence.  In  the  present  case,  one 
of  the  vessels  in  question  ran  aground  in  the  night,  and 
was  consequently  abandoned,  but  not  on  account  of 
the  battering  received  by  Putnam's  cannonade ;  nor 
was  any  other  vessel  so  much  disabled,  through  the 
same  means,  as  to  be  towed  off  by  the  boats  of  the 
fleet,  as  here  stated.  In  fact,  it  is  incredible  that  a 
party  of  militia,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery,  without 
any  cover,  at  hailing  distance  from  two  armed  vessels, 
could  accomplish  the  feats  pretended.  Nothing  but 
enchantment  or  witchcraft  could  have  produced  such 
a  result.  A  broadside  fire  from  one  of  the  vessels 
would  have  caused  terrible  havoc  among  three  hundred 
men  thus  situated.  But  fortunately  for  them,  they 
were  not  in  reach  of  the  cannon  of  those  vessels,  which 
were  at  Hog  or  Noddle  island. 

The  manner  in  which  this  story  is  related  shows  it  to 
be  deceptive.  A  party  of  three  hundred  men  are  order 
ed  on  a  particular  service,  without  designating  the  offi 
cer  who  should  take  command  of  them,  and  in  default 
thereof,  Putnam  assumes  it.  Neither  are  the  men  who 
were  to  compose  this  detachment  pointed  out.  Did 
this  pretended  reinforcement  fulfil  the  orders  it  is  said 
to  have  received,  to  join  the  party  employed  in  remov 
ing  the  cattle,  &c.,  from  the  islands  mentioned  ?  By 
no  means.  They  went  down  to  the  beach,  and  made 
some  bluster  and  noise,  by  firing  two  pieces  of  artille 
ry,  probably  towards  the  islands.  No  reinforcement 
appears  to  have  been  necessary,  a  sufficient  number  of 
men  having  been  sent  in  the  first  instance  for  the  pur 
pose  intended,  who  executed  their  mission  as  required. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  account  for  the  origin  of  this  no 
table  affair  of  the  reinforcement.  The  people  in  the 
neighborhood  of  those  islands,  hearing  the  roar  of  can- 


105 

non,  ran  down  to  the  beach,  from  mere  curiosity,  to 
ascertain  the  cause  ;  and,  at  the  suggestion  of  some 
body,  two  field-pieces  were  procured,  and  occasionally 
fired,  in  defiance  of  the  enemy,  but  without  doing  harm 
to  anyone  ;  nor  were  they  in  a  situation  to  be  injured 
themselves,  as  the  result  proved.  Gen.  Putnam  cun 
ningly  claimed  the  command  of  this  redoubtable  party, 
which  nobody  disputed,  for  no  one  knew  who  com 
manded,  or  that  there  was  any  commander  at  all.  And 
that  there  could  not  have  been  any  regular  command, 
is  evident  from  the  nature  of  the  case.  It  must  have 
been  a  helter-skelter  assemblage  of  men  and  boys, 
brought  together  from  the  cause  above  stated  ;  and 
which  could  not,  by  reason  of  its  composition,  be  re 
duced  to  order  ;  nor  was  it  necessary,  for  they  had 
nothing  to  do  requiring  concert  of  action. 

Alter  all,  the  whole  of  this  affair  was  but  a  small 
matter,  a  mere  skirmish.  Neither  Gordon  nor  Mar 
shall  take  any  notice  of  it. 

Paul  Allen,  however,  in  his  history  of  the  revolution, 
instead  of  giving  to  Putnam  the  command  of  the  rein 
forcement,  pretended  to  have  been  ordered,  which  was 
all  that  Putnam  claimed,  and  which  advanced,  by  his 
own  account,  no  further  than  to  the  beach  on  the  main, 
transfers  him  to  the  command  of  the  militia  on  Hog 
and  Noddle  islands  ;  thinking,  perhaps,  the  command, 
assumed  by  him,  not  of  sufficient  consequence  for  the 
general.  In  other  respects,  the  statement  of  Mr.  Allen 
bears  the  impress  of  authenticity.  He  says: 

"  Various  parties  of  militia,  under  the  orders  of  the 
provincial  congress,  had  been  engaged  in  frequent  skir 
mishes  with  the  British  foraging  parties  from  Boston. 
It  was  considered  as  a  matter  of  great  importance 
that  the  British  should  be  deprived  of  the  supplies  of 
stock  and  other  articles  of  provision,  which  abounded 
on  the  islands  in  Boston  harbor.  For  this  purpose 
Gen.  Putnam  with  a  party  of  six  hundred  men.  in  their 
attempts  to  bring  oft'  the  stock  and  destroy  the  hay  on 


106 

one  of  the  islands,  were  opposed  by  a  party  of  marines 
from  Boston,  who  were  supported  by  several  armed 
vessels  and  barges.  A  warm  action  commenced,  which 
continued  through  the  whole  of  a  dark  night ;  and  one 
of  the  vessels  running  aground,  the  British  in  the 
morning  were  compelled  to  abandon  her,  and  make 
their  escape." 

Mr.  Allen  shows  that  the  contention  for  the  stock, 
&c.,  on  the  islands  in  Boston  harbor,  was  between  the 
British  troops  and  the  Massachusetts  militia,  acting 
under  the  orders  of  their  provincial  congress.  This 
was  before  any  continental  army  had  been  put  into  a 
state  of  organization.  Putnam  had  just  arrived  at 
Cambridge  from  Connecticut,  and  is  it  probable  that 
the  militia  of  Massachusetts  would  be  immediately  put 
under  his  command  ? 

The  late  Gen.  Dearborn  informed  an  acquaintance 
of  the  writer,  that  he  was  with  the  party,  about  five 
hundred  men,  who  were  engaged  on  the  memorable 
occasion  in  question  ;  that  they  were  on  the  islands  a 
day  and  a  half;  that  skirmishing  was  kept  up  almost 
the  whole  time,  and  that  he  then  thought  the  fighting, 
it  being  his  first  essay,  most  tremendous.  It  turned 
out,  however,  he  said,  not  so  terrible  as  he  had  imagined, 
the  Americans  having  only  one  man  killed,  and  three 
wounded.  He  saw  Putnam  on  the  beach,  as  the  party 
were  passing  over  to  the  islands. 

Out  of  this  mighty  affair,  Gen.  Putnam  contrived  to 
create  a  large  capital ;  for,  by  means  of  it,  he  was  made 
a  major-general.  It  was  immediately  bruited  about 
the  country,  by  whose  instrumentality  may  easily  be 
imagined,  that  Putnam  was  the  hero  of  that  renowned, 
eventful  day,  and  that  his  bravery  and  skill  in  military 
affairs  were  unsurpassed.  The  congress  thereupon  ap 
pointed  him  a  major-general  in  the  continental  service, 
as  the  following  letter  shows : 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Rosier  Sherman  to  Gen.  Da 
vid  Wooster,  dated  Philadelphia,  June  23,  1775  : 


107 

"  DEAR  SIR, — The  congress,  having  determined  it  ne 
cessary  to  keep  up  an  army  for  the  defence  of  Ameri 
ca  at  the  charge  of  the  united  colonies,  have  appointed 
the  following  general  officers  :  George  Washington, 
Esq.,  cornmander-in-chief ;  major-generals,  Ward,  Lee, 
Schuyler,  and  Putnam  ;  brigadier-generals,  Pomeroy, 
Montgomery,  yourself.  Heath,  Spencer,  Thomas,  Sul 
livan,  of  New  Hampshire,  and  one  Green,  of  Rhode 
Island.  I  am  sensible  that,  according  to  your  former 
rank,  you  were  entitled  to  the  place  of  a  major-gene 
ral  ;  and  as  one  was  to  be  appointed  in  Connecticut,  I 
heartily  recommended  you  to  the  congress.  I  inform 
ed  them  of  the  arrangement  made  by  our  assembly, 
which  I  thought  would  be  satisfactory  to  have  them 
continued  in  the  same  order.  But  as  Gen.  Putnam's 
fame  was  spread  abroad,  and  especially  his  successful 
enterprise  at  Noddle's  island,  the  account  of  which  had 
just  arrived,  it  gave  him  the  preference  in  the  opinion 
of  the  delegates  in  general,  so  that  his  appointment 
was  unanimous  among  the  colonies  ;  but,  from  your 
known  abilities  and  firm  attachment  to  the  American 
cause,  we  were  very  desirous  of  your  continuance  in 
the  army,  and  hope  you  will  accept  of  the  appointment 
made  by  the  congress.  I  suppose  a  commission  is  sent 
to  you  by  Gen.  Washington."  (Davis's  Mem.  A.  Burr, 
vol.  1,  p.  59.) 

The  reception  of  Putnam's  appointment  by  the  offi 
cers  of  the  army,  and  its  consequences,  are  set  forth  in 
the  following  letter  from  the  commander-iri-chief : 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Washington  to  the 
president  of  congress : 

"Camp  at  Cambridge,  10th  of  July,  1775. 

"  I  am  very  sorry  to  observe,  that  the  appointment 
of  general  officers,  in  the  provinces  of  Massachusetts 
and  Connecticut,  has  not  corresponded  with  the  wishes 
and  judgment  of  either  the  civil  or  military.  The  great 
dissatisfaction  expressed  on  this  subject,  and  the  appa- 


108 

rent  danger  of  throwing  the  whole  army  into  the  utmost 
disorder,  together  with  the  strong  representations  made 
by  the  provincial  congress,  have  induced  me  to  retain 
the  commissions  in  my  hands  until  the  pleasure  of  the 
continental  congress  should  be  further  known ;  except 
Gen.  Putnam's,  which  was  given  the  day  1  came  to  the 
camp,  [July  2d,]  and  before  I  was  apprised  of  these  dis 
gusts.  In  such  a  step,  I  must  beg  the  congress  will  do 
me  the  justice  to  believe  that  I  have  been  actuated 
solely  by  a  regard  to  the  public  good. 

"  I  have  not,  nor  could  I  have,  any  private  attach 
ments  ;  every  gentleman  in  appointment  was  a  stranger 
to  me,  but  from  character.  I  must,  therefore,  rely  upon 
the  candor  and  indulgence  of  congress  for  their  most 
favorable  construction  of  my  conduct  in  this. particular. 
Gen.  Spencer's  disgust  was  so  great  at  Gen.  Putnam's 
promotion,  that  he  left  the  army  without  visiting  me, 
or  making  known  his  intention  in  any  respect."  (Sparks' 
Washington,  v.  iii.  p.  17.) 

The  provincial  generals  having  received  advice  that  the 
British  commander-in-chief  designed  to  take  possession  of  the 
heights  on  the  peninsula  of  Charlestown,  detached  a  thousand 
men  in  the  night  of  the  16th  of  June,  under  the  orders  of 
Gen.  Warren,  to  intrench  themselves  upon  one  of  these  emi 
nences,  named  Bunker  Hill. 

It  is  strange  that  Col.  Humphreys,  the  aid-de-camp 
of  Gen.  Putnam,  and  afterwards  of  Gen.  Washington, 
should  not  have  known  that  Gen.  Warren  had  no  com 
mand  on  this  eventful  occasion.  The  author,  after 
giving  a  short  account  of  the  conflict  which  ensued  on 
the  17th,  observes: 

In  this  battle,  the  presence  and  example  of  Gen.  Putnam, 
who  arrived  with  the  reinforcement,  were  not  less  conspicuous 
than  useful.  He  did  every  thing  that  an  intrepid  and  expe 
rienced  officer  could  accomplish.  The  enemy  pursued  to 
Winter  Hill — Putnam  made  a  stand,  and  drove  them  back 
under  cover  of  their  ships. 


109 

It  is,  however,  affirmed,  and  I  believe  fully  proved, 
as  will  hereafter  appear,  that  Gen.  Putnam's  presence 
and  example,  upon  the  occasion,  was  not  on  the  battle 
field,  at  Breed's  Hill,  but  at  Bunker  Hill  proper,  among 
those  who  took  no  part  in  the  congest.  Putnam's  rein 
forcements,  unfortunately,  never  came  into  action.  That 
"  he  did  every  thing  that  an  intrepid  and  experienced 
officer  could  accomplish,"  means  nothing, — specification 
is  wanting  ;  and,  that  he  drove  the  British  from  Winter 
Hill,  under  cover  of  their  ships,  is  decidedly  untrue. 

"  On  the  retreat  from  Bunker  Hill,  our  troops  took 
post  upon  the  heights  in  the  neighborhood  ;  the  regi 
ment  of  Stark  on  Winter  Hill.  The  night  succeeding 
the  battle  and  the  following  day  were  passed  in  the  la 
bor  of  intrenching;  but  the  experience  of  the  19th  of 
April  and  the  17th  of  June  deterred  the  British  troops 
from  any  repetition  of  the  attempt  to  penetrate  into  the 
interior,  in  this  portion  of  the  country."  (Everett's  Life 
of  Stark,  p.  65.) 

Indeed,  the  editor  of  the  edition  of  1818  of  Hum 
phreys'  Life  of  Putnam,  acknowledges  the  error,  stating, 
that  "  there  was  no  pursuit  of  the  British  beyond  Bun 
ker  Hill." 

The  premature  death  of  Warren,  one  of  the  most,  illustri 
ous  patriots  that  ever  bled  in  the  cause  of  freedom  ;  the  vete 
ran  appearance  of  Putnam,  collected,  yet  ardent  in  action ; 
together  with  the  astonishing  scenery  and  interesting  groupe 
around  Bunker  Hill,  rendered  this  a  magnificent  subject  for 
the  historic  pencil.  Accordingly  Trumbull,  formerly  an 
aid-de-camp  to  Gen.  Washington,  afterwards  deputy-adju 
tant-general  of  the  northern  army,  now  an  artist  of  great 
celebrity  in  Europe,  hajth  finished  this  picture  with  that  bold 
ness  of  conception,  and  those  touches  of  art  which  demon 
strate  the  master.  Heightened  in  horror  by  the  flames  of  a 
burning  town,  and  the  smoke  of  conflicting  armies,  the  prin 
cipal  scene,  taken  the  moment  when  Warren  fell,  represents 
that  hero  in  the  agonies  of  death,  a  grenadier  on  the  point  of 
bayoneting  him,  and  Col.  Small,  to  whom  he  was  familiarly 
known,  arresting  the  soldier's  arms  ;  at  the  head  of  the  Brit- 

10 


110 

ish  line,  Maj.  Pitcairne  is  seen  falling  dead  into  the  arms 
of  his  son ;  and  not  far  distant  Gen.  Putnam  is  placed  at  the 
rear  of  our  retreating  troops,  in  the  light-blue  and  scarlet 
uniform  he  wore  that  day,  with  his  head  uncovered,  and  his 
sword  waving  towards  the  enemy,  as  it  were  to  stop  their 
impetuous  pursuit.  In  nearly  the  same  attitude  he  is  exhib 
ited  by  Barlow  in  that  excellent  poem,  the  Vision  of  Colum 
bus. 

'  There  strides  bold  Putnam,  and  from  all  the  plains 
Calls  the  third  host,  the  tardy  rear  sustains, 
And,  'mid  the  whizzing  deaths  that  fill  the  air, 
Waves  back  his  sword,  and  dares  the  foll'wing  war.'  " 

The  painter  has  here  evidently  taken  his  cue  in  part 
from  the  poet  But  whether  Gen.  Putnam  had  taken 
any  part  in  the  action  or  not,  to  exhibit  him  in  this 
blustering,  gasconading  attitude,  when  retiring  from 
the  enemy,  does  not,  in  my  opinion,  redound  to  his 
credit,  nor  to  the  good  taste  of  either  the  writer  or  the 
artist,  notwithstanding  their  acknowledged  superior 
merits. 

The  manner  in  which  this  picture  was  concocted  is 
singular,  and  worthy  of  notice.  Col.  Trumbull,  it  seems, 
had  almost  completed  a  painting  of  this  battle,  when  he 
unfortunately  met  with  Col.  Small  of  the  British  army, 
who  advised  him  to  change  his  plan,  under  a  pretence 
that  justice  had  not  been  done  to  his  (Small's)  friend, 
as  he  called  him,  Gen.  Putnam.  The  alteration  pro 
posed,  by  the  way,  gave  Small  himself  a  most  conspi 
cuous  and  honorable  position.  As  it  introduced  a  very 
imposing  figure  into  the  group,  tending  to  render  the 
painting  popular,  Col.  Trumbull,  perhaps,  the  more 
readily  adopted  the  suggestion,  and  thereby  spoiled  his 
picture,  by  reason  of  its  giving  a  false  historical  repre 
sentation. 

The  agency  of  Col.  Small  in  this  matter  would  seem 
to  have  remained  secret  till  1818,  when  the  action  of 
Putnam  at  the  Bunker  Hill  battle  became  a  subject  of 
controversy.  This  drew  from  Col.  Trumbull  the  fol- 


Ill 

lowing  communication,  addressed  to  Col.  Daniel  Put 
nam,  son  of  the  general : 

In  the  summer  of  1786  I  became  acquainted  in  London 
with  Col.  John  Small,  of  the  British  army,  who  had  served 
in  America  many  years,  and  had  known  Gen.  Putnam  inti 
mately  during  the  war  of  Canada  from  1756  to  1763.  From 
him,  I  had  the  two  following  anecdotes  respecting  the  battle 
of  Bunker  Hill ;  I  shall  nearly  repeat  his  words ;  looking 
at  the  picture  which  I  had  almost  completed,  he  said  :  "  I  do 
not  like  the  situation  in  which  you  have  placed  my  old  friend 
Putnam  ;  you  have  not  done  him  justice.  I  wish  you  would 
alter  that  part  of  your  picture,  and  introduce  a  circumstance 
which  actually  happened,  and  which  I  can  never  forget. 
When  the  British  troops  advanced  the  second  time  to  the  at 
tack  of  the  redoubt,  I,  with  other  officers,  was  in  front  of  the 
line  to  encourage  the  men  ;  we  had  advanced  very  near  the 
works  undisturbed,  when  an  irregular  fire,  like  a  feu-de-joie, 
was  poured  in  upon  us;  it  was  cruelly  fatal.  The  troops 
fell  back,  and  when  I  looked  to  the  right  and  left,  I  saw  not 
one  officer  standing  ;  I  glanced  my  eye  to  the  enemy,  and 
saw  several  young  men  levelling  their  pieces  at  me  ;  I  knew 
their  excellence  as  marksmen,  and  considered  myself  gone. 
At  that  moment  my  old  friend  Putnam  rushed  forward,  and 
striking  up  the  muzzles  of  their  pieces  with  his  sword,  cried 
out — '  For  God's  sake,  my  lads,  don't  fire  at  that  man — I 
love  him  as  I  do  my  brother.'  We  were  so  near  each  other 
that  I  heard  his  words  distinctly.  He  was  obeyed  ;  £  bowed, 
thanked  him,  and  walked  away  unmolested." 

The  other  anecdote  relates  to  the  death  of  Gen.  War 
ren: 

At  the  moment  when  the  troops  succeeded  in  carrying  the 
redoubt,  and  the  Americans  were  in  full  retreat,  Gen.  Howe, 
(who  had  been  hurt  by  a  spent  ball  which  bruised  his  ankle) 
was  leaning  on  my  arm.  He  called  suddenly  to  me  :  "Do 
you  see  that  elegant  young  man  who  has  just  fallen  ?  Do  you 
know  him  ?"  I  looked  to  the  spot  towards  whichi  he  pointed — 
"Good  God,  sir,  I  believe  it  is  my  friend  Warren."  "Leave 
me  then  instantly — run — keep  off  the  troops,  save  him  if  pos 
sible."  I  flew  to  the  spot :  "  My  dear  friend,"  I  said  to  him, 
"I  hope  you  are  not  badly  hurt;"  he  looked  up,  seemed  to 


112 


recollect  me,  smiled,  and  died  f  a  musket  ball  had  passed 
through  the  upper  part  of  his  head. 

JOHN  TRUMBULL. 
DANIEL  PUTNAM,  esq. 

If  the  first  anecdote  here  narrated  were  true,  it  would 
cast  an  indelible  stain  upon  the  character  of  Gen.  Put 
nam.  There  was  neither  humanity  nor  patriotism  ex 
hibited  in  the  act,  but  the  reverse  of  both.  What!  an 
American  officer,  from  private  friendship,  grant  such 
favor  to  an  enemy  on  the  field  of  battle,  as  to  put  to 
hazard  the  vital  interests  of  his  country,  its  liberty  ! 
Such  a  course  might  have  been  the  means  of  sacrificing 
the  lives  of  many  Americans,  and  even  of  turning  the 
scale  of  victory  in  favor  of  the  enemy.  Why  was  not 
this  man  ordered  to  surrender,  and  thereby  save  his 
life  ?  He  is  permitted  to  walk  away  unmolested,  again 
to  rally  his  troops  and  make  another  onset ;  which,  ac 
cording  to  the  story,  he  did,  and  was  successful. 

But  I  believe  it  will  appear  evident,  in  the  sequel, 
that  both  these,  reports  are  unfounded.  In  the  first 
place,  that  Putnam  was  not  personally  engaged  in  the 
battle ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  that'  Warren  fell  out 
of  view  of  any  British  officer. 

Col.  Swett  adopts  both  these  anecdotes ;  and,  after 
giving  that  respecting  Small's  being  suffered  to  escape, 
says:  *The  general's  humane  and  chivalrous  generosity 
excited  in  them  [those  who  had  leveled  their  muskets 
at  Col.  Small]  new  admiration,  and  his  friend  retired 
unhurt." 

As  I  look  upon  this  statement  to  be  an  absolute  fraud, 
and,  therefore,  that  no  information  was  derived  from 
those  engaged  in  the  battle,  I  must  suppose  the  writer 
to  have  anticipated  what  he  thought  would  naturally 
follow  in  such  case,  a  liberty  often  taken  by  historians. 
But  as  to  this,  I  beg  leave  to  differ  with  him.  I  believe 
the  brave  men  who  took  part  in  that  memorable  con 
test  had  too  much  self-respect  to  applaud  such  mawk 
ish  civility  to  a  British  officer,  at  the  imminent  risk  of 


113 

their  own  lives,  as  well  as  that  of  the  cause  of  their 
country.  The  occasion  was  too  critical  to  admit  the 
exercise  of  chivalrous  acts  towards  the  enemy,  and 
thereby  hazard  the  loss  of  the  battle.* 

Mr.  Peabody  gives  credit  to  the  story,  in  regard  to 
the  favor  shown  to  Small,  but  is  silent  on  that  of  his 
pretended  attempt  to  save  the  life  of  Gen.  Warren. — 
If  the  former  of  these  anecdotes  were  true,  would  not 
Gen.  Putnam  have  been  apt  to  inform  his  biographer 
of  the  circumstance  ?  And  would  not  such  kindness 
and  generosity,  of  which  we  hear  so  much  in  the  Life 
of  Putnam,  been  blazoned  forth  to  the  world  in  capitals? 
Would  not  those  whose  pieces  were  thus  striken  up,  as  well 
as  others  who  must  have  seen  the  transaction,  have  been 
likely  to  tell  the  story  ?  Was  there  none  but  Col.  Small 
who  would  venture  to  relate  it  ?  What  was  the  length 
of  Putnam's  sword?  and  how  many  muskets  could  he 
have  struck  up  ?  for  there  must  have  been  many  point 
ed  at  Small,  he  being  the  only  man  left  standing  of  the 
enemy,  in  that  particular  location  of  the  action.  The 
difficulties  of  giving  these  anecdotes  any  thing  like  the 
appearance  of  reality  are  insurmountable.  The  one 
seems  to  have  been  formed  for  the  benefit  of  Gen.  Put 
nam,  and  the  other,  to  be  dovetailed  into  it,  in  order  to 
make  out  a  neat  romantic  affair,  and  give  a  quid  pro 
quo,  for  the  benefit  of  Col.  Small  ;  and  thereby  furnish 
a  good  subject  for  the  painter. 

The  controversy  respecting  the  conduct  of  Gen. 
Putnam,  at  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  appears  to  have 
originated  principally  from  an  article  on  that  battle, 
written  by  the  late  Gen.  Dearborn,  and  published  in 
1818  ;  although  there  were  other  accounts  of  the  bat- 

*  An  instance  of  gallantry  of  this  kind  happened  in  a  battle,  in  the  penin 
sula  of  Spain,  in  the  time  of  the  French  revolutionary  war.  Two  officers, 
a  Frenchman  and  an  Englishman,  came  in  contact,  and  the  former  had 
raised  his  sword  to  cut  down  his  adversary,  when  perceiving  him  to  be 
unarmed,  having  but  one  hand,  with  which  he  guided  his  horse,  the 
Frenchman  bowed  very  civilly,  and  passed  him  by.  The  English,  how 
ever,  gained  the  victory,  and,  perhaps,  the  one-armed  officer  was  very  in 
strumental  in  producing  the  result. 

10* 


114 

tie,  written  previously,  by  general  officers  of  the  revo 
lutionary  army,  which  censure  Gen.  Putnam  for  his 
delinquency  on  that  memorable  occasion. 

Gen.  Dearborn,  I  understand,  kept  a  record  of  his 
military  life,  noting  such  occurrences  of  importance  as 
came  under  his  observation.  This  record,  of  course, 
contained  an  account  of  Bunker  Hill  battle,  where  he 
commanded  a  company,  in  Col.  John  Stark's  regiment. 
This  account,  it  seems,  was  abstracted  from  the  jour 
nal,  and  first  appeared  in  a  periodical,  entitled  the  Port 
Folio,  published  at  Philadelphia.  This  brought  for 
ward  Col.  Daniel  Putnam,  son  of  Gen.  Putnam,  with  a 
counter  statement,  endeavoring  to  prove  Gen.  Dear 
born's  account  incorrect.  At  length  the  dispute  took  a 
political  party  complexion,  abuse  was  substituted  for 
reason,  and  truth  no  longer  considered,  essential  io  the 
support  of  argument.  The  cause  that  gave  this  turn 
to  the  controversy  will  hereafter  be  explained. 

This  article  of  Gen.  Dearborn,  with  testimony  ad 
duced  in  its  support,  including  extracts  from  the  writ 
ings  of  others  on  the  same  subject,  were  printed  in  a 
pamphlet  form,  at  Portland,  N.  H.,  in  1835,  entitled,  A 
History  of  the  Battle  of  Breed's  Hill.  From  this  pub 
lication  I  propose  to  extract  such  portion  as  may  be 
immediately  applicable  to  the  investigation  I  have  un 
dertaken. 

Having  introduced  the  communication  of  Col.  Small, 
I  will,  in  the  first  place,  copy  two  documents  on  that 
subject.  That  of  Capt.  Trevett  goes  to  show  the  im 
probability,  at  least,  that  any  intimacy  existed  between 
Putnam  and  Small.  He  says : 

I  commanded  a  company  of  artillery  from  the  town  of 
Marblehead,  attached  to  Col.  Richard  Gridley's  regiment, 
stationed  at  Cambridge.  About  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
of  the  17th. of  June,  1775,  I  left  Cambridge  with  my  com- 
pany,  for  Bunker  Hill.  When  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
from  the  colleges,  I  saw  Gen.  Putnam  pass  upon  a  horse  to. 
wards  the  town  of  Cambridge,  and  in  fifteen  or  twenty  min- 


115 

utes  I  saw  him  pass  in  like  manner  towards  Charlestown. 
When  I  arrived  at  Bunker  Hill,  on  the  northwest  side,  I 
there  saw  Gen.  Putnam  dismounted,  in  company  with  seve 
ral  others.  I  halted  my  company,  and  went  forward  to  se 
lect  a  station  for  my  pieces,  and  on  my  return,  saw  Gen. 
Putnam  as  before  ;  the  American  arid  English  forces  being 
then  engaged.  I  proceeded  on  with  my  company,  and  soon 
after  joined  that  part  of  the  American  force  at  the  rail  fence, 
towards  Mystic  river,  when  the  Americans  commenced  a 
general  retreat.  As  I  was  descending  the  northwest  side 
of  Bunker  Hill,  I  again  saw  Gen.  Putnam  in  the  same 
place,  putting  his  tent  upon  his  horse.  I  asked  him  where 
I  should  retreat  with  the  field-piece  I  had  brought  off:  he 
replied,  to  Cambridge,  and  I  accordingly  marched  my  com 
pany  to  Cambridge. 

In  the  month  of  May  or  June,  1795,  being  in  the  island 
of  Guernsey,  I  had  occasion  in  the  course  of  business  to  call 
upon  Maj.  (alias  Col.)  Small,  the  governor.  After  closing 
my  business  with  him,  he  remarked  that  my  countenance 
was  not  new 'to  him,  and  inquired  where  he  had  seen  me. 
I  replied,  that  it  must  have  been  at  Col.  IngersolPs  tavern 
in  Boston— and  that  I  had  once  been  opposed  to  him  in  ac 
tion.  He  immediately  entered  into  a  free  and  general  con 
versation  on  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill, — but  he  made  no  in 
quiry  after  Gen.  Putnam,  nor  did  he  in  any  way,  either  di 
rectly  or  indirectly,  allude  to  him,  either  as  a  friend  or  an 
officer. 

SAMUEL  R.  TREVETT. 

Boston,  June  2,  1818. 

The  testimony  of  Deacon  Samuel  Lawrence  is  di 
rectly  in  point,  and  puts  this  matter,  so  far  as  respects 
the  death  of  Gen.  Warren,  at  rest,  beyond  all  cavil  or 
controversy.  And  Col.  Small's  account  of  it,  being 
thus  proved  to  be  at  variance  with  fact,  gives  us  a  right 
to  conclude  his  other  anecdote  to  be  alike  unfounded. 
The  deacon  says  : 

I,  Samuel  Lawrence,  of  Groton,  testify,  that  I  was  at  the 
battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  in  Col.  William  Prescott's  regiment ; 
that  I  marched  with  the  regiment  to  the  point  on  Breed's 


116 

Hill,  which  was  fixed  on  for  a  redoubt ;  that  I  assisted  in 
throwing  up  the  work,  and  in  forming  a  redoubt,  under  Col. 
Prescott,  who  directed  the  whole  of  this  operation.  The 
work  was  begun  about  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  June 
16,  1775.  I  was  there  the  whole  time,  and  continued  in 
the  redoubt,  or  in  the  little  fort,  during  the  whole  battle  un 
til  the  enemy  came  in  and  a  retreat  was  ordered. 

Gen.  Putnam  was  not  present  either  while  the  works  were 
erecting,  or  during  the  battle.  I  could  distinctly  see  the 
rail  fence  and  the  troops  stationed  there  during  the  battle, 
but  Gen.  Putnam  was  not  present  as  I  saw.  Just  before 
the  battle  commenced,  Gen.  Warren  came  to  the  redoubt. 
He  had  on  a  blue  coat,  white  waistcoat,  and  I  think  a  cock 
ed  hat,  but  of  this  I  am  not  certain — Col.  Prescott  advanced 
to  him,  said  he  was  glad  to  see  him,  and  hoped  he  would 
take  the  command.  Gen.  Warren  replied,  "  No,  he  came 
to  see  the  action,  but  not  to  take  command  ;  that  he  was  on 
ly  a  volunteer  on  that  day."  Afterwards  I  saw  Gen.  War- 
.  ren  shot  ;  I  saw  him  when  the  ball  struck  him,  and  from  that 
time  until  he  expired.  No  British  officer  was  within  forty  or 
ffty  rods  of  him,  from  the  time  the  ball  struck  him  until  I  saw 
he  was  dead. 

SAMUEL  LAWRENCE. 

Sworn  to  before  Samuel  Dana,  Justice  of  the  Peace,  &c. 

EXTRACTS  FROM  THE  HISTORY  OP  THE  BATTLE  OF  BREED'S 
HlLL,  ABOVE  MENTIONED. 

Memoirs  of  Maj.  Gen.  William  Heath,  (1798.) 
Perhaps  there  never  was  a  better  fought  battle  than  this, 
[of  Bunker  Hill,]  all  things  considered  ;  and  loo  much 
praise  can  never  be  bestowed  on  the  conduct  of  Col.  Wil 
liam  Prescott,  who,  notwithstanding  any  thing  that  may  have 
been  said,  was  the  proper  commanding  officer,  at  the  redoubt, 
and  nobly  acted  his  part  as  such,  during  the  whole  action. 

Just  before  the  action  began,  Gen.  Putnam  came  to  the 
redoubt,  and  told  Col.  Prescott  that  the  intrenching  tools 
must  be  sent  off,  or  they  would  be  lost;  the  colonel  replied, 
that  if  he  sent  any  of  the  men  away  with  the  tools,  not  one 
of  them  would  return  ;  to  this  the  general  answered,  they 
shall  every  man  return.  A  large  party  was  then  sent  off 


117 

• 

with  the  tools,  and  not  one  of  them  returned  ;  in  this  in 
stance  the  colonel  was  the  best  judge  of  human  nature.  In 
the  time  of  action,  Col.  Prescott  observed  that  the  brave  Gen. 
Warren  was  near  the  works ;  he  immediately  stepped  up  to 
him,  and  asked  him  if  he  had  any  orders  to  give  him.  The 
general  replied  that  he  had  none,  that  he  exercised  no  com 
mand  there.  "  The  command,"  said  the  general,  "  is 
yours." 

Maj.  Gen.  Henry  Lee,  in  his  Memoirs  of  the  Wai', 
(1812,)  says  of  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill : 

The  military  annals  of  the  world  rarely  furnish  an 
achievement  which  equals  the  firmness  and  courage  dis 
played  on  that  proud  day  by  the  gallant  band  of  Americans  ; 
and  it  certainly  stands  first  in  the  brilliant  events  of  our 
war. 

When  future  generations  shall  inquire  where  are  the  men 
who  gained  the  highest  prize  of  glory  in  the  arduous  contest 
which  ushered  in  our  nation's  birth, — upon  Prescott  and  his 
companions  in  arms  will  the  eye  of  history  beam. 

A  Sketch  of  the  Battle  of  Breed's  Hill,  by  Maj.  Gen. 
James  Wilkinson,  (1816.)* 

The  resolution  of  the  provincial  council  of  war  being 
taken,  Col.  Prescott,  a  man  of  strong  mind  and  dauntless 
resolution,  who,  I  understand,  had  served  in  the  seven  years 
war  as  a  provincial  subaltern,  seconded  by  a  Col.  Brewer, 
who  also  served  in  the  same  war  as  a  sergeant  of  rangers, 
was  ordered  with  one  thousand  Massachusetts  men,  to  take 
possession  of  Bunker  Hill,  but  whether  by  mistaking  the 
spot,  which  seems  improbable,  Col.  Prescott  passed  the  crown 
of  Bunker  Hill  about  six  hundred  yards,  and  broke  ground 
on  Breed's  Hill,  about  twelve  hundred  yards  from  the  Brit 
ish  battery  on  Cop's  Hill  in  North  Boston. 

The  British  general  was  started  by  this  encroachment, 
which  left  him  no  time  to  deliberate  ;  for  although  Bunker 
Hill  would  have  given  little  annoyance  to  Boston,  Breed's 
Hill  positively  commanded  the  northern  part  of  it.  Maj. 
Gen.  Howe,  therefore,  being  first  for  duty,  was  ordered  with 
ten  companies  of  grenadiers,  and  ten  of  light  infantry,  and 


118 

• 

the  5th,  38th,  43d  and  52d  regiments,  to  dislodge  the  provin 
cials  ;  and  on  this  service,  seconded  by  Brigadier-General 
Pigot,  he  embarked  in  barges  about  noon,  and  rowed  to  Mor 
ton's  point,  the  eastern  extremity  of  the  peninsula  of  Charles- 
town,  and  the  present  site  of  the  navy  yard  of  the  United 
States,  where  he  landed  and  formed  without  opposition  ;  but 
disliking  the  disposition  and  aspect  of  the  provincials,  he  or 
dered  his  troops  to  set  down,  and  sent  back  to  Boston  for  a 
reinforcement,  to  land  and  co-operate  from  the  side  of 
Charlestown  ;  for  which  service  the  47th  regiment  and  1st 
battalion  of  marines  were  detached  ;  and  yet  this  corps  of 
Sir  William  Howe,  composed  of  five  regiments,  one  battal 
ion,  and  twenty  flank  companies,  has  been  generally  report 
ed  at  about  two  thousand  men ;  but  surely  sixty-four  com 
panies,  at  least,  capnot  be  reckoned  for  less  than  three 
thousand,  and  this  number  I  shall  claim,  for  the  honor  of 
Prescott  and  Stark,  and  the  troops  they  commanded,  which 
did  not  exceed  fifteen  hundred  combatants.  Gen.  Howe 
halted  at  Morton's  point,  as  well  to  arrange  and  refresh  his 
corps  for  combat,  as  to  wait  the  reinforcement ;  being  per 
fectly  concealed  from  observation  in  his  front  by  the  nature 
of  the  ground.  Prescott,  at  the  same  time,  manned  his  re 
doubt,  and  the  retrenchment,  and  occupied  the  circumjacent 
ground  in  the  most  advantageous  manner  he  could,  with 
about  eight  hundred  men  out  of  the  one  thousand  ordered  for 
the  service  ;*  whilst  Gen.  Putnam  and  a  Col.  Gerrish  took 
post  with  about  fifteen  hundred  men,  on  and  around  Bunker 
Hill.  In  the  mean  time,  Col.  Stark,  with  his  own  regiment 
and  that  of  Reed's  from  New  Hampshire,  amounting  to  about 
seven  hundred  men,  half  organized,  and  wretchedly  equip 
ped, f  were  pressing  for  the  scene  of  action  ;  Capt.  H.  Dear 
born,  lately  a  major-general,  marched  on  Col.  Stark's  right, 
traversed  the  causeway  under  a  heavy  cross  fire  from  float 
ing  batteries,  and  passed  Gen.  Putnam  on  Bunker  Hill,  with 

*  Two  hundred  men  had  been  sent  away  with  the  intrenching  tools,  as 
above  stated.  (Edit.  V.  R.) 

t  The  men  were  armed  with  fusils  of  various  calibres,  each  individual 
was  furnished  with  one  quarter  of  a  pound  of  powder  in  a  horn,  one  flint, 
and  lead  sufficient  to  make  fifteen  charges,  either  of  ball  or  buck-shot ;  the 
men  prepared  their  ammunition  according  to  their  discretion,  some  with 
cartridges  and  others  with  loose  ammunition ;  the  powder  in  their  horns, 
and  the  lead  in  their  pockets. 


119 

Col.  Gerrish  by  his  side,  and  one  thousand  or  one  thousand 
two  hundred  men  under  their  orders.  As  this  corps  of  citi 
zen  soldiers  approached  the  redoubt  under  the  cannonade  of 
the  enemy's  batteries  from  Charles  river,  and  Cop's  Hill, 
Col.  Stark  determined  to  form  his  men  behind  the  post  and 
rail  fences  before  described ;  but  when  he  reached  the  bank 
of  the  Mystic,  he  cast  his  eyes  down  upon  the  beach,  and  as  he 
observed  to  me  on  the  spot,  thought  it  was  so  plain  a  way 
that  the  enemy  could  not  miss  it ;  he  therefore  ordered  a 
number  of  his -boys  to  jump  down  the  bank,  and  with  stones 
from  the  adjacent  walls,  they  soon  threw  up  a  strong  breast 
work  to  the  water's  edge,  behind  which  he  posted  triple 
ranks  of  his  choice  men  ;  in  the  mean  time,  those  who 
formed  in  rear  of  the  fences,  to  conceal  themselves  from 
the  enemy,  filled  the  space  between  the  rails  with  grass  and 
hay,  behind  which  they  either  knelt  or  sat  down,  every 
man  having  made  an  aperture  in  the  grassy  rampart,  through 
which,  while  resting  his  fusee,  he  could  take  deliberate 
aim. 

Capt.  Dearborn  was  posted  with  his  company  nearest  the 
redoubt,  on  the  right  of  Stark's  line.  About  one  o'clock 
Gen.  Howe  put  two  columns  and  a  detachment  with  his  ar 
tillery  in  motion;  one  column  marched  by  the  beach,  and 
his  light  infantry  led  the  other  on  the  margin  of  the  bank  of 
the  Mystic,  and  directly  to  the  left  of  Col.  Stark's  line  ;  the 
detachment  and  artillery,  from  the  best  information  I  have 
been  able  to  procure,  inclined  towards  his  left,  and  com 
menced  a  feeble  attack  against  the  redoubt  at  long  shot,  ap 
parently  with  a  design  to  draw  the  attention  of  Col.  Pres- 
cott,  whilst  the  column  on  the  beach,  and  that  on  the  bank 
of  the  Mystic,  were  designed  to  turn  the  flank  and  gain  the 
rear  of  the  provincials  on  Breed's  Hill,  which  they  would 
have  accomplished,  if  they  had  not  been  driven  back.  Col. 
Stark's  orders  to  his  men,  who  were  concealed  behind  the 
stone  wall  on  the  beach,  were  not  to  fire  until  the  front  of 
the  enemy  reached  a  point  which  he  had  marked  in  the 
bank  at  eight  or  ten  rods  distance,  and  those  on  the  bank  im 
mediately  under  his  eye,  were  directed  to  reserve  their  fires 
until  they  could  see  the  enemy's  half  gaiters,  which  from 
the  form  of  the  ground,  would  bring  them  within  the  same 


120 

distance ;  in  this  situation  of  the  provincials,  the  columns 
of  the  enemy  on  the  beach  and  the  bank  advanced  by  heavy 
platoons,  without  firing,  as  if  not  apprised  of  what  awaited 
them,  and  when  within  the  prescribed  distance,  received  a 
volley  which  mowed  down  the  whole  front  ranks,  and  the 
columns  were  instantly  broken  and  fell  back  in  disorder, 
that  on  the  beach,  entirely  out  of  the  combat,  having  ninety- 
six*  men  killed  outright,  before  they  could  escape  the  Amer 
ican  fire ;  on  the  banks  the  light  infantry  fell  back  until 
covered  by  the  ground,  then  re-formed,  and  -again  advanced 
to  the  attack,  and  were  again  repulsed  with  similar  slaugh 
ter  ;  three  times  were  these  brave  unfortunate  men  led  to 
the  charge,  and  were  finally  repulsed. f  Sir  William  Howe 
now  gave  up  his  first  plan  of  attack,  to  force  his  way  into 
the  rear  of  the  provincials,  and  making  an  entire  new  dis 
position,  he  jdirected  his  whole  force  against  the  redoubt,  at 
tacking  it  on  three  sides  at  the  same  time.  Gen.  Clinton, 
with  the  47th  regiment  and  the  battalion  of  marines  on  the 
right ;  Gen.  Pigot  with  the  5th,  38th  and  43d  regiments,  in 
the  center  ;  and  the  commander,  with  the  grenadiers  and 
52d  regiment  on  the  left ;  the  light  infantry  appear  to  have 
been  put  hors  de  combat. 

The  retrenchment  was  turned  on  the  left  and  entered  by 
the  grenadiers,  but  being  exposed  to  the  perpendicular  fire  of 
the  redoubt  and  the  oblique  fire  of  Capt.  Dearborn,  they  were 
obliged  to  abandon  it.  Assailed  in  his  front  and  flank  by 
three-fold  numbers,  Prescott  persevered  with  great  obstinacy 
and  valor,  until  his  ammunition  was  nearly  expended,  and 
the  redoubt  was  forced  by  the  grenadiers  at  the  angle  which 
joined  the  retrenchment.  He  was  then  obliged  to  give  away, 
and  his  men  retreated  in  disorder.  After  the  third  repulse 
of  the  light  infantry,  and  whilst  the  attack  was  carried 
against  the  redoubt,  Stark's  men  behind  the  post  and  rail 
fence  near  the  Mystic  were  unassailed  and  unoccupied,  and 
the  scenes  near  the  redoubt  being  obscured  by  the  smoke, 
they  were  induced  to  retreat  reluctantly  after  the  work  was 

*  Mr.  John  Winslow,  then  in  Boston,  I  understand,  counted  that  number 
the  next  day. 

1 1  had  these  details  from  Col.  Stark  on  the  field,  the  17th  of  March, 
177fi,  and  I  remember  his  observing,  "  the  dead  lay  as  thick  as  sheep  in  a 
told ;"  it  was  at  this  point  the  enemy  suffered  most  severely. 


121 

carried.  If  they  had  been  thrown  forward,  where  the  light 
infantry  finally  gave  way,  to  attack  Sir  William's  right 
flank  and  rear,  the  issue  of  this  conflict  might  have  proved 
unfortunate  for  him  ;  or  if  Gen.  Putnam  had  moved  up  with 
Col.  Gerrish  and  the  men  who  remained  stationary  within 
six  hundred  yards  of  the  combat,  which  lasted  an  hour  and 
a  half,  the  triumph  of  the  provincials  would  have  been  de 
cisive,  and  those  of  the  British  corps  who  were  not  killed 
must  have  surrendered,  which  would  probably  have  termi 
nated  the  contest,  and  prevented  the  disseverment  of  the 
British  empire  ;  but  I  understand  from  high  authority,  that 
it  was  in  vain  Col.  Prescott  sent  messenger  after  messenger 
to  entreat  Gen.  Putnam  to  come  to  his  succor  ;  he  rode  about 
Bunker  Hill,  while  the  battle  raged  under  his  eye,  with  a 
number  of  entrenching  tools  slung  across  his  horse,  but  did 
not  advance  a  step,  and  was  passed,  with  Col.  Gerrish  at 
his  side,  by  Stark  and  Dearborn,  as  they  retreated,  near  the 
spot  where  they  saw  him  when  they  advanced ;  and  for  this 
conduct  Col.  Prescott  never  ceased  to  reprobate  the  gen 
eral. 

This  isolated  sketch  being  intended  as  a  mere  record  of 
facts  little  known,  it  may  be  proper  to  state,  that  between 
Prescott  and  Stark  there  was  no  preconcert  or  plan  of  co 
operation  :  each  fought  his  distinct  corps,  and  defended 
his  ground,  according  to  his  own  judgment,  and  there  was 
no  general  command  exercised  on  the  field  ;  as  soon  as  the 
men  were  stationed,  every  one  reasoned  and  resolved  for  his 
country,  under  the  direction  of.  his  own  will.  All  the  rein 
forcements  which  arrived  at  Bunker  Hill  after  Col.  Stark 
had  passed,  halted  and  kept  company  with  Gen.  Putnam 
and  Col.  Gerrish.  The  colonel  was  cashiered,  but  the  gen 
eral,  being  distinguished  for  his  popularity,  his  integrity  and 
patriotism,  served  as  third  in  command  at  the  termination  of 
the  American  revolution. 

The  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  by  Maj.  Gen.  Henry 
Dearborn,  (1818.) 

On  the  16th  of  June,  1775,  it  was  determined  that  a  for 
tified  post  should  be  established  at  or  near  Bunker  Hill. 
A  detachment  of  the  army  was  ordered  to  advance  early 
11 


122 

in  the  evening  of  that  day,  and  commence  the  erection  of  a 
strong  work  on  the  heights  in  the  rear  of  Charlestown. 

The  work  was  commenced  and  carried  on  under  the  di 
rection  of  such  engineers  as  we  were  able  to  procure  at  that 
time.  It  was  a  square  redoubt,  the  curtains  of  which  were 
about  sixty  or  seventy  feet  in  extent,  with  an  intrenchment, 
or  breast-work,  extending  fifty  or  sixty  feet  from  the  north 
ern  angle,  towards  Mystic  river. 

In  the  course  of  the  night  the  ramparts  had  been  raised 
to  the  height  of  six  or  seven  feet,  with  a  small  ditch  at  their 
base,  but  it  was  yet  in  a  rude  and  imperfect  state.  Being 
in  full  view  from  the  northern  heights  of  Boston,  it  was  dis 
covered  by  the  enemy,  as  soon  as  the  daylight  appeared,  and 
a  determination  was  immediately  formed^by  Gen.  Gage,  for 
dislodging  our  troops  from  this  new  and  alarming  position. 
Arrangements  were  promptly  made  for  effecting  this  impor 
tant  object.  The  movements  of  the  British  troops  indicating 
an  attack,  were  soon  discovered,  in  consequence  of  which, 
orders  were  immediately  issued  for  the  march  of  a  consid 
erable  part  of  our  army  to  reinforce  the  detachment  at  the 
redoubts  on  Breed's  Hill. 

Col.  Stark's  regiment  was  quartered  in  Medford,  distant 
about  four  miles  from  the  point  of  anticipated  attack.  It 
then  consisted  of  thirteen  companies,  and  was  probably  the 
largest  regiment  in  the  army.  About  ten  o'clock  in  the 
morning  he  received  orders  to  march.  The  regiment  being 
destitute  of  ammunition,  it  formed  in  front  of  a  house  occu 
pied  as  an  arsenal,  where  each  man  received  a  gill  cup  full 
of  powder,  fifteen  balls,  and  one  flint. 

After  completing  the  necessary  preparations  for  action, 
the  regiment  formed  and  marched  about  one  o'clock.  When 
it  reached  Charlestown  Neck  we  found  two  regiments,  halt 
ed,  in  consequence  of  a  heavy  enfilading  fire  thrown  across 
it,  of  round,  bar,  and  chain  shot,  from  the  Lively  frigate, 
and  floating  batteries  anchored  in  Charles  river,  and  a  float 
ing  battery  lying  in  the  river  Mystic.  Maj.  M'Clary  went 
forward,  and  observed  to  the  commanders,  if  they  did  not 
intend  to  move  on,  he  wished  them  to  open  and  let  our  regi 
ment  pass  ;  the  latter  was  immediately  done.  My  company 
being  in  front,  I  marched  by  the  side  of  Col.  Stark,  who 


123 

moving  with  a  very  deliberate  pace,  I  suggested  the  proprie 
ty  of  quickening  the  march  of  the  regiment,  that  it  might 
sooner  be  relieved  from  the  galling  cross  fire  of  the  enemy. 
With  a  look  peculiar  to  himself,  he  fixed  his  eyes  upon  me, 
and  observed  with  great  composure — "  Dearborn,  one  fresh 
man  in  action,  is  worth  ten  fatigued  ones,"  and  continued  to 
advance  in  the  same  cool  and  collected  manner.  When  we 
had  reached  the  top  of  Bunker  Hill,  where  Gen.  Putnam 
had  taken  his  station,  the  regiment  halted  for  a  few  moments 
for  the  rear  to  come  up. 

Soon  after,  the  enemy  were  discovered  to  have  landed  on 
the  shore  of  Morton's  point,  in  front  of  Breed's  Hill,  under 
cover  of  a  tremendous  fire  of  shot  and  shells  from  a  battery 
on  Cop's  Hill,  in  Boston,  which  had  opened  on  the  redoubt, 
at  daybreak. 

At  this  moment  the  veteran  and  gallant  Stark,  harangued 
his  regiment  in  a  short  but  animated  address ;  then  directed 
them  to  give  three  cheers,  and  make  a  rapid  movement  to 
the  rail  fence  which  ran  from  the  left,  and  about  forty  yards 
in  the  rear  of  the  redoubt  towards  Mystic  river. 

Our  regiment  was  formed  in  the  rear  of  the  rail  fence, 
with  one  other  small  regiment  from  New  Hampshire,  under 
the  command  of  Col.  Reed  ;  the  fire  commenced  between 
the  left  wing  of  the  British  army,  commanded  by  Gen. 
Howe,  and  the  troops  in  the  redoubt  under  Col.  Prescott, 
while  a  column  of  the  enemy  was  advancing  on  our  left,  on 
the  shore  of  Mystic  river,  with  an  evident  intention  of  turn 
ing  our  left  wing,  and  that  veteran  and  most  excellent  regi 
ment  of  Welsh  fusileers,  so  distinguished  for  its  gallant  con 
duct  in  the  battle  of  Minden,  advanced  in  column  directly 
on  the  rail  fence,  when  within  eighty  or  a  hundred  yards, 
displayed  into  line,  with  the  precision  and  firmness  of  troops 
on  parade,  and  opened  a  brisk  but  regular  fire  by  platoons, 
which  was  returned  by  a  well-directed,  rapid,  and  fatal  dis 
charge  from  our  whole  line. 

The  action  soon  became  general,  and  very  heavy  from 
right  to  left.  In  the  course  of  ten  or  fifteen  minutes,  the 
enemy  gave  way  at  all  points,  and  retreated  in  great  dis 
order,  leaving  a  large  number  of  the  dead  and  wounded  on 
the  field. 


124 

The  firing  ceased  for  a  short  time,  until  the  enemy  again 
formed,  advanced  and  recommenced  a  spirited  fire  from  his 
whole  line.  Several  attempts  were  again  made  to  turn  our 
left,  but  the  troops  having  thrown  up  a  slight  stone  wall  on 
the  bank  of  the  river  and  lying  down  behind  it,  gave  such  a 
deadly  fire,  as  cut  down  almost  every  man  of  the  party  op 
posed  to  them  ;  while  the  fire  from  the  redoubt  and  the  rail 
fence  was  so  well  directed  and  so  fatal,  especially  to  the 
British  officers,  that  the  whole  army  was  compelled  a  sec 
ond  time  to  retreat  with  precipitation  and  great  confusion. 
At  this  time  the  ground  occupied  by  the  enemy  was  covered 
with  his  dead  and  wounded.  Only  a  few  small  detached 
parties  again  advanced,  which  kept  up  a  distant,  ineffectual, 
scattering  fire,  until  a  strong  reinforcement  arrived  from 
Boston,  which  advanced  on  the  southern  declivity  of  the  hill, 
in  the  rear  of  Charlestown  ;  it  wheeled  by  platoons  to  the 
right  and  advanced  directly  upon  the  redoubt  without  firing 
a  gun.  By  this  time  our  ammunition  was  exhausted,  a  few 
only  had  a  charge  left. 

The  advancing  column  made  an  attempt  to  carry  the  re 
doubt  by  assault,  but  at  the  first  onset  every  man  that  mount 
ed  the  parapet  was  cut  down,  by  the  troops  within,  who  had 
formed  on  the  opposite  side,  not  being  prepared  with  bayonets 
to  meet  a  charge. 

The  column  wavered  for  a  moment,  but  soon  formed 
again  ;  when  a  forward  movement  was  made  with  such 
spirit  and  intrepidity  as  to  render  the  feeble  efforts  of  a  hand- 
•  ful  of  men,  without  the  means  of  defence,  unavailing,  and 
they  fled  through  an  open  space  in  the  rear  of  the  redoubt, 
which  had  been  left  for  a  gateway.  At  this  moment  the  rear 
of  the  British  column  advanced  round  the  angle  of  the  re 
doubt,  and  threw  in  a  galling  flank  fire  upon  our  troops,  as 
they  rushed  from  it,  which  killed  and  wounded  a  greater 
number  than  had  fallen  before  during  the  action.  The  whole 
of  our  line  immediately  gave  way  and  retreated  with  rapid 
ity  and  disorder  towards  Bunker  Hill ;  carrying  off  as  many 
of  the  wounded  as  possible,  so  that  only  thirty-six  or  seven 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  among  whom  were  Lieut. 
Col.  Parker,  and  two  or  three  other  officers  who  fell  in  or 
near  the  redoubt. 


125 

When  the  troops  arrived  at  the  summit  of  Bunker  Hill, 
we  found  Gen.  Putnam  with  nearly  as  many  men  as  had 
been  engaged  in  the  battle  ;  notwithstanding  which  no  meas 
ure  had  been  taken  for  reinforcing  us,  nor  was  there  a  shot 
fired  to  cover  our  retreat,  or  any  movement  made  to  check 
the  advance  of  the  enemy  to  this  height,  but  on  the  contrary, 
Gen.  Putnam  rode  off,  with  a  number  of  spades  and  pick 
axes  in  his  hands,  and  the  troops  that  had  remained  with 
him  inactive  during  the  whole  of  the  action,  although  within' 
a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  battle  ground,  and  no  obstacle 
to  impede  their  movement  but  musket  balls. 

The  whole  of  our  troops  now  descended  the  northwestern 
declivity  of  Bunker  Hill,  and  recrossed  the  neck.  Those 
of  the  New  Hampshire  line  retired  towards  Winter  Hill,  and 
the  others  on  to  Prospect  Hill. 

Some  slight  works  were  thrown  up  in  the  course  of  the 
evening — strong  advance  pickets  were  posted  on  the  roads 
leading  to  Charlestown,  and  the  troops  anticipating  an  at 
tack,  rested  on  their  arms. 

Soon  after  the  commencement  of  the  action,  a  detachment 
from  the  British  force  in  Boston  was  landed  in  Charlestown, 
and  within  a  few  moments  the  whole  town  appeared  in  a 
blaze.  A  dense  column  rose  to  a  great  height,  and  there 
being  a  gentle  breeze  from  the  southwest,  it  hung  like  a 
thunder  cloud  over  the  contending  armies.  A  very  few 
houses  escaped  the  dreadful  conflagration  of  this  devoted 
town. 

From  similar  mistakes,  the  fixed  ammunition  furnished  for 
the  field-pieces  was  calculated  for  guns  of  a  larger  calibre, 
which  prevented  the  use  of  field-artillery,  on  both  sides. 
From  the  ships  of  war  and  a  large  battery  on  Cop's  Hill,  a 
heavy  cannonade  was  kept  up  upon  our  line  and  redoubt, 
from  the  commencement  to  the  close  of  the  action  and  dur 
ing  the  retreat ;  but  with  little  effect,  except  killing  the 
brave  Maj.  Andrew  M'Clary  of  Col.  Stark's  regiment,  soon 
after  we  retreated  from  Bunker  Hill.  He  was  among  the 
first  officers  of  the  army — possessing  a  sound  judgment,  of 
undaunted  bravery,  enterprising,  ardent  and  zealous,  both 
as  a  patriot  and  soldier.  His  loss  was  severely  felt  by  his 
compatriots  in  arms,  while  his  country  was  deprived  of  the 

11* 


126 

services  of  one  of  her  most  promising  and  distinguished 
champions  of  liberty. 

My  position  in  the  battle,  more  the  result  of  accident  than 
any  regularity  of  formation,  was  on  the  right  of  the  line  at 
the  rail  fence,  which  afforded  me  a  fair  view  of  the  whole 
scene  of  action. 

Our  men  were  intent  on  cutting  down  every  officer  they 
could  distinguish  in  the  British  line.  When  any  of  them 
discovered  one,  he  would  instantly  exclaim,  "  there,"  "  see 
that  officer,"  "  let  us  have  a  shot  at  him,"  when  two  or  three 
would  fire  at  the  same  moment ;  and  as  our  soldiers  were 
excellent  marksmen  and  rested  their  muskets  over  the  fence, 
they  were  sure  of  their  object.  An  officer  was  discovered 
to  mount  near  the  position  of  Gen.  Howe,  on  the  left  of  the 
British  line,  and  ride  towards  our  left ;  which  a  column  was 
endeavoring  to  turn.  This  was  the  only  officer  on  horse 
back  during  the  day,  and  as  he  approached  the  rail  fence, 
I  heard  a  number  of  our  men  observe,  "there,"  "  there," 
"  see  that  officer  on  horseback" — "  let  us  fire,"  "  no,  not 
yet," — "wait  until  he  gets  to  that  little  knoll," — "now" — 
when  they  fired  and  he  instantly  fell  dead  from  his  horse. 
It  proved  to  be  Maj.  Pitcairn,  a  distinguished  officer.  The 
fire  of  the  enemy  was  so  badly  directed,  I  should  presume 
that  forty-nine  balls  out  of  fifty  passed  from  one  to  six  feet 
over  our  heads,  for  I  noticed  an  apple-tree,  some  paces  in 
the  rear,  which  had  scarcely  a  ball  in  it  from  the  trunk  and 
ground  as  high  as  a  man's  head,  while  the  trunk  and  branches 
above  were  literally  cut  to  pieces. 

I  commanded  a  full  company  in  action  and  had  only  one 
man  killed  and  five  wounded,  which  was  a  full  average  of 
the  loss  we  sustained,  excepting  those  who  fell  while  sally 
ing  from  the  redoubt,  when  it  was  stormed  by  the  British 
column. 

Our  total  loss  in  killed  was  eighty-eight,  and  as  well  as  I 
can  recollect,  upwards  of  two  hundred  wounded.  Our  pla 
toon  officers  carried  fusees. 

In  the  course  of  the  action,  after  firing  away  what  ammu 
nition  I  had,  I  walked  to  the  higher  ground  to  the  right,  in 
rear  of  the  redoubt,  with  an  expectation  of  procuring  from 
some  of  the  dead  or  wounded  men  who  lay  there,  a  supply. 


127 

While  in  that  situation,  I  saw  at  some  distance  a  dead  man 
lying  near  a  small  locust  tree.  As  he  appeared  to  be  much 
better  dressed  than  our  men  generally  were,  I  asked  a  man 
who  was  passing  me,  if  he  knew  who  it  was.  He  replied, 
«  It  is  DR.  WARREN."* 

I  did  not  personally  know  Dr.  Warren,  but  was  acquaint 
ed  with  his  public  character.  He  had  been  recently  ap 
pointed  a  general  incur  service, but  had  not  taken  command. 
He  was  president  of  the  provincial  congress  then  sitting  at 
Watertown,  and  having  heard  that  there  would  probably  be 
an  action,  had  come  to  share  in  whatever  might  happen,  in 
the  character  of  a  volunteer.  His  death  was  a  severe  mis 
fortune  to  his  friends  and  country.  Posterity  will  appreciate 
his  worth  and  do  honor  to  his  memory.  He  is  immortalized 
as  a  patriot,  who  gloriously  fell  in  defence  of  freedom. 

The  number  of  our  troops  in  action,  as  near  as  I  was  able 
to  ascertain,  did  not  exceed  fifteen  hundred.  The  force  of 
the  British,  at  the  commencement  of  the  action,  was  estima 
ted  at  about  the  same  number,  but  they  were  frequently  re 
inforced. 

Had  our  ammunition  held  out,  or  had  we  been  supplied 
with  only  fifteen  or  twenty  rounds,  I  have  no  doubt  that  we 
should  have  killed  and  wounded  the  greatest  part  of  their 
army,  and  compelled  the  remainder  to  have  laid  down  their 
arms ;  for  it  was  with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  they  were 
brought  up  the  last  time. 

Our  fire  was  so  deadly,  particularly  to  the  officers,  that  it 
would  have  been  impossible  to  have  resisted  it,  but  for  a 
short  time  longer. 

I  did  not  see  a  man  quit  his  post  during  the  action,  and  do 
not  believe  a  single  soldier,  who  was  brought  into  the  field, 
fled,  until  the  whole  army  was  obliged  to  retreat,  for  want 
of  powder  and  ball. 

Every  platoon  officer  was  engaged  in  discharging  his  own 
musket,  and  left  his  men  to  fire  as  they  pleased,  but  never 

*  This  shows  that  no  British  officer  was  near  Gen.  Warren  when  he  fell, 
and  consequently  that  Col.  Small's  statement  to  Col.  Trumbull  is  not  true. 
I  have  said  in  the  introduction  to  this  work,  that  "  it  is  most  probable  that 
Warren  fell  within  the  redoubt ;"  but  the  above  statement  of  Gen.  Dear 
born,  and  the  testimony  of  Samuel  Lawrence,  render  it  certain  that  he  was 
shot  in  the  retreat  after  leaving  the  redoubt. 


128 

without  a  sure  aim  at  some  particular  object,  which  was 
more  destructive  than  any  mode  which  could  have  been 
adopted  with  troops  who  were  not  inured  to  discipline,  and 
never  had  been  in  battle,  but  were  still  familiar  with  the  use 
of  arms,  from  boyhood,  and  each  having  his  peculiar  man 
ner  of  loading  and  firing,  which  had  been  practised  upon  for 
years,  with  the  same  gun  ;  any  attempt  to  control  them  by 
uniformity  and  system,  would  have  rendered  their  fires  in 
finitely  less  fatal  to  the  enemy.  Not  an  officer  or  soldier 
of  the  continental  troops  engaged  was  in  uniform,  but  were 
in  the  plain  and  ordinary  dress  of  citizens ;  nor  was  there 
an  officer  on  horseback. 

The  total  loss  of  the  British  was  about  twelve  hundred  ; 
upwards  of  five  hundred  killed  and  between  six  and  seven 
hundred  wounded.  The  Welsh  fusileers  suffered  most  se 
verely  ;  they  came  into  action  five  hundred  strong,  and  all 
were  killed  or  wounded  but  eighty-three. 

I  will  mention  an  extraordinary  circumstance  to  show  how 
far  the  temporary  reputation  of  a  man  may  affect  the  minds 
of  all  classes  of  society. 

Gen.  Putnam  had  entered  our  army  at  the  commencement 
of  the  revolutionary  war,  with  such  a  universal  popularity 
as  can  scarcely  NOW  be  conceived,  even  by  those  who  THEN 
felt  the  whole  force  of  it,  and  no  one  can  at  this  time  offer  • 
any  satisfactory  reasons  why  he  was  held  in  such  high  es 
timation. 

In  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill  he  took  post  on  the  declivity 
towards  Charlestmcn  Neck  ;  where  I  saw  him  on  horseback 
as  we -passed  on  to  Breed's  Hill,  with  Col.  Gerrish  by  his 
side.  I  heard  the  gallant  Col.  Prescott  (who  commanded  in 
the  redoubt)  observe  after  the  war,  at  the  table  of  his  excel 
lency,  James  Bowdoin,  then  governor  of  this  commonwealth, 
"  that  he  sent  three  messengers  during  the  battle  to  Gen. 
Putnam,  requesting  him  to  come  forward  and  take  the  com 
mand,  there  being  no  general  officer  present,  and  the  rela 
tive  rank  of  the  colonel  not  having  been  settled  ;  but  that  he 
received  no  answer,  and  his  whole  conduct  was  such,  both 
during  the  action  and  the  retreat,  that  he  ought  to  have  been 
shot."  He  remained  at  or  near  the  top  of  Bunker  Hill  un 
til  the  retreat,  with  Col.  Gerrish  by  his  side;  I  saw  them 


129 

together  when  we  retreated.  He  not  only  continued  at  that 
distance  himself  during  the  whole  of  the  action,  but  had  a 
force  with  him  nearly  as  large  as  that  engaged.  No  rein 
forcement  of  men  nor  ammunition  was  sent  to  our  assist 
ance  ;  and,  instead  of  attempting  to  cover  the  retreat  of  those 
who  had  expended  their  last  shot  in  the  face  of  the  enemy, 
he  retreated  in  company  with  Col.  Gerrish,  and  his  whole 
force,  without  discharging  a  single  musket ;  but  what  is  still 
more  astonishing,  Col.  Gerrish  was  arrested  for  cowardice, 
tried,  cashiered,  and  universally  execrated  ;  while  not  a  word 
was  said  against  the  conduct  of  Gen.  Putnam,  whose  extra 
ordinary  popularity  alone  saved  him,  not  only  from  trial,  but 
even  from  censure.  Col.  Gerrish  commanded  a  regiment, 
and  should  have  been  at  its  head.  His  regiment  was  not  in 
action  although  ordered — but  as  he  was  in  the  suit  of  the 
general,  and  appeared  to  be  in  the  situation  of  adjutant-gen 
eral,  why  was  he  not  directed  by  Putnam  to  join  it,  or  the 
regiment  sent  into  action  under  the  senior  officer  present 
with  it  ? 

When  Gen.  Putnam's  ephemeral  and  unaccountable  pop 
ularity  subsided  or  faded  away,  and  the  minds  of  the  people 
were  released  from  the  shackles  of  a  delusive  trance,  the 
circumstances  relating  to  Bunker  Hill  were  viewed  and  talk 
ed  of  in  a  very  different  light,  and  the  selection  of  the  unfor 
tunate  Col.  Gerrish  as  a  scape-goat  considered  as  a  mysteri 
ous  and  inexplicable  event. 

I  have  no  private  feeling  to  gratify  by  making  this  state- 
ment  in  relation  to  Gen.  Putnam,  as  I  never  had  any  inter 
course  with  him,  and  was  only  in  the  army  where  he  was 
present,  for  a  few  months ;  but  at  this  late  period,  I  con 
ceive  it  a  duty  to  give  a  fair  and  impartial  account  of  one 
of  the  most  important  battles  during  the  war  of  indepen 
dence,  and  all  the  circumstances  connected  with  it,  so  far  as 
I  had  the  means  of  being  correctly  informed. 

It  is  a  duty  I  owe  to  posterity,  and  the  character  of  those 
brave  officers  who  bore  a  share  in  the  hardships  of  the  rev 
olution. 

Affidavit  of  Robert  Bradford  Wilkins. 
I,  Robert  B.  Wilkins,  of  Concord,  county  of  Rockingnam, 
state  of  New  Hampshire,  do  testify  and  say,  that  I  acted  as 


130 

a  private  soldier  in  the  battle  of  Breed's  Hill,  otherwise 
called  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  on  the  17th  of  June,  1775; 
that  I  was  attached  to  Capt.  Levi  Spaulding's  company,  of 
Col.  Jas.  Reed's  regiment.  That  I  was  on  that  day  sta 
tioned  at  Charlestown,  below  the  neck  and  on  the  main 
street,  that  our  company  proceeded  from  thence  on  to  Bun 
ker  Hill,  over  the  hollow  and  on  to  Breed's  Hill ;  that  after 
our  company  arrived  at  the  works,  near  Mystic  river,  I  was 
sent  back  on  an  errand,  by  the  captain,  to  the  house  where 
we  had  been  stationed  ;  and  on  returning  by  a  route  nearer 
to  the  neck,  than  that  we  first  passed,  I  saw  Gen.  Putnam 
with  Col.  Gerrish,  as  near  as  I  could  judge,  one  hundred 
rods  from  the  line  and  troops  I  had  left ;  that  the  firing  with 
small-arms  commenced  after  I  returned  the  second  time  ; 
that  in  the  action  the  enemy  were  three  times  repulsed  ; 
that  in  the  interval  between  the  second  and  third  repulse,  I 
received  a  severe  wound  from  a  musket  ball  in  my  right  el 
bow-joint,  for  which  wound,  I  have  since  received  a  pension 
from  the  government  of  the  United  States ;  that  I  then  left 
the  field  of  battle  just  before  the  retreat  of  the  Americans 
from  the  fort,  and  passed  on  to  Bunker  Hill,  where  I  found 
Gen.  Putnam  and  Col.  Gerrish  in  nearly  the  same  place 
where  I  first  saw  them  ;  that  I  was  then  almost  exhausted 
from  the  loss  of  blood;  that  Col.  Gerrish  gave  me  some  re 
freshment  and  bound  a  handkerchief  around  my  arm  at  the 
place  of  my  wound,  and  sent  two  men  to  assist  me  over  the 
neck,  who  left  me  before  I  had  cleared  the  neck,  and  I  fell 
and  lay  on  the  ground,  until  nearly  all  the  Americans  had 
retreated  from  the  hill,  when  I  was  helped  off.  I  served 
from  the  commencement  to  the  close  of  the  revolutionary 
war,  and  acted  successively  as  a  private,  a  sergeant,  ensign 
and  lieutenant. 

ROBERT  B.  WILKINS. 

Sworn  to  before  Samuel  Greene,  Justice  of  the  Peace. 

May  30,  1818. 

Rev.  Dr.    William  Bentley's  statement. 

SALEM,  May  20,  1818. 

I  was  with  Gen.  Stark  on  the  31st  of  May,  1810.     I  al 
ways  had  a  deep  interest  in  the  man,  and  usually  kept  a 


131 

notice  of  the  subject  of  our  conversation.     I  found  him  in 

freat  good  humor,  and  soon  upon  his  old  war  stories,  which 
did  not  take  care  minutely  to  preserve,  because  Maj.  Ca 
leb  Stark  had  told  me  he  was  collecting  every  thing  worthy  of 
the  public  eye,  and  to  be  published  after  his  father's  de 
cease,  and  in  due  honor  of  his  memory.  As  among  other 
objects,  I  intended  to  get  a  likeness,  and  was  uncertain  of 
success,  among  the  maps,  prints,  and  papers  I  carried  him, 
were  some  portraits,  and  among  them  was  one  of  Gen.  Put 
nam.  I  recollect  upon  the  sight  of  the  head  of  Gen.  Putnam 
he  said,  "  My  Champlain,"  as  he  called  me,  "you  know  my 
opinion  of  that  man.  Had  he  done  his  duty,  he  would  have 
decided  the  fate  of  his  country  in  the  first  action."  He  then 
proceeded  to  describe  to  me  the  scene  of  action  and  the 
"pen,"  as  he  called  the  enclosed  works,  and  breast- works, 
and  gave  his  reasons  for  not  entering  it,  and  the  want  of 
judgment  in  the  works.  He  then  told  me  where  he  saw 
Gen.  Putnam  and  what  was  done  on  the  occasion,  and  his 
remarks  were  as  severe  as  his  genius  and  the  sentiments  of 
ardent  patriotism  could  make  them.  As  Gen.  Stark  always 
used  the  same  language  on  the  subject,  it  will  be  recollected 
by  many  of  his  friends. 

WILLIAM  BENTLEY. 

Certificate  of  the  Rev.  Daniel  Chaplin,  D.  D.,  of  Groton,  and 
Rev.  John  Bullard  of  Pepper  ell. 

This  may  certify  the  public,  that  we  whose  names  we 
have  given,  were  in  the  habits  of  intimacy  with  Col.  W. 
Prescott,  of  Pepperell,  a  man  of  the  strictest  integrity,  dur 
ing  most  of  the  period  after  he  left  the  revolutionary  army 
until  his  death  ;  that  at  sundry  times  in  conversation  with 
him  about  the  war,  particularly  about  the  battle  of  Bunker 
Hill,  so  called,  he  uniformly  told  us,  that  Maj.  Gen.  War 
ren  came  to  the  fort  on  Breed's  Hill,  which  had  been  formed 
the  night  preceding,  a  little  before  the  British  made  an  at 
tack  on  the  works  ;  that  he,  Col.  Prescott,  said  to  Gen.  War 
ren,  "  I  am  happy  to  'see  you,  general,"  or  using  words  to 
the  same  effect,  "  for  you  will  now  take  command,  and  I  will 
obey  your  orders  and  am  relieved."  Said  Gen.  Warren  to 
him,  in  reply,  "I  have  no  command  here,  Col.  Prescott,  I 


132 

am  a  volunteer,  I  came  to  learn  actual  service."  Prescott 
said,  "  I  wish  then  you  would  look  at  the  works  we  have 
thrown  up,  and  give  your  opinion."  Warren  replied — "  You 
are  better  acquainted  with  military  matters  than  I  am."  Af 
ter  which  they  immediately  parted,  and  met  not  again.  Col. 
Prescott  further  informed  us  repeatedly,  that  when  a  retreat 
was  ordered  and  commenced,  he  was  descending  the  hill,  he 
met  Gen.  Putnam,  and  said  to  him,  "Why  did  you  not  sup 
port  me,  general,  with  your  men,  as  I  had  reason  to  expect, 
according  to  agreement?"  Putnam  answered,  "I  could  not 
drive  the  dogs  up."  Prescott  pointedly  said  to  him,  "  If  you 
could  not  drive  them  up,  you  might  have  led  them  up."  We 
have  good  reason  to  believe  further,  from  declarations  of  some 
of  our  parishioners,  men  of  respectability,  whose  veracity 
cannot  be  doubted,  who  belonged  to  Col.  Prescott's  regiment, 
and  were  present  through  the  whole  service,  that  Gen.  Put 
nam  was  not  on  Breed's  Hill  the  night  preceding,  or  on  that 
day,  except  that  just  before  the  attack  was  made,  he  might 
have  gone  to  the  fort  and  ordered  the  tools  to  be  carried  off, 
that  they  might  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  in  the 
event  of  his  carrying  the  works,  and  holding  the  ground,  and 
that  he  and  his  men,  with  Col.  Gerrish,  remained  on  the  side 
of  Bunker  Hill  towards  the  neck  during  the  whole  action. 

DANIEL  CHAPLIN, 
JOHN  BULLARD. 
Groion,  June  5,  1818. 

Statement  of  the  Hon.  Abel  Parker,  judge  of  prolate. 

As  I  was  in  the  battle  on  Breed's  Hill,  otherwise  called 
Bunker  Hill,  on  the  17th  day  of  June,  1775,  and  there  re 
ceived  one  ball  through  my  leg,  another  having  passed 
through  my  clothes,  all  accounts  of  that  battle  which  I  have 
seen  published,  have  been  to  me  extremely  interesting.  But 
I  have  never  seen  any  account  which  I  considered  in  any 
degree  correct,  until  the  one  published  by  Gen.  Dearborn. 
On  perusing  that  account  with  the  utmost  attention,  I  could 
discover  but  one  mistake,  and  that  related  to  his  assertion, 
'  that  there  was  not  a  man  that  flinched,'  or  to  that  effect,  for 
his  narrative  is  not  now  before  me,  and  even  in  that  case,  I 
believe  the  general's  assertion  may  be  strictly  true,  if  his 


133 

meaning  be  confined  to  the  time  after  his  arrival  on  the  hill. 
Previous  to  that,  there  were  many  who  left  the  ground  at  the 
fort,  particularly  at  the  landing  of  the  British  troops ;  but 
after  the  commencement  of  the  battle  with  small-arms,  I 
know  of  no  man's  leaving  his  post,  until  the  order  to  retreat 
was  given  by  Col.  Prescott.  But  notwithstanding  the  cor 
rectness  of  Gen.  Dearborn's  description  of  that  battle,  some 
persons  seem  to  be  much  exasperated  by  it,  in  particular  as 
to  what  he  asserted  in  regard  to  Gen.  Putnam.  As  long  as 
they  confined  themselves  to  mere  declamation,  without  bring 
ing  forward  any  evidence  to  disprove  the  general's  assertion, 
I  deemed  it  unnecessary  for  me  to  appear  in  vindication  of 
the  general's  statement.  But  on  perusing  a  letter  from  Col. 
Trumbull  to  Col.  Putnam,  wherein  mention  is  made  of  a  con 
versation  with  Col.  Small  in  London,  I  concluded,  notwith 
standing  my  aversion  to  taking  any  part  in  a  newspaper  dis 
cussion,  that  to  remain  any  longer  silent,  would  be  absolutely 
criminal.  I  shall,  therefore,  in  as  concise  a  manner  as  pos 
sible,  state  what  I  know  relating  to  that  memorable  battle. 
Immediately  after  the  battle  of  Lexington,  I  engaged  in  the 
service  of  my  country,  in  Capt.  John  Nutting's  company,  in 
the  regiment  commanded  by  Col.  Wm.  Prescott.  Both  of 
these  officers  belonged  to  the  town  of  Pepperett,  where  I  then 
lived.  I  was  at  this  time  a  little  more  than  twenty-two  years 
of  age.  On  the  16th  day  of  June  following,  Col.  Prescoit's 
regiment  with  two  or  three  others,  were  ordered  to  march 
and  take  possession  of  Bunker  Hill.  On  our  arrival  at  the 
place  called  Charlestown  neck,  a  halt  was  made,  and  Capt. 
Nutting's  company,  with  ten  of  the  Connecticut  troops,  were 
detached  to  proceed  into  Charlestown  as  a  guard  ;  the  re 
mainder  marched  to  the  hill,  which  in  fact  was  Breed's,  and 
not  Bunker  Hill,  where  they  commenced  building  a  small 
fort.  In  the  morning,  not  far  from  sunrising,  the  alarm  was 
fired  from  the  British  vessel  lying  in  the  river.  Some  time 
after  this,  Nutting's  company  left  the  town,  and  marched  to 
join  the  regiment  on  the  hill.  When  we  arrived  there,  the 
fort  was  in  considerable  forwardness,  and  the  troops  com 
menced  throwing  up  the  breast- work  mentioned  by  Gen. 
Dearborn.  We  had  not  been  long  employed  in  that  work, 
before  the  cannon  shot  from  a  hill  in  Boston,  and  the  vessels 

12 


134 

lying  in  the  river,  were  poured  in  upon  us  in  great  profusion. 
However,  the  work  progressed  until  it  would  answer  the 
purpose  for  which  it  was  designed.  But  the  firing  from  the 
British  artillery  continued  with  unabated  fury.  Some  time 
before  this,  there  was  brought  to  the  fort  several  brass  field- 
pieces,  one  of  which  was  actually  fired  towards  Boston  ;  but 
the  ball  did  not  reach  the  town.  It  had  this  effect,  however, 
on  the  British,  that  it  made  them  double  their  diligence  in 
firing  upon  us.  In  the  time  of  this  heavy  fire,  I,  for  the  first 
time  that  day,  saw  Gen.  Putnam  standing  with  others,  under 
cover  of  the  north  wall  of  the  fort,  where,  I  believe,  he  re 
mained  until  the  British  troops  made  their  appearance  in 
their  boats.  At  this  time  the  artillery  was  withdrawn  from 
the  fort,  but  by  whose  orders  I  know  not,  and  Gen.  Putnam, 
at,  or  near  the  same  time,  left  the  fort.  The  removing  of 
the  artillery,  and  Gen.  Putnam's  departure,  took  place  a  lit 
tle  before  (if  my  memory  be  correct)  the  New  Hampshire 
troops  made  their  appearance  on  the  hill.  I  saw  them  when 
they  arrived,  and  witnessed  their  dexterity  in  throwing  up 
their  breast- work  of  rails  and  hay.  When  the  British  first 
made  their  attack  with  small-arms,  I  was  at  the  breast- work, 
where  I  remained  until  I  received  my  wound  from  the  party 
who  flanked  it ;  I  then  went  to  the  fort,  where  I  remained 
until  the  order  to  retreat  was  given  by  Col.  Prescott.  After 
my  arrival  at  the  fort  I  had  a  perfect  opportunity  of  viewing 
the  operations  of  the  day,  and  noticed  Col.  Prescott  as  the 
only  person  who  took  upon  him  any  command.  He  frequent 
ly  ordered  the  men  from  one  side  to  the  other,  in  order  to 
defend  that  part  which  was  prest  hardest  by  the  enemy ; 
and  I  was  within  a  few  yards  of  him,  when  the  order  to  re 
treat  was  given ;  and  I  affirm,  that  at  that  time  Gen.  Putnam 
was  not  in  the  fort,  neither  had  he  been  there  at  any  time  af 
ter  my  entering  the  same ;  and  I  have  no  hesitation  in  de 
claring,  that  the  story  told  by  Col.  Small  to  Col.  Trumbull, 
concerning  Gen.  Putnam's  saving  him  from  the  fire  of  our 
men  at  that  time,  is  altogether  unfounded. 

ABEL  PARKEK. 
Jeffrey,  New  Hampshire,  May  27,  1818. 


135 

GEN.    MlCHAEL1    McCLARY's    LETTER. 

"  Epsom,  May  10,  1818. 
**  DEAR  SIR — 

"Your  letter  of  the  first  instant  I  received  yesterday, 
and  a  few  days  previously,  I  saw  in  the  New  Hamp 
shire  Patriot  the  account  published  by  your  father  of 
what  is  generally  called  Bunker  Hill  battle,  which,  to 
the  best  of  my  recollection,  is  correct. 

"  I  was  in  the  battle  from  its  commencement  to  the 
end,  and  have  no  recollection  of  seeing  Gen.  Putnam 
in  or  near  it.  I  was  the  principal  part  of  the  time  the 
action  continued  near  Col.  Stark,  who  commanded  the 
regiment  to  which  I  belonged,  and  on  our  retreat  from 
Breed's  Hill,  in  ascending  Bunker  Hill,  I  well  remem 
ber  seeing  Gen.  Putnam  there  on  his  horse,  with  a 
spade  in  his  hand. 

"  Being  an  officer  in  the  company  under  your  father's 
command,  I  had  an  opportunity  of  knowing  the  circum 
stances  generally  attending  the  battle,  and  if  Gen.  Put 
nam  had  been  there  [that  is,  taken  any  part  in  it]  I 
should  have  known  it. 

"  I  am,  dear  sir,  &c., 

"  MICHAEL  McCLARY. 

"  H.  A.  S.  DEARBORN." 

GEN.  B.  PIERCE'S  LETTER. 

"  Hillsborough,  N.  H.,  May  17,  1818. 

"  MUCH  RESPECTED  GENERAL 

"  I  have  read  your  account  of  the  battle  of  Bunker 
Hill,  and  consider  it  to  be  more  like  the  thing  itself  than 
any  statement  I  have  seen.  I  went  on  to  the  hill  about 
11  o'clock,  A.  M.,  on  the  17th.  When  I  arrived  at  the 
summit  of  Bunker  Hill,  I  saw  there  two  pieces  of  can 
non,  and  two  or  three  soldiers  standing  by  them,  who 
said  they  belonged  to  Capt.  Calender's  company,  and 
that  the  officers  had  run  away.  Gen.  Putnam  sat  there 
upon  a  horse.  I  saw  nobody  else  but  him  and  the  be 
fore  mentioned  soldiers.  The  general  requested  our 


13G 

company  (which  was  commanded  by  Capt.  John  Ford, 
of  Chelmsford,  Massachusetts)  to  take  these  cannon 
down  to  the  lines ;  which  they  refused  to  do,  saying 
they  had  no  knowledge  of  the  use  of  artillery,  but  were 
ready  to  fight  with  their  own  arms.  Capt.  Ford  then 
addressed  his  company  in  a  very  animated  strain,  which 
had  the  desired  effect,  and  they  seized  the  ropes,  and 
soon  drew  the  cannon  to  the  rail  fence. 

"  I  think  I  saw  Gen.  Putnam  at  that  place,  looking 
for  something  he  had  lost.  I  did  not  hear  him  give 
any  orders,  or  assume  any  command,  except  at  the  top 
of  Bunker  Hill,  when  I  was  going  to  the  field  of  action. 
I  remained  at  the  rail  fence  until  all  the  powder  and 
ball  were  spent.  I  had  a  full  view  of  the  movements 
of  the  enemy,  and  I  think  your  statement  of  the  order 
of  the  day,  and  of  the  two  contending  armies  correct, 
and  cannot  be  denied  with  the  semblance  of  truth. — 
Excuse  an  old  soldier. 

"  I  am,  sir,  &c.,  B.  PIERCE. 

"  Maj.  Gen.  HENRY  DEARBORN." 

According  to  the  condition  of  Callender's  artillery, 
as  stated  both  by  Gen.  Dearborn  and  Col.  Swett,  it  was 
excessively  ridiculous  for  Gen.  Putnam  to  request  it  to 
be  taken  to  the  lines,  where  it  could  be  of  no  manner 
of  use.  Gen.  Dearborn  says  :  "  From  similar  mistakes, 
the  fixed  ammunition  furnished  for  the  field-pieces  was 
calculated  for  guns  of  a  larger  caliber,  which  prevent 
ed  the  use  of  field  artillery  on  both  sides."  Col.  Swett 
observes : 

Perfect  as  was  the  fire  of  the  American  infantry,  their  ar 
tillery  was  as  grossly  defective  in  every  respect.  This  arm 
requires  science,  experience,  and  knowledge  of  position.  But 
the  artillery  companies  were  just  selected  from  the  infantry, 
and  entirely  ignorant  of  their  duty.  Callender  carried  his 
pieces  into  action,  but  his  cartridges  required  adjusting.  To 
tally  in  violation  of  military  discipline,  he  left  his  post  with 
out  orders,  and  was  retiring  to  a  secure  place  under  cover 
of  the  hill,  to  prepare  for  firing.  Putnam  observed  this  ap- 


137 

pearance  of  retreat,  and  was  fired  with  indignation  ;  he 
ordered  him  instantly  to  his  post ;  Callender  remonstrated, 
but  Putnam  threatened  him  with  instant  death,  if  he  hesitated, 
and  forced  him  back.  His  men,  however,  were  disgusted 
with  a  part  of  the  service  they  did  not  understand.  Most  of 
them  had  muskets  and  mingled  in  the  fight.  The  pieces.were 
entirely  deserted,  and  the  captain  relinquished  them. 

Was  it  not  possible  to  convince  Gen.  Putnam,  that  it 
is  good  policy  in  war  to  keep  under  cover,  when  pre 
paring  for  action,  instead  of  being  uselessly  exposed  ?  I 
imagine  there  is  some  embellishment  in  this  story,  and 
that  Putnam  did  not  threaten  Callender  with  instant 
death,  if  he  hesitated. 

With  regard  to  Gen.  Putnam's  being  seen,  by  Gen. 
Pierce,  at  the  rail  fence,  it  was  evidently  in  the  fore 
part  of  the  day;  and  it  is  also  evident,  that  he  did  not 
intend  to  stay  longer  than  to  find  what  he  had  lost. 
The  battle  did  not  commence  till  three  o'clock,  P.  M. 
"  At  three  o'clock,"  says  Peabody,  "  the  British  line  was 
formed,  and  the  troops  moved  in  perfect  and  imposing 
order  towards  the  rail  fence  and  redoubt."  (p.  174.) 

LETTER  OF  DR.  THOMAS  KITTRIDGE,  OF  ANDOVER. 

"  Boston,  June  18,  1818. 
"  SIR— 

"  I  received  your  letter  of  the  8th  instant  in  due 
season,  in  which  you  request  me  to  answer  certain 
questions  respecting  the  battle  on  Bunker  Hill,  so 
called. 

"  I  was  surgeon  in  Frye's  regiment,  and  marched 
with  the  troops  in  the  evening  of  the  16th  of  June, 
1775,  which  consisted  of  three  regiments,  according  to. 
the  best  of  my  recollection,  Frye's,  Prescott's,  and 
Bridge's.*  Col.  Prescott  was  considered  commander 


*  According  to  Col.  Swett,  there  were  attached  to  this  expedition,  in  ad 
dition  to  the  above,  one  hundred  and  twenty  men  of  Gen.  Putnam's  regi 
ment,  and  one  company  of  artillery,  making  in  all  about  one  thousand 
men 

12* 


138 

of  the  whole  detachment.  We  arrived  at  the  hill  late 
in  the  evening,  and  the  troops  immediately  commenced 
throwing  up  works  for  our  defence.  *  *  * 
left  the  hill  with  the  first  who  was  wounded,  passed 
over  Charlestown  Neck,  where  I  proceeded  to  dress  his 
wounds.  You  ask  whether  I  saw  Gen.  Putnam  on  that 
day,  and  where  ?  I  saw  him  only  once,  as  I  came  off, 
at  the  foot  of  "the  lower  hill,  between  where  the  battle 
was  and  Charlestown  Neck.  He  was  under  a  tree, 
with,  as  I  supposed,  about  thirty  or  forty  men.  I  made 
a  halt,  when  I  came  against  him,  of  three  or  four  min 
utes  ;  and  while  I  was  there,  I  heard  Gen.  Putnam  re 
quest  some  of  the  men  to  go  up  to  the  fort,  and  endeavor 
to  get  some  of  the  intrenching  tools.  I  immediately  left 
them,  went  over  the  neck,  and  there  continued  dressing 
the  wounded  until  the  engagement  was  over. 
"  I  am,  sir,  &c., 

THOMAS  KITTRIDGE. 
"  Gen.  H.  A.  S.  DEARBORN." 


139 


CHAPTER  V. 

IN  order  to  a  clear  understanding  of  this  matter,  it  is 
necessary  to  know  the  condition  of  the  troops,  in  respect 
to  organization.  Mr.  Peabody  observes — "  On  the  21st 
of  May,  1775,  Gen.  Ward  was  commissioned  as  major- 
general  and  commander-in-chief  of  the  troops  of  Massa 
chusetts  ;  and  his  orders  were  obeyed  by  all  the  officers 
of  other  colonies  within  the  province."  Col.  Prescott 
received  orders  from  Gen.  Ward  to  repair  to  Bunker 
Hill,  with  one  thousand  men,  detached  for  the  purpose, 
and  erect  a  fortification.  Prescott,  however,  finding 
Breed's  Hill  the  most  eligible  position,  erected  the 
works  there.  He  had,  of  course,  command  of  the  men 
detached  for  this  service.  After  the  action  began, 
Prescott,  from  the  nature  of  his  situation,  could  not  ex 
tend  his  command  beyond  the  limits  of  his  redoubt  and 
breastwork.  Other  corps  sent  to  his  support,  conse 
quently,  fought  upon  their  own  responsibility,  under 
their  respective  officers.  There  was  no  general  com 
mand  ;  it  being  a  hurried  concern,  there  was  little  pre 
concert.  As  Gen.  Putnam  had  no  troops  committed  to 
his  charge,  he,  of  course,  had  no  command.  And  here 
the  mystery  is  explained,  why  no  inquiry  was  instituted 
respecting  his  conduct,  as  there  was  of  that  of  Col. 
Gerrish,  who  was  ordered  to  the  field  of  action.  Put 
nam  was  not  guilty  of  a  disobedience  of  orders,  having 
received  none. 

But,  although  not  amenable  to  a  military  tribunal  at 
the  time,  he  was  subject  to  trial  at  the  bar  of  public 
opinion.  He  came  to  the  camp  with  an  exalted  char 
acter  as  a  patriot,  and  high  military  fame,  in  conse- 


140 

quence  of  the  very  flattering  accounts  that  had  been 
given  of  his  services  in  the  Seven  Years'  War;  which 
gave  him  unbounded  influence  with  his  compatriots  in 
arms.  And  if,  through  these  means,  he  caused  the  re 
tention  of  the  troops  on  Bunker  Hill  from  the  glorious 
conflict,  his  conduct  can  never  be  too  severely  censured. 
Of  this  the  public  must  judge  from  the  circumstances 
detailed.  A  decided  opinion  on  the  subject  would,  in 
all  probability,  have  been  formed  before  now,  had  not 
party  strife  mingled  its  baneful  influence  in  the  discus 
sion. 

Gen.  Dearborn  had  given  an  apparently  honest  state 
ment  of  such  facts  as  came  under  his  notice,  at  the 
battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  and  which  militated  against  the 
conduct  of  Gen.  Putnam  on  that  occasion ;  and  Dear 
born  being  afterwards  nominated,  by  the  republican 
party,  for  governor  of  the  commonwealth  of  Massa 
chusetts,  the  popularity  of  Putnam  was  brought,  by  the 
opposite  party,  to  bear  against  his  election.  It  was 
said  he  had  traduced  the  character  of  this  veteran  sol 
dier,  and  thus  rendered  himself  unworthy  of  credit,  and 
of  course,  unfit  to  be  elevated  to  the  high  and  responsi 
ble  station  of  governor  of  the  commonwealth,  &c.,  &c. 

Col.  Daniel  Putnam,  before  noticed,  son  of  Gen.  Put 
nam,  published  a  counter  statement  to  that  of  Gen. 
Dearborn,  endeavoring  to  show  that  Gen.  Putnam  took 
an  active  part  in  the  action ;  and  the  federal  party  ap 
pointed  a  committee  to  procure  testimony  to  that  effect. 
The  late  Samuel  L.  Knapp,  Esq.,  was  a  member  of  that 
committee,  and  he  stated  to  a  friend  of  the  writer,  that 
notices  were  published  inviting  old  soldiers  in  the  coun 
try,  who  were  in  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  to  come  to 
Boston  and  give  testimony  of  the  facts  required,  and 
that  they  should  be  well  remunerated  for  their  expenses 
and  time.  Col.  Knapp  furthermore  said,  that  he  be 
came  disgusted  with  the  manner  in  which  this  business 
was  conducted,  and  resigned  his  place  in  the  com 
mittee. 


141 

On  the  principle,  it  is  presumed,  that  "  all's  fair  in 
politics,"  an  article  also  appeared  in  the  North  Ameri 
can  Review,  said  to  be  written  by  the  honorable  Dan 
iel  Webster,  in  which  the  testimony  given  in  the  case 
on  both  sides  is  stated,  and  the  weight  of  evidence  de 
clared  to  preponderate  in  favor  of  the  advocates  of 
Putnam.  If  Mr.  Webster  wrote  this  article  his  argu 
ment  should  be  received  with  great  caution,  for  he  must 
have  felt  as  much  interest  in  the  decision  of  the  question 
as  he  had  in  any  action  at  law  which  he  ever  summed 
up  in  a  court  of  justice.  His  given  opinion,  therefore, 
ought  to  have  no  more  influence  on  the  public  mind 
than  the  pleadings  of  a  lawyer  for  his  client  in  a  bad 
cause. 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing,  evidently  to  suit  the  oc 
casion,  a  new 

"  HISTORICAL  AND  TOPOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH  OF  BUNKER 
HILL  BATTLE"  is  manufactured  by  S.  Swett,  and  indus 
triously  circulated. 

I  will  take  a  brief  view  of  this  work.  It  may  not  be 
amiss  to  inform  the  reader,  that  the  copy  here  used  is 
added  as  an  appendix  to  Humphreys'  Life  of  Putnam, 
and  that  the  pages  of  the  latter,  ending  with  page  one 
hundred  and  sixty-nine,  are  continued  in  the  appendix. 

Col.  Swett  prefaces  his  volume  thus  : 

"  The  writer  of  the  following  has  no  ambition  or  pre 
tensions  to  be  an  author,  but  from  his  attention  to  mili 
tary  subjects,  consented  to  describe  a  battle,  one  of  the 
most  glorious  and  important  ever  fought  in  America, 
and  to  render  his  feeble  contribution  to  the  monument 
of  fame  which  history  yet  owes  our  ancestors.  The 
materials  lay  scattered  among  newspapers,  magazines, 
records  and  files  of  congress,  the  scattered  surviving 
veterans  of  the  day,  and  others.  He  was  compelled  by 
circumstances  to  commence  his  researches  in  July,  and 
finish  his  sketch  in  August." 

By  whose  solicitation  did  the  author  consent  to  un 
dertake  this  job  ?  What  call  was  there  for  it  at  this 


142 

particular  time,  and  especially,  that  so  short  a  period 
should  be  allowed  for  its  accomplishment  ?  The  elec 
tion  was  near  at  hand,  and  it  was  deemed  essential  to 
persuade  the  people  that  Dearborn,  in  his  description 
of  the  same  battle,  had  falsified  facts ;  and  was  conse 
quently  unworthy  the  confidence  of  his  fellow-citizens  ; 
unsafe  to  be  trusted  with  the  power  which  his  friends 
sought  to  Bestow  upon  him. 

Can  any  reliance  be  placed  upon  a  history,  induced 
by  such  motives,  and  thus  hastily  written ;  more  espe 
cially,  when  composed  of  the  materials  here  enumera 
ted  ?  No  historian,  surely,  who  had  the  least  regard 
to  the  accuracy  of  his  statements,  would  confide  in 
newspaper  reports.  And,  in  this  case,  much  of  the  tes 
timony  derived  from  the  surviving  veterans  of  the  day, 
and  others,  when  the  manner  in  which  it  has  been  ob 
tained  is  taken  into  consideration,  is,  perhaps,  entitled 
to  little  more  respect.  But  the  history  must  be  written, 
and  the  author  was  compelled  to  compose  it  of  the  docu 
ments  with  which  he  was  furnished  ;  and  he  certainly 
has  shown  a  good  deal  of  tact  and  management  in  the 
arrangement  of  them.  His  employers  had  reason  to 
be  satisfied  with  the  performance. 

The  country  has  been  inundated  with  newspaper; 
magazine,  and  oral  traditions  of  the  prowess  and  hair 
breadth  escapes  of  Israel  Putnam,  sufficient  to  form  a 
small  volume,  exclusive  of  those  recorded  in  his  biog 
raphy.  From  these  Col.  Swett  has  culled  such  of  those 
respecting  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill  as  he  thought  best 
suited  his  purpose,  with  which  he  incorporated  new  re 
ports,  got  up  for  the  occasion. 

In  the  author's  preliminary  remarks,  page  185,  he 
observes  : 

Connecticut,  essentially  and  undeviatingly  republican, 
was  behind  none  of  the  provinces  in  her  determined  hostility 
to  the  usurpation  and  encroachments  of  the  throne.  To  her 
antipathy  to  royalty  the  proscribed  judges  of  Charles  the 
First  had  owed  their  inviolable  asylum  in  her  territory.  Re- 


143 

ligious  as  well  as  civil  liberty  was  in  jeopardy,  and  the 
former  with  her  was  paramount  to  all  earthly  considera 
tions.  In  her  vocabulary,  the  British  troops  were  the  Philis 
tines,  and  Putnam,  the  American  Samson,  a  chosen  instrument 
to  defeat  the  foe  :  and  fortunately  she  inspired  her  own  con 
fidence  into  all  her  sister  states. 

The  most  remarkable  resemblance  between  the  two 
characters,  and  which  is  probably  alluded  to  here,  is 
that  each  destroyed  a  ferocious  wild  beast,  a  lion  and 
a  wolf;  but  still  there  is  a  considerable  disparity  in  the 
achievements.  Samson  "rent  him  [the  lion]  as  he 
would  have  rent  a  kid,  and  he  had  nothing  in  his  hand." 
Whereas,  Putnam  shot  the  wolf  with  a  musket,  charged 
with  nine  buck-shot ;  which  any  common  man  might 
have  done.  It  has  been  said,  however,  that  "  Putnam. 
strangled  the  wolf  in  his  arms,  after  having  wounded 
her ;"  but  this  is  admitted  to  be  an  error. 

By  the  way,  after  the  account  of  the  wolf-killing  had 
gone  to  press,  I  received  from  a  gentleman,  formerly 
a  resident  of  Pomfret,  further  information  on  the  sub 
ject  ;  and  as  much  has  been  made  of  this  matter  by  the 
eulogists  of  Gen.  Putnam,  I  will  here  insert  an  abstract 
of  it.  The  person  who  gave  me  the  former  account, 
stated  that  he  had  never  visited  the  cave  in  question, 
but  received  his  information  from  others..  After  all,  I 
think  it  doubtful  that  any  person  has  entered  this  fa 
mous  cleft  to  ascertain  its  dimensions,  since  the  redoubt 
able  exploit  of  Putnam  ;  and  I  am  inclined  to  believe 
that  the  account  of  my  correspondent  comes  nearer  the 
truth  than  any  thing  hitherto  published  on  the  subject. 
He  says: 

"  The  affair  of  the  wolf  is  simple,  but  has  been  ex 
aggerated.  Some  neighbors  in  Pomfret  started  a  wolf, 
and  he  being  closely  pursued,  found  his  way  to  a  crev 
ice  of  a  large  rock ;  the  situation  of  which  is  solitary 
and  romantic.  He  was  soon  dispatched  by  firing  into 
the  crevice  ;  after  which  Putnam  proposed  getting  him 
out,  and  his  companions  having  fastened  a  rope  to  his 


144 

heels  he  crept  into  the  crevice  and  drew  out  the  dead 
wolf,  being  assisted  by  his  associates  hauling  the  rope. 

"  This  was  the  version  of  the  wolf-story  for  many 
years  ;  beyond  this  is  bombast  and  exaggeration,  in 
tended  to  enhance  the  courage  of  Putnam." 

If  any  danger  were  to  be  apprehended  in  the  case, 
it  was  that  the  wolf  might  not  be  quite  dead.  Put 
nam,  however,  was  well  prepared  for  such  event,  hav 
ing  his  musket  well  loaded, — which  he  doubtless  dis 
charged  at  the  enemy  before  attempting  to  lay  hands 
upon  him,  and  then  gave  the  signal  for  retreat.  At  his 
second  or  third  entrance  into  the  crevice,  it  seems,  he 
secured  his  prey.  The  author  continues  : 

The  whole  army  was  under  the  command  of  Artemas 
Ward,  commissioned  by  the  provincial  congress,  on  the  21st 
of  May,  general  and  commander-in-chief  of  the  Massachu 
setts  forces.  His  general  orders  were  copied  and  obeyed  by 
the  forces  of  all  the  other  provinces  in  Massachusetts,  indis 
criminately,  and  the  officers  of  all  of  them  were  ordered  on 
courts  martial,  and  detailed  for  the  usual  routine  of  duty 
without  any  distinction  whatever.  (Orderly  Books.) 

Gen.  Ward  was  a  gentleman  of  liberal  education,  vigor 
ous  understanding,  and  distinguished  probity.  He  had  been 
a  member  of  the  council,  speaker  of  the  assembly,  and 
chief-justice  of  one  of  the  courts  in  Massachusetts,  and  his 
rank  and  character  commanded  an  extensive  influence  in 
the  country.  He  had  also  served  with  reputation  in  the  war 
of  1756,  was  a  lieutenant-colonel  at  the  storming  [attempted] 
of  Ticonderoga,  under  Gen.  Abercrombie,  and  soon  after 
commanded  the  regiment. 


THE    BATTLE. 


On  the  16th  of  June,  1775,  with  the  advice  of  the  coun 
cil  of  war,  Gen.  Ward  issued  orders  to  Col.  William  Pres- 
cott,  to  the  commander  of  Col.  Frye's  regiment,  and  Col. 
Bridge,  to  be  prepared  for  an  expedition,  with  all  their  men 
fit  for  service,  and  one  day's  provisions.  The  same  order 
issued  for  one  hundred  and  twenty  of  Gen.  Putnam's  regi 
ment,  and  one  company  of  artillery  with  two  field-pieces. 


145 

With  these  troops  Col.  Prescott  was  ordered  to  proceed  to 
Charlestown  in  the  evening,  take  possession  of  Bunker  Hill, 
and  erect  the  requisite  fortifications  to  defend  it.  His  or 
ders  were  to  be  kept  profoundly  secret,  and  provisions  and 
refreshments  were  to  be  sent  in  the  morning,  with  as  many 
more  troops  as  should  be  necessary  to  reinforce  him. 

Not  an  officer  in  the  army  could  have  been  selected  more 
worthy  the  honor,  or  more  adequate  to  the  arduous  under 
taking  than  Col.  Prescott.  In  this  veteran,  age  already  be 
gan  to  display  its  ravages  ;  but  the  fire  of  his  youth  was 
undamped.  He  was  of  Pepperell,  and  was  early  left  in 
affluence  by  the  decease  of  his  father.  He  soon  received  a 
commission  in  the  provincial  army,  and,  with  marry  of  his 
neighborhood  who  enlisted,  he  joined  the  forces  under  Gen. 
Winslow,  and  assisted  in  the  conquest  of  Nova  Scotia.  His 
military  talents  attracted  instant  admiration,  and  he  was  urged 
by  the  British  officers  to  accept  a  commission  in  the  royal  ar 
my.  Attachment  to  his  brave  soldiers  and  countrymen,  how 
ever,  did  not  permit  him  to  separate  himself  from  them,  and  he 
returned  to  his  estate.  The  soldiers  who  had  served  under 
him  still  considered  him  their  head.  Like  the  chief  of  some 
feudal  clan,  he  received  them  all  with  open  doors  at  his  hos 
pitable  mansion.  In  the  habits  he  had  acquired  in  camps 
his  property  was  expended  for  their  relief,  comfort,  or  enter 
tainment,  as  freely  as  they  were  ready  on  every  occasion 
to  shed  their  blood  for  his  honor,  and  under  his  command. 

His  figure  was  tall  and  commanding,  and  his  countenance 
grave,  ardent,  and  impressive  as  his  character.  With  this 
presence,  and  his  long  and  formidable  sword,  he  needed  no 
uniform  to  distinguish  him  as  a  leader.  In  a  simple  calico 
frock,*  he  headed  the  detachment  of  about  one  thousand 
men,  who  left  camp  at  dark,  and  proceeded  to  Charlestown. 
Col.  Prescott  led  the  way  with  two  sergeants,  having  dark 
lanterns,  open  only  to  the  rear,  about  six  paces  in  front  of 
the  troops. 

Gen.  Putnam,  having  the  general  superintendence  of  the 
expedition,  and  the  chief  engineer,  Col.  Gridley,  accompa 
nied  the  troops.  Profound  mystery  hung  over  the  object  of 

*  It  will  be  shown,  in  the  sequel,  that  the  description  here  given  of  the 
costume  of  Col.  Prescott  on  this  occasion  is  incorrect. — Edit.  V.  R. 

13 


146 

the  expedition  till  they  crossed  Charlestown  neck  and  found 
the  wagons  loaded  with  intrenching  tools. 

At  daybreak  Gen.  Putnam  ordered  Lieut.  Clark  to  send 
and  request  of  Gen.  Ward  a  horse  for  him  to  ride  to  Bunker 
Hill.  The  lieutenant  went  himself,  but  the  general's  impa 
tience  could  not  await  an  answer.  On  his  return  he  found 
him  mounted  and  departing. 

The  latter  paragraph  tends  to  discredit  the  former  ; 
because,  if  Putnam  had  gone  on  to  the  hill  with  thetropps, 
as  general  superintendent  of  the  expedition,  it  can  hard 
ly  be  conceived  that  he  would  have  quit  his  post,  and 
be  found  snug  in  Cambridge  the  next  morning  at  day 
break. 

The  superintendence  of  a  military  expedition,  by  the 
way,  must  necessarily  be  confided  to  the  commanding 
officer,  otherwise  a  conflict  of  opinion  might  prevent 
the  success  of  the  enterprise.  The  probability  is,  that 
Gen.  Putnam  was  not  made  privy  to  this  expedition 
till  after  the  troops  detailed  for  the  purpose  had  de 
parted. 

The  author,  in  speaking  of  Warren's  arrival  at  Bun 
ker  Hill,  says  : 

He  joined  Gen.  Putnam,  and  they  consulted  on  measures 
to  be  pursued.  Gen.  Putnam  informed  him,  that  "  from 
long  experience  he  perfectly  comprehended  the  character  of 
the  British  army  ;  they  would  ultimately  succeed  and  drive  us 
from  the  works,  but  from  the  mode  of  attack  they  had  chosen, 
it  was  in  our  power  to  do  them  infinite  mischief,  though  we 
must  be  prepared  for  a  brave  and  orderly  retreat,  when  we 
could  maintain  our  ground  no  longer."  Warren  expressed 
his  full  assent  to  these  opinions,  and  agreed  to  "be  governed 
by  them. 

Warren,  on  the  contrary,  according  to  all  previous 
accounts  of  the  battle,  appeared  to  anticipate  victory, 
and  exerted  all  his  energies  to  produce  that  result. 
Gen.  Putnam  unfortunately  never  seemed  to  have  con 
fidence  in  himself,  nor  in  the  troops  he  commanded, 
when  contending  with  British  forces. 


147 

Mr.  Peabody  gives  another  version  to  the  meeting 
of  Warren  and  Putnam.  There  is  no  knowing  which 
to  believe,  nor  from  whence  they  obtained  their  infor 
mation.  He  says — "A  single  horseman  rode  at  full 
speed  over  Bunker  Hill,  and  encountered  Gen.  Putnam. 
It  was  Gen.  Warren ;  and  Putnam  offered  to  receive 
his  orders.  Warren  replied,  that  he  came  only  as  a 
volunteer,  and  desired  to  know  where  his  services 
would  be  most  useful.  Putnam  pointed  to  the  redoubt, 
remarking  that  Ije  would  be  covered  there.  '  I  came 
not,'  said  Warren,  '  for  the  purpose  of  security ;  tell 
me  where  the  onset  will  be  most  severe.'  *  Go,  then, 
to  the  redoubt,'  said  Putnam  ;  *  Prescott  is  there,  and 
will  do  his  duty ;  if  that  can  be  defended,  the  day  is 
ours.'  Warren  rode  forward  to  the  redoubt,  where  he 
was  received  with  loud  acclamations." 

Had  Putnam  followed  the  counsel  himself,  which  he 
is  here  said  to  have  given  Warren,  and  gone  to  the  re 
doubt  with  four  or  five  hundred  men  of  those  uselessly 
retained  upon  Bunker  Hill,  the  redoubt  would  unques 
tionably  have  been  defended,  the  day  would  have  been 
ours,  and  Putnam  justly  entitled  to  the  applause  of  his 
country. 

Putnam  was  anxious  and  mortified  that  a  post,  on  which 
his  defence  and  reputation  so  materially  depended,  should  be 
entirely  neglected.  His  mother  wit,  cultivated  in  the  school 
of  experience,  under  British  officers,  the  most  distinguished 
masters  of  the  day,  perfectly  comprehended  the  immense  im 
portance  of  entrenching.  He  seemed  to  have  intuitively 
seized  the  maxims  of  Caesar's  learned  campaigns,  as  well  as 
to  anticipate  the  scientific  results  of  such  modern  defences  as 
Gen.  Jackson's.  He  ordered  the  entrenching  tools  to  be  car 
ried  by  a  large  detachment  to  the  rear. 

The  first  division  of  the  enemy  awaiting  the  remainder  of 
the  detachment,  which  had  not  yet  embarked,  were  quietly 
dining,  and  most  of  them  for  the  last  time,  from  their  crowd 
ed  and  cumbrous  knapsacks. 

Gen.  Putnam  seized  the  opportunity  of  hastening  to  Cam 
bridge,  whence  he  returned  with  the  reinforcements.  He  had 


148 

to  pass  a  galling  enfilading  fire  of  round,  bar  and  chain  shot, 
which  thundered  across  the  neck  from  the  Glasgow  frigate 
in  the  channel  of  Charles  river,  and  two  floating  batteries 
hauled  close  to  the  shore. 

And  now  the  brave  Stark  arrived  with  his  regiment.  Gen. 
Putnam  reserved  a  part  of  it,  to  throw  up  a  work  on  Bunker 
Hill,  and  ordered  him  to  press  on  to  the  lines  as  quick  as 
possible,  with  the  remainder.  They  proceeded  with  the 
other  New  Hampshire  regiment  under  Col.  Reed,  and  joined 
the  Connecticut  troops  at  the  rail  fence. 

Did  Gen.  Putnam  expect  to  get  back  to  the  field  of 
action  before  the  enemy  had  finished  dinner  ?  He  had 
no  authority  to  order  Col.  Stark  ;  but  the  latter  may 
have  been  induced,  at  his  request,  to  leave  him  a  part 
of  his  regiment  for  the  purpose  specified.* 

It  will  be  remarked,  however,  that  the  entrenching 
tools  had  already  been  sent  to  the  rear  by  a  large  de 
tachment,  consisting,  it  is  supposed,  of  about  two  hun 
dred  men.  And  these  were  drawn  from  the  redoubt, 
instead  of  ordering  a  party  of  the  idle  men  on  Bunker 
Hill  to  perform  the  service.  This  bad  management, 
and  retaining  a  part  of  Stark's  regiment  from  the  field 
of  action,  to  throw  up  a  work  on  Bunker  Hill  without 
tools,  contributed  essentially  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  day. 

The  removal  of  the  entrenching  tools  was  avowedly 
to  prevent  their  falling  into  the  enemy's  hands,  in  case 
of  their  carrying  the  fortifications,  and,  for  that  purpose, 
were  of  course  conveyed  across  Charlestown  neck. 
The  men  detached  for  the  service  were  not  again  seen 
on  the  field  of  battle  that  day.  Col.  Swett  admits  this 
fact.  He  says — "  The  detachment  sent  off  with  the  en 
trenching  tools,  in  contempt  of  their  orders,  never  re 
turned."  -(p.  241.) 

*  Mr.  Peabody  gives  the  same  account  as  Col.  Swett,  in  respect'  to  Put 
nam  s  detaining  a  portion  of  Stark's  regiment  on  Bunker  Hill.  And  Mr. 
Everett,  in  his  Life  of  the  latter,  gives  a  like  relation,  upon  the.  authority, 
it  is  presumed  of  the  two  former  writers  ;  as  no  mention  is  made  of  it  m 
tne  Memoirs  of  htark,  which  he  professes  to  follow  as  his  guide,  in  regard 
to  the  personal  history  of  the  subject  of  his  work 


149 

These  tools  were  doubtless  used,  on  the  night  suc 
ceeding  the  retreat,  in  throwing  up  breast-works  on 
Winter  and  Prospect  Hills. 

The  drums  beat  to  arms.  Putnam  left  his  works,  com 
menced  on  Bunker  Hill,  and  led  the  troops  into  action. 

Or,  more  properly,  relinquished  the  commencement 
of  works,  having  no  means,  as  before  shown,  for  the 
purpose.  That  Putnam,  however,  led  the  troops  into 
action,  is  an  allegation  entirely  gratuitous.  The  author 
produces  no  testimony  in  its  support ;  besides,  it  has 
been  positively  proved  not  to  be  the  fact. 

.Gen.  Ward  had  by  this  time  despatched  sufficient  reinforce 
ments,  but  they  did  not  reach  the  field.  The  fire  across  the 
neck  wore  an  aspect  too  terrific  for  raw  troops  to  venture  in 
it.  Putnam  flew  to  the  spot  to  overcome  their  fears  and 
hurry  them  on  before  the  enemy  returned.  He  entreated, 
threatened,  and  encouraged  them ;  lashing  his  horse  with 
the  flat  of  his  sword,  he  rode  backward  and  forward  across 
the  neck,  through  the  hottest  Jire,  to  convince  them  there  ivas 
no  danger.  The  balls  however  threw  up  clouds  of  dust 
about  him,  and  the  soldiers  were  perfectly  convinced  that  he 
was  invulnerable,  but  not  equally  conscious  of  being  so  them 
selves.*  Some  of  these  troops,  however,  ventured  over. 

That  Putnam  passed  Charlestown  neck,  in  company 
with  a  reinforcement,  that  had  been  ordered  to  Bunker 
Hill,  is  not  improbable ;  and  that  he  rode  ahead  of  the 
detachment  is  highly  probable,  presuming  there  would 
be  less  shot  expended  at  a  single  object,  than  when  a 
considerable  body  of  men  were  exposed  together.  But 
that  he  rode  backward  and  forward  across  the  neck,  as 
here  represented,  would  prove  him  a  madman,  unfit  to 
command  armies.  Putnam,  throughout  the  whole  of 
his  military  career,  has  shown  too  much  common  sense 
and  prudence,  thus  uselessly  to  expose  his  person.  The 
ridiculous  experiment  is  also  stated  to  have  proved  of 

*  The  principal  fact  here  is  proved  by  the  deposition  of  Mr.  Samuel  Bas- 
selt;  the  other  circumstances  by  oral  testimony. 

13* 


150 

no  avail,  as  it  did  not  convince  the  troops  there  wa3  no 
danger,  but  the  contrary. 

But  after  all  the  parade  made  with  Gen.  Putnam  in 
respect  to  ^reinforcements,  of  what  benefit  was  it,  so 
long  as  they  were  not  brought  into  action?  "All  the 
reinforcements,"  says  Gen.  Wilkinson,  "  which  arrived 
at  Bunker  Hill,  after  Col.  Stark  had  passed,  halted  and 
kept  company  with  Gen.  Putnam  and  Col.  Gerrish." 

Gen.  Putnam  left  the  neck  for  Bunker  Hill  to  bring  np 
the  reinforcements.  The  men  were  disorganized  and  dis 
persed  on  the  west  side  of  the  hill,  and  covered  by  the  sum 
mit  from  the  fire.  Putnam  ordered  them  on  to  the  lines  ; 
he  entreated  and  threatened  them,  and  some  of  the  most 
cowardly  he  knocked  down  with  his  sword,  but  all  in  vain. 
The  men  complained  they  had  not  their  officers ;  he  offered 
to  lead  them  on  himself,  but  "  the  cannon  were  deserted  and 
they  stood  no  chance  without  them."  The  battle  indeed  ap 
peared  here  in  all  its  horrors.  The  British  musketry  fred 
high,  and  took  effect  on  this  elevated  hill,  and  it  was  com 
pletely  exposed  to  the  combined  fire  from  their  ships,  bat 
teries,  and  field-pieces. 

What  inconsistency  1  Gen.  Putnam  having  just  made 
a -requisition  on  Col.  Stark  for  men  to  assist  in  raising 
his  works  on  Bunker  Hill,  is  at  the  same  time  endeav 
oring  to  drive  off  others  to  the  field  of  action  at  Breed's 
Hill.  If  these  men  declined  fighting,  surely  they  would 
not  refuse  to  work,  for  their  own  security.  "  The  men 
complained  they  had  not  their  officers."  This  does  not 
appear,  however,  to  have  been  the  fact ;  there  was  Col. 
Gerrish  at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  by  the  side  of  Gen, 
Putnam,  and  it  is  not  alleged  that  any  of  the  officers 
left  their  corps.  The  story  seems  void  of  foundation, 
the  sheer  imagination  of  the  writer.  No  one  is  found 
to  vouch  for  it.  The  original  biographer  of  Gen.  Put 
nam,  who  claims  to  have  derived  his  information  imme 
diately  from  the  general,  makes  no  mention  of  the  cir 
cumstances  here  detailed.  Col.  Humphreys  says:  "In 
this  battle,  the  presence  and  example  of  Gen.  Putnam, 


151 

who  arrived  with  the  reinforcement,  were  not  less  con 
spicuous  than  useful."  But,  according  to  the  foregoing 
statement,  the  presence  of  Gen.  Putnam  was  of  no  avail ; 
in  fact,  it  seenled  like  an  incubus,  paralyzing  the  ener 
gies  of  all  around  him.  They  followed  his  example, 
however,  in  keeping  clear  of  the  action. 

All  that  Putnam  could  with  propriety  do,  in  the  situ 
ation  in  which  he  stood,  was,  like  Gen.  Warren,  to  have 
rushed  into  the  battle  as  a  volunteer.  He  had  no  right 
to  command  a  single  soldier  ;  but  as  the  troops  seem  not 
to  have  been  aware  of  this,  it  is  surprising  his  influence 
should  have  had  so  little  weight  as  represented,  and  it, 
therefore,  remains  in  doubt  whether  he  exercised  or  not 
any  influence  in  the  manner  stated.  No  other  officers 
complained  of  the  disobedience  of  the  soldiers  ;  they 
had  only  to  intimate  their  wll,  to  have  it  immediately 
put  in  execution.  Gen.  Putnam  alone  required  physical 
force,  and  that  even  seems  to  have  proved  unavailing, 
in  producing  obedience  to  his  commands. 

The  advance  of  the  enemy  were  in  full  view  of  the  Ame 
ricans.  Putnam  now,  with  the  assistance  of  Capt.  Ford's 
company,  opened  his  artillery  upon  them.  He  had  on  this 
day  performed  the  service  of  general,  engineer  and  guide,  and 
he  now  turned  cannonier,  with  splendid  success,  and  to  the 
highest  satisfaction  of  his  surrounding  countrymen.  Each 
company  of  artillery  had  but  twelve  cartridges,  and  these 
were  soon  expended.  He  pointed  the  cannon  himself,  the 
balls  took  effect  on  the  enemy,  and  one.ease  of  canister  made 
a  lane  through  them.  As  in  Milton's  battle, 

"  Foul  dissipation  followed  and  forced  rout." 

There  seems  to  be  some  difficulty  in  giving  Putnam 
his  proper  title  upon  this  occasion.  Col.  Swett-had  be 
fore  dubbed  him  general-superintendent,  which,  perhaps, 
comprehends  all  the  above-mentioned  titles.  Passing 
his  generalship,  of  which  enough  has  been  said,  I  must 
observe,  that  the  route  from  Cambridge  to  Bunker  Hill 
was  probably  too  well  known  to  require  a  guide ;  and 


152 

as  to  cannonier,  none  was  necessary,  no  use  being  made 
of  the  artillery.  Gen.  Dearborn  observes — "  The  fixed 
ammunition,  furnished  for  the  field-pieces,  was  calcula 
ted  for  guns  of  a  larger  caliber,  which  prevented  the 
use  of  field  artillery."  It  was,  perhaps,  fortunate  that 
the  cannon  balls  provided  were  too  large  for  the  field- 
pieces,  by  which  means,  the  powder,  intended  for  the 
"cannon,  was  reserved  for  the  small-arms. 

There  can  be  no  wonder,  that  the  author,  in  giving 
this  description,  should  have  adverted  to  Milton's  war 
in  heaven,  the  poetry  of  the  one  corresponding  with 
that  of  the  other. 

The  Americans  made  every  preparation  possible  to  repel 
the  last  desperate  effort  of  the  enemy.  Putnam  again  rode 
to  the  rear,  and  exhausted  every  art  and  effort  to  bring  on 
the"  scattered  reinforcements.  Capt.  Bayley,  only,  of  Col. 
Gerrish's  regiment,  advanced  to  the  lines,  and  Capt.  Trevett 
now  arrived  at  the  rail  fence  with  his  pieces. 

The  Americans  collected  and  made  a  brave  and  orderly  re 
treat.  Putnam  put  spurs  to  his  foaming  horse  and  threw  himself 
between  the  retreating  force  and  the  enemy,  who  were  but  twelve 
rods  from  him  ;*  his  countrymen  were  in  momentary  expec 
tation  of  seeing  this  compeer  of  the  immortal  Warren  fall. 
He  entreated  them  to  rally  and  renew  the  fight,  to  finish  his 
works  on  Bunker  Hill,  and  again  give  the  enemy  battle  on  that 
unassailable  position,  and  pledged  his  honor  to  restore  to  them 
an  easy  victory.  Capt.  Smith  of  Gen.  Ward's  regiment  came 
with  his  company  to  reinforce,  joined  in  the  retreat,  and  as 
sisted  to  keep  the  enemy  at  bay. 

The  Americans  had  retreated  about  twenty  rods  before  the 
enemy  had  time  to  rally  and  pour  in  a  destructive  fire  on 
them,  which  destroyed  more  than  they  had  lost  before  during 
the  day.  Col.  Prescott's  adjutant  was  shot  and  crippled, 
Capt.  Dow,  of  his  regiment,  was  also  crippled  by  a  wound  in 
the  leg,  and  Capt.  Bancroft  had  a  part  of  his  hand  carried  off. 

*  Deposition  of  Lyman,  then  a  lieutenant,  and  present,  and  Miner,  a  pri 
vate  in  the  same  company.  This  is  confirmed  too  by  the  testimony  of  a 
distinguished  officer  of  the  revolution,  yet  living,  who  had  served  with 
Gen.  Putnam  in  the  French  war,  and  was  present  himself  and  badly 
wounded. 


153 

The  American  left  wing  were  openly  congratulating  them 
selves  on  their  victory,  when  their  flank  was  opened  by  the 
retreat  of  the  right.  The  enemy  pressed  on  them,  and  they 
were  in  their  turn  compelled  to  retire.  Putnam  covered  their 
retreat  with  his  Connecticut  troops,  and  dared  the  utmost  fury 
of  the  enemy )  in  the  rear  of  the  whole.  These  pursued  with 
little  ardor,  but  poured  in  their  thundering  volleys,  and  show 
ers  of  balls  fell  like  hail  around  the  general* 

He  addressed  himself  to  every  passion  of  the  troops,  to 
persuade  them  to  rally,  to  throw  up  his  works  on  Bunker  Hill, 
and  make  a  stand,  and,  as  the  last  resort,  threatened  them 
with  the  eternal  disgrace  of  deserting  their  general.  He 
took  his  stand  near  a  field-piece,  and  seemed  resolved  to  brave 
the  foe  alone.  His  troops,  however,  felt  it  impossible  to  with 
stand  the  overwhelming  force  of  the  British  bayonets ;  they 
left  him.  One  sergeant  only  dared  to  stand  by  his  general 
to  the  last;  he  was  shot  down,  and  the  enemy's  baydnels were 
just  upon  the  general,  before  he  retired. 

A  casual  reader  would  be  apt  to  think  the  bombastic 
description  of  Gen.  Putnam's  prowess  here  given  was 
sheer  burlesque,  intended  by  the  writer  to  throw  ridi 
cule  upon  his  pretensions  ;  but  no  such  design  was  en 
tertained.  It  is  the  common  language  used  by  authors 
generally  when  treating  of  Gen.  Putnam,  the  American 
Samson,  and,  moreover,  is  perfectly  in  character  with 
the  subject  thereof.  I  have  the  utmost  confidence  in 
the  testimony  here  adduced  ;  bating  a  few  trifling  mis 
takes  which  might  easily  occur.  For  instance,  Putnam, 
with  his  Connecticut  troops,  did  not  cover  the  retreat. 
*  No  reinforcement  of  men,  nor  ammunition,"  says  Gen. 
Dearborn,  "  were  sent  to  our  assistance;  and,  "instead 
of  attempting  to  cover  the  retreat  of  those  who  had 
expended  their  last  shot  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  he 
[Putnam]  retreated  in  company  with  Col.  Gerrish  and 


*  This  fact  we  have  from  a  respectable  friend,  who  was  present  and  yet 
lives,  Philip  Johnson,  Esq.,  of  Newburyport.  His  honor  and  veracity  is 
surpassed  by  no  man's.  See  also  deposition  of  Capt.  Hills,  then  ensign  to 
Knowlton. 


154 

his  whole  force,  without  discharging  a  single  musket." 
This  statement  is  confirmed  by  Col.  Prescott. 

The  witnesses  brought  forward,  in  this  case,  were 
young  men  at  the  time,  and  seeing  the  fuming  and  blus 
tering  of  the  general,  they  would  naturally  look  upon 
him  as  a  paragon  of  heroism.  But,  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind,  that  this  vain  show  was  after  the  battle  was  lost ; 
and  to  think  then  of  raising  a  breastwork  upon  Banker 
Hill,  and  that  too  without  tools,  and  making  a  stand 
there,  would  have  been  sheer  madness,  an  insult  to  the 
brave  men  who  had  survived  the  contest.  This  Put 
nam  could  have  had  no  idea  of  attempting,  whatever 
pretensions  may  be  made  to  the  contrary.  For,  ac 
cording  to  Col.  Swett's  report  of  his  declaration  to  Gen. 
Warren,  he  had  no  expectation  of  maintaining  the  po 
sition.  And,  besides,  Mr.  Swett  admits,  that  the  en 
trenching  tools  had  been  sent  off.  A  few  of  these,  it 
seems,  remained  scattered  in  different  places,  a  part  of 
which  Gen.  Putnam  had  collected  and  slung  upon  his 
horse,  for  the  purpose  of  bearing  them  out  of  the  reach 
of  the  enemy,  and  not  with  a  view  of  erecting  a  fortifi 
cation  upon  Bunker  Hill.  By  his  raving  and  dashing 
about,  however,  with  his  "foaming  horse"  he  acquired 
what,  from  his  former  experience,  he  had  reason  to  ex 
pect,  the  applause  of  the  multitude.  And  he  left  the 
field  a  hero  of  the  first  order,  "  the  bravest  of  the  brave," 
and  has  continued  to  be  so  regarded  to  the  present  day. 

Finally,  if  the  foregoing  inflated  and  extravagant  re 
lations  respecting  Gen.  Putnam  continue  to  obtain  pub 
lic  confidence,  there  can  be  no  limits  to  human  credu 
lity,  and  sober  reason  and  common  sense  will  in  vain 
plead  for  consideration — they  will  be  looked  upon  as 
flat  and  insipid  in  comparison  with  such  exalted  con 
ceptions. 

What  seems  mostly  to  be  relied  upon  by  Col.  Swett, 
and  to  sustain  which  he  advances  his  strongest  testi 
mony,  is  the  swaggering,  fighting  attitude  assumed  by 
Putnam  at  the  catastrophe,  the  closing  scene  of  the 


155 

drama.  This,  however,  is  not  contradicted,  but  con 
ceded  in  its  fullest  latitude,  bating  his  remaining  at  the 
cannon  till  the  enemy  were  close  upon  him. 

AN    ORATION 

Was  delivered  at  Charlestown,  Massachusetts,  on  the 
17th  of  June,  1841,  in  commemoration  of  the  Battle 
of  Bunker  Hill,  by  George  E.  Ellis.  Although  the  or 
ator  evidently  wished  to  give  an  impartial  history  of 
this  eventful  scene,  he  appears  to  have  labored  under 
embarrassment  in  consequence  of  the  political  turn 
which  had  been  given  to  the  discussion,  in  respect  to 
the  part  taken  by  individuals  in  the  contest ;  and,  by 
taking  a  middle  course,  he  endeavors  to  escape  the 
censure  of  either  party  which  had  entered  into  contro 
versy  on  the  subject.  In  doing  this,  his  statements  in 
some  instances  are  in  opposition  to  what,  I  believe,  has 
been  clearly  proved  in  the  foregoing  pages.  His  re 
flections,  however,  are  very  interesting  and  valuable. 
He  has  ventured  to  give  full  credit  to  the  real  hero  of 
that  memorable  day,  Col.  William  Prescott,  in  opposi 
tion  to  all  other  claimants  whatever.  The  following 
are  extracts  from  the  oration : 

On  the  15th  of  June,  the  Committee  of  Safety,  by  a  se 
cret  vote,  which  was  not  recorded,  till  the  19th,  advised  the 
taking  possession  of  Bunker  Hill  and  the  Dorchester  Heights. 
On  the  next  day  the  provincial  congress,  as  a  counterblast 
to  Gen.  Gage's  proclamation,  by  which  Hancock  and  Adams 
had  been  excepted  from  the  proffer  of  a  general  amnesty, 
issued  a  like  instrument,  in  which  Gen.  Gage  and  Admiral 
Graves  were  the  scape-goats. 

It  was  amid  the  full  splendor,  luxuriance  and  heat  of  our 
summer,  when  rich  crops  were  waving  upon  all  the  hills 
and  valleys  around  us,  that  the  council  of  war  decided  to 
carry  into  execution  the  vote  of  the  Committee  of  Safety. 
We  may  omit  the  question  as  to  the  prudence  or  discretion 
of  the  measure,  as  being  equally  difficult  of  decision  and 
unimportant,  save  as  the  misgivings  of  those  who  predicted 


156 

that  the  deficiency  of  ammunition  would  endanger  a  failure, 
were  proved  by  the  result  to  be  well  grounded. 

On  Friday,  June  16th,  the  very  day  upon  which  Wash 
ington  was  officially  informed  in  the  congress  at  Philadel 
phia,  of  his  appointment  to  the  command  of  the  continental 
army  about  to  be  enlisted,  Gen.  Ward  issued  orders  to  Cols. 
Prescott  and  Bridge,  and  the  commandant  of  Col.  Frye's  reg 
iment,  to  have  their  men  ready  and  prepared  for  immediate 
service.  They  were  all  yeomen  from  Middlesex  and  Essex 
counties,  and  were  habituated  to  the  hard  labors  of  a  farm 
beneath  a  summer's  sun.  Capt.  Gridley's  new  company  of 
artillery,  and  one  hundred  and  twenty  men  from  the  Con 
necticut  regiment,  under  the  command  of  Capt.  Knowlton, 
were  included  in  the  order. 

Twenty-three  years  ago  a  controversy  arose  concerning 
the  command  of  this  expedition.  Who  was  its  commander, 
rightfully  or  actually  ?  This  question,  which  became  most 
unfortunately  mingled  with  party  politics,  was  most  earnest 
ly  and  passionately  discussed.  The  only  decisive  evidence 
which  both  parties  would  have  admitted  to  be  satisfactory, 
would  consist  in  the  production  of  the  order  which  came 
from  Gen.  Ward  ;  this,  however,  is  not  in  existence.  Judge- 
Advocate  Tudor,  who  presided  at  the  court  martials  institu 
ted  by  Gen.  Washington  on  his  arrival  at  Cambridge,  said 
that  Col.  Prescott  appeared  to  have  been  the  chief.  The 
contradictory  and  discordant  statements  of  those  who,  hav 
ing  been  engaged  in  the  field  at  different  places  and  at  dif 
ferent  hours,  were  called  upon  during  the  controversy  to 
make  depositions  as  to  who  was  the  commander-in-chief,  are 
to  be  accounted  for  by  the  lapse  of  time  and  the  effects  of 
age ;  and  besides,  great  allowances  are  to  be  made  on  ac 
count  of  the  confusion  in  the  army,  and  the  hurried  and  un 
systematic  character  of  the  •  expedition.  He  who  led 'the 
detachment  and  fulfilled  the  order,  probably  received  the  or 
der.  The  order  was  to  intrench,  and  to  defend  the  intrench- 
ments  ;  this  order  was  fulfilled  by  night  and  by  day,  by  the 
body  of  men  whom  Prescott  led  from  Cambridge  to  Charles- 
town,  and  by  the  reinforcements  who  joined  them.  There 
is  no  evidence  that  Prescott  received  any  order  from  any 
other  officer  besides  Gen.  Ward.  At  anv  rate,  he  under- 


157 

stood  till  the  day  of  his  death,  that  he  had  the  command  of 
the  expedition.  A  fair  and  impartial  detail  of  the  action,  if 
so  be  we  are  able  to  present  it,  will  be  sufficient  to  satisfy 
the  simple  desire  for  the  simple  truth. 

Col.  Gridley  accompanied  as  chief  engineer.  Three  com- 
panics  of  Bridge's  regiment  did  not  go,  but  as  small  parties 
of  other  regiments  fell  into  the  detachment,  it  consisted  of 
about  one  thousand  men.  They  took  with  them  provisions 
for  one  meal.  Col.  Prescott  was  ordered  to  take  possession 
of,  to  fortify  and  to  defend  Bunker  Hill,  but  to  keep  the  pur 
pose  of  the  expedition  secret,  nor  was  it  known  to  the  men 
until  they  found  the  wagons  on  Charlestown  neck,  laden 
with  the  intrenching  tools.  The  detachment  was  drawn  up 
upon  Cambridge  Common,  in  front  of  Gen.  Ward's  head 
quarters,  after  sunset,  when  prayers  were  offered  by  the 
Rev.  Pres.  Langdon,  and  about  nine  o'clock  the  expedition 
was  in  motion  ;  Prescott,  with  two  sergeants  carrying  dark- 
lanterns  open  in  the  rear,  leading  the  way,  Though  Pres 
cott  has  frequently  been  represented  in  accounts  of  the  bat 
tle  as  dressed  in  the  working  garb  of  a  farmer,  and  appears 
in  Trumbull's  painting  as  wearing  a  slouched  hat  and  bear 
ing  a  musket,  he  was  in  reality  arrayed  in  a  simple  and  ap 
propriate  military  costume,  a  three-cornered  hat,  a  blue 
coat  with  a  single  row  of  buttons,  lapped  up  and  faced  ;  and 
he  wore  his  well-proved  sword.  This  statement  may  be 
thought  a  trivial  correction,  but  it  sometimes  happens  that 
important  facts  depend  upon  small  particulars.  As  he  was 
sensible  to  the  effects  of  the  heat,  and  expected  warm  ser 
vice,  he  took  with  him  a  linen  coat,  or  banyan,  which  he 
wore  in  the  engagement. 

The  order  designated  Bunker  Hill  as  the  position  to  be 
taken.  But  by  mounting  it  we  can  ourselves  see  that,  com 
manded  as  it  might  be  by  shipping  in  the  rivers,  and  by  de 
fences  upon  Breed's  Hill,  it  would  have  been  altogether  un 
tenable,  except  in  connection  with  the  latter  summit,  while 
for  all  purposes  of  restraining  and  annoying  the  enemy  in 
Boston,  Breed's  Hill  was  far  superior.  Much  time,  however, 
was  consumed  in  deliberation,  after  the  detachment  had 
crossed  the  peck,  and  it  was  only  after  the  repeated  and  ur 
gent  warnings  of  the  engineer  that  longer  delay  would  nul- 

14 


158 

lify  all  their  labors,  that  the  works  were  commenced  upon 
Breed's  Hill  about  midnight.  In-  the  account  of  the  engage 
ment  afterwards  prepared  by  the  Massachusetts  congress,  it 
is  said  that  Breed's  Hill  was  fortified  by  mistake.  The  rea 
son  for  this  statement  is  not  apparent.  Undoubtedly  if  both 
summits  had  been  fortified,  and  defended  by  troops  well  pro 
vided  with  ammunition,  the  provincials  would  have  main 
tained  their  ground,  but  they  could  not  have  prevented  the 
design  of  the  British  in  occupying  the  heights  without  se 
curing  Breed's  Hill.  As  the  summits  are  not  within  mus 
ket-shot,  and  as  the  British  would  certainly  have  occupied 
Breed's  Hill,  if  not  first  taken  by  the  provincials,  our  scan 
ty  ammunition  and  weak  artillery  would  have  been  of  but 
little  avail.  ***** 

It  has  been  asserted  by  two  or  three  persons,  and  contra- 
dieted  by  others,  who  were  together  working  by  night  upon 
the  intrenchrnents,  that  Gen.  Putnam  was  there,  directing, 
encouraging,  and  aiding.  As  we  have  no  certainty  that  he 
was  then  in  the  works,  of  course  we  cannot  decide  whether 
he  had  any  part  in  their  construction.  He  may  have  rode 
over  the  neck  with  or  after  the  detachment,  and  he  would 
have  been  a  most  welcome  counsellor.  As  Putnam  was 
met  the  next  forenoon,  coming  from  Cambridge  to  Charles- 
town,  by  Maj.  Brooks,  who  was  sent  to  Gen.  Ward  with  a 
message  from  Col.  Prescott,  he  must  have  left  the  redoubt, 
if  he  had  been  in  it  at  all,  in  the  course  of  the  night,  or  very 
early  in  the  morning.  *  *  * 

The  instant  that  the  first  beams  of  light  marked  distinctly 
the  outlines  of  the  Americans,  and  of  their  intrenchrnents 
upon  the  hill,  the  cannon  of  the  Lively,  which  floated  near 
est,  opened  a  hot  fire  upon  them,  at  the  same  time  arousing 
the  sleepers  in  Boston  to  come  forth  as  spectators  or  actors 
in  the  cruel  tragedy.  The  other  armed  vessels,  some  float 
ing  batteries,  and  the  battery  on  Cop's  Hill,  combined  to 
pour  forth  their  volleys,  uttering  a  startling  and  dismal  note 
of  preparation  for  the  day's  conflict.  But  the  works,  though 
not  completed,  were  in  a  state  of  such  forwardness  that  the 
missiles  of  destruction  fell  harmless,  and  the  intrenchers 
continued  to  strengthen  their  position.  The  enemy  in  Bos. 
ton  could  scarcely  credit  their  eyesight.  Prescott,  the  hero 


159 

of  the  day,  with  whom  its  proudest  fame  should  rest,  was 
undaunted,  ardent,  and  full  of  heroic  energy.  He  planned 
and  directed,  he  encouraged  the  men,  he  mounted  the  works, 
and,  with  his  bald  head  uncovered  and  his  commanding 
frame,  he  was  a  noble  personification  of  a  patriot  cause. 
Some  of  the  men  incautiously  ventured  from  the  works, 
when  one  of  them  was  instantly  killed  by  a  cannon  shot. 
This  first  victim  was  buried  in  the  ditch,  and  his  companions 
were  fearfully  warned  of  the  fatalities  which  the  day  would 
bring  yet  nearer  to  them. 

When  the  orders  had  been  issued  at  Cambridge,  the  night 
before,  to  those  who  had  thus  complied  with  them,  refresh 
ments  and  reinforcements  had  been  promised  in  the  morning. 
Thus  some  of  the  men  might  have  thought  they  had  fulfilled 
their  part  of  the  work,  and  were  entitled  to  relief,  or  were 
at  liberty  to  depart.  Some  few,  when  the  first  victim  fell, 
left  the  hill  and  did  not  return.  Those  who  remained  were 
exhausted  with  their  toil,  and  without  food  or  water,  and  the 
morning  was  already  intensely  hot.  The  officers,  sympa 
thizing  with  their  situation  and  sufferings,  requested  Prescott 
to  send  to  Cambridge  for  relief.  He  summoned  a  council 
of  war,  but  was  resolute  against  the  petition,  saying  that  the 
enemy  would  not  venture  an  attack,  and  if  they  did  venture, 
would  be  defeated  ;  that  the  men  who  had  raised  the  works 
were  best  able  to  defend  them,  and  deserved  the  honor  of  the 
victory  ;  that  they  had  already  learned  to  despise  the  fire  of 
the  enemy.  The  vehemence  of  Prescott  infused  new  spirit 
into  the  men,  and  they  resolved  to  stand  the  dread  issue. 
Prescott  ordered  a  guard  to  the  ferry  to  prevent  a  landing 
there..  He  was  seen  by  Gage,  who  was  reconnoitering  from 
Cop's  Hill,  and  who  inquired  of  Counsellor  Willard,  by  his 
side.  "  Who  is  that  officer  commanding  ?"  Willard  recog 
nised  his  brother-in-law,  and  named  Col.  Prescott.  "  Will 
he  fight  ?"  asked  Gage.  The  answer  was,  "  Yes,  sir,  de 
pend  upon  it,  to  the  last  drop  of  blood  in  him ;  but  I  cannot 
answer  for  his  men."  Yet  Prescott  could  answer  for  his 
men,  and  that  amounted  to  the  same  thing.  *  *  *  * 

By  nine  o'clock  the  preparations  in  Boston,  heard  and  seen 
by  Prescott  on  the  hill,  informed  him  of  the  determination 
of  the  British  to  attack.  He  therefore  gave  up  his  first  opin- 


160 

ion,  that  they  would  not  dare  to  resist  him,  and  comforted 
himself  and  his  men  with  the  promise  of  certain  and  glori 
ous  victory.  He  sent  Maj.  Brooks  to  Gen.  Ward,  to  urge 
the  necessity  of  his  being  reinforced.  Brooks  being  obliged 
to  proceed  on  foot,  as  Capt.  Gridley  would  not  risk  one  of 
his  artillery  horses  to  pass  the  neck,  which  was  swept  by 
the  Glasgow  frigate,  arrived  about  ten  o'clock  at  head-quar 
ters,  where  the  Committee  of  Safety  were  then  in  session. 
Brooks'  urgency,  seconded  by  the  solicitations  of  Richard 
Devens,  a  member  of  the  committee,  and  a  citizen  of  Charles- 
town,  induced  Gen.  Ward  to  order  that  Cols.  Reed  and 
Stark,  then  at  Medford,  should  reinforce  Prescott  with  the 
New  Hampshire  troops.  The  companies  at  Chelsea  were 
then  recalled,  and  the  order  reached  Medford  at  eleven 
o'clock.  The  men  were  as  speedily  as  possible  provided 
with  ammunition,  though  much  time  was  consumed  in  the 
preparation.  Each  man  received  two  flints,  a  gill  of  powder, 
and  fifteen  balls.  They  were  without  cartridge-boxes,  and 
used  powder-horns  and  pouches,  or  their  pockets,  as  substi 
tutes,  and  in  making  up  their  cartridges  they  were  obliged 
to  beat  and  shape  their  balls  according  to  the  different  cali 
bre  of  their  guns.  * 

It  was  of  vital  necessity  that  every  charge  of  powder  and 
ball  spent  by  the  Americans  should  take  effect.  There  were 
none  for  waste.  The  officers  commanded  their  men  to  with 
hold  their  fire  till  the  enemy  were  within  eight  rods,  and 
when  they  could  see  the  whites  of  their  eyes,  to  aim  at  their 
waistbands,  also  to  "  aim  at  the  handsome  coats,  and  pick 
off  the  commanders."  As  the  British  left  wing  came  within 
gun-shot  the  men  in  the  redoubt  could  scarcely  restrain  their 
fire,  and  a  few  discharged  their  pieces.  Prescott,  indignant 
at  this  disobedience,  vowed  instant  death  to  any  one  who 
should  repeat  it,*  and  promised,  by  the  confidence  which 
they  reposed  in  him,  to  give  the  command  at  the  proper  mo 
ment.  His  lieutenant-colonel,  Robinson,  ran  round  the  top 
of  the  works  and  knocked  up  the  muskets.  When  the  space 
between  the  assailants  and  the  redoubt  was  narrowed  to  the 
appointed  span,  the  word  was  spoken  at  the  moment ;  the 

*This  declaration  has  been  borrowed  from  Prescott  and  given  to  Putnam, 
Edit.  V.  R. 


161 

deadly  flashes  burst  forth,  and  the  green  grass  was  crimson 
ed  with  the  life-blood  of  hundreds.  The  front  rank  was 
nearly  obliterated,  as  were  its  successive  substitutes,  as  the 
Americans  were  well  protected  and  were  deliberate  in  their 
aim.  ***** 

The  British  officers  were  seen  to  goad  on  some  of  their 
reluctant  men  with  their  swords.  It  was  for  them  now  to 
receive  the  fire,  and  to  reserve  their  own  till  they  could  fol 
low  it  by  a  thrust  of  the  bayonet.  Each  shot  of  the  provin 
cials  was  true  to  its  aim.  Col.  Abercrombie,  Majs.  Wil 
liams  and  Spendlove  fell.  Gen.  Howe  was  wounded  in  the 
foot.  Hand  to  hand  and  face  to  face,  were  exchanged  the 
last  awful  hostilities  of  that  day.  Only  a  ridge  of  earth  di 
vided  the  grappling  combatants,  whose  feet  were  slipping 
upon  the  gory  sand  while  they  joined  in  the  mortal  strife. 
When  the  enemy  found  themselves  received  with  stones,  the 
missiles  of  a  more  ancient  warfare,  they  knew  that  their 
work  was  nearly  done,  as  they  now  contended  with  unarm 
ed  men.  Young  Richardson,  of  the  Royal  Irish,  was  the 
first  who  scaled  the  parapet,  and  he  fell,  as  did  likewise  the 
first  rank  that  mounted  if,  among  whom  Maj.  Pitcairn,  who 
had  shed  the  first  blood  at  Lexington,  was  shot  by  a  negro 
soldier.  It  was  only  when  the  redoubt  was  crowded  with 
the  enemy  and  the  defenders  in  one  promiscuous  throng, 
and  assailants  on  all  sides  were  pouring  into  it,  that  Pres- 
cott,  no  less,  but  even  more  a  hero  when  he  uttered  the  re 
luctant  word,  ordered  a  retreat.  A  longer  trial  would  have 
been  folly,  not  courage.  Some  of  the  men  had  splintered 
their  musket-stocks  in  fierce  blows,  nearly  all  were  defence 
less,  yet  there  was  that  left  within  them,  in  a  dauntless  soul, 
which  might  still  help  their  country  at  its  need.  Prescott 
gave  the  crowning  proof  of  his  devoted  and  magnanimous 
spirit,  when  he  cooled  the  heat  of  his  own  brain,  and  bore 
the  bitter  pang  in  his  own  heart,  by  commanding  an  orderly 
and  still  resisting  retreat.  He  was  the  hero  of  that  blood- 
dyed  summit — the  midnight  leader  and  guard,  the  morning 
sentinel,  the  orator  of  the  opening  strife,  the  cool  and  delib 
erate  overseer  of  the  whole  struggle,  the  well-skilled  marks 
man  of  the  exact  distance  at  which  a  shot  was  certain  death  ; 
he  was  the  venerable  chief  in  whose  bright  eye  and  steady 


162 

nerve  all  read  their  duty ;  and  when  conduct,  skill,  and 
courage  could  do  no  more,  he  was  the  merciful  deliverer  of 
the  remnant.  Prescott  was  the  hero  of  the  day,  and  where- 
ever  its  tale  is  told,  let  him  be  its  chieftain. 

The  troops  in  the  redoubt  now  fought  their  pathway 
through  the  encircling  enemy,  turning  their  faces  towards 
the  foe  while  they  retreated  with  backward  steps.  •  Gridley, 
who  had  planned  and  defended  the  works,  received  a  wound, 
and  was  borne  off.  Warren  was  among  the  last  to  leave 
the  redoubt,  and  at  a  short  distance  from  it,  a  musket-ball 
through  his  head  killed  him  instantly.  When  the  corpse  of 
that  illustrious  patriot  was  recognised  and  identified  the  next 
morning  by  Dr.' Jeffries,  Gen.  Howe  thought  that  this  one 
victim  well  repaid  the  loss  of  numbers  of  his  mercenaries, 
It  is  not  strange  that,  both  in  English  and  American  narra 
tives  of  that  day,  and  in  some  subsequent  notices  of  it,  War 
ren  should  have  been  represented  as  the  commander  of  the 
provincial  forces.  His  influence  and  his  patriotism  were 
equally  well  known  to  friend  and  foe.  There  is  no  more 
delicate  task  than  to  divide  among  many  heroes  the  honors 
of  a  battle-field,  and  the  rewards  of  devoted  service.  Yet 
the  high-minded  will  always  appreciate  the  integrity  of  the 
motive  which  seeks  to  distinguish  between  the  places  and 
the  modes  of  service,  where  those  who  alike  love  their  coun 
try  enjoy  the  opportunity  of  securing  the  laurels  of  heroism 
and  devotion.  The  council-chamber  and  the  forum,  and 
the  high  place  in  the  public  assembly,  offer  to  the  patriot- 
statesman  the  opportunity  for  winning  remembrance  and 
honor  to  his  name;  the  battle-field  must  retain  the  same 
high  privilege  for  the  patriot-soldier,  for  there  alone  can  he 
earn  the  wreath.  Let  the  chivalry  and  the  magnanimity 
of  Warren  for  ever  fill  a  brilliant  page  in  our  history,  but 
let  not  a  partial  homage  attach  to  him  the  honor  to  which 
another  has  a  rightful  claim.  It  was  no  part  of  his  pure 
purpose,  in  mingling  with  his  brethren  on  that  field,  to  mo 
nopolize  its  honors  and  to  figure  as  its  hero.  It  is  enough 
that  he  stood  among  equals  in  devotion  and  patriotism.  Let 
it  be  remembered  that  he  did  not  approve  the  measure  of 
thus  challenging  a  superior  enemy  with  such  insufficient 
preparation:  the  more  honorable,  therefore,  was  his  self- 


163 

sacrifice,  in  giving  the  whole  energy  of  his  will  to  falsify  tne 
misgivings  of  his  judgment.  Here,  then,  is  his  claim,  which, 
when  fully  allowed,  leaves  the  honors  of  that  summit  to  the 
leader  of  the  heroic  band.  *  *  *  * 

Prescott  repaired  to  head-quarters  to  make  return  of  his 
trust.  He  was  indignant  at  the  loss  of  the  battle,  and  im 
plored  Gen.  Ward  to  commit  to  him  three  fresh  regiments, 
promising  with  them  to  win  back  the  day.  But  he  had  al 
ready  honorably  accomplished  all  that  his  country  might 
demand.  He  complained  bitterly  that  the  reinforcements, 
\vhich  might  have  given  to  his  triumph  the  completeness  that 
was  needed  to  make  it  a  victory,  had  failed  him. 

I  will  close  the  subject  of  the  Bunker  Hill  battle  with 
the  following  notice,  which  lately  appeared  in  the  New 
York  Commercial  Advertiser.  It  may  not  be  generally 
known,  that  Mr.  Bancroft  is  now  publishing  a  History 
of  the  United  States,  from  the  discovery  of  the  Ameri 
can  continent,  which  is  spoken  of  with  the  highest  ap 
probation.  He  has  come  to  the  same  conclusion  as  has 
been  expressed  in  the  foregoing  sheets,  in  respect  to  the 
cause  of  Putnam's  escaping  the  sentence  of  a  court 
martial. 

Although  Gen.  Putnam  brought  to  the  battle  ground 
no  reinforcements,  a  sufficient  number  were  sent  by 
Gen.  Ward,  the  greater  part  of  which  stopped  with  the 
former  and  Col.  Gerrish  on  Bunker  Hill.  These  were 
supposed  to  amount  to  about  one  thousand  two  hun 
dred,  and  to  be  equal  to  the  number  of  Americans  en 
gaged  in  the  action.  Their  retention,  it  is  evident, 
caused  the  loss  of  th§  battle  ;  and  Mr.  Bancroft  has 
doubtless  so  expressed  himself  in  his  lecture. 

"  Mr.  Bancroft  has  .been  delivering  a  lecture  in  Bos 
ton,  the  subject  of  which  was  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill. 
It  is  spoken  of  as  one  of  the  author's  ablest  and  most 
brilliant  performances.  Upon  one  point,  that  of  the 
questioned  presence  and  merits  of  Gen.  Putnam  in  that 
battle,  Mr.  Bancroft  had  taken  great  pains  in  his  prepa 
ration.  The  result  of  his  researches  has  been  to  settle 


164 

the  point.  The  commander  was  Col.  Prescott — not 
Gen.  Putnam.  Nor  did  the  latter  take  any  efficient 
part  in  the  engagement.  Before  it  commenced  he  went 
to  the  rear  to  bring  up  reinforcements.  Putnam  re 
appeared  before  the  battle  was  over,  but  without  the 
reinforcements.  The  loss  of  the  day  was  attributed  to 
their  absence.  An  inquiry  upon  the  subject  was  insti 
tuted  by  Washington,  and  the  reason  that  Putnam 
escaped  censure  was  the  fact  that  he  was  not  in  any 
command  during  the  day." 


165 


CHAPTER  VI. 

BATTLE    OF    LONG    ISLAND. 

After  the  battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  the  next  conspicuous 
and  responsible  situation  in  which  Gen.  Putnam  appears, 
was  at  the  battle  of  Long  Island. 

Col.  Humphreys  gives  but  a  slight  sketch  of  this 
event,  of  which  the  following  is  the  most  essential : 

On  the  22d  day  of  August,  [1776,]  the  van  of  the  British 
landed  on  Long  Island,  and  was  soon  followed  by  the  whole 
army,  except  one  brigade  of  Hessians,  a  small  body  of  Brit 
ish,  and  some  convalescents,  left  on  Staten  Island.  Our 
troops  on  Long  Island  had  been  commanded  during  the 
summer  by  Gen.  Greene,  who  was  now  sick  ;  and  Gen.  Put 
nam  took  the  command  but  two  days  [four  days]  before  the 
battle  of  Flatbush.  The  instructions  to  him,  pointing  in  the 
first  place  to  decisive  expedients  for  suppressing  the  scatter 
ing,  unmeaning,  and  wasteful  fire  of  our  men,  contained 
regulations  for  the  service  of  the  guards,  the  brigadiers  and 
the  field-officers  of  the  day  ;  for  the  appointment  and  encour 
agement  of  proper  scouts,  as  well  as  for  keeping  the  men 
constantly  at  their  posts.  To  -these  regulations  were  added 
exhortations  for  the  soldiers  to  conduct  themselves  manfully 
in  such  a  cause,  and  for  their  commander  to  oppose  the  enemy's 
approach  with  detachments  of  his  best  troops  ;  while  he  should 
endeavor  to  render  their  advance  more  difficult  by  construct 
ing  abattis,  and  to  entrap  their  parties  by  forming  ambuscades. 
Gen.  Putnam  was  within  the  lines,  when  an  engagement  took 
place  on  the  27th,  between  the  British  army  and  our  ad 
vanced  corps,  in  which  we  lost  about  a  thousand  men  in 
killed  and  missing,  with  the  generals  Sullivan  and  Lord 
Stirling  made  prisoners.  But  our  men,  though  attacked  on 


166 

all  sides,  fought  with  great  bravery ;  and  the  enemy's  loss 
was  not  light. 

The  unfortunate  battle  of  Long  Island,  the  masterly  retreat 
from  thence,  and  the  actual  passage  of  part  of  the  hostile 
fleet  in  the  East  river,  above  the  town,  preceded  the  evacua 
tion  of  New  York. 

To  the  foregoing  I  add  the  account  of  that  affair  by 
Judge  Marshall,  in  his  Life  of  Gen.  Washington  ;  which 
has  the  most  undoubted  claims  to  authenticity,  being 
"compiled  under  the  inspection  of  the  Hon.  Bushrod 
Washington,  from  original  papers,  bequeathed  to  him 
by  his  deceased  relative,  and  now  [at  the  time  of  his 
writing]  in  possession  of  the  author." 

I  shall  notice  only  such  leading  points  as  go  to  show 
the  cause  of  the  terrible  disasters  of  that  day. 

"  As  the  de^nce  of  Long  Island  was  intimately  con 
nected  with  that  of  New  York,  a  brigade  had  very  early 
been  stationed  there,  and  had  taken  a  strong  position  at 
Brooklyn,  capable  of  being  maintained  for  a  considera 
ble  time.  This  post,  communicating  immediately  with 
York  island,  might  easily  be  reinforced,  or  abandoned, 
as  occasion  should  require,  and  there  an  extensive 
camp  had  been  marked  out  and  fortified.  *  *  * 

"  Maj.  Gen.  Greene  originally  commanded  on  Long 
Island,  but  he  being  unfortunately  taken  extremely  ill, 
was  superseded  by  Gen.  Sullivan.  *  *  *  The 
movements  of  the  enemy  soon  indicated  an  intention  to 
make  their  first  attack  on  Long  Island,  in  consequence 
of  which  Gen.  Sullivan  was  strongly  reinforced.  Early 
in  the  morning  of  the  22d  the  principal  part  of  the  Brit 
ish  troops,  and  Col.  Donlop's  corps  of  chasseurs  and 
Hessian  grenadiers,  with  forty  pieces  of  cannon,  landed 
without  opposition,  under  cover  of  the  guns  of  the  fleet, 
near  Utrecht  and  Gravesend. 

"  Maj.  Gen.  Putnam  was  now  directed  to  take  com 
mand  at  Brooklyn,  which  camp  was  reinforced  with 
six  regiments  ;  and  he  was  charged  most  earnestly  by 
the  commander-in-chief  to  be  in  constant  readiness  for 


167 

an  attack,  and  to  guard  the  woods  between  the  two  camps 
with  his  best  troops. 

"  In  front  of  the  camp  was  a  range  of  hills  covered 
with,  thick  woods,  which  extended  from  east  to  west 
nearly  the  length  of  the  island,  and  across  which  were 
three  roads  leading  to  Brooklyn  ferry.  These  hills, 
though  steep,  are  everywhere  passable  by  infantry. 

"  About  nine  o'clock  at  night,  Gen.  Clinton  silently 
drew  off  the  van  of  the  army,  consisting  of  the  light 
infantry,  grenadiers,  light-horse,  reserve  under  Lord 
Cornwallis,  and  some  other  corps,  with  fourteen  field- 
pieces,  from  Flatland,  across  the  country,  through  that 
part  which  is  called  the  New  Lotts,  in  order  to  seize  a 
pass  in  the  heights  about  three  miles  east  of  Bedford, 
on  the  Jamaica  road.  Arriving  entirely  undiscovered, 
about  two  hours  before  daybreak,  within  half  a  mile  of 
the  pass,  he  halted  to  make  his  dispositions  for  taking 
possession  of  it.  Here  his  patrols  fell  in  with  and  cap 
tured  one  of  the  American  parties,  which  had  been 
stationed  on  this  road  for  the  purpose  of  giving  notice 
of  the  first  approach  of  the  enemy  in  that  quarter. 
Learning  from  his  prisoners  that  the  pass  was  unoccu 
pied,  he  immediately  seized  it ;  and  on  the  appearance 
of  day,  the  whole  column  passed  the  heights  and  ad 
vanced  into  the  level  country  between  them  and 
Brooklyn.  They  were  immediately  followed  by  an 
other  column  under  Lord  Percy."  (Gen.  Howe's  letter.) 

"  About  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  Brig.  Gen.  Lord 
Stirling  was  directed,  with  the  two  nearest  regiments, 
to  meet  the  enemy  on  the  road  leading  from  the  Nar 
rows.  Maj.  Gen.  Sullivan,  who  commanded  all  the 
troops  without  the  lines,  proceeded  with  a  very  consid 
erable  body  of  New  Englanders  on  the  road  leading 
directly  to  Flatbush,  and  another  detachment  occupied 
the  heights  between  that  place  and  Bedford.  *  *  * 

"  The  firing  towards  Brooklyn  gave  the  first  intima 
tion  to  the  American  right,  that  the  enemy  had  gained 
their  rear.  ****** 


168 

"  The  loss  sustained  by  the  American  army  was  very 
considerable,  but  could  not  be  accurately  ascertained 
by  either  party.  Gen.  Washington  did  not  admit  it  to 
exceed  one  thousand  men,  but  in  this  estimate  he  could 
only  have  included  the  regular  troops.  In  a  letter 
written  by  Gen.  Howe,  he  states  the  prisoners  to  have 
amounted  to  one  thousand  and  ninety-seven,  among 
whom  were  Maj.  Gen.  Sullivan.  Brig.  Lord  Stirling, 
and  Woodhull.  He  computes  the  loss  of  the  Americans 
at  three  thousand  three  hundred,  but  this  computation 
is  probably  excessive.  The  loss  of  the  enemy  is  stated 
by  Gen.  Howe  at  twenty-one  officers,  and  three  hun 
dred  and  forty-six  privates  killed,  wounded,  and  taken. 

"The  attempt  to  defend  Long  Island  was  so  disastrous 
in  its  issue,  and  believed  to  have  been  so  perilous  in  it 
self,  that  persons  were  not  wanting  who  condemned  it ; 
and  it  is  yet  represented  as  a  great  error  in  the  com- 
mander-in-chief.  But  in  deciding  on  the  wisdom  of 
measures,  the  event  will  not  always  lead  to  a  correct 
judgment.  Before  a  just  opinion  can  be  formed,  it  is 
necessary  to  consider  the  previous  state  of  things,  to 
weigh  the  motives  which  led  to  the  decision,  and  to 
compare  the  value  of  the  object  and  the  probability  of 
securing  it,  with  the  hazards  attending  the  attempt. 

"  There  was,  certainly,  in  the  plan  of  maintaining  Long 
Island  considerable  hazard  ;  but  not  so  much  as  to  de 
monstrate  the  propriety  of  relinquishing  a  post  of  so 
much  importance,  without  a  struggle  to  preserve  it. 

"  With  much  more  appearance  of  reason,  the  general 
has  been  condemned  for  not  having  guarded  the  road 
that  leads  over  the  hills  from  Jamaica  to  Bedford.  An 
attention  to  this  object  was  more  particularly  the  duty 
of  the  officer  commanding  the  post,  whose  general  written 
instructions,  given  two  days  previous  to  the  action,  had 
directed  that  the  woods  should  be  well  guarded,  and  the 
approach  of  the  enemy  through  them  rendered  as  difficult 
as  possible. 

"  The  most  advisable  plan  appears  to  have  been,  so 


169 

to  watch  the  motions  of  the  enemy,  as,  if  possible,  to  be 
master  of  his  designs,  to  oppose  with  a  competent  force 
every  attempt  to  seize  the  heights,  and  to  guard  all  the 
passes  in  such  a  manner  as  to  receive  notice  of  the  ap 
proach  through  any  one  of  them  in  sufficient  time  to 
recall  the  troops  maintaining  the  others. 

"  This  plan  was  adopted  ;  and  the  heavy  disasters 
of  the  day  are  principally  attributable  to  the  failure  of 
those  charged  with  the  execution  of  that  very  impor 
tant  part  of  it,  respecting  the  intelligence  from  the  Ja 
maica  road." 

It  thus  appears  that  Gen.  Putnam  did  not  fulfil  the 
orders  of  the  commander-in-chief,  in  guarding  the 
passes  in  question.  He  had  a  large  disposable  force 
under  his  command,  amply  sufficient  for  the  purpose, 
which  remained  idle  with  him  at  Brooklyn  Heights 
during  the  struggle.  "  Gen.  Clinton,"  says  Gen.  Howe, 
"  learning  from  his  prisoners  that  the  pass  was  unoc 
cupied,  immediately  seized  it."  •  These  prisoners  con 
sisted  probably  of  some  half-dozen  men  ;  whereas,  one 
hundred  or  a  hundred  and  fifty  were  required  at  that 
pass,  to  be  of  any  avail.  Such  number  would  likely 
have  been  able  to  capture  the  British  patrols,  and  give 
immediate  information  at  head-quarters  of  the  approach 
of  the  enemy  in  that  quarter. 

"  The  suspicions  of  Gen.  Putnam,"  says  Marshall, 
*'  had  been  very  much  directed  towards  the  road  along 
the  coast."  And  his  erroneous  judgment,  it  seems,  led 
to  his  disobedience  of  orders.  Hence  the  fatal  calamity 
of  that  eventful  day,  in  which  the  Americans  had  over 
three  thousand  men  killed,  wounded,  and  taken  prison 
ers.  Although  the  American  army  might  not  have  been 
able  to  retain  its  position  on  Long  Island,  still  its  loss 
would  have  been  far  less,  had  Putnam  done  his  duty. 
There  is  no  possibility  of  evading  this  conclusion.  By 
his  remissness,  the  enemy  passed  undiscovered  within 
our  lines,  by  which  means  the  American  army  was 
completely  surrounded,  and  had  to  fight  their  way 

15 


170 

through  the  ranks  of  the  enemy  as  well  as  they  could  ; 
many  of  whom  in  the  attempt  were  killed,  wounded,  or 
taken  prisoners. 

By  the  assigning  of  Putnam  to  the  command  at  Brook 
lyn,  it  would  not  appear  that  he  was  to  supersede  Gen. 
Sullivan.  Marshall,  moreover,  says — "  Maj.  Gen.  Sul 
livan  commanded  all  the  troops  without  the  lines." 
Sullivan,  however,  entertained  a  different  opinion,  as 
will  presently  be  shown.  It  was  proper  for  Gen. 
Washington  to  remain  in  New  York,  for  he  could  not 
know  that  the  descent  upon  Long  Island  was  not  a 
mere  finesse,  and  that  the  main  attack  would  be  on  the 
city  of  New  York.  It  consequently  became  important 
that  some  head-quarters  should  be  established  on  Long 
Island,  and  Brooklyn  was  the  only  convenient  station 
for  the  purpose.  Here,  moreover,  was  the  grand  depot 
of  troops,  and  the  officer  commanding  had  the  power 
to  detach  such  portions  of  them  as  he  chose,  to  give 
aid  wherever  required,  and,  therefore,  had  virtually  the 
chief  command.  This  was  the  most  responsible  station, 
and  the  commandant  ought  to  have  had  a  sufficient 
number  of  mounted  men  constantly  on  the  alert,  to 
give  him  information  from  the  different  positions  on  the 
lines,  every  ten  or  fifteen  minutes.  Nothing  of  the  kind 
was  done,  all  was  left  hap-hazard.  No  intelligence  of 
the  enemy  was  received  till  they  were  within  our  lines, 
and  the  American  army  was  surprised  and  overwhelm 
ed  in  consequence  of  this  criminal  neglect. 

That  Gen.  Putnam  considered  himself  in  command 
of  all  the  troops  on  Long  Island  is  evident  from  the 
statement  of  the  vigilant,  enterprising  officer,  Col.  [then 
major]  Aaron  Burr,  as  made  to  his  biographer,  and  by 
him  published  as  follows  : 

"  At  this  time  Maj.  Gen.  Greene  commanded  on  Long 
Island,  but  his  health  was  so  bad,  that  it  became  neces 
sary  for  him  to  resign  it.  The  commander-in-chief  or 
dered  Gen.  Putnam  to  assume  the  command.  Maj. 
Burr  was  his  aid-de-camp.  The  landing  of  the  British 


171 

had  been  previously  effected,  on  the  22d  of  August, 
without  opposition,  near  Utrecht  and  Gravesend,  on  the 
southwest  end  of  the  island.  The  American  troops, 
less  than  twelve  thousand,  were  encamped  on  the  north 
of  Brooklyn  Heights.  The  British  force  was  more 
than  twenty  thousand  strong.  The  armies  were  sepa 
rated  by  a  range  of  hills,  at  that  time  covered  with 
wood,  called  the  Heights  of  Gowannus,  Maj.  Burr 
immediately  commenced  an  inspection  of  the  troops, 
and  made  to  the  general  a  most  unfavorable  report, 
both  as  to  the  means  of  defence  and  their  discipline. 
Previous  to  the  action,  Maj.  Burr  had  expressed  to  Gen. 
Putnam  the  opinion,  that  a  battle  ought  not  to  be  risked. 
He  proposed,  however,  several  enterprises  for  beating 
up  the  quarters  of  the  enemy.  To  all  which  Gen. 
Putnam  replied,  that  his  orders  were  not  to  make  any 
attack,  but  to  act  on  the  defensive  only."  (Davis's 
Mem.  A.  Burr,  vol.  1,  p.  98.) 

According  to  this  order,  the  enemy  were  not  to  be 
disturbed  till  they  were  perfectly  prepared  for  action  ; 
left  quietly  to  choose  their  own  time,  and  place  of  attack. 
There  must  be  here  some  misconception  on  the  part  of 
Gen.  Putnam.  Under  the  circumstances  in  which  the 
armies  were  placed,  it  would  seem  impossible  that  the 
commander-in-chief  should  have  given  such  an  order. 
The  notorious  Gen.  Hull  acted  upon  this  principle  :  not 
Washington  ! 

The  following  letter  explains  the  views  of  Gen.  Sul 
livan,  in  regard  to  the  command  at  the  action  on  Long 

T     1  J 

Island  : 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Sullivan  to  the  presi 
dent  of  congress : 

"  Whitemarch,  26th  of  October,  1777. 
"  I  know  it  has  been  generally  reported,  that  I  com 
manded  on  Long  Island  when   the  action   happened 
there.     This  is  by  no  means  true.     Gen.  Putnam  had 
taken  the  command  from  me  four  days  before  the  ac- 


172 

tion.  Lord  Stirling  commanded  the  main  body  with 
out  the  lines.  I  was  to  have  commanded  under  Gen. 
Putnam  within  the  lines.  I  was  uneasy  about  a  road, 
through  which  I  had  often  foretold  that  the  enemy 
would  come,  but  could  not  persuade  others  to  be  of  my 
opinion.  I  went  to  the  hill  .near  Flatbush  to  reconnoi- 
ter,  and  with  a  picket  of  four  hundred  men  was  sur 
rounded  by  the  enemy,  who  had  advanced  by  the  very 
road  I  had  foretold,  and  which  I  had  paid  horsemen  fif 
ty  dollars  for  patrolling  by  night,  while  I  had  the  com 
mand. 

"  What  resistance  I  made  with  these  four  hundred 
men  against  the  British  army,  I  leave  to  the  officers 
who  were  with  me  to  declare.  Let  it  suffice  for  me 
to  say,  that  the  opposition  of  the  small  party  lasted 
from  half-past  nine  to  twelve  o'clock."  (Sparks'  Wash 
ington,  vol.  iv.,  p.  517. 

Sullivan  must  have  alluded  to  Gen.  Putnam,  as  not 
being  apprehensive  of  the  enemy's  taking  the  route  by 
which  they  actually  entered  the  American  lines  ;  for 
Washington  had  expressed  his  opinion  fully  that  there 
should  be  a  bright  look-out  in  that  quarter,  and  the 
passes  well  guarded.  This  delusion  of  Putnam,  per 
haps,  caused  his  neglect  of  orders,  which  led  to  the  fa 
tal  catastrophe  that  followed. 

It  appears  that  Gen.  Sullivan  conceived  he  had  been 
slighted  in  respect  to  the  command  on  Long  Island,  as 
well  as  on  other  occasions,  and  that  he  expressed  his 
feelings  to  Washington  on  the  subject,  which  drew 
from  the  latter  the  following  singular  letter : 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Washington  to  Gen. 
Sullivan  : 

Morristown,  15th  March,  1777. 

"  Do  not,  my  dear  Gen.  Sullivan,  torment  yourself 
with  imaginary  slights,  and  involve  others  in  the  per 
plexities  you  feel  on  that  score.     No  other  officer  ot 
rank,  in  the  whole  armv,  has  so  often  conceived  him- 


173 

self  neglected,  slighted,  and  ill-treated,  as  you  have 
done,  and  none  I  am  sure  has  had  less  cause  than  your 
self  to  entertain  such  ideas.  Mere  accidents,  things 
which  have  occurred  in  the  common  course  of  service, 
have  been  considered  by  you  as  designed  affronts.  But 
pray,  sir,  in  what  respect  did  Gen.  Greene's  late  com 
mand  at  Fort  Lee  differ  from  his  present  command  at 
Baskenridge,  or  from  yours  at  Chatham  ?  And  what 
kind  of  separate  command  had  Gen.  Putnam  at  New 
York  ?  I  never  heard  of  any,  except  his  commanding 
there  ten  days  before  my  arrival  from  Boston,  and  one 
day  after  I  had  left  it  for  Harlem  Heights,  as  senior 
officer.  In  like  manner  at  Philadelphia,  how  did  his 
command  differ  from  the  one  he  has  at  Princeton,*  and 
wherein  does  either  vary  from  yours  at  Chatham  ?  Are 
there  any  peculiar  emoluments  or  honors  to  be  reaped 
in  the  one  case  and  riot  in  the  other  ?  No.  Why 
then  these  unreasonable,  these  unjustifiable  suspicions  ? 
"  Your  ideas  and  mine,  respecting  separate  com 
mands,  have  but  little  analogy.  I  know  of  but  one 
separate  command,  properly  so  called,  and  that  is  the 
northern  department:  and  Gen.  Sullivan,  Gen.  St. 
Clair,  or  any  other  general  officer  at  Ticonderoga,  will 
be  considered  in  no  other  light,  whilst  there  is  a  supe 
rior  officer  in  the  department,  than  if  he  were  placed 
at  Chatham,  Baskenridge,  or  Princeton.  But  I  have 
not  time  to  dwell  upon  a  subject  of  this  kind."  (Sparks' 
Washington,  vol.  iv.  p.  364.) 

*  Putnam's  command  at  Princeton  will  be  taken  notice  of  hereafter. 
15* 


174 


CHAPTER  VII. 


CAPTURE    OF    FORTS    MONTGOMERY    AND    CLINTON. 

THE  next  prominent  command  of  Gen.  Putnam  was 
a  little  below  the  Highlands  on  the  North  river ;  than 
which  no  military  post  in  the  country  at  the  time  was 
more  important.  Here  obstructions  had  been  thrown 
across  the  river,  and  forts  erected  to  defend  them,  for 
the  purpose  of  preventing  the  passage  of  the  enemy's 
ships.  This  pass  might  with  propriety  be  denominated 
the  Therrnopyle  of  New  York.  And  although  Gov. 
Clinton,  who  had  charge  of  forts  Montgomery  and 
Clinton,  and  the  citizen  soldiers  under  his  command,  ex 
hibited  bravery  equal  perhaps  to  that  of  Leonidas  and 
his  Spartan  band  of  heroes  ;  but  being  attacked  in  rear, 
as  was  Leonidas,  they  were  overpowered  by  superior 
numbers,  while  the  main  army  at  the  post,  instead 
of 'being  stationed,  a  part  of  them  at  least,  so  as  to 
guard  the  passes  through  the  mountains  agreeably  to 
Washington's  instructions,  was  drawn  off  by  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  miles  from  the  scene  of  action,  out 
of  reach  of  the  enemy,  where  they  remained  idle  dur 
ing  the  engagement,  without  an  opportunity  of  dis 
charging  a  single  shot. 

Col.  Humphreys  gives  the  following  account  of  the 
storming  of  the  forts,  and  the  consequent  removal  of 
the  obstructions  in  the  river  : 

On  the  5th  of  October,  [1777,]  Sir  Henry  Clinton  came 
up  the  North  river  with  three  thousand  men.  After  making 


175 

many  feints  to  mislead  the  attention,  he  landed,  the  next 
morning,  at  Stony  Point,  and  commenced  his  march  over 
the  mountains  to  Fort  Montgomery.  Gov.  Clinton,  an  ac 
tive,  resolute,  and  intelligent  officer,  who  commanded  the 
garrison,  upon  being  apprised  of  the  movement,  despatched 
a  letter,  by  express,  to  Gen.  Putnam  for  succor.  By  the 
treachery  of  the  messenger,  the  letter  miscarried.  Gen. 
I  Putnam,  astonished  at  hearing  nothing  respecting  the  enemy, 
{ rode,  with  Gen.  Parsons,  and  CoL  Root,  his  adjutant-general, 
to  reconnoiter  them  at  King's  Ferry.  In  the  mean  time,  at 
five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  Sir  Henry  Clinton's  columns, 
having  surmounted  the  obstacles  and  barriers  of  nature,  de 
scended  from  the  Thunder  Hill,  through  thickets  impassa 
ble  but  for  light  troops,  and  attacked  the  different  redoubts. 
The  garrison,  inspired  by  the  conduct  of  their  leaders,  de 
fended  the  works  with  distinguished  valor.  But,  as  the  post 
had  been  designed  principally  to  prevent  the  passing  of 
ships,  and  as  an  assault  in  rear  had  not  been  expected,  the 
works  on  the  land  side  were  incomplete  and  untenable.  In 
the  dusk  of  twilight,  the  British  entered  with  their  bayonets 
fixed.  Their  loss  was  inconsiderable.  Nor  was  that  of  the 
garrison  great.  Gov.  Clinton,  his  brother  Gen.  James  Clin 
ton,  Col.  Dubois,  and  most  of  the  officers  and  men,  effected 
their  escape  under  cover  of  the  thick  smoke  and  darkness 
that  .suddenly  prevailed.  The  capture  of  this  fort  by  Sir 
Henry  Clinton,  together  with  the  consequent  removal  of  the 
chains  and  booms  that  obstructed  the  navigation,  opened  a 
passage  to  Albany,  and  seemed  to  favor  a  junction  of  his 
force  with  that  of  Gen.  Burgoyne.  But  the  latter  having 
been  compelled  to  capitulate  a  few  days  after  this  event,  and 
great  numbers  of  militia  having  arrived  from  New  England, 
the  successful  army  returned  to  New  York  ;  yet  not  before  a 
detachment  from  it,  under  the  orders  of  Gen.  'Vaughan,  had 
burnt  the  defenceless  town  of  Esopus,  and  several  scattering 
buildings  on  the  banks  of  the  river. 

The  author  of  these  memoirs,  then  major  of  brigade  to 
the  first  Connecticut  brigade,  was  alone  at  head-quarters 
when  the  firing  began.  He  hastened  to  Col.  Wyllys,  the 
senior  officer  in  camp,  and  advised  him  to  despatch  all  the 
men  not  on  duty  to  Fort  Montgomery,  without  waiting  for  or- 


176 

ders.  About  five  hundred  men  marched  instantly  under 
Col.  Meigs  ;  and  the  author,  with  Dr.  Beardsley,  a  surgeon 
in  the  brigade,  rode,  at  full  speed,  through  a  bye-path,  to 
let  the  garrison  know  that  a  reinforcement  was  on  its  march. 
Notwithstanding  all  the  haste  these  officers  made  to  and 
over  the  river,  the  fort  was  so  completely  invested  on  their 
arrival,  that  it  was  impossible  to  enter.  They  went  on 
board  the  new  frigate  which  lay  near  the  fortress,  and  had 
the  misfortune  to  be  idle,  though  not  unconcerned  spectators 
of  the  storm.  They  saw  the  minutest  actions  distinctly 
when  the  works  were  carried.  The  frigate,  after  receiving 
several  platoons,  slipped  her  cable,  and  proceeded  a  little 
way  up  the  river  ;  but  the  wind  and  tide  becoming  adverse, 
the  crew  set  heron  fire,  to  prevent  her  falling  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy,  whose  "ships  were  approaching. 

Without  attributing  treachery  to  the  messenger  of 
Gov.  Clinton,  of  which  there  is  no  probability,  Mar 
shall  accounts  very  naturally  for  his  not  meeting  with 
Gen.  Putnam — namely,  in  consequence  of  his  absence 
from  camp  on  a  reconnoitering  excursion.  That  "  an 
assault  in  rear  had  not  been  expected,"  is  in  direct  con 
tradiction  to  fact.  Gen.  Washington  "  directed,"  says 
Marshall,  "  that  two  thousand  militia  should  be  called 
for  from  Connecticut  to  guard  the  passes  through  the 
mountains."  According  to  the  same  author,  it  appears 
that  the  works  were  in  good  condition  in  the  rear.  In 
fact,  an  attack  could  be  made  from  no  other  quarter, 
as  will  soon  be  shown.  Men  only  were  wanted.  Had 
a  third  of  the  troops  that  were  unoccupied  been  thrown 
into  the  forts,  the  force  would  have  been  sufficient  to 
maintain  them. 

The  following  is  an  abstract  of  Judge  Marshall's  his 
tory  of  the  transactions  upon  this  occasion : 

"  On  the  arrival  in  September  of  a  reinforcement  of 
Europeans  at  New  York,  fears  were  immediately  en 
tertained  for  the  Highlands ;  and  Gen.  Putnam,  in  con 
formity  with  his  instructions,  called  for  assistance  on 


177 

Connecticut  "and  New  York,  the  governor  of  which 
latter  state  was  also  the  commanding  officer  in  the 
forts.  His  requisitions  were  complied  with,  but  the 
enemy  not  marching  immediately  against  these  posts, 
and  the  services  of  the  militia  being  necessary  at  home 
to  seed  their  farms,  they  became  exceedingly  impa 
tient  :  many  of  them  deserted,  and  Gen.  Putnam  was 
induced  to  discharge  the  residue. 

"  Impressed  with  the  danger  to  which  the  forts  were 
exposed  from  this  measure,  and  entirely  convinced, 
from  the  present  state  of  both  the  British  armies,  that 
the  attack  must  be  made  very  soon,  if  at  all,  Gov.  Clin 
ton  immediately  ordered  out  half  the  militia  of  New 
York,  with  assurances  that  they  should  be  relieved  in 
one  month  by  the  other  half.  The  order,  to  which  a 
reluctant  obedience  was  paid,  was  executed  so  slowly, 
that  the  forts  were  carried  before  the  militia  were  in 
the  field. 

"  This  post  had  always  been,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
commander-in-chief,  an  object  of  the  first  importance  ; 
and,  in  no  state  of  things,  under  no  pretence  of  a  su 
perior  army  commanded  by  himself,  had  he  ceased  to 
view  it  with  interest,  and  to  be  attentive  to  its  safety. 
When  therefore  his  orders  were  given  to  make  detach 
ments  from  thence,  in  order  to  repel  incursions  into 
Jersey,  and  to  reinforce  the  army  in  Pennsylvania,  so 
as  to  leave,  according  to  the  returns,  less  than  three 
thousand  men,  including  the  militia ;  he,  in  the  most 
explicit  terms,  stated  his  apprehension  that  the  enemy 
would  attempt  something  up  the  North  river.  Under 
this  impression,  he  directed  that  two  thousand  militia 
should  be  immediately  called  for  from  Connecticut  to 
guard  the  passes  through  the  mountains,  while  the  forts 
themselves  should  be  sufficiently  garrisoned  with  the 
best  troops.  Great  pains  had  been  taken,  and  much 
labor  employed,  to  render  this  position,  which  is  by  na 
ture  very  strong,  still  more  secure.  The  defences  most 
relied  upon  were  forts  Montgomery  and  Clinton,  on  the 


178 

western  bank  of  the  Hudson,  on  very  high  ground,  ex 
tremely  difficult  of  access,  and  separated  from  each 
other  by  a  small  creek  which  runs  from  the  mountains 
into  the  river.  These  forts  were  too  much  elevated  to  be 
battered  from  the  water,  and  the  hills  on  which  they 
were  erected,  too  steep  to  be  ascended  by  troops  land 
ing  at  the  foot  of  them  ;  and  the  mountains,  which 
commence  five  or  six  miles  below  them,  are  so  very 
high  and  rugged,  the  defiles  through  which  the  roads 
leading  to  them  pass,  so  narrow,  and  commanded  in 
such  a  manner  by  the  heights  on  both  sides,  that  the 
approaches  to  them  are  extremely  difficult  and  danger 
ous. 

"  To  prevent  the  enemy  from  passing  these  forts, 
chevaux-de-frize  were  sunken  in  the  river,  and  a  boom 
extended  from  bank  to  bank.  This  boom  was  covered 
with  immense  chains  stretched  at  some  distance  in  its 
front,  for  the  purpose  of  breaking  the  face  of  any  ves 
sel  sailing  against  it.  These  works  were  not  only  de 
fended  by  the  guns  of  the  fort,  but  by  a  frigate  and 
galleys  stationed  above  them,  capable  of  opposing  with 
an  equal  fire  in  front,  any  force  which  might  attack  by 
water  from  below. 

"  Fort  Independence  is  four  or  five  miles  below  forts 
Montgomery  and  Clinton,  and  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  river,  on  a  high  point  of  land  ;  arid  Fort  Constitu 
tion  is  about  six  and  a  quarter  miles  above  them,  on  an 
island  near  the  eastern  shore. 

"  The  garrisons  at  this  time  amounted  to  about  six 
hundred  men,  and  the  whole  force  under  Gen.  Putnam, 
the  militia  having  generally  left  him,  did  not  much  ex 
ceed  two  thousand.  Yet  this  force,  though  so  much 
less  than  that,  which  an  attention  to  the  orders  of  Gen. 
Washington  would  have  retained  at  the  station,  was, 
if  properly  applied,  more  than  competent  to  the  defence 
of  the  forts  against  any  numbers  which  could  be  spared 
from  New  York.  *****  Somewhat  more 
than  three  thousand  men  embarked  at  New  York,  and 


179 

landed  on  the  5th  day  of  October  at  Verplanck's  point, 
on  the  east  side  of  the  Hudson,  a  short  distance  below 
Peekskill,  and  Gen.  Putnam  retired  to  the  heights  in  his 
rear.  On  the  evening  of  the  same  day  a  part  of  the 
troops  re-embarked,  and  the  fleet  moved  up  the  river. 
The  next  morning,  at  break  of  day,  the  troops  destined 
for  the  enterprise,  debarked  on  the  west  side  at  Stony 
point,  and  immediately  commenced  their  march  through 
the  mountains  into  the  rear  of  forts  Montgomery  and 
Clinton.  The  debarkation  was  not  made  unobserved  ; 
but  the  morning  was  so  very  foggy  that  the  numbers 
could  not  be  distinguished.  In  the  mean  time,  the  ma 
neuvers  of  the  vessels,  and  the  appearance  of  the  small 
detachment  left  at  Verplanck's  point,  persuaded  Gen. 
Putnam  that  the  meditated  attack  was  on  Fort  Indepen 
dence. 

"Gov.  Clinton,  who  commanded  in  the  forts,  having 
notice  about  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  approach 
of  the  enemy,  made  the  best  disposition  in  his  power, 
and  sent  out  as  strong  parties  as  his  situation  would 
admit,  for  the  purpose  of  harassing  them  in  their  march 
through  the  defiles  of  the  mountains,  many  of  which 
were  already  passed.  He  also  sent  an  express  to  Gen. 
Putnam  to  give  notice  of  the  danger  which  threatened 
him.  Of  this  express  Putnam  makes  no  mention  ;  but 
as  he  states  himself  to  have  been  returning  with  Gen. 
Parsons  from  reconnoitering  the  position  of  the  enemy 
on  the  east  side  of  the  river,  it  is  probable  he  might 
be  engaged  on  that  business  when  the  express  reached 
the  camp. 

*  "  The  garrison,  when  summoned,  having  refused 
to  surrender,  the  attack  commenced  about  five,  on  both 
forts.  The  approaches  to  each  had  been  rendered  ex 
tremely  difficult  by  redoubts,  by  artillery,  and  by  rows 
of  abattis  extending  for  three  or  four  hundred  yards. 
The  works  were  defended  with  resolution,  and  were 
maintained  till  dark,  when,  the  lines  being  too  extensive 
to  be  completely  manned,  the  enemy  entered  them  in 


180 

different  places  ;  and  the  defence  being  no  longer  pos 
sible,  part  of  the  garrison  were  made  prisoners,  while 
their  better  knowledge  of  the  country  enabled  others 
to  escape.  Gov.  Clinton  passed  the  river  in  a  boat, 
after  the  enemy  were  in  possession  of  the  forts,  and 
Gen.  James  Clinton,  though  wounded  in  the  thigh  by  a 
bayonet,  also  made  his  escape.  The  loss  sustained  by 
the  garrisons  was  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  men. 
That  of  the  enemy  was  supposed  to  be  much  more  con 
siderable  ;  but  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  in  his  official  letter, 
states  it  at  less  than  two  hundred  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing. 

"  The  boom  and  chains  across  the  river  were  taken 
possession  of  with  the  forts,  and  the  continental  frigates 
and  galleys  were  burnt  to  prevent  them  too  from  falling 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

"Fort  Independence  and  Fort  Constitution  were 
evacuated  the  next  day,  and  Putnam  retreated  to  Fish- 
kill.  The  same  measures  had  been  taken  at  Fort  Con 
stitution,  as  at  forts  Clinton  and  Montgomery,  by  sink 
ing  impediments  in  the  river,  and  by  stretching  chains 
across  it  to  stop  the  vessels  of  the  enemy ;  but  they 
were  abandoned  without  even  an  attempt  to  defend 
them. 

"  After  burning  Continental  village,  where  stores  to 
a  considerable  amount  had  been  deposited,  Gen.  Vaugh- 
an,  with  a  strong  detachment,  proceeded  up  the  river 
as  far  as  Esopus,  which  he  also  destroyed.  Gen.  Put 
nam,  whose  army  was  by  this  time  increased  by  the 
militia  of  Connecticut,  New  Jersey,  and  New  York,  to 
six  thousand  men,  detached  Gen.  Parsons  with  two 
thousand,  to  repossess  themselves  of  Peekskill,  while 
with  the  residue  he  watched  the  progress  of  the  enemy 
up  the  river. 

"  On  the  first  intelligence  of  the  capitulation  of  Bur- 
goyne,  expresses  had  been  dispatched  by  Putnam  to 
Gates,  pressing  for  reinforcements  of  continental 
troops,  and  near  five  thousand  men  from  that  army 


181 

hastened  to  his  aid.  Before  their  arrival,  Gen.  Vaugh- 
an  had  proceeded  from  Esopus  down  the  river,  and 
having  reduced  to  ashes  forts  Montgomery  and  Clinton, 
and  every  village  and  almost  every  private  house  in 
his  power,  returned  to  New  York,  from  whence  a  re 
inforcement  was  then  about  to  sail  for  Gen.  Howe. 

"  The  military  stores  which  this  expedition  threw 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  were  very  considerable. 
The  Highlands  having  been  always  considered  as  a 
position  which,  more  than  any  other,  united  the  advan 
tages  of  convenience  and  security,  magazines  to  a  large 
amount  had  been  collected  there.  Some  of  these  were 
removed,  but  by  far  the  greater  part  of  them  were  lost. 
Much  labor  and  money  had  been  expended  on  the  forts, 
and  on  the  works  in  the  river  which  had  been  demol 
ished."  (Life  of  Washington,  vol.  iii.,  p.  292,  etc.) 

The  following  letters  from  Gov.  Clinton  and  Gen. 
Putnam  are  copied  from  Prof.  Sparks'  compilation  of 
the  writings  of  Gen.  Washington : 

EXTRACT  OF  A  LETTER  FROM  Gov.  CLINTON  TO  GEN. 
WASHINGTON,  dated  New  Windsor,  9th  of  October, 
1777. 

"  DEAR  GENERAL — I  have  to  inform  you,  in  conse 
quence  of  intelligence  received  by  Gen.  Putnam  from 
Gen.  Parsons,  who  lay  with  his  brigade  at  the  White 
Plains,  of  the  enemy's  having  received  reinforcements 
from  Europe  at  New  York,  and  that  by  their  move 
ments  there  was  reason  to  believe  they  intended  an  at 
tack  on  Peekskill,  and  to  possess  themselves  of  the 
passes  in  the  Highlands,  the  general  immediately  wrote 
to  me  these  circumstances ;  and,  to  prevent  if  possible 
the  disagreeable  consequences  that  might  arise  if  the 
army  at  the  different  posts  was  not  timely  reinforced,  1 
ordered  that  part  of  the  militia  of  this  state,  that  had 
not  already  marched  to  the  northward,  to  move,  and 
part  of  them  to  join  Gen.  Putnam,  and  the  remainder 
to  reinforce  the  posts  of  Fort  Montgomery  and  Fort 

16 


182 

Clinton  ;  but,  it  being  a  critical  time  with  the  yeomanry, 
as  they  had  not  yet  sown  their  grain,  and  there  being 
at  that  time  no  appearance  of  the  enemy,  they  were 
extremely  restless  and  uneasy.  They  solicited  Gen. 
Putnam  for  leave  to  return,  and  many  of  them  went 
home  without  his  permission.  Urged  by  these  considera 
tions,  he  thought  proper  to  dismiss  a  part  of  them. 

"As  I  thought  it  essentially  necessary,  that  they  should 
remain  in  the  field  for  some  time,  in  order  to  check  the 
progress  of  the  enemy,  should  they  attempt  to  put  their 
designs  in  execution,  I  issued  another  order  for  one 
half  immediately  to  march,  part  of  them  to  join  Gen. 
Putnam,  and  a  sufficient  number  to  reinforce  the  forts 
and  the  pass  at  Sidman's  bridge,  at  the  mouth  of  the 
clove ;  and,  in  order  to  induce  them  to  turn  out  with 
greater  alacrity,  I  thought  it  necessary  to  fix  their  time 
of  service  to  one  month,  at  the  expiration  of  which  time 
they  were  to  be  relieved  by  the  other  half.  While 
this  was  in  agitation,  and  before  an  arrangement  could 
possibly  be  made  by  the  respective  officers,  as  to  what 
part  of  them  should  serve  for  the  first  month,  they  were 
not  so  expeditious  as  was  absolutely  necessary,  which 
the  event  has  fully  evinced.  A  number  of  the  enemy's 
ships  made  their  appearance  on  the  3d  instant  in  Tar 
ry  town  bay,  whence  they  weighed  anchor  the  next  day, 
being  joined  by  several  ships  of  war  and  transports 
from  New  York.  They  proceeded  up  the  river  as 
high  as  King's  ferry,  and  at  daybreak  on  Sunday,  the 
5th,  landed  a  considerable  body  of  men  on  Verplanck's 
point. 

"  As  I  was  apprehensive,  from  many  circumstances, 
that  an  attack  on  the  forts  was  intended,  I  dispatched 
Maj.  Logan,  an  alert  officer,  who  was  well  acquainted 
with  the  ground,  on  Sunday  evening  through  the  moun 
tains  to  reconnoiter,  and  if  possible  gain  intelligence  of 
the  enemy's  motions.  The  major  returned  about  nine 
o'clock  on  Monday,  informing  me  that  from  the  best 
intelligence  he  could  procure,  and  the  rowing  of  the 


183 

boats,  he  had  reason  to  believe  they  had  landed  a  con 
siderable  force  on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  and  at 
Dunderberg  ;  but  as  the  morning  was  foggy,  it  was 
impossible  to  discern  them,  so  as.  to  form  any  judgment 
of  their  numbers."  Here  Gov.  Clinton  gives  a  detailed 
account  of  his  detaching  such  parties  as  his  limited 
means  would  justify,  "  in  order  (he  says)  to  give  the 
enemy  a  check,  and  retard  their  movements  till  I  could 
receive  a  reinforcement  from  Gen.  Putnam,  to  whom  I 
had  sent  an  express  for  that  purpose ;  [and  adds]  after 
as  obstinate  a  resistance  as  our  situation  and  the  weak 
ness  of  the  garrison  would  admit,  having  defended  the 
works  from  two  o'clock  till  the  dusk  of  the  evening,  the 
enemy,  by  the  superiority  of  numbers,  forced  the  works 
on  all  sides.  The  want  of  men  prevented  us  from  sus 
taining  and  supporting  every  part,  having  received  no 
reinforcement  from  Gen.  Putnam. 

"I  have  to  add,  that  by  some  fatality  the  two  conti 
nental  frigates  were  lost,  they  having  bee?i  ordered  down 
by  Gen.  Putnam  for  the  defence  of  the  chain ;  but,  be 
ing  badly  manned,  they  could  not  be  got  off  in  time, 
though  I  ordered  the  ship  Congress  to  proceed  to  Fort 
Constitution  the  day  before  the  attack,  lest  she  should 
meet  with  a  disaster  ;  and  the  ship  Montgomery,  which 
lay  near  the  chain,  it  being  the  ebb  of  tide  and  the  wind 
falling,  Capt.  Hodge  was  constrained  to  set  her  on  fire 
to  prevent  her  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
The  Congress  unfortunately  getting  aground  on  the  flat 
near  Fort  Constitution,  shared  the  same  fate.  Fort 
Constitution,  being  destitute  of  troops  to  defend  it,  was 
evacuated,  after  bringing  off  part  of  the  stores. 

"  The  army  who  attacked  us,  by  the  lowest  account, 
consisted  of  three  thousand,  chiefly  of  British  and  Hes 
sian  troops.  The  garrison  of  both  our  posts  did  not 
exceed  six  hundred  men,  and  many  of  these  unarmed 
militia.  The  ordinary  garrison  was  thus  reduced  by 
detaching  Maj.  Moffat  with  two  hundred  men  to  the  po*t 
at  Sidman's  bridge,  Col.  Malcom's  regiment  being  re- 


184 

moved  from  thence,  and  sixty  men  on  Anthony's  nose,  by 
Gen.  Putnam's  orders,  received  the  day  before  the  action. 
I  have  only  to  add,  that  where  great  losses  are  sustain 
ed,  however  unavoi4p,ble,  public  censure  is  generally 
the  consequence  to  those  who  are  immediately  con 
cerned.  If  in  the  present  instance  this  should  be  the 
case,  I  wish,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  Fort  Montgomery 
and  its  dependencies,  it  may  fall  on  me  alone ;  for  I 
should  be  guilty  of  the  greatest  injustice,  were  I  not  to 
declare,  that  the  officers  and  men  under  me  of  the  dif 
ferent  corps  behaved  with  the  greatest  spirit  and  bra 
very." 

EXTRACT  OF  A  LETTER  FROM  GEN.  PUTNAM  TO  GEN. 
WASHINGTON,  dated  Fishkill,  8th  October,  1777. 

"  DEAR  GENERAL — It  is  with  the  utmost  reluctance  I 
now  sit  down  to  inform  you,  that  the  enemy,  after 
making  a  variety  of  movements  up  and  down  the  North 
river,  landed  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  instant  about 
three  thousand  men  at  Tarry  town  ;  and,  after  making 
an  excursion  about  five  miles  up  the  country,  they  re 
turned  and  re-embarked  the  morning  following,  ad 
vanced  up  near  King's  ferry,  and  landed  on  the  east 
side  of  the  river ;  but  in  the  evening  part  of  them  re- 
embarked,  and  the  morning  after  landed  a  little  above 
King's  ferry,  on  the  west  side.  The  morning  being  so 
exceedingly  foggy  concealed  their  scheme,  and  pre 
vented  us  from  gaining  any  idea  as  to  the  number  of 
troops  they  landed.  In  about  three  hours  we  discover 
ed  a  large  fire  at  the  ferry,  which  we  imagined  to  be 
the  store-houses  ;  upon  which  it  was  thought  they  only 
landed  with  a  view  of  destroying  the  said  houses.  The 
picket  and  scouts,  which  we  had  out,  could  not  learn 
the  exact  number  of  the  enemy  that  were  remaining 
on  the  east  side  of  the  river  ;  but,  from  the  best  accounts, 
they  were  about  fifteen  hundred.  At  the  same  time  a 
number  of  ships  and  galleys,  with  about  forty  flat-boats, 
made  every  appearance  of  their  intention  to  land  troops, 


185 

both    at    Fort    Independence    and    Peekskill    landing. 
These  circumstances,  and  my  strength  being  not  more , 
than  twelve  hundred  continental  troops  and  three  hun 
dred  militia,  prevented  me  from  detaching  a  party  to  at 
tack  the  enemy  that  day  on  the  east  side  of  the  river. 

"  After  we  had  thought  it  impracticable  to  quit  the 
heights,  which  we  had  then  possession  of,  and  attack  the 
enemy,  Brig.  Gen.  Parsons  [Ajdt.  Gen.  Root]  and  my 
self  went  to  reconnoiter  the  ground  near  the  enemy ; 
and  on  our  return  from  thence  we  were  alarmed  with 
a  heavy  and  hot  firing,  both  of  small-arms  and  cannon, 
at  Fort  Montgomery,  which  immediately  convinced  me 
that  the  enemy  had  landed  a  large  body  of  men  in  the 
morning  at  the  time  and  place  before-mentioned.  Upon 
which  I  immediately  detached  five  hundred  men  to  rein 
force  the  garrison;  but  before  they  could  possibly  cross 
the  river  to  their  assistance,  the  enemy,  far  superior  in 
numbers,  had  possessed  themselves  of  the  fort.  Never 
did  men  behave  with  more  spirit  and  activity,  than  our 
troops  upon  this  occasion.  They  repulsed  the  enemy 
three  times,  who  were  in  number  at  least  five  to  one." 

By  the  foregoing  documents,  the  causes  which  led 
to  the  unfortunate  results  upon  this  occasion  are  made 
too  apparent  to  escape  the  notice  of  the  most  casual 
reader.  Let  it  be  remembered,  that  Gen.  Burgoyne 
was  making  his  way  to  the  head  waters  of  the  Hud 
son  ;  and  that  nothing  could  comport  more  with  the  in 
terests  of  the  enemy,  than  for  the  British  troops  in  New 
York  city  to  form  a  junction  with  Burgoyne  at  Albany. 
That  this  would  be  attempted  was  so  obvious  to  Gen. 
Washington,  that  he  was  constantly  reiterating  to  the 
commandant  at  Peekskill  to  be  prepared  for  that  event. 
Immense  expense  had  been  incurred  in  preparations  to 
guard  against  the  execution  of  such  project.  But  it  is 
a  little  extraordinary,  that  although  Gen.  Putnam,  ac 
cording  to  Humphreys,  on  account  of  the  smallness 
of  his  force,  "  repeatedly  informed  the  commander-in- 
chief,  that  the  posts  committed  to  his  charge  must,  in 
16* 


180 

all  probability,  be  lost  in  case  an  attack  should  be  made 
upon  them ;  and  that,  circumstanced  as  he  was,  he 
could  not  be  responsible  for  the  consequences,"  should 
at  the  same  time  discharge  the  militia  under  his  com 
mand,  before  the  expiration  of  the  term  for  which  they 
were  drafted.  He  had  evidently  no  expectation  of 
maintaining  these  posts.  His  besetting  sin  seems  to 
have  been  want  of  confidence  of  success,  which  para 
lyzed  his  efforts. 

When  the  enemy  landed  a  part  of  their  forces  at 
Verplanck's  point,  which  might  naturally  have  been  sup 
posed  a  feint,  intended  for  deception,  Gen.  Putnam,  in 
stead  of  attempting  to  annoy  them  in  the  least,  or  to 
reinforce  the  forts,  fled  instantly  to  the  heights  in  his 
rear.  His  conjectures  in  regard  to  the  objects  of  the 
expedition  were  every  thing  but  that  which  was  most 
obvious.  He  thought  there  were  indications  that  the 
enemy  "  intended  to  land  troops,  both  at  Fort  Indepen 
dence  and  at  Peekskill  landing  ;"  and,  on  discovering  a 
fire  on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  where  there  were 
some  store-houses  of  very  trifling  consequence,  he  con 
cluded  the  burning  of  them  was  the  sole  purpose  of 
their  landing  on  that  side. 

But  not  being  fully  satisfied  as  to  the  destination  of 
the  enemy,  and  for  what  purpose  so  large  an  armament 
had  been  prepared,  he  undertook  a  reconnoitering  jaunt 
down  to  King's  ferry ;  taking  with  him  the  only  gen 
eral  besides  himself  at  the  post,  and  his  adjutant-gene 
ral,  leaving  at  head-quarters  his  aid-de-camp  alone,  a 
young  man  about  twenty-four  years  of  age.  It  could 
hardly  have  been  expected,  that  the  senior  officer  re 
maining  in  camp  would  take  the  responsibility  of  de 
taching  any  portion  of  the  troops,  at  the  request  of  an 
officer  commanding  another  post,  or  from  other  con 
siderations  ;  nor,  it  may  be  presumed,  was  it  intended, 
or  orders  would  have  been  given  by  Gen.  Putnam  to 
that  effect.  On  hearing  the  firing  at  Fort  Montgome 
ry,  however,  patriotism  prevailed  with  Col.  Wyllys 


187 

over  discipline,  and  he  immediately  despatched  five 
hundred  men  to  the  scene  of  action,  but  who,  as  has 
been  seen,  arrived  too  late.  Col.  [then  Major]  Hum 
phreys  deserved  great  praise  for  the  part  he  took  upon 
the  occasion. 

At  this  critical  juncture,  was  not  Gen.  Putnam  re 
quired  by  every  principle  of  patriotism,  as  well  as  a  re 
gard  to  his  own  fame  as  commandant  of  the  station,  to 
have  remained  at  head-quarters,  retaining  Gen.  Parsons 
and  the  adjutant-general,  and  sent  one  or  more  alert 
subaltern  officers  to  look  out  for  the  movements  of  the 
enemy  ?  He  took  a  tour  of  some  twelve  miles,  and 
was  absent  many  hours,  not  having  returned  to  camp 
till  after  the  fatal  engagement  had  commenced,  which 
ended  in  the  utter  prostration  of  the  American  arms, 
producing  in  its  consequences  a  train  of  infinite  evils 
to  the  country.  Had  Gen.  Putnam  remained  at  his 
post,  so  that  the  express  from  Gov.  Clinton  could  have 
found  him,  who  was  despatched  about  ten  o'clock  in 
the  morning,  and  the  assault  on  the  forts  was  not  made 
till  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  ;  or  had  he,  without 
any  call  from  Clinton,  as  was  obviously  his  duty,  thrown 
reinforcements  into  forts  Montgomery  and  Clinton,  a 
very  different  result,  in  all  human  probability,  would 
have  taken  place. 

But  of  all  the  transactions  connected  with  this  event 
ful  drama,  none  seem  more  ill-advised,  than  the  re 
moval  of  Malcom's  regiment  from  Sedman's  bridge  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Clove,  thereby  throwing  open  the  gate 
for  the  ingress  of  the  enemy.  This  was  done  by  or 
ders  from  Gen.  Putnam,  issued  the  next  day  after  the 
appearance  of  the  expedition  at  Tarrytown  bay.  Sir 
Henry  Clinton  was  doubtless  advised  that  a  regiment 
occupied  this  post,  and,  not  being  aware  of  its  removal, 
took  a  more  difficult  course.  Gov.  Clinton,  however, 
deeming  it  of  the  utmost  importance  to  have  this  pass 
guarded, immediately  detached  from  Fort  Montgomery 
two  hundred  men  for  the  purpose ;  which  by  thus 


188 

weakening  the  garrison,  not  improbably  caused  the  loss 
of  the  fort.  The  Clove  is  a  cleft  or  opening  of  the 
highlands  or  mountains,  situated  a  little  south  of  west 
from  Fort  Montgomery,  which  renders  a  passage  to  it 
from  that  quarter  quite  practicable.  There  is  now  a 
railroad  on  this  route.  Malcom's  regiment  went  to 
swell  the  corps  de  reserve  upon  the  heights. 

There  are  errors  in  Gen.  Putnam's  official  report  to 
the  commander-in-chief  of  this  disaster  not  unworthy 
of  notice.  Gov.  Clinton,  whose  report  is  dated  a  day 
later  than  Putnam's,  and  who  no  doubt  took  more  pains 
than  he  to  obtain  correct  information,  makes  no  men 
tion  of  "  the  enemy's  landing  about  three  thousand  men 
at  Tarrytown,  and  making  an  excursion  of  about  five 
miles  up  the  country."  This  would  have  been  to 
"  march  up  the  hill,  and  then  march  down  again,"  with 
a  witness.  There  could  be  no  use  in  such  an  enter 
prise.  The  enemy  had  no  time  to  spare  in  such  jaunts 
of  pleasure. 

The  general  might  have  saved  the  trouble  of  excus 
ing  himself  for  not  attacking  the  enemy  that  remained 
on  the  east  side  of  the  river,  at  the  time  he  mentions, 
which  was  after  he  discovered  the  fire  on  the  opposite 
side.  At  that  time  there  were  few  or  no  enemies  for 
him  to  attack,  had  he  been  ever  so  much  disposed. 
The  main  body  evidently  landed  simultaneously  on  the 
west  side  of  the  river,  and  marched  immediately  for 
the  American  forts.  And  however  desirous  they  might 
be  to  delude  Gen.  Putnam  with  a  vain  show,  they  had 
not  many  men  to  spare  for  the  purpose,  certainly  not 
fifteen  hundred. 

Marshall  speaks  of  "  the  small  detachment  left  at 
Verplanck's  point."  Be  the  number  what  they  might, 
the  objection  made  by  Gen.  Putnam  for  not  attacking 
them  on  the  day  mentioned,  seems  a  substantial  reason 
for  his  doing  so,  before  they  were  further  reinforced  as 
he  expected.  But  in  case  the  indications  of  which  he 
takes  notice  had  not  appeared,  it  seems  he  would  have 


189 

detached  a  party  to  attack  his  fifteen  hundred  men  in 
buckram.  Why  not  march  with  his  whole  force,  which 
was  equal  to  the  supposed  number  of  the  enemy,  and 
fight  the  battle  in  person  ?  It  would  have  been  a  glori 
ous  opportunity  for  the  general  to  have  served  his 
country,  and  to  acquire  a  renown  far  more  substantial 
than  that  obtained  through  the  agency  of  others. 

It  is  not  easy  to  perceive  the  impracticability  of  Put 
nam's  quitting  the  heights,  as  he  states  ;  he  had  only  to 
order  his  men  to  the  right-about  face,  and  then  march 
back  to  the  place  from  whence  he  came  without  fear 
of  meeting  an  enemy  to  oppose  him.  The  British,  at 
any  rate,  had  no  cause  to  envy  Putnam's  sagacity  in 
obtaining  his  position ;  their  route  did  not  lie  in  that 
direction,  and  therefore  he  was  in  no  danger  of  being 
disturbed. 

There  is  a  mistake  in  Gen.  Putnam's  letter,  in  saying 
he  "  detached  five  hundred  men  to  reinforce  the  garri 
son."  This  was  done  by  Col.  Wyllys  before  the  gen 
eral's  return  to  head-quarters. 

Since  writing  the  foregoing,  I  am  informed  by  an 
intelligent,  elderly  gentleman,  who  was  born  and 
brought  up  near  Peekskill,  that  Gen.  Putnam  upon  this 
occasion  did  not  halt  until  he  arrived  at  Haight's  tavern, 
about  midway  of  the  highlands,  and  between  five  and 
six  miles  from  Peekskill.  King's  ferry  is  ten  miles  be 
low  Peekskill.  Putnam,  therefore,  with  his  two  gener 
als,  must  have  ridden  in  their  tour  at  least  thirty  miles. 
A  pretty  extensive  airing,  when  the  awful  crisis  in 
which  it  occurred  is  taken  into  consideration.  When 
these  reconnoiterers  returned  to  head-quarters,  as  might 
be,  and  probably  was,  expected,  the  fate  of  the  day  was 
sealed  ;  and  they  had  only  to  continue  their  retreat 
through  the  highlands  to  Fishkill. 

The  course  taken  in  this  case  will  no  doubt  be  justi 
fied  by  many,  in  consequence  of  their  preconceived 
opinions  of  the  courage,  patriotism,  and  warlike  propen 
sities  of  Israel  Putnam. 


190 

The  following  is  a  diagram  of  the  scene  of  action. 
There  are  defects  in  it ;  the  mountains,  as  well  as  the 
brook  in  the  Clove,  are  not  well  represented.  There 
was  a  run  of  water,  as  has  been  seen,  between  the 
forts.  The  drawing  however  is  sufficiently  accurate 
for  the  purpose  intended.  The  reader  will  perceive 
that  the  opening  of  the  Clove,  at  Sedman's  bridge,  was 
the  key  to  the  avenue  leading  to  the  forts,  which  afford 
ed  a  convenient  course  for  the  march  of  troops. 


BRIDGE: 


The  withdrawing  by  Gen.  Putnam  of  the  regiment 
stationed  at  this  pass,  under  existing  circumstances,  is, 
it  is  believed,  the  most  extraordinary  military  move 
ment  on  record.  He  also,  as  has  been  seen,  drew  sixty 
from  the  station  called  Anthony's  nose.  With 


men 


these  and  his  troops  at  Peekskill,  composing  a  corps  of 
fifteen  hundred,  he  immediately  repaired  to  the  moun 
tains,  where  he  remained  inactive ;  thus  abandoning 


191 

the  most  important  post  that  could  be  committed  to  his 
charge  without  firing  a  gun.  The  direful  consequences 
resulting  from  this  dereliction  of  duty  are  known,  and 
will  probably  never  be  forgotten  by  the  descendants 
of  those  whose  houses  were  committed  to  the  flames, 
and  other  property  destroyed  by  the  invading  foe. 

I  shall  now  make  copious  extracts  from  the  Life  of 
Alexander  Hamilton,  by  his  son  John  C.  Hamilton  ; 
and  from  the  Writings  of  George  Washington,  edited 
by  Jared  Sparks  :  containing  letters  from  Gen.  Wash 
ington,  and  Col.  Hamilton,  his  aid-de-camp,  which  pow 
erfully  illustrate  the  patriotism,  character,  and  services 
of  Gen.  Putnam. 

FROM  THE  LIFE  OF  HAMILTON. 

"While  the  advance  of  Burgoyne  was  looked  upon 
with  consternation ;  by  a  series  of  unparalleled  sufferings 
which  no  energy  could  surmount,  he  was  gradually 
broken  down,  until  a  brief  contest  compelled  him  to 
surrender  at  Saratoga. 

"  Intelligence  of  this  event  reached  the  head-quarters 
of  Washington  at  the  close  of  the  month  of  October, 
[1777,]  a  few  days  after  his  army  had  removed  to 
Whitemarsh,  and  he  immediately  addressed  a  letter  to 
Gates,  in  which,  after  congratulating  him  on  his  success, 
and  expressing  his  regret  that  a  matter  of  such  magni 
tude  should  have  reached  him  by  report  only,  or  through 
the  chance  of  letters,  instead  of  an  authentic  communi 
cation  under  his  own  signature,  he  says — '  Our  affairs 
having  terminated  to  the  northward,  I  have,  by  the  ad 
vice  of  the  general  officers,  sent  Col.  Hamilton,  one  of 
my  aids,  to  lay  before  you  a  full  statement  of  our  situation, 
and  that  of  the  enemy  in  this  quarter.  He  is  well  in 
formed  upon  the  subject,  and  will  deliver  my  sentiments 
upon  the  plan  of  operations  that  is  now  necessary  to  be 
pursued.  I  think  it  improper  to  enter  into  a  detail. 
From  Col.  Hamilton,  you  will  have  a  clear  and  com- 


192 

prehensive  view  of  things  ;  and  I  persuade  myself  you 
will  do  every  thing  in  your  power  to  facilitate  the  ob 
jects  I  have  in  contemplation.'  On  the  30th  of  October, 
Col.  Hamilton  departed,  under  the  following  '  instruc 
tions.' 

****«««  You  are  so  fully  acquainted  with  the  prin 
cipal  points  on  which  you  are  sent,  namely,  the  state 
of  our  army  and  the  situation  of  the  enemy,  that  I 
shall  not  enlarge  on  those  heads.  What  you  are  chief 
ly  to  attend  to,  is  to  point  out,  in  the  clearest  and  fullest 
manner,  to  Gen.  Gates,  the  absolute  necessity  there  is 
for  his  detaching  a  very  considerable  part  of  the  army 
at  present  under  his  command  to  the  reinforcement  of 
this ;  a  measure  that  will  in  all  probability  reduce  Gen. 
Howe  to  the  same  situation  in  which  Gen.  Burgoyne 
now  is,  should  he  attempt  to  remain  in  Philadelphia 
without  being  able  to  remove  the  obstructions  in  the 
Delaware,  and  open  a  free  communication  with  his 
shipping.  The  force,  which  the  members  of  the  coun 
cil  of  war  judge  it  safe  and  expedient  to  draw  down  at 
present,  are  the  three  New  Hampshire  and  fifteen  Mas 
sachusetts  regiments,  with  Lee's  and  Jackson's  of  the 
sixteen  additional. 

"  I  have  understood  that  Gen.  Gates  has  already  de 
tached  Nixon's  and  Glover's  brigades  to  join  Gen.  Put 
nam,  and  Gen.  Dickinson  informs  me  Sir  Henry  Clinton 
has  come  down  the  river  with  his  whole  force ;  if  this 
be  a  fact,  you  are  to  desire  Gen.  Putnam  to  send  the 
two  brigades  forward,  with  the  greatest  expedition,  as 
there  can  be  no  occasion  for  them  there. 

"  I  expect  you  will  meet  Col.  Morgan's  corps  upon 
their  way  down ;  if  you  do,  let  them  know  how  essen 
tial  their  services  are  to  us,  and  desire  the  colonel  or 
commanding  officer  to  hasten  their  march  as  much  as 
is  consistent  with  the  health  of  the  men  after  their  late 
fatigues.  G.  W. 

"  P.  S.  I  ordered  the  detachment  belonging  to  Gen. 
McDougal's  division  to  come  forward.  If  you  meet 


193 

them,  direct  those  belonging  to  Greene's,  Angel's,  Chand 
ler's,  and  Duryee's  regiments  not  to  cross  the  Delaware, 
but  to  proceed  to  Red  Bank.' 

"Col.  Hamilton  proceeded  by  way  of  New  Windsor 
to  Fishkill,  the  head-quarters  of  Gen.  Putnam,  from 
whence  he  addressed  the  following  letter  to  Gen. 
Washington,  on  the  2d  of  November : 

"  *  DEAR  SIR — I  lodged  last  night  in  the  neighborhood 
of  New  Windsor.  This  morning  I  met  Col.  Morgan 
with  his  corps,  about  a  mile  from  it,  in  march  for  head 
quarters. 

"  I  have  directed  Gen.  Putnam,  in  your  name,  to  send 
forward  with  all  dispatch  to  join  you,  the  two  continen 
tal  brigades  and  Warner's  militia  brigade ;  this  last  is 
to  serve  till  the  latter  end  of  this  month.  *  *  * 
Neither  Lee's  nor  Jackson's  regiments,  nor  the  detach 
ment  belonging  to  Gen.  McDougal's  division,  have  yet 
marched.  I  have  urged  their  being  sent,  and  an  order 
has  been  dispatched  for  their  instantly  proceeding. 

*  *  *  Gen.  Poor's  brigade  has  just  arrived  here  ; 
they  will  proceed  to  join  you  with  all  expedition.' 

"  On  Hamilton's  arrival  at  Albany,  he  had  an  inter 
view  with  Gen.  Gates,  the  result  of  which  is  stated  in 
the  following  letter  to  Gen.  Washington. 

"  '  Albany,  Nov.  4th,  1777. 

" '  DEAR  SIR — I  arrived  here  yesterday  at  noon,  and 
waited  on  Gen.  Gates  immediately  on  the  business  of 
my  mission,  but  was  very  sorry  to  find  his  ideas  did  not 
correspond  with  yours,  for  drawing  off  the  number  of 
troops  you  directed.  I  used  every  argument  in  my 
power  to  convince  him  of  the  propriety  of  the  measure, 
but  he  was  inflexible  in  the  opinion  that  two  brigades, 
at  least,  of  continental  troops  should  remain  in  and  near 
this  place.  *  *  *  All  I  could  effect  was  to  have 
one  brigade  dispatched  in  addition  to  those  already 
marched.  I  found  myself  infinitely  embarrassed,  and 
was  at  a  loss  how  to  act.' 

"  Col.  Hamilton,  having  concluded  his  mission  to  Gen. 
17 


194 

Gates,  returned  to  New  Windsor,  whence,  on  the  10th 
of  November,  he  addressed  the  commander-in-chief  to 
this  effect : 

" i  DEAR  SIR — I  arrived  here  last  night  from  Albany. 
Having  given  Gen.  Gates  a  little  time  to  recollect  him 
self,  I  renewed  my  remonstrance  on  the  necessity  and 
propriety  of  sending  you  more  than  one  brigade  of  the 
three  he  had  detained  with  him,  and  finally  prevailed 
upon  him  to  give  orders  for  Glover's,  in  addition  to 
Patterson's  brigade,  to  march  this  way.  *  *  * 

"  I  am  pained  beyond  expression  to  inform  your  ex 
cellency  that  on  my  arrival  here,  I  find  every  thing  has 
been  neglected  and  deranged  by  Gen.  Putnam,  and  that 
the  two  brigades,  Poor's  and  Learned's,  still  remain 
here  and  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  at  Fishkill. 
Col.  Warner's  militia,  I  am  told,  have  been  drawn  to 
Peekskill,  to  aid  in  an  expedition  against  New  York, 
which  it  seems  is,  at  this  time,  the  hobby-horse  with 
Gen.  Putnam.  Not  the  least  attention  has  been  paid 
to  my  order  in  your  name  for  a  detachment  of  one 
thousand  men  from  the  troops  hitherto  stationed  at  this 
post.  Every  thing  is  sacrificed  to  the  whim  of  taking 
New  York. 

"  The  two  brigades  of  Poor  and  Learned,  it  appears, 
would  not  march  for  want  of  money  and  necessaries ; 
several  of  the  regiments  having  received  no  pay  for  six 
or  eight  months  past.  There  has  been  a  high  mutiny 
among  the  former  on  this  account,  in  which  a  captain 
killed  a  man,  and  was  himself  shot  by  his  comrade. 
These  difficulties,  for  want  of  proper  management,  have 
stopped  the  troops  from  proceeding.  Gov.  Clinton  has 
been  the  only  man  who  has  done  any  thing  towards  re 
moving  them,  but  for  want  of  Gen.  Putnam's  co-opera 
tion  has  not  been  able  to  effect  it.  He  has  only  been 
able  to  prevail  with  Learned's  brigade  to  agree  to 
march  to  Goshen,  in  hopes,  by  getting  them  once  on 
the  go,  to  induce  them  to  continue  their  march.  On 
coming  here,  I  immediately  sent  for  Col.  Bailey,  who 


195 

now  commands  Learned's  brigade,  and  persuaded  him 
to  carry  the  brigade  on  to  head-quarters  as  fast  as  pos 
sible.  This  he  expects  to  effect  by  means  of  six  thou 
sand  dollars,  which  Gov.  Clinton  was  kind  enough  to 
borrow  for  me,  and  which  Col.  Bailey  thinks  will  keep 
the  men  in  good  humor  till  they  join  you.  They 
marched  this  morning  towards  Goshen. 

"  The  plan  I  before  laid  having  been  totally  derang 
ed,  a  new  one  has  become  necessary.  It  is  now  too 
late  to  send  Warner's  militia  ;  by  the  time  they  reached 
you,  their  term  of  service  would  be  out.  The  motive 
for  sending  them,  which  was  to  give  you  a  speedy  re 
inforcement,  has,  by  the  past  delay,  been  superseded. 

"  By  Gov.  Clinton's  advice,  I  have  sent  an  order  in 
the  most  emphatical  terms  to  Gen.  Putnam,  immediate 
ly  to  dispatch  all  the  continental  troops  under  him  to 
your  assistance,  and  to  detain  the  militia  instead  of 
them. 

"  My  opinion  is,  that  the  only  present  use  for  troops 
in  this  quarter  is  to  protect  the  country  from  the  depre 
dations  of  little  plundering  parties,  and  for  carrying  on 
the  works  necessary  for  the  defence  of  the  rivers.  No 
thing  more  ought  to  be  thought  of.  'Tis  only  wasting 
time  and  misapplying  men  to  employ  them  in  a  suicidal 
parade  against  New  York ;  for  in  this  it  will  undoubt 
edly  terminate.  New  York  is  no  object,  if  it  could  be 
taken,  and  to  take  it  would  require  more  men  than 
could  be  spared  from  more  substantial  purposes.  *Gov. 
Clinton's  ideas  coincide  with  mine.  He  thinks  that 
there  is  no  need  of  more  continental  troops  here  than 
a  few  to  give  a  spur  to  the  militia  in  working  upon  the 
fortifications.  In  pursuance  of  this,  I  have  given  the 
directions  before  mentioned.  If  Gen.  Putnam  attends 
to  them,  the  troops  under  him  may  be  with  you  nearly 
as  early  as  any  of  the  others,  though  he  has  unluckily 
marched  them  down  to  Tarrytown,  and  Gen.  Glover's 
brigade,  when  it  gets  up,  will  be  more  than  sufficient 
to  answer  the  true  end  of  this  post. 


198 

"  If  your  excellency  agrees  with  me  in  opinion,  it  will 
be  well  to  send  instant  directions  to  Gen.  Putnam  to 
pursue  the  object  I  have  mentioned,  for  I  doubt  whether 
he  will  attend  to  any  thing  I  shall  say,  notwithstanding 
it  comes  in  the  shape  of  a  positive  order.  I  fear,  unless 
you  interpose,  the  works  here  will  go  on  so  feebly  for 
want  of  men,  that  they  will  not  be  completed  in  time. 
Gov.  Clinton  will  do  every  thing  in  his  power.  I  wish 
Gen.  Putnam  was  recalled  from  the  command  of  this 
post,  and  Gov.  Clinton  would  accept  it :  the  blunders 
and  caprices  of  the  former  are  endless.  Believe  me, 
sir,  nobody  can  be  more  impressed  with  the  importance 
of  forwarding  the  reinforcements,  coming  to  you,  in  all 
speed,  nor  could  anybody  have  endeavored  to  promote 
it  more  than  I  have  done ;  but  the  ignorance  of  some, 
and  the  design  of  others,  have  been  almost  insuperable 
obstacles.  As  soon  as  I  get  Gen.  Poor's  brigade  in 
march,  I  shall  proceed  to  Gen.  Putnam's  at  Peekskill.' 

"On  the  12th  of  November,  he  addressed  another 
letter  to  Gen.  Washington,  in  which  he  says — '  By  a 
letter  of  yesterday,  Gen.  Poor  informs  me  he  would 
certainly  march  this  morning.  I  must  do  him  the  jus 
tice  to  say,  he  appears  solicitous  to  join  you,  and  that 
I  believe  the  past  delay  is  not  owing  to  any  fault  of  his, 
but  is  wholly  chargeable  to  Gen.  Putnam.  Indeed,  sir, 
I  owe  it  to  the  service  to  say,  that  every  part  of  this 
gentleman's  conduct  is  marked  with  blunders  and  tiegli- 
gence,  and  gives  general  disgust.  *  *  *  In  a  letter 
from  Gen.  Putnam,  just  now  received  by  Gov.  Clinton, 
he  appears  to  have  been  the  10th  at  White  Plains.  I 
have  had  no  answer  to  my  last  application.'" 

In  a  letter  from  Col.  Hamilton  to  Gen.  Washington, 
dated  at  Peekskill,  November  15th,  he  says: 

"  Gen.  Poor's  brigade  crossed  the  ferry  day  before 
yesterday.  Two  York  regiments,  Cortland's  and  Liv 
ingston's,  are  with  them  :  they  were  unwilling  to  be 
separated  from  the  brigade,  and  the  brigade  from  them. 
Gen.  Putnam  was  unwilling  to  keep  them  with  him. 


197 

The  troops  now  remaining  with  Gen.  Putnam,  will 
amount  to  about  the  number  you  intended,  though  they 
are  not  exactly  the  same.  He  had  detached  Col.  Webb's 
regiment  to  you.  He  says  the  troops  with  him  are  not 
in  a  condition  to  march,  being  destitute  of  shoes,  stock 
ings,  and  other  necessaries  ;  but  I  believe  the  true  rea 
sons  of  his  being  unwilling  to  pursue  the  mode  pointed 
out  by  you,  were  his  aversion  to  the  York  troops,  and 
his  desire  to  retain  Gen.  Parsons  with  him." 

"  Col.  Hamilton  had  the  gratification  of  receiving  a 
letter  from  Gen.  Washington,  dated  November  15th, 
1777,  in  which  he  says: 

";DEAR  SIR — I  have  duly  received  your  several  favors 
from  the  time  you  left  me  to  that  of  the  12th  instant. 
I  approve  entirely  of  all  the  steps  you  have  taken,  and 
have  only  to  wish  that  the  exertions  of  those  you  have 
had  to  deal  with  had  kept  pace  with  your  zeal  and 
good  intentions.' 

"  While  doing  justice  to  the  subject  of  this  memoir, 
it  is  painful  to  raise  the  veil,  and  to  dissipate  those 
pleasing  illusions,  cherished  from  childhood  towards 
every  actor  in  the  revolutionary  struggle,  which  have 
ripened  into  a  sentiment  little  short  of  personal  attach 
ment,  more  especially  when  the  person  inculpated  is 
Gen.  Putnam.  *"  *  *  But  higher  duties  are  to  be 
fulfilled  than  to  gratify  national  pride,  and  the  story 
of  the  revolution  is  but  half  told  when  those  difficulties 
are  concealed,  which  were  "encountered  and  overcome  by 
the  men  who  achieved  the  liberty  of  their  country. 

"  The  consequence  of  the  delays  which  had  been  in 
terposed  in  reinforcing  the  army  were  soon  and  sadly 
felt.  The  fall  of  Fort  Mifflin  was  a  prelude  to  the 
evacuation  of  Red  Bank.  A  reinforcement  from  New 
York  enabled  Cornwallis,  with  a  detachment  of  two 
thousand  men,  to  cross  the  river.  From  the  procrasti 
nation  in  forming  a  junction  with  Glover's  brigade,  then 
on  their  march  through  the  Jersies,  Gen.  Greene  found 
himself  too  weak  to  intercept  his  adversary,  and  on  the 

17* 


198 

night  of  the  20th  of  November,  after  the  waste  of  so 
many  lives,  the  water  guard  was  destroyed,  and  the  de 
fence  of  the  Delaware  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
Howe,  strengthened  by  the  succours  which  now  reach 
ed  him,  was  enabled  to  hold  possession  of  Philadelphia 
during  the  ensuing  winter,  *  though  just  before  the  re 
duction  of  the  forts,  he  balanced  upon  the  point  of  quit 
ting  that  city.' 

"  A  letter  from  Gen.  Washington  to  congress,  of  the 
10th  of  December,  in  which  he  mentions  the  movement 
of  the  enemy  to  Chesnut  hill,  and  their  sudden  retreat, 
expresses  a  '  regret  that  they  had  not  come  to  an  en 
gagement.'  The  retreat  was  unquestionably  owing  to 
a  discovery  of  the  increased  strength  of  the  Americans. 
From  this  may  be  inferred  Howe's  condition  at  that 
moment,  and  it  justifies  the  conclusion,  that  a  prompt 
obedience  to  the  orders,  conveyed  by  Hamilton,  on  the 
part  of  Gates  and  Putnam,  would  not  only  have  saved 
the  defences  of  the  river,  so  long  and  gallantly  main 
tained,  but  by  enabling  the  Americans  to  take  a  strong 
position  in  the  vicinity  of  Red  Bank,  would  have  cut 
off  the  communication  between  the  British  army  and 
fleet,  and  fulfilling  Washington's  prophecy,  Howe  would 
have  been  reduced  to  the  situation  of  Burgoyne,  thus  pro 
bably  terminating  the  war  in  the  second  year  of  our 
independence. 

"  The  conduct  of  Putnam,  on  this  occasion,  entered 
deeply  into  the  breast  of  Washington  ;  and  we  find 
him,  in  a  letter  from  Valley  Forge,  dated  March  G, 
1778,  thus  expressing  himself,  in  reference  to  the  com 
mand  of  Rhode  Island  :  «  They  also  know  with  more 
certainty  than  I  do,  what  will  be  the  determination  of 
congress  respecting  Gen.  Putnam  ;  and,  of  course, 
whether  the  appointment  of  him  to  such  a  command 
as  that  at  Rhode  Island  would  fall  within  their  views. 
It  being  incumbent  on  me  to  observe,  that  with  such 
materials  as  I  am  furnished,  the  work  must  go  on, — 
whether  well  or  ill  is  another  matter.  If,  therefore,  he 


199 

and  others  are  not  laid  aside,  they  must  be  placed  where 
they  can  least  injure  the  service' " 

FROM  SPARKS'  WRITINGS  OF  GEORGE  WASHINGTON. 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Washington  to  Gen. 
Putnam : 

"  Camp,  13th  November,  1777. 

"  DEAR  SIR — The  situation  of  our  affairs  in  this  quar 
ter  calls  for  every  aid  and  every  effort.  I  therefore 
desire,  that,  without  a  moments  loss  of  time,  you  will 
detach  as  many  effective  rank  and  file,  under  proper 
generals  and  other  officers,  as  will  make  the  whole 
number,  including  those  with  Gen.  McDougal,  amount 
to  twenty-five  hundred  privates  and  non-commissioned 
fit  for  duty. 

"  I  must  urge  you,  by  every  motive,  to  send  on  this 
detachment  without  delay.  No  considerations  are  to 
prevent  it.  It  is  our  first  object  to  defeat,  if  possible, 
the  army  now  opposed  to  us  here.  That  the  passes  in 
the  highlands  may  be  perfectly  secure,  you  will  imme 
diately  call  in  all  your  forces  now  on  command  at  out 
posts.  You  must  not  think  of  covering  a  whole  coun 
try  by  dividing  them  ;  and  when  they  are  ordered  in 
and  drawn  together,  they  will  be  fully  competent  to 
repel  any  attempt  that  can  be  made  from  the  enemy 
below,  in  their  present  situation.  Besides,  if  you  are 
threatened  with  an  attack,  you  must  get  what  aid  you 
can  from  the  militia.  That  you  may  not  hesitate  about 
complying  with  this  order,  you  are  to  consider  it  as 
peremptory,  and  not  to  be  dispensed  with.  Col.  Mal- 
com's  regiment  will  form  a  part  of  the  detachment." 
(MS.  letter.) 

Professor  Sparks  adds,  in  a  note : 

"  Gen.  Putnam  had  formed  a  plan  for  a  separate  at 
tack  on  the  enemy  at  Staten  Island,  Paulus  Hook, 
York  Island,  and  Long  Island,  at  the  same  time.  He 
had  obtained  accurate  knowledge  of  the  enemy's 


200 

strength,  and  Gov.  Trumbull  had  encouraged  him  to 
expect  large  reinforcements  of  militia  from  Connecticut 
for  this  purpose,  which,  with  the  continental  forces  un 
der  his  command,  and  the  aids  he  might  procure  from 
New  York  and  New  Jersey,  he  believed  would  enable 
him  to  execute  his  design.  The  above  order  from  Gen. 
Washington  put  an  end  to  the  project."  (Vol.  v.  p.  72.) 

WASHINGTON  TO  PUTNAM. 

"  Head-quarters,  19th  Nov.,  1777. 

"  DEAR  SIR — I  am  favored  with  yours  of  the  14th. 
/  could  have  wished  that  the  regiments  I  had  ordered 
had  come  on,  because  I  do  not  like  brigades  to  be 
broken  by  detachment.  The  urgency  of  Col.  Hamil 
ton's  letter  was  owing  to  his  knowledge  of  our  Wants 
in  this  quarter,  and  to  a  certainty  there  was  no  danger 
from  New  York,  if  you  sent  away  all  the  continental 
troops  that  were  with  you,  and  waited  to  replace  them 
by  those  expected  down  the  river.  I  cannot  but  say 
there  has  been  more  delay  in  the  march  of  the  troops, 
than  I  think  necessary  ;  and  I  could  wish  that  in  future 
my  orders  may  be  immediately  complied  with,  without 
arguing  upon  the  propriety  of  them.  If  any  accident 
ensues  from  obeying  them,  the  fault  will  be  upon  me  and 
not  icpon  you.  Be  pleased  to  inform  me  particularly 
of  the  corps  that  have  marched  and  are  to  march,  and 
by  what  routes  they  are  directed,  that  I  may  know 
how  to  dispatch  orders  to  meet  them  upon  the  road  if 
necessary." 

Mr.  Sparks,  in  a  note  appended  to  this  letter,  gives 
the  letter  above  alluded  to  from  Col.  Hamilton  to  Gen. 
Putnam ;  which,  in  a  hasty  examination  of  Hamilton's 
Life,  escaped  my  notice,  if,  in  fact,  it  be  therein  contain 
ed.  He  thus  introduces  it : 

"  On  Col.  Hamilton's  return  from  Albany,  after  exe 
cuting  his  mission  to  Gen.  Gates,  he  found,  when  he 
arrived  at  New  Windsor,  that  Gen.  Putnam  had  not 
sent  forward  such  reinforcements  to  Gen.  Washington, 


201 

as  were  expected.  Gen.  Putnam  seems  to  have  had  a 
special  reluctance  to  part  with  these  troops,  probably  in 
consequence  of  his  favorite  project  against  New  York. 
Col.  Hamilton's  letter  was  pointed  and  authoritative. 

" '  I  cannot  forbear  confessing,  (he  observed,)  that  I 
am  astonished  and  alarmed  beyond  measure  to  find 
that  all  his  excellency's  views  have  been  hitherto  frus 
trated,  and  that  no  single  step  of  those  I  mentioned  to 
you  has  been  taken  to  afford  him  the  aid  he  absolutely 
stands  in  need  of,  and  by  delaying  which  the  cause  of 
America  is  put  to  the  utmost  conceivable  hazard.  I  so 
fully  explained  to  you  the  general's  situation,  that  I  could 
not  entertain  a  doubt  you  would  make  it  the  first  object 
of  your  attention  to  reinforce  him  with  that  speed  the 
exigency  of  affairs  demanded  ;  but  I  am  sorry  to  say 
he  will  have  too  much  reason  to  think  other  objects,  in 
comparison  with  that  insignificant  one,  have  been  up 
permost.  I  speak  freely  and  emphatically,  because  I 
tremble  at  the  consequences  of  the  delay  that  has  hap 
pened.  Sir  Henry  Clinton's  reinforcement  is  probably 
by  this  time  with  Gen.  Howe.  This  will  give  him  a 
decisive  superiority  over  our  army.  What  may  be  the 
issue  of  such  a  state  of  things,  I  leave  to  the  feelings  of 
every  friend  to  his  country  capable  of  foreseeing  con 
sequences.  My  expressions  may  perhaps  have  more 
warmth  than  is  altogether  proper,  but  they  proceed 
from  the  overflowing  of  my  heart  in  a  matter  where  I 
conceive  this  continent  essentially  interested. 

"  I  wrote  you  from  Albany,  and  desired  you  would 
send  a  thousand  continental  troops,  of  those  first  pro 
posed  to  be  left  with  you.  This  I  understand  has  not 
been  done.  How  the  non-compliance  can  be  answered 
to  Gen.  Washington,  you  can  best  determine.  /  now, 
sir,  in  the  most  explicit  terms,  by  his  excellency's  author- 
ity,give  it  as  a  positive  order  from  him,  that  all  the  conti 
nental  troops  under  your  command  may  be  immediately 
marched  to  King's  ferry,  there  to  cross  the  river  and 
hasten  to  reinforce  the  army  under  him.  The  Massa- 


202 


chusetts  militia  are  to  be  detained  instead  of  them,  until 
the  troops  coming  from  the  northward  arrive.  When 
they  do,  they  will  replace,  as  far  as  I  am  instructed,  the 
troops  you  shall  send  away  in  consequence  of  this  re 
quisition.  The  general's  idea  of  keeping  troops  this 
way  does  not  extend  further  than  covering  the  country 
from  any  little  irruptions  of  small  parties,  and  carrying 
on  the  works  necessary  for  the  security  of  the  river. 
As  to  attacking  New  York,  that  he  thinks  ought  to  be 
out  of  the  question  at  present.  If  men  could  be  spared 
from  the  other  really  necessary  objects,  he  would  have 
no  objection  to  attempting  a  diversion  by  way  of  New 
York,  but  nothing  further.'"  (MS.  letter,  New  Wind 
sor,  Nov.  9th.) 

Gen.  Putnam  enclosed  a  copy  of  this  letter  to  Gen. 
Washington,  and  observed,  "  It  contains  some  unjust 
and  ungenerous  reflections,  for  I  am  conscious  of  having 
done  every  thing  in  my  power  to  succor  you  as  soon  as 
possible.  I  shall  go  to  New  Windsor  this  day  to  see 
Col.  Hamilton,  and,  until  I  have  orders  from  you  I  can 
not  think  of  continuing  at  this  post  myself,  and  send 
ALL  THE  TROOPS  AWAY.  If  they  should  go 
away,  I  am  confident  Gen.  Howe  will  be  further  rein 
forced  from  this  quarter."  He  then  enumerated  the 
number  of  regiments,  which,  from  the  best  information 
he  could  get,  he  believed  to  be  in  New  York.  Such 
was  the  state  of  the  particulars,  which  Gen.  Washing 
ton  had  before  him,  when  he  wrote  the  above  letter  to 
Gen.  Putnam. 

Gen.  Putnam,  by  his  "  too  great  intercourse  with  the 
enemy,"  stated  by  Chancellor  Livingston,  as  will  soon 
appear,  had  probably  the  means  of  knowing  their  con 
dition  in  New  York ;  and  they  in  return  were  doubtless 
well  informed  of  the  strength  and  situation  of  the  Ameri 
can  army  on  the  North  river,  before  the  expedition  of 
Sir  Henry  Clinton.  He  appeared  as  loth  to  part  with 
any  of  the  troops  under  his  command,  as  Pharoah  was 
to  permit  the  Jews  of  old  to  go  out  of  Egypt ;  and 


203 

nearly  as  much  pains  were  required  to  wrest  them  from 
his  clutches.  The  principal  grounds  for  his  neglect  to 
comply  with  the  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief,  pri 
vately  given  out,  was  his  premeditated  expedition 
against  New  York;  but  that  he  seriously  intended 
such  an  enterprise  on  his  own  responsibility,  under  an 
expectation  that  the  militia  of  the  surrounding  country 
would  flock  to  his  standard,  after  the  experience  they 
had  of  his  generalship,  is  too  absurd  for  a  moment's 
consideration.  He  intimated  the  project  to  Gen.  Gates, 
who  remarked — "  You  may  be  sure  they  [the  enemy] 
have  nothing  they  care  for  in  New  York.  Then  why 
should  you  attack  an  empty  town,  which  you  know  to 
be  untenable  the  moment  they  bring  their  men-of-wa? 
against  it?"  (Vol.  v.,  p.  130.) 

WASHINGTON  TO  PUTNAM. 

"  Head-quarters,  2d  December,  1777. 
"  DEAR  SIR — The  importance  of  the  North  river  in 
the  present  contest,  and  the  necessity  of  defending  it, 
are  subjects  which  have  been  so  frequently  and  so  fully 
discussed,  and  are  so  well  understood,  that  it  is  unne 
cessary  to  enlarge  upon  them.  These  facts  at  once 
appear,  when  it  is  considered  that  it  runs  through  a 
whole  state  ;  that  it  is  the  only  passage  by  which  the 
enemy  from  New  York,  or  any  part  of  our  coast,  can 
ever  hope  to  co-operate  with  an  army  from  Canada  ; 
that  the  possession  of  it  is  indispensably  essential  to 
preserve  the  communication  between  the  eastern,  mid 
dle,  and  southern  states ;  and,  further,  that  upon  its  se 
curity,  in  a  great  measure,  depend  our  chief  supplies  of 
flour  for  the  subsistence  of  such  forces  as  we  may  have 
occasion  for,  in  the  course  of  the  war,  either  in  the 
eastern  or  southern  departments,  or  in  the  country  ly 
ing  high  up  on  the  west  side  of  it.  These  facts  are 
familiar  to  all  ;  they  are  familiar  to  you.  I  therefore 
request  you,  in  the  most  urgent  terms,  to  turn  your 
most  serious  and  active  attention  to  this  infinitely  im- 


204 

portant  subject.  Seize  the  present  opportunity,  and 
em-ploy  your  whole  force  arid  all  the  means  in  your 
power  for  erecting  and  completing,  as  far  as  it  shall  be 
possible,  such  works  and  obstructions  as  may  be  neces 
sary  to  defend  and  secure  the  river  against  any  future 
attempts  of  the  enemy.  You  will  consult  Gov.  Clinton, 
Gen.  Parsons,  and  the  French  engineer,  Col.  Radiere, 
upon  the  occasion.  By  gaining  the  passage,  you  know 
the  enemy  have  already  laid  waste  and  destroyed  all 
the  houses,  mills,  and  towns  accessible  to  them.  Unless 
proper  measures  are  taken  to  prevent  them,  they  will 
renew  their  ravages  in  the  spring,  or  as  soon  as  the 
season  will  admit,  and  perhaps  Albany,  the  only  town 
in  the  state  of  any  importance  remaining  in  our  hands, 
may  undergo  a  like  fate,  and  a  general  havoc  and  de 
vastation  take  place. 

"  To  prevent  these  evils,  therefore,  I  shall  expect  you 
will  exert  every  nerve,  and  employ  your  whole  force 
in  future,  while  and  whenever  it  is  practicable,  in  con 
structing  and  forwarding  the  proper  works  and  means 
of  defence.  The  troops  must  not  be  kept  out  on  com 
mand,  and  acting  in  detachments  to  cover  the  country 
below,  which  is  a  consideration  infinitely  less  important 
and  interesting."  (p.  176.) 

Here  Mr.  Sparks  observes,  that  "  Gen.  Washington 
wrote  at  the  same  time  to  Gov.  Clinton,  with  a  good 
deal  of  solicitude,  on  this  subject.  *  Gen.  Gates  was 
directed  by  congress  (Washington  remarked)  to  turn 
his  views  to  this  matter ;  but,  from  some  proceedings 
that  have  just  come  to  hand,  he  may  be  employed  in 
the  board  of  war,  if  it  should  be  his  choice.  Should 
this  be  the  case,  nothing  would  be  more  pleasing  to  me, 
and  I  am  convinced  nothing  would  more  advance  the 
interest  of  the  states,  than  for  you  to  take  the  chief  di 
rection  and  superintendence  of  this  business  :  and  I 
shall  be  happy  if  the  affairs  of  government  will  permit 
you.  If  they  will,  you  may  rest  assured  that  no  aid  in 
my  power  to  afford  you  shall  be  withheld,  and  there 


205 

are  no  impediments  on  the  score  of  delicacy  or  superior 
command,  that  shall  not  be  removed!'  To  this  compli 
mentary  and  flattering  proposal,  Gov.  Clinton  replied  : 
*  The  legislature  of  this  state  is  to  meet  on  the  5th  of 
next  month.  The  variety  of  important  business  to  be 
prepared  for  their  consideration,  and  other  aftair§  of 
government,  will  employ  so  great  a  part  of  my  time, 
that  I  should  not  be  able  to  give  that  attention  to  the 
works  for  the  security  of  the  river,  which  their  impor 
tance,  and  the  short  time  in  which  they  ought  to  be 
completed,  require.  But  you  may  rest  assured,  sir,  that 
every  leisure  hour  shall  be  faithfully  devoted  to  them, 
and  my  advice  and  assistance  shall  not  on  any  consid 
eration  be  withheld  from  the  person  who  shall  be  in 
trusted  with  the  chief  direction.'"  (MS.  letter,  Decem 
ber  20th. 

The  following  letter  from  the  president  of  congress 
was  also  received  by  Gov.  Clinton : 

JOHN  HANCOCK  TO  Gov.  CLINTON. 

"  Philadelphia,  March  26,  1777. 

«  gIR — As  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the  for 
tresses  in  the  highlands  of  New  York  should  be  effec 
tually  secured,  and  that  for  this  purpose  an  active  and 
vigilant  officer  should  be  appointed  to  take  the  com 
mand  there,  the  congress  have  thought  proper  to  fix 
upon  you ;  being  fully  persuaded  that  you  will  exert 
yourself  to  render  the  forts  and  other  works  now  erect 
ing  there  fit  for  defence. 

"  They  have  likewise  been  pleased  to  promote  you  to 
the  rank  of  brigadier-general  in  the  army  of  the  United 
States.     I  do  myself  the  pleasure  to  enclose  your  com 
mission,  and  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  respect,  sir, 
"  Your  most  obd't  and  very  humble  servant, 

"JoHN  HANCOCK,  President. 
"  GEN.  CLINTON. 
You  will  please  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  this 

18 


206 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Washington  to  Gen. 
Gates : 

"Head-quarters,  2d  December,  1777. 

"  SIR — By  a  resolve  of  congress  of  the  5th  of  No- 
verr^ber,  you  are  directed,  with  a  certain  part  of  the 
northern  army  and  the  assistance  of  the  militia  of  New 
York  and  the  eastern  states,  to  attempt  the  recovery 
of  the  posts  upon  the  North  river  from  the  enemy,  and 
to  put  them,  if  recovered,  in  the  best  posture  of  defence. 
The  enemy  having  themselves  evacuated  forts  Mont 
gomery  and  Clinton,  while  the  resolve  was  in  agitation, 
but  of  which  the  congress  could  not  at  that  time  be  in 
formed,  the  first  part  falls  of  course ;  but  the  last  de 
serves  our  most  serious  attention,  as  upon  the  posses 
sion  of  the  North  river  depends  the  security  of  all  the 
upper  part  of  the  government  of  New  York,  and  the 
communication  between  the  eastern,  middle,  and  south 
ern  states.  *  *  *  My  not  having  heard  from  you, 
as  to  what  steps  you  have  taken  towards  carrying  into 
execution  the  resolve  for  repairing  the  old  works,  or 
building  new  ones,  or  when  you  might  be  expected 
down  into  that  part  of  the  country,  has  made  me,  hith 
erto  delay  recalling  Gen.  Putnam  from  the  command. 
But  I  beg  leave  to  urge  to  you  the  necessity  of  your 
presence  in  that  quarter,  as  speedily  as  possible ;  for  1 
fear  few  or  no  measures  have  yet  been  taken  towards 
putting  matters  in  a  proper  train  for  carrying  on  these 
important  works.  Gen.  George  Clinton  will  necessarily 
be  employed  in  the  affairs  of  his  government ;  but  I 
have  written  to  him,  and  I  am  certain  he  will  call  for 
and  contribute  all  the  aid  that  the  state  of  New  York 
can  possibly  afford.  You  are  vested  by  the  resolve  of 
congress  with  authority  to  demand  a  proportionable 
share  of  assistance  from  the  eastern  states." 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Washington  to  Gen 
Putnam  : 


207 

"  Valley  Forge,  25th  January,  1778. 

"  DEAR  SIR — I  begin  to  be  very  apprehensive  that 
the  season  will  entirely  pass  away,  before  any  thing 
material  will  be  done  for  the  defence  of  Hudson's  river. 
You  are  well  acquainted- with  the  great  necessity  there 
is  for  having  the  works  finished  as  soon  as  possible  ; 
and  I  must  earnestly  desire  that  the  strictest  attention 
may  be  paid  to  every  matter  which  may  contribute  to 
finishing  and  putting  them  in  a  respectable  state  before 
the  spring. 

"  I  wish  you  had  not  waited  for  returns  of  the  militia 
to  furnish  me  with  a  statement  of  the  troops  in  that 
quarter  ;  and,  if  you  do  not  get  them  in  before  you  re 
ceive  this,  you  will  please  to  let  me  have  an  accurate 
return  of  the  continental  troops  alone,  it  being  abso 
lutely  necessary  that  I  should  know  the  strength  of 
your  command  as  soon  as  possible.  I  congratulate 
you  on  the  success  of  your  two  little  parties  against 
the  enemy,  which  I  dare  say  will  prevent  their  making 
so  extensive  excursions  for  some  time  at  least."  (Vol. 
v.,  p.  223.) 

Gen.  Putnam's  reply  to  this  letter  is  dated  the  13th 
of  February.  After  giving  some  account  of  the  state 
of  the  works  at  the  Highlands,  he  adds  : 

"  Meigs's  regiment,  except  those  ur*d,er  inoculation 
for  the  small-pox,  is  at  the  White  Plains  ;  and  until  bar 
racks  can  be  fitted  for  their  reception,  I  have  thought 
best  to  continue  them  there,  to  cover  the  country  from 
the  incursions  of  the  enemy.  Dubois's  regiment  is  unfit 
to  be  ordered  on  duty,  there  being  not  one  blanket  in  the 
regiment.  Very  few  have  either  a  shoe  or  a  shirt,  and 
most  of  them  have  neither  stockings,  breeches,  nor  over- 
halls.  Several  companies  of  enlisted  artificers  are  in 
the  same  situation,  and  unable  to  work  in  the  field. 
Several  hundred  men  are  rendered  useless,  merely  for 
want  of  necessary  apparel,  as  no  clothing  is  permitted 


to  be  stopped  at  this  post.  Gen.  Parsons  has  returned 
to  camp  some  time  since,  and  takes  upon  himself  the 
command  to-morrow,  when  I  shall  set  out  for  Connec 
ticut."  (Vol.  v.,  p.  224.) 

This  latter,  it  will  be  observed,  is  dated  the  13th  of 
February:  Gen.  Putnam  then  held  command  at  the 
Highlands,  from  which  station  he  was  not  removed  till 
the  16th  of  March  following.  Although  an  officer 
might  be  tolerated  in  saying  metaphorically,  that  *  his 
men  are  bare-foot,  and  otherwise  naked  ;'  meaning 
thereby  that  they  are  very  destitute  of  shoes  and  other 
proper  clothing  ;  but  the  above  specifications  seem 
rather  too  hyperbolical  to  be  admitted  into  an  official 
statement  of  facts.  The  general  must  have  had  in  his 
mind  the  description  given  by  the  facetious  Falstaffof 
the  condition  of  his  company : 

"  If  I  be  not  ashamed  of  my  soldiers,  I  am  a  soused 
gurnet.  No  eye  hath  seen  such  scare-crows.  I'll  not 
march  through  Coventry  with  them,  that's  flat ;  nay, 
and  the  villains  march  wide  betwixt  the  legs,  as  if  they 
had  gyves  on  ;  for,  indeed,  I  had  the  most  of  them  out 
of  prison.  There's  but  a  shirt  and  a  half  in  all  my  com 
pany  ;  and  the  half  shirt  is  two  napkins,  tacked  togeth 
er,  and  thrown  over  the  shoulders,  like  a  herald's  coat 
without  sleeves  i 'and  the  shirt,  to  say  the  truth,  stolen 
from  my  host* at  Saint  Al ban's,  or  the  red-nose  inn 
keeper  of  Daintry.  But  that's  all  one  ;  they'll  find  linen 
enough  on  every  hedge." 

The  extravagance  of  the  above  report  of  the  condi 
tion  of  his  troops  by  Gen.  Putnam  would  naturally  lead 
the  reader  to  suspect  the  correctness  of  the  many  ex 
traordinary  relations  detailed,  through  him,  in  the  nar 
rative  of  his  life  by  Col.  Humphreys. 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Washington  to  Maj. 
Gen.  McDougall. 

"  Head-quarters,  Valley  Forge,  16th  March,  1778. 
"DEAR  SIR — I  was  favored  with  yours  of  the  17th 


209 

'  ultimo,  in  due  time,  and  should  have  proceeded  imme 
diately  upon  the  business  of  the  inquiry,  had  not  Gen. 
Putnam's  private  affairs  required  his  absence  for  some 
little  time.  I  have  appointed  Brig.  Gen.  Huntington 
and  Col.  Wigglesworth  to  assist  you  in  this  matter ;  and 
enclosed  you  will  find  instructions  empowering  you,  in 
conjunction  with  them,  to  carry  on  the  inquiry  agreea 
bly  to  the  resolve  of  congress.  You  will  observe,  by 
the  words  of  the  resolve,  that  the  inquiry  is  to  be  made 
into  the  loss  of  forts  Montgomery  and  Clinton  ;  and 
into  the  conduct  of  the  principal  officers  commanding 
those  forts. 

"  Hence  the  officer  commanding  in  chief  in  that  de 
partment  will  be  consequently  involved  in  the  inquiry  ; 
because,  if  he  has  been  deficient  in  affording  the  proper 
support  to  those  posts,  when  called  upon  to  do  it,  the 
commandant  and  principal  officers  will  of  course  make 
it  appear  by  the  evidence  produced  in  their  own  justi 
fication.  I  am  not  certain  that  Gen.  Putnam  has  re 
turned  to  Fishkill  ;  and  I  have  therefore  by  the  enclos 
ed,  which  you  will  please  to  forward  to  him  by  express, 
given  him  notice  that  the  inquiry  is  to  be  held,  and 
have  desired  him  to  repair  immediately  to  that  post. 
Gen.  Huntington  and  Col.  Wigglesworth  will  set  out 
as  soon  as  they  can  make  preparations  for  the  journey. 

"  Upon  your  arrival  at  the  Highlands,  you  are  to 
take  upon  you  the  command  of  the  different  posts  in 
that  department,  of  which  I  have  advised  Gen.  Putnam. 
Your  time  at  first  will  be  principally  taken  up  with  the 
business  which  you  now  have  in  hand ;  but  I  beg  that 
your  attention  may  be  turned,  as  much  as  possible,  to 
the  completion  of  the  works,  or  at  least  to  putting  them 
in  such  a  state,  that  they  may  be  able  to  resist  a  sudden 
attack  of  the  enemy." 

Mr.  Sparks  observes — "  There  had  been  a  series  of 
misapprehensions  on  the  subject  of  constructing  'milita- 
rv  works  on  the  Highlands,  as  well  as  a  train  of  ob- 

18* 


210 

stacles  to  their  progress.  On  the  5th  of  November,' 
congress  had  appointed  Gen.  Gates  to  command  in  the 
Highlands,  or  rather  had  connected  that  post  with  the 
northern  department,  and  invested  him  with  ample 
powers  to  carry  on  the  works  ;  but,  as  he  was  made 
president  of  the  board  of  war,  he  never  entered  upon 
these  duties.  Again,  on  the  18th  of  February,  Gov. 
Clinton  was  requested  to  take  the  superintendence  of 
the  works  ;  but  the  multiplicity  of  his  civil  employments 
made  it  necessary  for  him  to  decline  the  undertaking. 
Gen.  McDougall  took  the  command  on  the  28th  of 
March.  Two  days  previously  Kosciusko  arrived,  who 
had  been  appointed  engineer  in  the  place  of  Radiere. 
From  that  time  the  works  were  pressed  forward  with 
spirit.  To  the  scientific  skill  and  sedulous  application 
of  Kosciusko,  the  public  was  mainly  indebted  for  the 
construction  of  the  military  defences  at  West  Point." 

GEN.  WASHINGTON'  TO  GEN.  PUTNAM. 

"  Valley  Forge,  16th  March,  1778. 

"  DEAR  SIR — The  congress  having,  by  a  resolve  of 
the  28th  of  November  last,  directed  that  an  inquiry  be 
made  into  the  loss  of  forts  Montgomery  and  Clinton, 
and  into  the  conduct  of  the  principal  officers  command 
ing  these  forts,  I  have  appointed  Maj.  Gen.  McDougall, 
Brig.  Gen.  Huntington,  and  Col.  Wigglesworth,  to  car 
ry  the  resolve  into  execution.  It  is  more  than  probable 
that  the  conduct  of  the  officer  commanding  at  the  time 
in  that  department  will  be  involved  in  the  inquiry ;  and 
I  therefore  desire,  that  you  will  repair  immediately  to 
Fishkill  upon  the  receipt  of  this,  to  meet  Gen.  McDou 
gall  and  the  other  gentlemen. 

"  Gen.  McDougall  is  to  take  command  of  the  posts 
in  the  Highlands.  My  reason  for  making  this  change 
is  owing  to  the  prejudices  of  the  people,  which,  whether 
well  or  ill  grounded,  must  be  indulged  ;  and  I  should 
think  myself  wanting  in  justice  to  the  public  and  candor 
towards  you.  were  I  to  continue  you  in  a  command, 


211 

after  I  have  been,  almost  in  direct  terms,  informed  that 
the  people  of  the  state  of  New  York  will  not  render 
the  necessary  support  and  assistance,  while  you  remain 
at  the  head  of  that  department.  When  the  inquiry  is 
finished  I  desire  that  you  will  return  to  Connecticut  and 
superintend  the  forwarding  on  the  new  levies  with  the 
greatest  expedition." 

Mr.  Sparks  remarks :  "  Not  only  were  complaints 
uttered  by  the  popular  voice,  but  the  political  leaders 
of  the  state  expressed  discontent.  Robert  R.  Livings 
ton,  then  chancellor  of  New  York,  wrote  to  Gen.  Wash 
ington  on  the  subject  in  a  pointed  manner. 

" '  Your  excellency,'  said  he,  4  is  not  ignorant  of  the 
extent  of  Gen.  Putnam's  capacity  and  diligence ;  and 
how  well  soever  they  may  qualify  him  for  this  impor 
tant  command,  the  prejudices  to  which  his  imprudent 
lenity  to  the  disaffected,  and  too  great  intercourse  with 
the  enemy,  have  given  rise,  have  greatly  injured  his  in- 
iluence.  How  far  the  loss  of  Fort  Montgomery  and 
the  subsequent  ravages  of  the  enemy  are  to  be  attributed 
to  him,  I  will  not  venture  to  say ;  as  this  will  necessari 
ly  be  determined  by  a  court  of  inquiry,  whose  determi 
nations  I  would  not  anticipate.  Unfortunately  for  him, 
the  current  of  popular  opinion  in  this  and  the  neighbor 
ing  states,  and  as  far  as  I  can  learn  in  the  troops  under 
his  command,  runs  strongly  against  him.  For  my  own 
part,  /  respect  his  bravery  and  former  services,  and  sin 
cerely  lament  that  Ms  patriotism  will  not  suffer  him  to 
take  the  repose  to  which  his  age  and  past  services 
justly  entitle  him.'"  (MS.  letter,  Jan.  14th.) 

Gov.  Clinton  also  wrote  pressingly  to  Gen.  Washing 
ton  requesting  the  removal  of  Gen.  Putnam  from  the 
command  at  the  Highlands ;  as  may  be  seen  in  the 
governor's  inedited  manuscripts  in  the  possession  of  the 
family,  as  I  am  informed  by  one  of  the  executors  of  his 
estate. 

Although  Gen.  Washington  announced  to  Gen.  Put- 


212 

nam  his  removal  from  the  post  he  held,  in  the  most  de 
licate  manner,  no  one  knew  better  than  he,  whether  the 
prejudices  against  him  were  well  or  ill  grounded.  His 
directions  to  Gen.  Putnam  to  return  to  Connecticut, 
after  the  inquiry  was  finished,  "  and  superintend  the 
forwarding  on  the  new  levies,"  struck  me,  at  first  view, 
as  very  singular,  as  the  inquiry  might  lead  to  his  sus 
pension  or  dismission  from  the  service.  On  reflection, 
I  concluded  there  must  have  been  an  understanding  be 
tween  Gen.  Washington  and  the  members  of  the  board 
he  had  appointed  to  act  in  this  case,  and  that  Gen.  Put 
nam  should  be  let  off  without  censure  ;  it  being  under 
stood  that  he  should,  in  future,  be  placed  in  situations 
less  responsible  at  least,  than  those  he  had  before  occu 
pied.  Accordingly,  as  stated  by  Col.  Humphreys,  in 
his  Life  of  Putnam,  "  upon  full  knowledge  and  mature 
deliberation  of  facts  on  the  spot,  they  [the  court  of  in 
quiry]  reported  the  loss  [of  forts  Montgomery  and 
Clinton]  to  have  been  occasioned  by  want  of  men,  and 
not  by  any  fault  in  the  commanders" 

The  report  is  evidently  very  just,  in  respect  to  the 
defence  of  the  forts,  which  were  carried  by  superior 
numbers.  And  this  was  the  fault  of  the  commander 
of  the  department,  whose  force,  as  Marshall  justly  says, 
"  was,  if  properly  applied,  more  than  competent  to  the 
defence  of  the  forts  against  any  numbers  which  could 
be  spared  from  New  York." 

GEN.  WASHINGTON  TO  GEN.  PUTNAM. 

"  Head-quarters,  Valley  Forge,  29th  April,  1778. 
"  DEAR  SIR — I  am  pleased  to  hear  that  your  prospects 
of  procuring  recruits  and  drafts  for  the  army  bore  a 
more  favorable  appearance,  than  when  you  wrote  be 
fore.  I  must  beg  you  to  forward  on  those  for  the  regi 
ments  at  this  camp  as  fast  as  possible.  I  expect  in  a 
few  days  a  general  plan  of  operations  for  the  campaign 
will  be  settled  ;  if  one  similar  to  that  which  you  men 
tion  should  be  fixed  upon,  your  assif>ta?ice  will  still  be 


213 

wanting  in  Connecticut  to  arrange  and  forward  the  mi 
litia,  which  we  shall  have  occasion  to  draw  from  that 
state,  and  therefore  I  wish  you  to  continue  there  till  you 
hear  from  me." 

Washington,  it  appears,  was  determined  to  adhere 
to  his  resolution,  as  before  expressed  in  a  letter  from 
Valley  Forge,  dated  March  6,  1778. 

Extract  of  a  letter  from  Gen.  Washington  to  the 
president  of  congress : 

"  Middlebrook,  14th  April,  1779. 

"  The  plan  of  operations  for  the  campaign  being  de 
termined,  a  commanding  officer  was  to  be  appointed 
for  the  Indian  expedition.  This  command,  according 
to  all  present  appearances,  will  probably  be  of  the  second 
if  not  of  the  first  importance  for  the  campaign.  The 
officer  conducting  it  has  a  flattering  prospect  of  ac 
quiring  more  credit,  than  can  be  expected  by  any  other 
this  year  ;  and  he  has  the  best  reason  to  hope  for  suc 
cess.  Gen.  Lee,  from  his  situation,  was  out  of  the 
question  ;  Gen.  Schuyler  (who,  by  the  way,  would  have 
been  most  agreeable  to  me)  was  so  uncertain  of  con 
tinuing  in  the  army,  that  I  could  not  appoint  him  ;  Gen. 
Putnam,  I  need  not  mention.  I  therefore  made  the  offer 
of  it,  for  the  appointment  could  not  longer  be  delayed, 
to  Gen.  Gates,  who  was  next  in  seniority." 

I  now  return  to  the  biography. 

HORSE  NECK  EXPEDITION. 

In  order  to  cover  the  country  adjoining  to  the  Sound,  and 
to  support  the  garrison  of  West  Point,  in  case  of  an  attack, 
Maj.  Gen.  Putnam  was  stationed  for  the  winter  at  Reading, 
in  Connecticut.  He  had  under  his  orders  the  brigade  of 
New  Hampshire,  the  two  brigades  of  Connecticut,  the  corps 
of  infantry  commanded  by  Hazen,  and  that  of  cavalry  by 
Sheldon. 

About  the  middle  of  winter,  while  Gen.  Putnam  was  on  a 
visit  to  his  out-post  at  Horse  Neck,  he  found  Gov.  Tryon  ad- 


214 

vancing  upon  that  town  with  a  corps  of  fifteen  hundred  men. 
To  oppose  these  Gen.  Putnam  had  only  a  picquet  of  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  men,  and  two  iron  field-pieces,  without  horses 
or  drag-ropes.  He,  however,  planted  his  cannon  on  the  high 
ground,  by  the  meeting  house,  and  retarded  their  approach 
by  firing  several  times,  until,  perceiving  the  horse  (support 
ed  by  the  infantry)  about  to  charge,  he  ordered  the  picquet 
to  provide  for  their  safety,  by  retiring  to  a  swamp  inaccessi 
ble  to  horse,  and  secured  his  own,  by  plunging  down  the 
steep  precipice  at  the  church  upon  a  full  trot.  This  preci 
pice  is  so  steep,  where  he  descended,  as  to  have  artificial 
stairs,  composed  of  nearly  one  hundred  stone  steps,  for  the 
accommodation  of  foot-passengers.  There  the  dragoons, 
who  were  but  a  sword's  length  from  him,  stopped  short ;  for 
the  declivity  was  so  abrupt,  that  they  ventured  not  to  follow; 
and,  before  they  could  gain  the  valley,  by  going  round  the 
brow  of  the  hill  in  the  ordinary  road,  he  was  far  enough  be 
yond  their  reach.  He  continued  his  route,  unmolested,  to 
Stanford :  from  whence,  having  strengthened  his  picquet  by 
the  junction  of  some  militia,  he  came  back  again,  and,  in 
turn,  pursued  Gov.  Tryon  in  his  retreat.  As  he  rode  down 
the  precipice,  one  ball,  of  the  many  fired  at  him,  went  through 
his  beaver :  but  Gov.  Tryon,  by  way  of  compensation  for 
spoiling  his  hat,  sent  him,  soon  afterwards,  as  a  present,  a 
complete  suit  of  clothes.* 

I  will  now  give  Marshall's  account  of  this  famous 
affair : 

"In  July,  1779,  an  expedition  was  determined  on  rjy 
the  British  against  Connecticut,  the  command  of  which 
was  given  to  Gov.  Tryon,  a  major-general  in  the  army. 

"  On  the  3d  of  July,  the  troops  destined  for  this  expe 
dition,  amounting  to  about  two  thousand  six  hundred 
men,  embarked  at  Frog's  Neck,  on  the  Sound,  and  sail 
ing  eastward  reached  New  Haven  bay  on  the  5th,  in 

*  In  this  retreat,  though  with  a  very  inferior  force,  Gen.  Putnam  made 
about  fifty  prisoners,  part 'of  whom  were  wounded,  and  the  whole  were  the 
next  day  sent,  under  the  escort  of  an  officer's  guard,  to  the  British  lines 
for  exchange.  It  was  for  the  humanity  and  kindness  of  Putnam  to  the 
wounded  prisoners,  that  Gov.  Tryon  complimented  him  with  the  "  suit  of 
clothes."— Boston  Edit. 


215 

the  morning.  They  effected  their  landing,  took  pos 
session  of  the  town,  and  destroyed  whatever  naval  and 
military  stores  could  be  found.  In  the  afternoon  of  the 
next  day,  they  re-embarked,  and  proceeded  eastward 
along  the  coast,  to  the  village  of  Fairfield. 

"  Here  they  experienced  rather  more  opposition  than 
they  had  encountered  at  New  Haven.  The  militia  col 
lected  in  great  numbers,  and  showed  a  considerable  de 
gree  of  resolution.  But,  as  they  were  unequal  to  the 
defence  of  the  town,  this  flourishing  village  was  reduced 
to  ashes. 

"  The  troops  being  re-embarked  at  Fairfield,  the  fleet 
crossed  the  Sound  to  Huntington  bay,  where  it  remain 
ed  until  the  llth,  when  it  recrossed  that  water,  after 
which  the  troops  were  landed,  in  the  night,  on  the  Cow 
Pasture,  a  peninsula  on  the  east  of  the  bay  of  Nor- 
walk. 

"  About  the  same  time,  a  much  larger  detachment 
from  the  British  army  directed  its  course  towards 
Horse  Neck,  and  made  demonstrations  of  a  design  to 
penetrate  into  the  country  in  that  direction. 

"  On  the  first  intelligence  that  Connecticut  was  in 
vaded,  Gen.  Parsons,  who  was  a  native  of  that  state, 
had  been  directed  by  Gen.  Washington  to  hasten  to 
the  scene  of  action,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  confidence 
to  his  countrymen,  and  of  guiding  their  efforts.  Placing 
himself  at  the  head  of  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  con 
tinental  troops,  who  were  supported  by  considerable 
bodies  of  militia,  he  attacked  the  British  in  the  morning 
of  the  12th,  so  soon  as  they  were  in  motion,  and  kept 
up  through  the  day  an  irregular  distant  fire. 

"  In  contemplation  of  the  enterprise  under  Tryon, 
Sir  Henry  Clinton  had  ordered  a  considerable  body  of 
troops  from  Newport.  On  receiving  intelligence  from 
Gates  of  their  embarkation,  Gen.  Washington  directed 
Glover's  brigade  to  be  immediately  put  in  motion,  and 
to  proceed  with  as  much  dispatch  as  possible  towards 
the  Hudson.  While  on  the  march,  orders  were  given 


216 

him  to  join  the  militia  of  Connecticut,  and  assist  them 
in  repelling  the  invaders  of  that  state.  Gen.  Heath, 
with  his  division,  was  also  directed  to  take  a  position 
about  Ridgefield,  or  Bedford,  so  as  to  countenance  and 
aid  the  militia  as  much  as  possible. 

"  But  before  the  continental  troops  ordered  to  the  re 
lief  of  Connecticut  could  afford  any  real  service,  em 
ployment  was  found  on  the  Hudson  for  the  whole  force 
under  the  immediate  command  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton, 
and  all  further  operations  against  that  state  were  relin 
quished."  (Vol.  iv.,  p.  67.) 

It  is  strange  that  Gen.  Putnam,  to  whom  Col.  Hum 
phreys  says  he  was  indebted  for  the  narrative  of  his 
life,  if  he  had  any  concern  in  the  affair  at  Horse  Neck, 
should  not  remember  the  season  of  the  year  in  which 
it  took  place,  fixing  it  at  the  most  unpropitio-js  and  un 
usual  period  for  such  an  enterprise,  about  the  middle  of 
winter,  whereas  it  actually  occurred  in  July.  There 
can  be  no  mistake  in  this  case.  Judge  Marshall,  from 
the  documents  before  him,  gives  the  day  of  the  month, 
July  3d,  when  the  expedition  embarked,  and,  on  the 
12th,  those  who  landed  at  Horse  Neck  were  attacked 
by  Gen.  Parsons.  Marshall,  it  is  seen,  makes  no  men 
tion  of  Putnam  as  taking  any  part  in  this  skirmish. 
The  one  hundred  and  fifty  continental  troops,  said  to  be 
commanded  by  him,  were  under  the  orders  of  Gen. 
Parsons.  Indeed,  it  does  not  appear  that  Gen.  Putnam 
had  any  special  command  at  this  time,  but  on  the  con 
trary,  that  his  duties  were  confined  to  the  superintend 
ence  of  the  recruiting  service  in  Connecticut.  But  as 
senior  officer  in  that  state,  he  seems  to  have  assumed 
the  action  of  his  subordinates  as  his  own. 

If  any  orders  were  issued  through  Gen.  Putnam, 
during  his  continuance  in  Connecticut  in  the  service 
aforesaid,  to  forward,  to  particular  posts,  troops  with 
their  officers  who  were  stationed  in  the  vicinity  of  his 
quarters,  it  would  appear  to  be  done  out  of  compliment 
to  his  rank. 


217 

Provided  Putnam  had  under  his  orders  the  respeetar 
ble  force  stated  by  Humphreys,  why  were  they  not 
ordered  to  aid  in  expelling  the  invaders  of  Connecticut, 
instead  of  Gens.  Parsons,  Glover,  and  Heath,  with  the 
troops  under  their  command  ?  Marshall  says  nothing 
of  the  troops  stationed  at  Reading.  In  fact,  the  biogra 
phers  of  Putnam  are  at  variance  in  regard  to  his  own 
station.  Peabody  fixes  it  at  Danbury  instead  of  Read 
ing- 
Marshall  neglects  to  state  that  the  continental  troops 
retired  to  a  swamp  on  account  of  its  being  inaccessible 
to  horse,  when  the  British  infantry,  who  supported  the 
dragoons,  might  easily  follow ;  nor  does  he  say  there 
were  any  mounted  men  in  the  expedition.  He  is 
equally  silent  in  regard  to  the  fifty  prisoners,  said  by 
Humphreys  to  be  taken  by  the  Americans,  and  sent 
with  so  much  gallantry,  by  Gen.  Putnam,  to  the  British 
lines  for  exchange,  the  next  day  after  the  rencounter. 
The  liberality  of  Putnam  to  the  enemy,  upon  all  occa 
sions,  seems  unbounded.  By  the  present,  however, 
which  he  received  from  Tryon,  in  this  instance,  he 
had  his  reward.  Such  civilities,  by  the  way,  betwixt 
generals  commanding  opposing  armies,  appear  very 
unique  and  improper.  Where  individuals  fight  on  their 
own  special  account,  the  case  is  different.  The  eccen 
tric  John  Randolph  demanded  of  Henry  Clay  a  new 
coat,  in  compensation  for  one  which  had  been  pierced 
with  a  ball  in  a  duel  betwixt  those  gentlemen.  Whether 
Mr.  Clay  complied  with  the  request,  or  not,  the  writer 
is  not  informed. 

The  main  item  of  the  drama  remains  still  to  be  taken 
notice  of.  I  allude  to  Humphreys'  account  of  Gen. 
Putnam's  miraculous  escape,  by  descending  the  steep 
precipice  in  the  vicinity  of  the  scene  of  action.  And 
here  I  find,  that  notwithstanding  the  story  has  been 
stereotyped  again  and  again,  introduced  into  school 
books,  and  exhibited  in  pictorial  representations,  it  turns 
out  after  all  to  be  fabulous ;  that  Putnam  did  not  de- 

19 


218 

scend  the  dangerous  declivity,  in  manner  and  form  sta 
ted,  but  glided  down  the  hill  in  the  most  easy  and  safe 
style  conceivable  ;  although,  it  would  appear,  to  the 
sore  discomfort  of  his  horse. 

The  following  statement,  from  a  relative  of  Gen.  Put 
nam,  may  be  relied  upon  as  being  derived  from  the 
general  himself;  and  it  puts  a  very  different  face  upon 
the  transaction  to  what  has  hitherto  been  universally 
believed  to  be  the  fact.  He  says — "  It  may  not  be 
amiss  to  state,  that  it  is  generally  supposed  Putnam 
came  down  the  steps ;  we  have  seen  engravings  repre 
senting  him  thus.  But  he  told  Gen.  Samuel  Grosver- 
nor,  his  son-in-law,  the  manner  of  the  descent ;  '  The 
horse  was  well  trained  and  sagacious,  and  came  down 
the  hill  in  a  sliding  manner,  resting  upon  his  haunches.1" 
Here  the  general  was  as  much  at  his  ease  as  though 
sitting  in  an  arm-chair  at  his  head-quarters.  This  cor 
rection  is  contained  in  an  article  prepared  not  long 
since  for  a  periodical,  during  the  controversy  concern 
ing  the  validity  of  Humphreys'  Life  of  Putnam. 

Here  the  whole  gist  of  the  story,  which  has  been 
made  of  so  great  account,  the  adventurous  descent  of 
the  one  hundred  stairs,  upon  a  full  trot,  is  proved  to  be 
false  by  Gen.  Putnam  himself.  And  all  the  plates  con 
taining  this  representation  are  become  useless.  It  is 
very  extraordinary,  that  those  who  took  part  in  the  ac 
tion,  and  others  who  resided  near  the  scene  of  it,  should 
not  have  contradicted  this  erroneous  statement  so  long 
palmed  upon  the  public. 

I  find  that  the  Rev.  Dr.  Jedediah  Morse,  in  his  "An 
nals  of  the  American  Revolution,"  quotes  Humphreys' 
account  of  the  skirmish  at  Horse  Neck  entire,  and  gives 
his  authority.  He  also  gives  a  pictorial  representation 
of  Putnam's  famous  escape,  in  which  the  general  is  de 
picted  as  throwing  the  reins  to  his  horse,  extending 
both  arms,  and  brandishing  in  his  right  hand  his  sword, 
as  it  were,  in  defiance  of  the  enemy,  in  the  same  man 
ner  as  he  is  represented  by  Col.  Trumbull,  in  his  paint- 


219 

ing  of  the  retreat  from  Bunker  Hill.  Mr.  Otis,  in  his 
translation  of  Botta's  History  of  the  War,  in  default  of 
the  author's  taking  notice  of  the  wonderful  affair,  foists 
into  the  work  a  plate  representing  Putnam's  achievement, 
with  an  abridgment  of  Humphreys'  account  engraved 
upon  it.  This  he  introduces,  very  mal-apropos,  where 
the  history  relates  the  landing  of  British  troops  at  Ver- 
planck's  Point,  previous  to  the  storming  of  forts  Mont 
gomery  and  Clinton,  and  when  Putnam  was  ascending 
to  the  Heights,  instead  of  descending  to  the  plain,  as 
represented  in  the  plate. 

Mr.  Charles  A.  Goodrich,  in  an  abridged  History  of 
the  United  States,  for  the  use  of  schools,  gives  the 
Horse  Neck  exploit,  with  an  engraved  representation 
of  it.  And  Dr.  Lieber,  in  his  "  Encyclopedia  Ameri 
cana,"  gives  a  brief  account  of  the  same  ;  but  prudently 
omits  to  state  that  the  expedition  took  place  in  the  mid 
dle  of  winter. 

Col.  Humphreys  seems  to  have  been  the  historical 
pioneer  of  the  American  revolutionary  war ;  and  his 
work  has  served  as  a  text-book  for  future  historians  of 
that  event,  by  reason  that  most  writers  of  history  pre 
fer  taking  on  trust  what  is  ready  prepared  to  their 
hand,  rather  than  submit  to  the  trouble  of  investigation 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  facts.  Some  authors, 
however,  must  be  excepted  in  this  case,  particularly 
Marshall,  who  derived  his  information  from  original, 
authentic  documents. 

McPflERSON. 

I  will  here  give  an  instance  of  the  great  indulgence 
which  Gen.  Putnam  was  in  the  habit  of  granting  to  the 
enemy,  as  recorded  by  Humphreys. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  winter  of  1777,  Gen.  Putnam 
was  directed  to  take  post  at  Princeton,  where  he  re 
mained  until  the  spring. 

In  the  battle  of  Princeton,  Capt.  M'Phersort,  of  the  17th 
British  regiment,  a  very  worthy  Scotchman,  was  desperately 


220 

wounded  in  the  lungs,  and  left  with  the  dead.  Upon  Gen. 
Putnam's  arrival  there,  he  found  him  languishing  in  extreme 
distress,  without  a  surgeon,  without  a  single  accommodation, 
and  without  a  friend  to  solace  the  sinking  spirit  in  the  gloomy 
hour  of  death.  He  visited,  and  immediately  caused  every 
possible  comfort  to  be  administered  to  him.  Capt.  M'Pher- 
son,  who,  contrary  to  all  appearances,  recovered,  after  hav 
ing  demonstrated  to  Gen.  Putnam  the  dignified  sense  of  obli 
gations  which  a  generous  mind  wishes  not  10  conceal,  one 
day,  in  familiar  conversation,  demanded,  "  Pray,  sir,  what 
countryman  are  you  ?" — "  An  American,"  answered  the 
latter. — "  Not  a  Yankee  ?"  said  the  other. — "  A  full  blood 
ed  one,"  replied  the  general.  "  By  G — d,  I  am  sorry  for 
that,"  rejoined  M'Pherson,  "  I  did  not  think  there  could  be 
so  much  goodness  and  generosity  in  an  American,  or,  indeed, 
in  anybody  but  a  Scotchman." 

While  the  recovery  of  Capt.  M'Pherson  was  doubtful,  he 
desired  that  Gen.  Putnam  would  permit  a  friend  in  the  Brit 
ish  army  at  Brunswick  to  come  and  assist  him  in  making 
His  WILL.  Gen.  Putnam,  who  had  then  only  fifty  men  in 
his  whole  command,  was  sadly  embarrassed  by  the  proposi 
tion.  On  the  one  hand,  he  was  not  content  thai  a  British 
officer  should  have  an  opportunity  to  spy  out  the  weakness 
of  his  post ;  on  the  other,  it  was  scarcely  in  his  nature  to 
refuse  complying  with  a  dictate  of  humanity.  He  luckily 
bethought  himself  of  an  expedient  which  he  hastened  to  put 
in  practice.  A  flag  of  truce  was  dispatched  with  Capt. 
M'Pherson's  request,  but  under  an  injunction  not  to  return 
with  his  friend  until  after  dark.  In  the  evening  lights  were 
placed  in  all  the  rooms  of  the  college,  and  in  every  apart 
ment  of  the  vacant  houses  throughout  the  town.  During  the 
whole  night,  the  fifty  men,  sometimes  altogether,  and  some 
times  in  small  detachments,  were  marched  from  different 
quarters  by  the  house  in  which  M'Pherson  lay.  Afterwards 
it  was  known  that  the  officer  who  came  on  the  visit,  at  his 
return,  reported  that  Gen.  Putnam's  army,  upon  the  most 
moderate  calculation,  could  not  consist  of  less  than  four  or 
five  thousand  men. 

This  M'Pherson  seems  to  have  been  a  very  trouble 
some  subject,  and  probably  unreasonable  in  his  demands, 


221 

in  respect  both  to  accommodations  and  attendance;  and 
consequently  his  complaints  to  Gen.  Putnam  unfounded, 
whose  good  nature,  of  which  so  much  is  said  by  his  bio 
grapher,,  he  imposed  upon.  A  half-dozen  prisoners  like 
M'Pherson,  as  he  is  here  represented,  would  require  the 
services  of  Putnam's  whole  command  at  this  time. 

It  is  not  likely  that  the  little  finesse  of  parading  fifty 
men.  in  the  manner  stated,  had  the  least  influence  in 
deceiving  the  enemy  in  regard  to  the  number  of  men 
stationed  at  Princeton.  There  were  tories  enough 
either  there,  or  in  its  vicinity,  to  give  them  all  the  in 
telligence  desired  on  this  head.  Besides,  M'Pherson 
himself  was  doubtless  aware  of  the  paucity  of  troops 
at  this  post,  and  could  give  information  on  the  subject 
to  his  friend.  The  British  troops  then  in  Jersey  had 
gone  into  winter-quarters  at  Brunswick,  and  probably 
had  no  sufficient  inducement  to  undertake  an  expedition 
at  that  season. 

The  precaution,  however,  which  Gen.  Putnam  took 
to  prevent  his  weakness  being  discovered  by  the  enemy, 
shows  that  he  considered  the  admission  of  a  British 
officer  into  his  camp  hazardous  ;  common  prudence, 
therefore,  one  would  think,  should  have  induced  him 
not  to  permit  it,  especially  to  gratify  so  stupid  a  request 
as  that  of  M'Pherson,  and  when  the  British  were  treat 
ing  American  prisoners  with  savage  barbarity. 

MRS.  MARGARET  COGHLAN. 

The  following  sketch  of  some  circumstances  in  the 
life  of  Mrs.  Coghlan  gives  further  proofs  of  the  impru 
dent  indulgence  shown  to  the  enemy  by  Gen.  Putnam. 
The  sketch  is  copied  from  Davis's  Memoir  of  A.  Burr, 
vol.  i.,  p.  86. 

"  From  the  year  1778  to  1795,  Mrs.  Margaret  Cogh 
lan  made  no  inconsiderable  noise  in  the  court  and  fash 
ionable  circles  of  Great  Britain  and  France.  She  was 
the  theme  of  conversation  among  the  lords,  the  dukes, 
and  the  M.  P's.  Having  become  the  victim,  in  early 

19* 


222 

life,  of  licentious,  dissolute,  and  extravagant  conduct, 
alternately  she  was  reveling  in  wealth,  and  then  sunken 
in  poverty.  At  length,  in  1793,  she  published  her  own 
memoirs.  Mrs.  Coghlan  was  the  daughter. of  Maj. 
MoncriefFe,  of  the  British  army,  who  was  Lord  Corn- 
wallis's  brigade-major.  He  had  three  wives.  She  was 
a  daughter  of  the  first.  Mrs.  Coghlan  is  introduced 
here,  because  her  early  history  is  intimately  connected 
with  the  subject  of  these  memoirs. 

"  In  July,  1776,  she  resided  in  Elizabethtown,  New 
Jersey.  Her  father  was  with  Lord  Percy,  on  Staten 
Island.  In  her  memoirs,  she  says — '  Thus  destitute  of 
friends,  /  wrote  to  Gen.  Putnam,  who  instantly  answer 
ed  my  letter  by  a  very  kind  invitation  to  his  house,  as 
suring  me  that  he  respected  my  father,  and  was  only 
his  enemy  in  the  field  of  battle ;  but,  in  private  life,  he 
or  any  of  his  family  might  always  command  his  servi 
ces.  On  the  next  day  he  sent  Col.  Webb,  one  of  his 
aids-de-camp,  to  conduct  me  to  New  York.  I  was 
received  with  great  tenderness,  both  by  Mrs.  Putnam 
and  her  daughters :  and  on  the  next  day  I  was  intro 
duced  by  them  to  Geri.  and  Mrs.  Washington,  who 
likewise  made  it  their  study  to  show  me  every  mark 
of  regard.  But  /  seldom  was  allowed  to  be  alone,  al 
though  sometimes  I  found  an  opportunity  to  escape  to 
the  gallery  on  the  top  of  the  house,  where  my  chief  de 
light  was  to  view,  with  a  telescope,  our  fleet  and  army 
at  Staten  Island.  *  *  *  *  At  length,  a  flag  of 
truce  arrived  from  Staten  Island,  with  letters  from  Maj. 
Moncrieflfe,  demanding  me  ;  for  he  now  considered  me 
as  a  prisoner.  Gen.  Washington  would  not  acquiesce 
in  this  demand,  saying  /  should  remain  a  hostage  for 
my  father's  good  behavior.  I  mii&t  here  observe,  that 
when  Gen.  Washington  refused  to  deliver  me  up,  the 
noble-minded  Putnam,  as  if  it  were  by  instinct,  laid  his 
hand  on  his  sword,  and  with  a  violent  oath,  swore  that 
my  father's  request  should  be  granted.  The  command- 
er-in-chief,  whose  influence  governed  congress,  soon 


223 

prevailed  on  them  to  consider  me  as  a  person  whose 
situation  required  their  strict  attention ;  and  that  I 
might  not  escape,  they  ordered  me  to  Kingsbridge, 
where  in  justice  I  must  say,  that  I  was  treated  with  the 
utmost  tenderness.  Gen.  Mifflin  there  commanded. 
His  lady  was  a  most  accomplished,  beautiful  woman.'" 
The  letter  from  Gen.  Putnam,  of  which  Mrs.  Coghlan 
speaks,  is  found  among  the  papers  of  Col.  Burr,  and  is 
in  the  following  words : 

'"New  York,  July  26,  1776. 

"'I  should  have  answered  your  letter  sooner,  but 
had  it  not  in  my  power  to  write  you  any  thing  satis 
factory.  The  omission  of  my  title,  in  Maj.  Moncrieffe's 
letter,  is  a  matter  I  regard  not  in  the  least ;  nor  does  it 
in  any  way  influence  my  conduct  in  this  affair,  as  you 
seem  to  imagine.  Any  political  difference  alters  him 
not  to  me  in  a  private  capacity.  As  an  officer,  he  is 
my  enemy,  and  obliged  to  act  as  such,  be  his  private 
sentiments  what  they  will.  As  a  man,  I  owe  him  no 
"enmity ;  but  far  from  it  will,  with  pleasure,  do  any  kind 
office  in  my  power  for  him  or  any  of  his  connections. 

" '  I  have,  agreeably  to  your  desire,  waited  on  his 
excellency  to  endeavor  to  obtain  permission  for  you  to 

fo  to  Staten  Island.  He  informs  me,  that  Lieut.  Col. 
atterson,  who  came  with  the  last  flag,  said  he  was 
empowered  to  offer  the  exchange  of  -  -  for  Gov. 
Skeene.  And  I  am  desired  to  inform  you,  if  this  ex 
change  is  made,  you  will  have  liberty  to  pass  out  with 
Gov.  Skeene,  but  that  *io  flag  will  be  sent  solely  for 
that  purpose. 

"'Maj.  William  Livingston  was  lately  here,  and  in 
formed  me  that  you  had  an  inclination  to  live  in  this 
city,  and  that  all  the  ladies  of  your  acquaintance  having 
left  town,  and  Mrs.  Putnam  and  two  daughters  being 
here,  proposes  your  staying  with  them.  If  agreeable  to 
you,  be  assured,  miss,  you  will  be  sincerely  welcome. 
You  will,  I  think,  be  in  a  more  probable  way  of  accom- 


224 

plishing  the  end  you  wish,  that  of  seeing  your  father, 
and  may  depend 'upon  every  civility  from,  miss,  your 
obedient  servant,  ISRAEL  PUTNAM/ 

"This  letter  is  in  the  handwriting  of  Maj.  Burr,  and 
undoubtedly  prepared  by  him  for  the  signature  of  the 
general.  Miss  Moncrieffe  was  at  this  time  in  her  four 
teenth  year.  She  had  travelled,  and,  for  one  of  her 
age,  had  mingled  much  in  the  world.  She  was  accom 
plished  and  considered  handsome. 

"  Burr  perceived  immediately  that  she  was  an  extra 
ordinary  young  woman.  Eccentric  and  volatile,  but 
endowed  with  talents,  natural  as  well  as  acquired,  of  a 
peculiar  character.  Residing  in  the  family  of  Gen. 
Putnam  with  her,  and  enjoying  the  opportunity  of  a 
close  and  intimate  intercourse,  he  was  enabled  to  judge 
of  her  qualifications,  and  came  to  the  conclusion,  not 
withstanding  her  youth,  that  she  was  well  calculated 
for  a  spy,  and  thought  it  not  improbable  that  she  might 
be  employed  in  that  capacity  by  the  British.  Maj. 
Burr  suggested  his  suspicions  to  Gen.  Putnam,  and  re 
commended  that  she  be  conveyed  to  her  friends  soon 
as  might  be  convenient.  She  was  soon  after  removed 
to  Kingsbridge,  where  Gen.  Mifflin  commanded.  After 
a  short  residence  there,  leave  was  granted  for  her  de 
parture  to  Staten  Island." 

There  appears  to  have  been  a  deep-laid  scheme  by 
Maj.  Moncrieffe  for  gaining  information  of  the  condition 
of  the  American  army  by  means  of  his  daughter,  and 
Gen.  Putnam  is  pitched  upon'as  the  medium  through 
which  to  effect  the  purpose.  It  would  seem  that  Put 
nam  and  Moncrieffe  had  been  previously  acquainted, 
by  the  friendly  and  respectful  manner  in  which  the 
former  speaks  of  the  latter,  in  his  letter  to  Miss  Mon 
crieffe  ;  and  also  by  the  familiar  style  used  by  the  ma 
jor  in  reference  to  Putnam,  in  the  letter  to  his  daughter, 
to  which  allusion  is  made,  omitting  his  title.  At  any 
rate,  either  from  this  cause,  or  from  the  known  indul- 


225 

gent  character  of  Putnam,  Maj.  Moncrieffe  was  anxious 
to  have  his  daughter  placed  under  his  protection ;  and, 
by  much  shrewd  management,  the  object  was  effected. 

The  idea  held  out  by  Miss  M.  of  a  wish  to  be  con 
veyed  to  Staten  Island  was  a  sheer  finesse,  to  get  into 
the  family  of  Gen.  Putnam.  Before  her  arrival  in  New 
York,  Gen.  Washington  had  no  objection  to  her  being 
sent  to  her  father,  on  the  first  convenient  occasion  ;  but 
on  her  introduction  to  him,  he  at  once  perceived  her 
capability  of  doing  mischief,  and  that  her  father  had  a 
design  in  this  affair.  He  accordingly  ordered  her  to 
be  strictly  watched,  to  prevent  her  making  communica 
tions  to  the  enemy.  The  easy,  confiding  Gen.  Putnam 
had  no  conception  of  any  danger  from  this  source. 

Finally,  when  Maj.  Moncrieffe  found  his  plan  was 
detected,  and  that  he  could  expect  no  important  intelli 
gence  from  his  daughter,  he  makes  a  bluster  about  her 
being  retained  as  a  prisoner,  and  demands  that  she  be 
sent  to  him  at  Staten  Island.  Gen.  Washington  thought 
it,  at  the  time,  unsafe  to  permit  her  departure,  although 
he  afterwards  consented  to  it.  As  to  retaining  her  as 
"  a  hostage  for  her  father's  good  behavior,"  if  Wash 
ington  made  such  a  declaration,  it  must  have  been  in 
joke.  The  manner,  however,  in  which  Gen.  Putnam 
is  said  to  have  expressed  himself,  both  by  word  and 
action,  on  Washington's  refusal  to  accede  to  Moncrieffe's 
request,  was  supremely  ridiculous. 

THE  MILITARY  CONDUCT  OF  COL.  AARON  BURR  AND 
GEN.  PUTNAM  CONTRASTED. 

Col.  Richard  Platt,  in  a  letter  to  Com.  Valentine 
Morris,  dated  New  York,  January  27,  1814,  in  answer 
to  a  request  of  the  latter,  to  be  informed  what  was  the 
reputation  and  services  of  Col.  Burr  during  the  revolu 
tionary  war?  in  the  course  of  his  remarks,  says — "I 
must  now  present  him  [Burr]  in  contrast  with  his 
equals  in  rank,  and  his  superiors  in  command. 

"  In  September,  1777,  the  British  came  out  of  the  city 


226 

of  New  York,  on  the  west  side  of  the  Hudson  river, 
about  two  thousand  strong,  for  the  purpose  of  plunder 
ing  and  devastating  the  adjacent  country,  and  capturing 
the  public  stores.  Col.  Burr  was  with  his  regiment, 
distant  about  thirty  miles,  when  he  heard  of  the  enemy, 
and  yet  he  was  in  their  camp,  and  captured  or  destroy 
ed  their  picket-guard  before  the  next  morning.  For 
two  days  and  nights  he  never  slept.  His  regular  force 
did  not  exceed  three  hundred  men ;  but,  by  surprising 
the  British  pickets,  he  struck  consternation  into  their 
ranks,  and  they  fled  with  precipitation,  leaving  behind 
them  their  plunder  and  part  of  their  stores.  The  fol 
lowing  letters  afford  ample  details."  [An  extract  of 
one  is  here  given.] 

"  Statement  of  Judge  George  Gardner,  dated  New- 
burgh,  December  20,  1812: 

"'In  September,  1777,  the  regiment  called  Malcom's 
regiment  lay  at  Suffren's,  in  the  Clove,  under  the  com 
mand  of  Lieut.  Col.  Burr.  Intelligence  having  been 
received,  that  the  enemy  were  in  Hackensack  in  great 
force,  and  advancing  into  the  country,  Col.  Burr  imme 
diately  marched  with  the  effective  men,  except  a  guard 
to  take  care  of  the  camp.  I  understood  that  while  we 
were  on  the  march,  an  officer  arrived  express  from 
Maj.  Gen.  Putnam,  who  commanded  at  Peekskill,  re 
commending  or  ordering  Col.  Burr  to  retire  with  the 
public  stores  to  the  mountains:  to  which  Col.  Burr  re 
plied,  that  he  could  not  run  away  from  an  enemy  whom 
he  had  not  seen,  and  that  he  would  be  answerable  for 
the  public  stores  and  for  his  men.' 

"  Judge  Gardner  then  relates  the  manner  in  which 
they  proceeded,  and  surprised  the  picket-guard  of  the 
enemy,  '  most  of  whom,'  he  says,  *  were  killed.  The 
enemy,  probably  alarmed  by  these  threatening  appear 
ances,  retreated  the  next  day,  leaving  behind  them  the 
greater  part  of  the  cattle  and  plunder  they  had 
taken/" 

Col.  Platt  then  places  in  contrast,  to  this  enterprise 


227 

of  Col.  Burr,  the  conduct,  of  Gen.  Putnam,  on  a  like 
occasion.  "  On  the  east  side  of  the  Hudson,  at  Peeks- 
kill,"  he  observes,  "  was  a  major-general  of  our  army, 
with  an  effective  force  of  about  two  thousand  men. 
The  enemy  advanced,  and  our  general  retired  without 
engaging  them.  Our  barracks  and  storehouses,  and 
the  whole  village  of  Peekskill,  were  sacked  and  burnt, 
and  the  country  pillaged."  (Davis's  Mem.  A.  Burr.) 

LETTER  OF  WASHINGTON  TO  PUTNAM. 

• 

A  singular  letter  is  appended  to  Humphreys'  Life  of 
Gen.  Putnam,  addressed  to  the  latter  by  Gen.  Wash 
ington.  As  Washington  kept  copies  of  all  his  letters, 
and  as  this  is  not  found  in  Mr.  Sparks'  collection  of  his 
works,  there  is  reason  to  suspect  its  authenticity;  espe 
cially  as  Mr.  Peabody,  in  his  Life  of  Putnam,  published 
in  1839,  has  made  a  very  significant  addition  to  the 
copy  thereof  in  the  edition  of  Humphreys',  issued  in 
1818. 

The  object  of  Putnam's  letter,  to  which  this  purports 
to  be  an  answer,  seems  to  have  been  to  obtain  .the 
opinion  and  perhaps  influence  of  Washington  in  respect 
to  his  pay  when  not  in  actual  service,  of  which  the 
following  are  extracts  : 

"  Head-quarters,  3d  June,  1783. 

"DEAR  SIR — Your  favor  of  the  20th  of  May  I  received 
with  much  pleasure.  For  I  can  assure  you  that  among 
the  many  worthy  and  meritorious  officers  with  whom 
I  have  had  the  happiness  to  be  connected  in  the  ser 
vice  through  the  course  of  this  war,  and  from  whose 
cheerful  assistance  [and  advice  I  have  received  much 
support  and  confidence]  in  the  various  and  trying  vicis 
situdes  of  a  complicated  contest,  the  name  of  Putnam  is 
not  forgotten."1' 

The  passage  in  brackets  is  interpolated  by  Mr.  Pea- 
body,  a  liberty,  it  is  believed,  not  often  taken  in  a  per 
sonal  correspondence  so  near  the  time  of  its  occurrence, 


228 

whatever  may  have  been  the  case  in  ancient  polemical 
writings,  not  so  easily  detected. 

When  the  correspondence  of  these  generals,  in  the 
course  of  the  war,  is  taken  into  consideration,  it  will 
hardly  appear  credible  that  Washington  would  seri 
ously  express  himself  as  above  stated.  The  remarks, 
in  fact,  will  admit  of  a  double  sense.  Washington 
had,  indeed,  cause  on  many  accounts  not  to  forget  Put 
nam.  Among  others  may  be  mentioned  his  conduct  at 
the  battle  of  Long  Island,  and  during  his  command  on 
the  North  river,  especially  his  refusing  to*  obey  the  or 
ders  of  the  former,  by  his  accredited  aid-de-camp,  Col. 
Hamilton,  to  forward  reinforcements  to  him  at  Phila 
delphia.  "Call  you  this  backing  your  friends?"  The 
letter  contains  the  following  clause : 

"  The  secretary  at  war,  who  is  now  here,  informs 
me  that  you  have  ever  been  considered  as  entitled  to 
full  pay  since  your  absence  from  the  field,  and  that  you 
will  still  be  considered  in  that  light  until  the  close  of  the 
war ;  at  which  period  you  will  be  equally  entitled  to 
the  ^same  emoluments  of  half-pay  or  commutation  as 
other  officers  of  your  rank." 

At  the  date  of  this  letter  the  war  was  virtually  at  an 
end.  Provisional  articles  of  peace  had  been  signed  at 
Paris,  by  commissioners  appointed  for  that  purpose, 
November  the  30th,  1782  ;  and  although  the  definitive 
treaty  was  not  signed  till  the  30th  of  September,  1783, 
there  had  been  no  act  of  hostility  between  the  two  ar 
mies,  and  a  state  of  peace  actually  existed  from  the 
commencement  of  the  year  1783. 

The  complimentary  letter  of  Gen.  Washington,  there 
fore,  must  be  presumed  to  have  originated  from  a  desire 
on  his  part  to  bury  in  oblivion  all  former  causes  of  dis 
satisfaction,  and  to  cultivate  the  friendly  feelings  of  all 
those  who  had  acted  under  his  command  during  the 
revolutionary  struggle,  on  the  near  approach  of  their 
final  separation. 

And  he  probably  hoped,  by  this  conciliatory  letter, 


229 

to  abate  the  mortification  of  Gen.  Putnam  at  being  so 
long  detained  from  the  army. 

"  In  the  campaign  of  1779,"  says  Humphreys,  "which 
terminated  the  career  of  Gen.  Putnam's  services,  he 
commanded  the  Maryland  line,  posted  at  Buttermilk 
Falls,  about  two  miles  below  West  Point."  This,  by 
the  way,  was  not  a  separate  command.  The  post  was 
a  dependence  of  West  Point,  where  Washington  com 
manded  in  person  at  this  time ;  which  is  probably  the 
reason  that  Marshall  says  nothing  of  this  command. 

When  the  army  went  into  winter-quarters  at  Mor- 
ristown,  Putnam  made  a  visit  to  Connecticut,  where  he 
had  an  attack  of  paralysis  which  deprived  him  of  the 
use  of  his  limbs  on  one  side  in  a  considerable  degree. 

In  that  situation  he  has  constantly  remained,  favored  with 
such  a  portion  of  bodily  activity  as  enables  him  to  walk  and 
to  ride  moderately ;  and  retaining,  unimpaired,  his  relish  for 
enjoyment,  his  love  of  pleasantry,  his  strength  of  memory, 
and -all  the  faculties  of  his  mind.  As  a  proof  that  the  powers 
of  memory  are  not  weakened,  it  ought  to  be  observed,  that 
he  has  lately  repeated,  from  recollection,  all  the  adventures 
of  his  life,  which  are  here  recorded,  and  which  had  formerly 
been  communicated  to  the  compiler  in  detached  conversa 
tions. 

In  patient,  yet  fearless  expectation  of  the  approach  of  THE 
KING  OF  TERRORS,  whom  he  hath  full  often  faced  in  the  field 
of  blood,  the  Christian  hero  now  enjoys,  in  domestic  retire 
ment,  the  fruit  of  his  early  industry. 

The  editor  of  the  copy  here  used,  adds  : 
On  the  19th  of  May,  1790,  Putnam  ended  a  life  which  had 
been  spent  in  cultivating  and  defending  the  soil  of  his  birth. 
Much  of  his  life  had  been  spent  in  arms,  and  the  military 
of  the  neighborhood  were  desirous  that  the  rites  of  sepulture 
should  be  accompanied  with  martial  honors :  they  felt  that 
this  last  tribute  of  respect  was  due  to  a  soldier,  who,  from  a 
patriotic  love  of  country,  had  devoted  the  best  part  of  his  life 
to  the  defence  of  her  rights,  and  the  establishment  of  her  in 
dependence — and  who,  through  long  and  trying  services,  was 
never  once  reproached  for  misconduct  as  an  officer;  but  when 

20 


230 

disease  compelled  him  to  retire  from  service,  left  it,  beloved 
and  respected  by  the  army  and  his  chief,  and  with  high 
claims  to  the  grateful  remembrance  of  his  country. 

Under  these  impressions,  the  grenadiers  of  the  llth  regi 
ment,  the  independent  corps  of  artillerists,  and  the  militia 
companies  in  the  neighborhood,  assembled  each  at  their  ap 
pointed  rendezvous,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  and 
having  repaired  to  the  late  dwelling-house  of  the  deceased, 
a  suitable  escort  was  formed,  attended  by  a  procession  of 
the  Masonic  brethren  present,  and  a  large  concourse  of  re 
spectable  citizens,  which  moved  to  the  Congregational  meet 
inghouse  in  Brooklyn  ;  and,  after  divine  service  performed 
by  the  Rev.  Dr.  Whitney,  all  that  was  earthly  of  a  patriot 
and  hero  was  laid  in  the  silent  tomb,  under  the  discharge  of 
volleys  from  the  infantry,  and  minute  guns  from  the  artillery. 

An  eulogy  was  pronounced  at  the  grave  by  Dr.  A. 
Waldo  ;  who  said  of  the  defunct — 

Born  a  hero — whom  nature  taught  and  cherished  in  the 
lap  of  innumerable  toils  and  dangers,  he  was  terrible  in  bat 
tle!  But,  from  the  amiableness  of  his  heart — when  carnage 
ceased,  his  humanity  spread  over  the  field,  like  the  refresh 
ing  zephyrs  of  a  summer's  evening  ! — The  prisoner — the 
wounded — the  sick — the  forlorn — experienced  the  delicate 
sympathy  of  this  SOLDIER'S  PILLAR. — The  poor,  and  the 
needy,  of  every  description,  received  the  charitable  bounties 

of  this  CHRISTIAN  SOLDIER. 

He  pitied  littleness — loved  goodness — admired  greatness, 
and  ever  aspired  to  its  glorious  summit !  The  friend,  the 
servant,  and  almost  unparalleled  lover  of  his  country ;  worn 
with  honorable  age,  and  the  former  toils  of  war — PUTNAM  ! 
"  Rests  from  his  labors." 

Mr.  Peabody  closes  his  Life  of  Putnam  as  follows  : 
"  It  only  remains  for  us  to  say  a  few  words  respecting 
the  military  and  personal  character  of  one,  whose  his 
tory  we  have  thus  attempted  to  delineate.  His  quali 
ties  as  a  soldier  are  already  apparent  to  the  reader. 
Under  all  circumstances,  however  critical,  he  was  per 
fectly  fearless  and  self-possessed,  and  full  of  the  most 
active  energy  and  resource  at  the  time  when  they  were 


231 

most  urgently  required.  No  man  could  surpass  him  in 
the  fiery  charge,  of  which  the  success  depends  so  much 
upon  the  leader ;  in  this  respect  he  reminds  the  reader 
of  Murat,  the  gallant  marshal  of  Napoleon  ;  nor  would 
the  general  feeling  deny  him  the  proud  title,  by  which 
another  of  those  marshals  was  distinguished,  that  of  the 
bravest  of  the  brave,"  [Marshal  Ney.] 

Notwithstanding  all  that  is  here  said,  it  is  in  vain  we 
search  the  histories  of  the  American  revolutionary  war 
for  a  single  fiery  charge  of  Putnam ;  where  he  gained 
a  victory,  or  even  fought  a  battle.  And  as  to  his  feats 
in  the  French  war,  the  reader  is  now  enabled  to  form 
a  just  estimate  of  their  value. 

Without  attributing  the  effect  of  magical  delusion 
operating  upon  the  public  mind,  it  is  difficult  to  account 
for  the  universal  opinion  entertained  of  the  character 
of  Putnam  so  contrary  to  that  which  he  exhibited 
through  the  whole  course  of  his  life.  All  was  bluster 
and  bravado,  without  corresponding  action  to  support 
his  pretensions.  Gen.  Putnam,  however,  must  have 
possessed  much  ingenuity  and  tact  to  have  acquired 
the  fame  of  a  great  warrior  without  subjecting  himself 
to  the  personal  hazards  usually  required  for  that  pur 
pose.  As  to  his  patriotism,  let  the  reader  judge.  FIAT 
JUSTICIA. 


THE    END. 


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